People v. Velazquez

2026 IL App (5th) 240977-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: March 5, 2026
• Docket: 5-24-0977
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE 2026 IL App (5th) 240977-U NOTICE Decision filed 03/05/26. The This order was filed under text of this decision may be NO. 5-24-0977 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is changed or corrected prior to the filing of a Petition for not precedent except in the

Rehearing or the disposition of IN THE limited circumstances allowed the same. under Rule 23(e)(1). APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIFTH DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Vermilion County. ) v. ) No. 20-CM-71 ) HECTOR VELAZQUEZ, ) Honorable ) Karen E. Wall, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE McHANEY delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Cates and Justice Hackett concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: Defendant’s conviction is reversed and the cause remanded to the trial court for further proceedings where there was not a valid waiver of the right to a jury trial by the defendant.

¶2 The defendant, Hector Velazquez, was found guilty of unlawful possession of cannabis

following a stipulated bench trial. He was sentenced to 12 months of court supervision. On direct

appeal, the defendant contends that his constitutional right to a jury trial was violated when he was

not admonished of the consequences of waiving that right. The State concedes that error occurred

and that there was no valid jury waiver by the defendant.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 On February 4, 2020, the defendant was charged by information with one count of

possession of cannabis, more than 30 grams, but less than 100 grams, a Class A misdemeanor. The 1 charge stemmed from the defendant being a passenger in a vehicle that was stopped by Danville

police officer Kyle Butcher. As part of the traffic stop, the defendant was searched, and cannabis

was discovered on his person.

¶5 On February 23, 2024, defense counsel filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained

from the traffic stop, arguing the stop was prolonged beyond what was reasonably required to

complete the purpose of the stop. The trial court denied the motion to suppress. Defense counsel

filed a motion to reconsider, which was also denied.

¶6 On June 10, 2024, the trial court called the matter for a jury pretrial hearing. The defendant

was present via Zoom, and his counsel was present in person. The trial court inquired about the

status of the case. Defense counsel responded and stated,

“Your Honor, I have received an offer from the State today, which I will be discussing later

with my client. However, I was anticipated [sic] today that we would simply set this matter

for a stipulated bench trial, realizing of course that that date may not be needed given the

offer that was made.”

The defendant was not advised on the record by the trial court or by defense counsel regarding

waiving his right to a jury trial and proceeding with a bench trial.

¶7 The trial court scheduled a bench trial for June 21, 2024, but the defendant failed to check

in on Zoom at that time, so the matter was reset for a bench trial on August 9, 2024. The trial court

conducted a stipulated bench trial on August 9, 2024, with the defendant appearing by Zoom. The

defendant was found guilty and, on the same day, sentenced to 12 months of court supervision and

a $75 fine and court costs.

2 ¶8 II. ANALYSIS

¶9 The defendant raises two issues on appeal; however, we need only address the defendant’s

claim regarding the waiver of his right to a jury trial. The State confessed error on this issue, and

we find the confession to be well taken.

¶ 10 “The right to a trial by jury is a fundamental right guaranteed by our federal and state

constitutions.” People v. Bracey, 213 Ill. 2d 265, 269 (2004). A defendant may waive the right to

a jury trial, but to be valid, the waiver must be knowingly and understandingly made. Id.

¶ 11 Generally, a jury waiver made by defense counsel in open court in the defendant’s presence

and without objection from the defendant is a valid waiver. People v. Johnson, 2019 IL App (1st)

162517, ¶ 14. “For a waiver to be effective, the court need not impart to defendant any set

admonition or advice.” Bracey, 213 Ill. 2d at 270. “A determination of whether a jury waiver is

valid cannot rest on any precise formula but depends on the facts and circumstances of each

particular case.” In re R.A.B., 1 197 Ill. 2d 358, 364 (2001). Rather, the determination turns on

“whether the waiving defendant understood that his case would be decided by a judge and not a

jury.” People v. Reed, 2016 IL App (1st) 140498, ¶ 7. The defendant’s prior interactions with the

criminal justice system, or lack thereof, can be considered by a reviewing court when determining

whether a jury waiver was knowingly made. Johnson, 2019 IL App (1st) 162517, ¶ 14. “We review

whether defendant knowingly waived his right to a jury trial de novo.” Reed, 2016 IL App (1st)

140498, ¶ 7.

¶ 12 In the present case, defense counsel advised the court that an offer had been received from

the State, but as a matter of scheduling, asked the court to set a stipulated bench trial. However, at

1 R.A.B. was abrogated on other grounds by the supreme court’s decision in In re Destiny P., 2017 IL 120796, ¶ 14 n.1, on the basis that it incorrectly referred to a juvenile’s right to a jury trial as a fundamental right when the source of that right is statutory and not constitutional. Despite this, courts still find R.A.B. instructive in that it sets forth the manner in which to review an invalid jury-waiver claim. 3 no point did defense counsel waive the right to a jury trial on the defendant’s behalf, nor did the

defendant sign a written jury waiver. Additionally, the present case was the defendant’s first

experience with the criminal justice system. As the supreme court noted in R.A.B., “vague

references to a stipulated bench trial by [defendant’s] attorney, the prosecutor, and the circuit court

[are] insufficient to constitute a valid jury waiver.” R.A.B., 197 Ill. 2d at 367.

¶ 13 The State concedes that the references in the instant case were insufficient to constitute a

valid jury waiver in open court. We agree and find that the defendant did not knowingly and

voluntarily waive his right to a jury trial before proceeding to a stipulated bench trial. Accordingly,

we reverse the defendant’s conviction and remand the matter to the trial court so the defendant

may be admonished of his right to a jury trial and make a knowing decision about whether to

proceed with a stipulated bench trial.

¶ 14 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 15 For the foregoing reasons, the defendant’s conviction is reversed, and the matter is

remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.

¶ 16 Reversed and remanded.