2025 IL App (1st) 230449 No. 1-23-0449 Opinion filed August 29, 2025 Sixth Division ______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________ THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County. ) v. ) No. 18 CR 06600 01 ) JORGE VELAZQUEZ, ) The Honorable ) Gregory Paul Vasquez, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.
JUSTICE HYMAN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Justices C.A. Walker and Gamrath concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 The trial judge holds considerable power over the courtroom. With this authority comes
the obligation to embody fairness, maintain neutrality, and exercise restraint. Jorge Velazquez
contends that the judge overseeing his bench trial abandoned each of these obligations. We agree.
¶2 Velazquez first argues that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he
committed predatory criminal sexual assault of a child. We find that a rational trier of fact could
have reasonably concluded that Velazquez was guilty. ¶3 Next, Velazquez asserts that the trial judge engaged in judicial misconduct. A thorough
review of the record leads us to the conclusion that the judge acted arbitrarily and capriciously,
resulting in a fundamentally unfair verdict. Rather than preside from the bench, he sat in the jury
box throughout the trial, posed hundreds of questions to the witnesses, and often stood close to
them while they testified. More troubling, mid-trial, he suggested that key defense witnesses
seemed to be lying.
¶4 A conviction may be supported by sufficient evidence and still demand reversal if the trial
was not fairly conducted. That is not a contradiction. The law asks two distinct questions: Was
there enough evidence to convict, and was the trial officiated with the fairness our system requires?
The first speaks to proof; the second, to process. A defendant is entitled to a neutral judge who
conducts the proceedings with impartiality, dignity, and respect for the boundaries of judicial
authority.
¶5 A judge is duty-bound to remain impartial and allow both sides to be heard without
disrupting the balance the law requires. Justice is undone when a judge denies the “necessary
incident of a fair trial.” See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 52 (1932). No conviction, however
supported, can undo what the United States and Illinois Constitutions guarantee every criminal
defendant: a fair chance to be heard. We reverse and remand for a new trial.
¶6 BACKGROUND
¶7 Bench Trial
¶8 The State accused Jorge Velazquez of committing predatory criminal sexual assault of a
child (720 ILCS 5/11-1.40(a)(1) (West 2018)). The State presented the complaining witness and a
propensity witness, both of whom were his now-adult nieces. (We will refer to them by their
-2- initials, consistent with custom. People v. Munoz-Salgado, 2016 IL App (2d) 140325, ¶ 1 n.1). The
defense presented Velazquez and six others, including family members and a friend.
¶9 Throughout the bench trial, the judge presided from the jury box. After the trial, he
explained that he makes it a “practice to sit in the jury box and watch the witness testify.” But he
did not stay seated. “I made it a point, rather than sitting on the bench, to look at the witnesses and
evaluate their demeanor. I came down off the bench and stood right in front of them, every single
witness.” During the trial, he did not explain his movements on the record.
¶ 10 Testimony of V.S.
¶ 11 V.S. testified that, in 2018, she told the police how her uncle, Velazquez, had sexually
assaulted her when she was a child. Velazquez was born in 1971, and V.S. was born in 1995. She
described two assaults during the summer of 2002, while Velazquez did mechanical work with her
dad in the garage, and a third incident, an attempted assault at a family gathering, about four or
five years later.
¶ 12 During the first assault, V.S. stood at the edge of her bed playing with dolls when
Velazquez appeared. He pulled down her underwear, raised her skirt, and inserted his finger into
her vagina twice. They said nothing to one another. V.S. prayed her father would walk in because
he would know what was happening.
¶ 13 During the second assault, weeks later, Velazquez again entered V.S.’s bedroom, pulled
down her underwear, and inserted his finger into her vagina once. It caused V.S. pain and upset
and terrified her. But she did not understand what happened, did not tell her parents, and did not
“show any or symptoms that [she] was in pain at that time.”
-3- ¶ 14 The third incident occurred during a family party at Velazquez’s home when V.S. was age
12 or 13. Velazquez tried pulling V.S. close to him as she walked by in the living room. V.S.
resisted. They said nothing to one another. V.S. “pushed back” because she had learned about
sexual assault through a school program. She did not tell her parents, feeling that they would not
believe her, and worrying that she would no longer be close to Velazquez’s sons.
¶ 15 On cross-examination, V.S. agreed when asked by counsel whether this incident was years
later, and then also agreed with the trial judge that she was “slightly older” at the time of the third
incident.
¶ 16 V.S. testified that she disclosed the third incident to her best friend. Years later, after going
on her first date, she disclosed the assaults to her mother, but they did not go to the police, fearing
family fallout. Finally, in 2018, V.S.’s mother shared V.S.’s account after hearing that a young
family member of Velazquez’s and a 20-something cousin (J.C.) had accused Velazquez of assault.
Soon after, V.S. spoke with the police on multiple occasions and described three to six instances
of penetration.
¶ 17 During V.S.’s direct examination, the trial court posed 14 questions across 14 pages of
transcript, some asking V.S. to repeat herself, but most seeking new information. During cross-
examination, the trial court asked 88 questions across 28 pages of transcript, primarily seeking
responses about the incidents, the disclosures (hers and others), and the family dynamics before
the assault accusation.
¶ 18 For example, V.S. continued to attend holidays and gatherings about two to three times a
year and never missed one. She remained close with one of Velazquez’s sons and wanted his
family to live closer to her. She still spoke to Velazquez and politely interacted with him but never
-4- hugged or kissed when greeting him. She or her parents asked him to be a godfather for her
quinceañera, meaning he had helped fund the party and posed for a photo with him and the family.
She acknowledged that, more recently, her husband received money from him.
¶ 19 Propensity Evidence
¶ 20 J.C. testified that she told the police how her uncle, Velazquez, sexually assaulted her when
she was a child, 10 years after the assaults V.S. described. J.C. lived with her family on the second
floor of a dwelling in which Velazquez’s family lived in the basement and other relatives on the
first floor. J.C. testified that Velazquez touched her “inappropriately” “at least five times” and
described two assaults in detail. Both occurred in the basement when J.C. was 12 years old.
¶ 21 During the first assault, J.C. was watching S.G., then an infant, while Velazquez’s wife
showered and Velazquez’s sons were in their room. Velazquez arrived, saw J.C. with S.G. in the
living room, and touched her vagina while saying nothing. She pushed his hand away. He touched
her nipple and squeezed her breast. He stopped when his wife appeared. J.C. excused herself and
cried upstairs. She told no one, fearing family fallout.
¶ 22 The second assault occurred while J.C. was doing laundry in the basement. Velazquez
appeared and rubbed her vagina over her clothes. He said nothing. J.C. picked up her laundry
basket and tried to walk upstairs. Velazquez grabbed the basket, put it to the side, and grabbed her
leg. That caused her legs to separate, and Velazquez placed his hand down the front of her shorts
and touched her again. J.C. grabbed her basket, ran upstairs, and cried. She told no one, still fearing
family fallout. She would continue to hug Velazquez to greet him but would not kiss him.
-5- ¶ 23 J.C. testified that she disclosed these incidents to her mother six years later and that S.G.,
then five, had just accused Velazquez of touching her. S.G. had been crying while getting dressed
to go home, and J.C. took S.G. to the basement to speak. Later, J.C. spoke with the police.
¶ 24 During J.C.’s testimony, the trial court asked about 79 questions, primarily seeking
substantive responses. Most of those occurred on cross-examination as the court sought responses
about the incidents, J.C.’s and S.G.’s disclosures, and the family dynamics preceding the assault
accusation. (Cross-examination covered 16 pages.) In short, J.C. had been close to Velazquez and
his family but not since 2018 when these accusations arose.
¶ 25 Despite the State’s use of S.G.’s statements at trial, the trial court did not hold a hearing
under section 115-10.1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/115-10.1(b) (West
2022)) on their reliability.
¶ 26 Defense
¶ 27 The defense called Velazquez, family members, and a friend of Velazquez’s. The trial
judge asked about 96 questions of defense witnesses, primarily seeking substantive responses. The
judge noted pauses on the record when some witnesses testified but not when he approached them.
(Later, when delivering the verdict, the judge described approaching all the witnesses but not the
number of times or when.) Velazquez denied V.S.’s and J.C.’s accusations and, like the other
defense witnesses, described the family dynamics before the confrontation.
¶ 28 Ivana Rosales grew up with V.S. Her mother is V.S.’s cousin. Rosales recalled going to a
theme park with V.S., V.S.’s boyfriend, and others when V.S. was 13 or 14 years old. V.S. and her
boyfriend held hands, kissed, and hugged at the park.
-6- ¶ 29 Mario Castillo (Castillo) also grew up with V.S. He and V.S. are cousins. He recalled that
at family gatherings, either at her grandma’s home or V.S.’s home, V.S. would act the same with
Velazquez as with others when greeting them, either by hugging them or shaking their hand. But
he never saw Velazquez and V.S. hug and kiss. During this testimony, the trial judge put on the
record a “significant pause” during Castillo’s testimony.
¶ 30 Norma Juarez knew the family for 20 years and was a friend of Velazquez’s. Juarez met
V.S. at family parties around the time V.S. was six years old. She also met J.C. around that time.
Counsel asked Juarez if she recalled how V.S. acted toward Velazquez “after she was *** six years
of age,” and the State objected, insisting on a more specific time range. The trial court sustained
and stated, “The reason the Court is pausing is because the witness is pausing as if—give me the
impression obliged to answer.” Juarez then recalled V.S. hugging and kissing Velazquez to greet
him at a family party as a 12- or 13-year-old.
¶ 31 Ivan Garcia grew up with V.S. and J.C., his cousins. He is a son of Velazquez. Counsel
asked Garcia about going to the park as a child with his dad, J.C., and others; the State objected to
the relevance. The trial court overruled the objection, stating “[T]he impression is that you’re
pulling teeth out of the witness and frankly putting words in the [witness’] mouth.” Counsel then
noted how the timeline of the accusations was open-ended. The trial court replied in part, “I let
everything in and I sift through it [at a bench trial].” The court noted it disliked the pace of
counsel’s questioning, “When it’s coming out in a constrained fashion where the witnesses are
silent for a long period of time, and they’re looking over at the defendant or someone at the defense
counsel table as if they want to get answers[.]”
-7- ¶ 32 Garcia testified that, throughout childhood summers, Velazquez would take him, J.C., and
their respective siblings to the park several times a week. He recalled that J.C. would tease, hug,
kiss, and pinch Velazquez at family parties. He also recalled how Velazquez would drive him and
J.C. home from shifts at a restaurant job they held after Garcia graduated from high school.
¶ 33 Ana Martinez, a friend of Velazquez’s wife, was expected to testify that S.G. denied the
accusations that Velazquez assaulted her. But the State objected to the relevance of Martinez’s
testimony, and the trial court sustained the objection, labeling the notion that her testimony could
be used to impeach J.C.’s account of confronting S.G. as “extremely disingenuous.”
¶ 34 Laura Castillo (Laura), Velazquez’s wife, testified that V.S. approached them when she
was 14 years old to be her godparents (“padrinos,” a designation under the Catholic faith which
commits them to raise V.S. if her parents passed away). Laura further testified that V.S. asked
them for a $1,500 loan in 2017, which they provided and she never repaid.
¶ 35 When counsel inquired whether V.S.’s mother had hired a babysitter around the time of
the assaults described by V.S., the State objected. The judge overruled the objection, stating, “I’m
going to allow it in. But not if it’s going to take so long. The pauses between questions is [sic]
killing me because of the time span. It’s appearing as though something is being contrived as we
speak. So I’m trying to avoid that.” Laura answered by stating that V.S. had a babysitter (her
brother’s wife) living in the basement.
¶ 36 Laura also testified that she never asked J.C. to babysit S.G. and that Velazquez was S.G.’s
primary caretaker when S.G. was an infant.
¶ 37 Laura agreed that, since the confrontation in 2018, the family’s relations had fractured. She
does not allow S.G. to speak with J.C., and she no longer speaks with V.S., J.C., or her sisters.
-8- ¶ 38 Velazquez denied the accusations against him. Regarding V.S., he denied touching in a
sexual manner, entering her room, and using her family’s bathroom while working with V.S.’s
father. (He testified they would use a bucket to urinate while working on cars in the garage and
that he would only go inside with V.S.’s father.) Velazquez recalled V.S. being at home with her
babysitter during those summer days. At family parties and in his house, V.S. would greet him
with a kiss and a hug, which he accepted, although he was not accustomed to these gestures. V.S.
would play with Velazquez’s children. As a teenager, she asked him and his wife to be her
godparents, and as an adult, she asked them for a loan, which they provided.
¶ 39 As for J.C., Velazquez denied touching her sexually and denied that he ever saw her
babysitting S.G. while his wife showered. He described J.C. as a playful and affectionate child
who sometimes hugged and kissed him.
¶ 40 Verdict
¶ 41 In closing, the parties focused on witness credibility. The State noted how upset J.C. was
while testifying, stressing that the trial court “saw” her “trembling” and weeping on the stand.
¶ 42 The trial court found Velazquez guilty of predatory criminal sexual assault of V.S.,
stressing its “opportunity to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses.”
“I have heard the girls [V.S. and J.C.] testify. And, frankly, I believe them. It was
certainly clear from their demeanor, their demeanor on in some instances was getting upset,
which is understandable. But they still get upset years later, which some people would say
is very consistent with this type of assault.
I made it a point rather than sitting on the bench to look at the witnesses and
evaluate their demeanor. I came down off the bench and stood right in front of them, every
-9- single witness. Including the defendant who sat in and [sic] jury box at times. I stood right
in front of each witness at times. When there was a long pause—which I never noted for
the record, I began to question the witness as almost to imply that there was an invitation
for somebody to ask something.
In short, I found no motive for these witnesses, State witnesses, to testify falsely.
The defendant did testify. And when the defendant does testify, he places his
credibility in issue.
I have determined from viewing his testimony that defendant is not credible, nor
were many of his witnesses.”
¶ 43 Posttrial
¶ 44 Velazquez moved for a new trial, arguing in part that the trial court erred by questioning
the defense witnesses in a manner that “intimidated”—“by leaving the bench and standing [three]
to [four] feet in front of [them].” He called Castillo, Juarez, and Laura to testify.
¶ 45 Castillo testified that the trial court came within “a couple feet” of him as he testified. A
paned glass, installed as a Covid protocol, separated them. Castillo stated, “I don’t know if he was
trying to intimidate me for something, but he was really close as [counsel was] asking questions.
I felt a little bit intimidated.” Castillo noted that the trial court had not presided from the bench
throughout the trial.
¶ 46 Without objection, the trial court inquired of Castillo. During that inquiry, the court
directed Castillo to look at counsel’s face and answer whether he could see the judge’s face while
he (presumably) sat on the bench. Castillo said he could not see the judge’s face. The trial court
then asked, “Sometimes I got off the jury box when you were talking softly, right?” Castillo began
- 10 - to respond, saying, “Most of the time when I was being asked a question, you were right in front
of me - -.” The court interjected, “Did it change your testimony? True or false?” Castillo replied,
“That did not change my testimony.”
¶ 47 The trial court began to inquire of counsel while Castillo remained on the stand. The court
asked, “[Counsel,] [s]o you want to establish for the record that I was in front of him, yes?”
Counsel agreed. When counsel also confirmed that the court could better see and hear Castillo
from wherever it chose to sit or stand during trial, the court stated, “So you have established that.”
The court then directed counsel to call the next witness.
¶ 48 Juarez recalled that the trial judge initially sat in the jury box and moved closer during her
testimony. This “intimidated” her because she “thought that he *** was going to think [she] was
lying.” After counsel finished questioning her, the trial court asked whether she could see his face
while looking at counsel. She replied, “No,” agreeing that either the trial court would have had to
ask her to face him, or he would have to leave the bench if he was to see her face while she testified.
She agreed that she thought the court got in the jury box to determine her credibility. When the
court asked if that is why she became nervous, she testified, “When you got close to me, yes.”
¶ 49 Laura recalled feeling “nervous” because the judge sat in the jury box as she testified. The
judge asked her no questions.
¶ 50 The trial court found that no witness testified to having “said something different” because
of his actions, only that they were “nervous” which “would never be a basis for a *** new trial.”
The trial court also faulted the “architectural style” of the courtroom for having to preside off the
bench during trial. He suggested that he typically presided this way.
- 11 - “So it’s my practice, especially whether the case hinges, especially when the case
hinges on credibility; it’s my practice to sit in the jury box and watch the witness testify.
And if I’m having trouble hearing the witness, I’ll get up close enough to hear every
single word the witness testifies to. I do not want any word to escape my examination.
If I didn’t understand something the witness said, I’ll make sure that I clarify in a
bench trial setting where I am the one who has to determine credibility.
I did realize early on this that was a case that involved the determination of
credibility. And so, I particularly made that decision that I should, at least, have the vantage
point that a juror would have. So I—that is why I placed myself in a position that I did.
Not one witness got up here and testified that oh, I was so intimidated, I said
something different.
So the important testimony leaves something to be desired. But in any event, that’s
why that was done.”
¶ 51 The trial court denied a new trial and later sentenced Velazquez to six years in prison.
¶ 52 ANALYSIS
¶ 53 Velazquez contends (i) the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he sexually
assaulted V.S. and (ii) the trial court engaged in judicial misconduct on several grounds.
¶ 54 Sufficiency of the Evidence
¶ 55 Velazquez argues the State failed to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt because no
rational trier of fact could conclude that he sexually assaulted V.S. when she was seven years old.
We disagree.
- 12 - ¶ 56 Someone who is 17 years or older commits predatory criminal sexual assault by sexually
penetrating someone who is less than 13 years old. E.g., 720 ILCS 5/11-1.40(a)(1) (West 2018)
(defining charged offense of predatory criminal sexual assault). We assess the proof in the light
most favorable to the State and ask whether a rational trier of fact could have found the elements
beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Collins, 106 Ill. 2d 237, 262 (1985).
¶ 57 The parties agreed Velazquez was older than 17 during the relevant time. And V.S.’s
testimony tracked the statute’s elements. V.S. described how, on two days, Velazquez inserted his
finger into her vagina when she was around seven years old, after leaving the garage where
Velazquez was working with her father and finding her alone in her room. Velazquez contends
V.S.’s testimony was “extreme[ly] vague[ ].” We disagree. Her testimony established the how
(finger to vagina), when (summertime, age seven), who (Velazquez), and where (in her childhood
room) of the charged offense, not once but twice.
¶ 58 A rational trier of fact could have concluded that Velazquez, a trusted family member in a
position of authority over V.S., sexually assaulted her. People v. Duplessis,
248 Ill. App. 3d 195, 199-200 (1993) (“In sexual assault cases involving family relationships, the
victim’s credibility is not lessened if there is no immediate outcry.”). The State had no special
burden to present bystander accounts, physical evidence, or other corroboration, as Velazquez
appears to demand. People v. Gray, 2017 IL 120958, ¶ 36 (“The testimony of a single witness is
sufficient to convict if the testimony is positive and credible, even where it is contradicted by the
defendant.”). And V.S.’s testimony need not be free from inconsistency, as if preserved in amber
from the sweep of time and its effect on memory. Gray, 2017 IL 120958, ¶ 47 (“[E]ven
- 13 - contradictory testimony does not necessarily destroy the credibility of a witness, and it is the task
of the trier of fact to determine when, if at all, she testified truthfully.”).
¶ 59 V.S. consistently described at least three acts of sexual penetration, and drawing reasonable
inferences in the State’s favor, we find no inconsistency that renders V.S.’s account incredible or
improbable. See id. (“Minor discrepancies in testimony affect only its weight and will not render
it unworthy of belief.”). That one witness testified to the presence of a babysitter does not preclude
a finding that Velazquez’s assaults happened while that babysitter was absent. And that V.S.
remained close with her cousins, especially Velazquez’s sons, does not preclude finding that
Velazquez assaulted her. On the contrary, the significance of those friendships is a basis for
rationally inferring why V.S. might have remained quiet about what happened. Duplessis,
248 Ill. App. 3d at 199-200 (recognizing unique dynamic of familial relationships as rational basis
for delaying outcry).
¶ 60 So, too, does her inexperience at seven years old. See generally People v. Bowen,
183 Ill. 2d 103, 115 (1998) (noting, “the very young, often lack the cognitive or language skills to
effectively communicate instances of abuse at trial *** or may be impeded psychologically in their
efforts to do so”). V.S. testified that, during the first and second assaults, she did not understand
what Velazquez was doing. Only years later, after a school program, did she realize what he was
attempting during the third incident and tell her best friend. Given her age at that time, V.S.’s
recollection echoed J.C.’s testimony about Velazquez assaulting her around that age. See generally
People v. Smart, 2025 IL 130127, ¶ 72 (discussing permissibility of propensity inferences in this
context).
- 14 - ¶ 61 To be sure, Velazquez fairly attacks V.S.’s credibility, for example, by pointing to
testimony, including his own, that V.S. remained affectionate with him at family parties, as he
became her padrino at her quinceañera, and giving her and her husband a loan. Likewise,
Velazquez stresses how witnesses described J.C. as affectionate toward Velazquez while playing
at the park, attending events with the Velazquez family, and hitching a ride home from work after
shifts with his son. But none of this reaches the high bar of “compel[ling] the conclusion that no
reasonable person could accept [Velazquez’s guilt] beyond a reasonable doubt.”
People v. Cunningham, 212 Ill. 2d 274, 280 (2004). The nature of the crime, V.S.’s young age,
and her family’s dynamics undermine the idea, explicit in Velazquez’s argument, that V.S. (or
J.C.) should have “overtly despise[d]” her uncle or that she (or J.C.) had an “unusually affectionate
relationship” with Velazquez despite his sexual abuse.
¶ 62 We reject any suggestion that victims of family sexual abuse react, or avoid reacting, in a
particular way. That witnesses described V.S. showing physical affection to boys in her teenage
years does not preclude a finding that physical affection during her first date led her to disclose to
her mother what happened when she was a child. See In re M.G., 2024 IL App (1st) 232106, ¶ 29
(recognizing fear, shame, and guilt as motives to remain silent about sexual abuse within families).
¶ 63 Our task is narrow. See Collins, 106 Ill. 2d at 261-62 (stating standard). We hold that the
trial record contains sufficient evidence that, when viewed in a light most favorable to the State,
rationally supports the finding that V.S. was credible and, thus, Velazquez guilty.
¶ 64 Judicial Misconduct
¶ 65 Velazquez contends that the trial judge dominated the witnesses and proceedings to render
the verdict fundamentally unfair. We agree.
- 15 - ¶ 66 A fair trial is fundamental to every criminal prosecution. People v. Williams,
124 Ill. 2d 300, 308 (1988). To that end, the United States and the Illinois Constitution guarantee
due process and equal justice under the law. See U.S. Const., amend. XIV;
Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 2. Due process is a guarantee that the trial court will “ ‘hold the balance
nice, clear and true between the State and the accused.’ ” Williams, 124 Ill. 2d at 308 (quoting
Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927)). Likewise, equal justice guarantees a trial consistent
with the rules of evidence and procedure and free of bias in an open pursuit of the truth. See id.
¶ 67 Our constitutional design entrusts the trial court to preside with restraint, consistent with
these foundational constraints. Id. The parties’ dispute centers on the way the judge exercised this
discretion, including its extensive questioning of witnesses and its findings of fact. A trial court
that acts without the restraint required of it abuses its discretion and must be reversed. See
People v. Holland, 2023 IL App (4th) 220384, ¶¶ 42-44 (discussing standard of review).
¶ 68 Before reaching the merits, however, we consider and reject the State’s contention that
Velazquez forfeited review of this issue by not objecting at trial. The State acknowledges that
judicial misconduct is a proper basis for relaxing the appellate rule that a defendant must both
object at trial and include his objections in a posttrial motion. See generally People v. Sprinkle,
27 Ill. 2d 398, 401 (1963) (creating relevant exception to forfeiture rule). No duty to object exists
if that objection “ ‘would have fallen on deaf ears.’ ” People v. McLaurin, 235 Ill. 2d
478, 488 (2009) (quoting People v. Davis, 378 Ill. App. 3d 1, 10 (2007)).
¶ 69 The record gives no hint that the trial court would have behaved differently in response to
an objection. The judge described as his “practice” presiding from the jury box and physically
approaching witnesses as they answered questions. He often commandeered the questioning, both
- 16 - during trial and after, even cutting short Castillo’s posttrial testimony. He described witness
demeanor as critical to the finding of guilt but “never *** a basis” for a new trial. In short, the
judge created “extraordinary circumstances” calling for us to relax the ordinary rules of forfeiture.
See McLaurin, 235 Ill. 2d at 488.
¶ 70 Velazquez contends the trial court abused its discretion by (i) impeding counsel’s
examination of witnesses, (ii) abandoning its role as a neutral arbiter, and (iii) failing to consider
its own intimidating behavior when relying on witness demeanor to find guilt. The State responds
that the court (i) probed for the truth, rather than provoke responses, (ii) clarified disputed issues,
rather than confront witnesses, and (iii) reached a verdict after a full and fair consideration of the
evidence. We carefully reviewed the record and reject the State’s characterizations.
¶ 71 We begin by noting that, like us, neither party has found a case where the trial court has
described as its “practice” presiding from the jury box or a judge approaching testifying witnesses
like an attorney. While the trial court enjoys broad discretion to preside as circumstances require
and the law permits (see Williams, 124 Ill. 2d at 308), the trial court abused that discretion by
conducting the entire trial from the jury box, and well alongside the parties, and by blurring the
line between neutral arbiter and engaged participant.
¶ 72 Even conduct not barred by a specific rule may be improper. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 63, Canon 3
(eff. Dec. 3, 2005). (stating, in canon then in effect, that judge “should be patient, dignified, and
courteous to litigants, jurors, witnesses, [and] lawyers ***.”). The layout of the courtroom is
intentional, separating the decision-maker from the advocates, and symbolic, reinforcing the
solemn divide between the adversarial process and the judge’s role as adjudicator. See, e.g., People
v. Mpulamasaka, 2016 IL App (2d) 130703, ¶¶ 113-118 (error for prosecutor to sit in witness stand
- 17 - while arguing to jury complainant was credible, even absent defense objection). The prosecution
(or plaintiff) and the defense are equally positioned from the bench, allowing both sides to observe
the judge readily. The trial judge must re-enforce that balance by “tak[ing] steps to avoid the
appearance that he or she is partial to the [prosecution] or to the defense.” Mpulamasaka, 2016 IL
App (2d) 130703, ¶ 116 (error for trial judge to allow State to argue from witness stand).
¶ 73 Both parties acknowledge the extraordinary number of questions the judge asked witnesses
during the lawyers’ examinations. See generally People v. Cofield, 9 Ill. App. 3d 1048, 1050,
(1973) (trial court has power to “question witnesses in order to elicit truth or bring enlightenment
on material issues which seem obscure”). By our count, the court asked 277 questions of which
217 sought information and 60 asked witnesses to repeat themselves. 200 of the 277 questions
(72%) occurred during Velazquez’s counsel’s examination of witnesses.
¶ 74 But the State also gives short shrift to the judge’s cascade of questions consistently coming
from a few feet in front of the witnesses in the area reserved for counsel, a departure as unthinkable
as a lawyer taking the bench to examine witnesses. And the State contends the volume of questions
is less significant than their nature, asserting that the trial court’s questioning was not “coupled
with hostile remarks” and did not “indicate its opinion of the witnesses’ testimony.” See Cofield,
9 Ill. App. 3d at 1050 (finding error at bench trial where court assumed role of judge and
prosecutor). Sometimes that may be true, but here the record refutes the State’s portrayal that the
court withheld judgment. Amid the trial, the judge repeatedly disparaged the defense witnesses,
for example, at one point describing them as “looking over at the defendant or someone at the
defense counsel table as if they want to get answers.”
- 18 - ¶ 75 The trial court likewise focused on specific witnesses. During Juarez’s testimony, the court
said he was “pausing” in response Juarez’s apparent need for a cue from counsel about what she
was “obliged” to say. During Garcia’s testimony, the court said to the defense counsel, “[T]he
impression is that you’re pulling teeth out of the witness and frankly putting words in the
[witness’s] mouth[.]” During Laura’s testimony, the court said, “The pauses between questions is
[sic] killing me because of the time span. It’s appearing as though something is being contrived as
we speak. So I’m trying to avoid that.” See People v. Jackson, 409 Ill. App. 3d 631, 649 (2011)
(error at bench trial for court to question witness in way suggesting it prejudged outcome before
hearing all evidence). Contrary to the State’s view, the judge made statements during trial that
expressed derogatory opinions about witness testimony.
¶ 76 The trial court’s opinions did not change when it reached (and later affirmed) its verdict,
which troubles us for several reasons. First, the trial court inquired about S.G.’s out-of-court
accusations (as V.S. and J.C. recounted them) but had never held a hearing under section 115-
10.1(b) (725 ILCS 5/115-10.1(b) (West 2022)) on their reliability. See People v. Mitchell, 155 Ill.
2d 344, 355 (1993) (error to consider child’s out-of-court statements at trial absent reliability
hearing). Generally, we presume the trial court only considered admissible evidence. Smart, 2025
IL 130127, ¶ 94. But here, the trial court elicited substantive responses about these statements.
Further, the trial court curtailed counsel’s attempt to impeach those untested statements not based
on inadmissibility but on the court’s belief that the use of that witness’s testimony would be
“extremely disingenuous.”
¶ 77 Second, the trial court’s questioning ticked up dramatically as counsel for Velazquez
inquired of witnesses, giving the impression that court was advocating for the prosecution. The
- 19 - trial court must take steps to avoid the appearance that it is partial to one side. E.g., Mpulamasaka,
2016 IL App (2d) 130703, ¶ 116 (error for trial judge to allow State to argue from witness stand
in closing to jury). Here, the trial court asked 217 questions seeking information and 60 asked
witnesses to repeat themselves, and most of those questions (200 of the 277), occurred while
counsel for Velazquez examined witnesses. See People v. Santucci, 24 Ill. 2d 93, 99 (1962)
(holding “persistent interrogation” of witnesses by the court and comments toward defense counsel
“fatally infected” fairness of jury trial).
¶ 78 Third, by basing its credibility determinations on witness demeanor, the trial judge
arbitrarily disregarded the impact of its actions. Generally, “[w]hen assessing credibility, a trial
court is called upon to evaluate everything together—visual (demeanor, body language), audio
(tone), and the effect of the witness’s testimony (i.e., the impact a witness’s testimony has upon
the listeners).” People v. Carter, 2021 IL App (4th) 180581, ¶ 70 (describing concept of
“paralanguage”). The trial court’s findings indicate that it relied on the “demeanor” of State
witnesses as credible, “I have heard the girls [V.S. and J.C.] testify. And, frankly, I believe them.
It was certainly clear from their demeanor.” And he found the demeanor of defense witnesses as
not credible, “I have determined from viewing his testimony that defendant is not credible, nor
¶ 79 Yet when denying the motion for a new trial, the judge stated, “I have *** [l]istened to the
[defense] witnesses; however, with respect to the witnesses, they nearly [sic] said they were
nervous, which would never be a basis for a motion for new trial.” That is, the trial court found
that mere fact that he made the defense witnesses nervous would never be the basis for a new trial,
despite basing his verdict primarily on witness demeanor.
- 20 - ¶ 80 By treating demeanor in two different ways, the trial court upsets “ ‘the balance nice, clear
and true between the State and the accused.’ ” Williams, 124 Ill. 2d at 308 (quoting Tumey, 273
U.S. at 532). The trial judge admitted that witness demeanor played a deciding role in reaching his
verdict, yet he arbitrarily excluded demeanor as irrelevant when denying the motion for a new trial.
See People v. Wofford, 156 Ill. App. 3d 238, 243 (1987) (“A judge’s remarks must be a material
factor in defendant’s conviction or the prejudice to defendant must appear as their probable
result.”). We reject the State’s contention that this was not error.
¶ 81 The totality of the trial judge’s conduct thus reflects that due process and fairness were
neither maintained nor meaningfully protected, creating reversible error. The trial court elicited
inadmissible evidence (Mitchell, 155 Ill. 2d at 355), tilted its questioning in the prosecution’s favor
(Jackson, 409 Ill. App. 3d at 649), derided the defense and its witnesses (Cofield, 9 Ill. App. 3d at
1050), and excluded the effect of its actions on the credibility determinations it made (Williams,
124 Ill. 2d at 308). The cumulative effect of the judge’s words, questioning, and conduct resulted
in a denial of a fair trial, leaving us with no choice but to reverse.
¶ 82 We have no concern that these same errors will occur on remand. While this specific trial
judge’s “practice” compounded these errors, the judge has since retired. See , Ill. State Bar Ass’n
Section Newsletter, Recent Appointments and Retirements,
https://www.isba.org/sections/bench/newsletter/2023/08/recentappointmentsandretirements (last
visited Aug. 20, 2025) [https://perma.cc/67PR-UVUF] (noting Judge Gregory Paul Vazquez’s
retirement).
¶ 83 Although we can imagine moments when a trial judge may need to move from the bench,
we encourage judges to oversee bench trials from the bench. And if they must move, judges should
- 21 - narrate for the record when they are doing so and why. An open pursuit for the truth requires it.
See Williams, 124 Ill. 2d at 308. Courtroom etiquette reflects a shared set of norms, which benefits
litigants, witnesses, and judges. See Ill. Code Jud. Conduct (2023), Canon 2, R. 2.8(B) (eff. May
17, 2023) (stating, in canon now in effect, judge “shall be patient, dignified, and courteous to
litigants, jurors, witnesses, [and] lawyers ***.”).
¶ 84 Reversed and remanded for a new trial.
- 22 - People v. Velazquez, 2025 IL App (1st) 230449
Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 18-CR- 06600(01); the Hon. Gregory Paul Vasquez, Judge, presiding.
Attorneys James E. Chadd, Douglas R. Hoff, and Timothy Liam Kelly, of for State Appellate Defender’s Office, of Chicago, for appellant. Appellant:
Attorneys Eileen O’Neill Burke, State’s Attorney, of Chicago (John E. for Nowak, Daniel Piwowarczyk, and Mary R. Hain, Assistant Appellee: State’s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.
- 23 -