People v. Vargas CA4/2

Opinion

Filed 12/9/25 P. v. Vargas CA4/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent, E083931

v. (Super.Ct.No. FWV22004451)

ANGEL PADILLA VARGAS, OPINION

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Ingrid Adamson

Uhler Judge. Affirmed.

Thomas Owen, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and

Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney

General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Eric A. Swenson and Tyler L.

Krentz, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

1 INTRODUCTION

After hearing evidence that he attacked his girlfriend with a knife, a jury convicted

defendant and appellant Angel Padilla Vargas of premeditated attempted murder and

making criminal threats, among other offenses. (Pen. Code, §§ 664, 187, subd. (a), 245,

subd. (a)(1).)1 On appeal, Vargas argues that: (1) the record contains insufficient

evidence of premeditation and deliberation to support the attempted murder conviction,

and (2) the trial court failed to provide a required unanimity instruction on the criminal

threats charge. We conclude those arguments lack merit and affirm.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

A. Prosecution’s Case

In the late evening of December 9, 2022, Vargas attacked the victim, Jane Doe,

with a knife in the presence of her two young daughters. At the time of the incident,

Vargas and Doe had been dating for about three years and were renting a room together

in a mobile home owned by M.H. Vargas and Doe had a three-year-old daughter, and

Doe had a twelve-year-old daughter from another relationship.

The day before the attack, Vargas was riding in a car with his friend and a woman,

J.M., who happened to be Vargas’s neighbor. Vargas was upset. He told them that he

thought Doe was cheating on him with his female landlord, M.H., and he said that he

“was going to kill her.” At trial, J.M. testified that she was not sure which “her” Vargas

was referring to but figured his threat was directed toward the landlord.

1 Unlabeled statutory citations refer to the Penal Code.

2 Doe testified that Vargas was a jealous boyfriend, and he would accuse her,

“daily” of being unfaithful. She told the jury that, on the night before the attack, she had

suggested that they end their relationship, and Vargas had responded, “ ‘No, I’ll kill you

first.’ ” The following evening, Vargas returned home from work after 9:00 p.m. He was

holding some beer and told Doe not to bother him. Doe went into their bedroom, where

her daughters were already asleep, and Vargas followed her in, demanding that she stop

ignoring him and “tell him the truth that [she] wanted to leave him because [she] already

had someone else.” When Doe failed to react to his accusations, he threw furniture

around the room for several minutes until Doe’s daughters woke up.

The older daughter asked Vargas what was going on, and Doe told him to calm

down. Vargas left the bedroom through a door that led outside to a patio where they kept

some cooking supplies, and when he returned, he was holding a large kitchen knife.

Vargas called Doe a “bitch” and a “whore” and said that “if [she] wasn’t going to

be with him, then [she] wasn’t going to be with anybody” and that “he was going to kill

[her].” Doe was holding her older daughter in her arms and Vargas stood about an arm’s

length away from them. Doe plead with him to calm down and yelled, “ ‘My daughter’s

in the middle. . . . You’re going to hurt her.’ ” The older daughter told him to leave her

mother alone, and he responded, “ ‘You need to move aside or I’m going to hurt you,

too.’ ”

Vargas swung the knife at Doe several times. She was able to dodge most of his

advances, but he made contact at least twice, cutting her arm and the left side of her head.

The older daughter noticed the injuries and told her mother that she was bleeding.

3 Vargas turned to leave the bedroom through the patio door, and the older daughter

grabbed the younger daughter and told her mother to run. Doe followed her daughters

out of the bedroom and banged on the door that separated her part of the trailer from

M.H.’s, yelling for the landlord to help them and let them in.

At trial, M.H. testified that she was reading in bed when she heard pounding and

yelling coming from the other side of her trailer. When she heard the older daughter yell,

“ ‘Please open the door,’ ” she left her bedroom and opened the outer door to her side of

the home. Doe’s older daughter was holding the younger daughter in her arms and

shaking, and Doe was standing behind her daughters, bleeding from her head. M.H.

ushered them inside, locked the outer door, and told them to lock themselves inside her

bedroom and hide.

Vargas soon began banging on the other side of the outer door “with something”

and broke the door’s screen. Through the door, M.H. told him to calm down and that she

was going to call the police. She asked him what he was doing to Doe, and he told her

“not to worry about it, that he was going to kill [her] too.” Afraid that the outer door

would not hold, M.H. ran out of her house through a different door—a sliding glass door

located on the side of the home. She found a place to hide outside, behind a neighbor’s

house, and called 911.

As M.H. was calling for help, Vargas broke through the outer door and began

pounding on M.H.’s bedroom door. He told Doe to come out of the room or he would

kill her. When she did not come out, he kicked open the door. Doe told him “to calm

down, that they were going to arrest him,” but he grabbed her arm and said she had to go

4 with him. He swung the knife at her several more times and made at least two attempts

to stab her in the head again.

To placate Vargas, Doe said that she would go with him. As he was leading her

out of the bedroom, she broke free of his grip, grabbed her daughters, and ran out of the

same sliding glass door M.H. had used earlier. As she scanned her surroundings for a

place to hide, she felt weak from the blood loss.

M.H. testified that, when she saw the three of them coming toward her, Doe was

bleeding and saying, “ ‘He’s going to kill us. He’s going to kill us.’ ” As the women

waited for the police to arrive, Vargas went next door to J.M.’s house. At trial, J.M. said

that she was sleeping when she heard loud banging on the door. When she answered the

door, Vargas was standing there, covered in blood, and he told J.M., “ ‘I killed her. I told

you I was going to kill her.’ ” Vargas asked her for some clean clothes, but J.M. went

back inside and refused to help him.

When the police arrived, M.H.’s mobile home had been ransacked, and the walls

and doors were streaked with blood. Vargas had broken the sliding glass door, three

other doors, the microwave, the stove, the refrigerator, and the television. After

searching for him with the help of a helicopter, officers found Vargas crouched behind a

nearby pickup truck. He tried to run from the officers and had to be tackled before he

was taken into custody.

When the officers found the women, they all appeared to be in shock. Doe was

taken to the hospital for medical treatment. Her face was covered in blood, and she had

5 two inch-long stab wounds on her head and a stab wound on her arm. The following day,

M.H. found the knife Vargas had used in the attack near some trees in her front yard.

Doe testified that she believed that Vargas was going to kill her during the attack.

She obtained a restraining order against him after the incident and was still terrified of

him at the time of trial.

B. Defense Case

Vargas did not testify or call any witnesses to testify in his defense.

C. Verdict and Sentencing

The jury convicted Vargas of premeditated attempted murder (§§ §§ 664, 187,

subd. (a)); assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)); making criminal threats

(§ 422, subd. (a)); vandalism (§ 594, subd. (b)(1)); and two counts of child abuse (§ 273a,

subd. (a)). The jury also found that, during the commission of the attempted murder, he

personally used a deadly weapon. (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1).) The trial court sentenced him

to three years eight months in prison, plus a consecutive term of seven years to life.

DISCUSSION

A. Premeditation and Deliberation

Vargas argues that we must reverse the premeditated attempted murder conviction

because the record does not contain sufficient evidence of premeditation and deliberation.

We disagree.

An attempted murder is deliberate and premeditated “if it occurs ‘ “ ‘as the result

of preexisting thought and reflection rather than unconsidered or rash impulse.’ ” ’ ”

(Cardenas (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 102, 121; People v. Jurado (2006) 38 Cal.4th 72, 118.)

6 Deliberation refers to a “ ‘careful weighing of considerations in forming a course of

action,’ ” and premeditation means “ ‘thought over in advance.’ ” (People v. Halvorsen

(2007) 42 Cal.4th 379, 419.)

“[T]he requisite reflection need not span a specific or extended period of time.”

(People v. Nelson (2011) 51 Cal.4th 198, 213 (Nelson).) The key inquiry is whether the

killing “ ‘ “ ‘occurred as the result of preexisting reflection rather than unconsidered or

rash impulse.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Cage (2015) 62 Cal.4th 256, 276.) “Such reflection may

be revealed by planning activity, motive, and the manner of the killings, among other

things.” (People v. Potts (2019) 6 Cal.5th 1012, 1027 (Potts).) Those categories of

evidence—referred to as the Anderson2 factors—“are descriptive and neither normative

nor exhaustive,” so “reviewing courts need not accord them any particular weight”

(People v. Halvorsen, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 420).

Vargas contends that the record contains insufficient evidence of premeditation

and deliberation because “[t]he more likely interpretation of the facts suggests a crime of

passion or an impulsive act of violence, not a premeditated intent to kill.” Vargas’s

challenge fails for the simple reason that he asks us to apply an incorrect standard of

review.

In reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, we review the record “to

determine whether it discloses reasonable and credible evidence to allow a rational trier

of fact to determine guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,” and we “draw all reasonable

2 People v. Anderson (1968) 70 Cal.2d 15, 26-27 (Anderson).

7 inferences in favor of the judgment.” (People v. Cardenas (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 102,

119, fn. 11 (Cardenas).) We do not resolve credibility issues or evidentiary conflicts, as

that is “the exclusive province of the trier of fact.” (People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th

1149, 1181.) Instead, we uphold the conviction “ ‘unless it appears “that upon no

hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support [the

conviction].” ’ ” (People v. Cravens (2012) 53 Cal.4th 500, 508.) Thus, Vargas’s claim

that his characterization of the evidence is the “more likely interpretation” is insufficient

to warrant reversal. The jury’s interpretation of the evidence does not have to be the

more likely one for it to be upheld on substantial evidence review; it simply has to be

supported by reasonable and credible evidence.

But more importantly, the record contains more than sufficient evidence from

which the jury could conclude that Vargas’s attempted murder of Doe was the result of

reflection rather than impulse. The prosecution presented evidence that, during an

argument about his jealous suspicions, Vargas went outside to retrieve a knife, then

subjected Doe to a prolonged knife attack that involved his chasing her through the house

and telling her that he was going to kill her. (See, e.g. People v. Manriquez (2005)

37 Cal.4th 547, 577 [substantial evidence of premeditation and deliberation where the

defendant approached the victim several minutes after they had engaged in a verbal

altercation, pulled a gun from his waistband, and shot the victim in the chest].) Crucially,

Vargas voiced his plan to kill Doe, not only during, but also before and after his attack.

From that evidence, the jury could reasonably conclude that his actions were

premeditated and deliberate.

8 In arguing for reversal, Vargas’s argument asks us to view the record in the light

most favorable to him. For example, he contends that his multiple threats to kill Doe

reflected his “emotional instability . . . rather than any calculated plan.” He also argues

that his attack was “chaotic and disorganized,” and the fact that he “did not deliver a fatal

blow, despite being armed with a weapon capable of causing death, strongly suggest[s]

that the attack was impulsive . . . and not designed to kill.” He also argues that he was

too intoxicated to form a plan to kill Doe.

However, the inferences are different when conflicts in the evidence are resolved

in favor of the verdict, as the standard of review requires. For instance, the jury could

reasonably infer a deliberate design to kill from the fact that Vargas stabbed a particularly

vulnerable body part, Doe’s head, during his attack. (See, e.g. People v. Anderson (1968)

70 Cal.2d 15, 27 [“[P]lunging a lethal weapon into the chest evidences a deliberate

intention to kill”].) And, although the distance from the bedroom to the patio may have

been short, the jury could nevertheless conclude that the distance afforded Vargas a

sufficient opportunity to form a deliberate plan to kill Doe because “[t]houghts may

follow each other with great rapidity, and cold, calculated judgment may be arrived at

quickly.” (Nelson, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 213.) The jury could also reasonably infer

from Vargas’s threat to harm Doe’s older daughter if she did not move away from Doe,

and from his resumption of his attack after Doe fled to M.H.’s side of the trailer, that he

was enacting a preconceived design from which he would not be deterred. (Potts, supra,

6 Cal.5th at p. 1029 [“A theory that a person killed in a fit of rage is undermined by proof

9 that, after ample opportunity for reflection, the person decided that continuing a violent

attack was appropriate.”].)

Additionally, Vargas’s conduct before and after the killing is inconsistent with a

rash, impulsive killing. The jury could reasonably infer from both of his statements to his

neighbor that he was carrying out a plan he had formed at least as early as the previous

day and that his motive was jealousy. (People v. Disa (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 654,

667 [The jury may consider the “defendant’s conduct after the killing in relation to the

manner of killing.”]; People v. Brooks (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1, 59, 66 [Evidence that the

defendant had become “increasingly jealous and possessive of” the victim in the months

before he killed her was evidence of motive and supported a finding of premeditation and

deliberation.].) It does not matter that J.M. did not, at the time, take Vargas’s threat from

the day before the attack seriously. What matters is how the jury interpreted the threat.

Given the evidence of Vargas’s actions after the threat, the jury could reasonably

conclude that the threat was in fact serious and that he intended to kill Doe.

Finally, we reject Vargas’s contention that the evidence that he was intoxicated

“undermined the prosecution’s argument that [he] acted with premeditation and

deliberation.” The trial court instructed the jury that it could consider evidence of

voluntary intoxication in deciding whether Vargas formed an intent to kill or acted with

deliberation and premeditation. The jury resolved the factual question of Vargas’s

intoxication against him, and their finding is supported by substantial evidence. (See

People v. Castillo (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1009, 1014 [The question of whether a defendant

was intoxicated and the effect of the intoxication on their mental state is one of fact for

10 the jury to resolve.].) Although Doe testified that Vargas arrived home from work with

“beers in his hand,” she did not know how much he drank and did not describe him as

drunk. From that evidence, the jury could reasonably conclude that he was not

intoxicated, let alone so intoxicated as to prevent him from forming a plan to kill.

For all of these reasons, we conclude that the record contains substantial evidence

to support the jury’s finding of premeditation and deliberation.

A. Unanimity Instruction

Vargas argues that the trial court committed prejudicial error by failing to give a

unanimity instruction for the criminal threats charge because the record contains evidence

that he made multiple threats to kill Doe. We disagree.

“A criminal defendant is entitled to a verdict in which all 12 jurors concur as a

matter of due process under the state and federal Constitutions. [Citation.] In any case in

which the evidence would permit jurors to find the defendant guilty of a crime based on

two or more discrete acts, either the prosecutor must elect among the alternatives or the

court must require the jury to agree on the same criminal act.” (People v. Arevalo–

Iraheta (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 1574, 1588–1589.) “The omission of a unanimity

instruction is reversible error if, without it, some jurors may have believed the defendant

guilty based on one act, while others may have believed him guilty based on another.”

(Id. at p. 1589.)

There are multiple exceptions to the unanimity instruction requirement. As

relevant here, the “continuous-course-of-conduct exception” applies if the separate acts

that could amount to the charged offense “ ‘are so closely connected in time as to form

11 part of one transaction.’ ” (People v. Jennings (2010) 50 Cal.4th 616, 679.) “There also

is no need for a unanimity instruction if the defendant offers the same defense or defenses

to the various acts constituting the charged crime.” (Ibid.) The rationale behind the

same-defense exception is that “a guilty verdict indicates that the jury rejected the

defendant’s defense in toto.” (People v. Hernandez (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 559, 572.)

Vargas argues that a unanimity instruction was required because Doe testified

about at least four different threats from Vargas, any one of which could have been the

basis of the jury’s guilty verdict. Specifically, he argues that Doe testified about the

following threats: (1) his threat to kill her when they were arguing inside their bedroom,

before he retrieved the knife; (2) his threat to kill her after he returned from the patio,

while he was wielding the knife; (3) his threat to harm her older daughter if her daughter

did not get out of the way; and (4) his threat to kill her after he found her inside M.H.’s

bedroom. We are not persuaded.

To begin with, the record demonstrates that the prosecution elected to treat the

threats he made to kill Doe while he was swinging the knife at her as the basis for the

criminal threats charge. This is made clear by the charge itself, which identified Doe as

the victim, and by the prosecutor’s closing argument, in which he identified the offending

conduct as the “multiple” threats Vargas made to kill Doe while “[h]e had the knife in his

hand, and he was swinging at her in close proximity.” Because of that election, there was

no risk that some, but not all, of the jurors would have convicted Vargas of the offense

based on the threat he made to the older daughter or the threat he made to Doe before he

grabbed the knife. (See People v. Hawkins (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 1428, 1455 [unanimity

12 instruction was not required where the prosecutor identified in argument to the jury “what

conduct by defendant amounted to the crime charged”].)

Moreover, a unanimity instruction was not required due to the fact that the elected

conduct covered multiple threats. This is because the threats Vargas made to kill Doe

while wielding the knife fall under both exceptions described above. The continuous-

course-of-conduct exception applied because the threats formed part of a single

transaction—Vargas’s knife attack on Doe. (People v. Jennings, supra, 50 Cal.4th at

p. 679.) The same-defense exception applied because Vargas’s defense to all of the

charges except vandalism was that Doe was not a credible witness and was not telling the

truth. In closing argument, defense counsel conceded Vargas’s guilt on the vandalism

charge but told the jury that his client never attacked or threatened to kill Doe. Counsel

argued that the more reasonable interpretation of the evidence was that Vargas and Doe

had argued, Doe had taken her daughters with her and left, and that Vargas had ransacked

the mobile home after they had gone. By finding Vargas guilty of all the charged

offenses, the jury demonstrated that it rejected his defense in full. (People v. Hernandez,

supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at p. 572.)

For all of these reasons, we reject Vargas’s challenge to the criminal threats

conviction.

13 DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

FIELDS J. We concur:

RAMIREZ P. J.

McKINSTER J.