NOTICE 2026 IL App (5th) 241285-U NOTICE Decision filed 06/04/26. The This order was filed under text of this decision may be NO. 5-24-1285 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is changed or corrected prior to not precedent except in the the filing of a Petition for IN THE limited circumstances allowed Rehearing or the disposition of under Rule 23(e)(1). the same. APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIFTH DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Jackson County. ) v. ) No. 24-CF-237 ) GEORGE D. TRAVIS, ) Honorable ) Ralph R. Bloodworth III, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________
PRESIDING JUSTICE CATES delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Barberis and Hackett concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: We affirm the defendant’s conviction as the State proffered sufficient evidence for a jury to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. In addition, we find that the defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails as the defendant suffered no prejudice. Finally, we find the trial court did not commit a sentencing error, thus there can be no plain error.
¶2 Following a jury trial, the defendant, George Travis, was convicted of residential burglary.
The defendant was sentenced to 12 years in the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) to be
served at 50% with no more than 2 years of mandatory supervised release. On appeal the defendant
claims that the State’s evidence was insufficient to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, that
the defendant’s trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel, and that the defendant’s
sentence was excessive. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the defendant’s conviction and
sentence.
1 ¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 On April 24, 2024, the State charged the defendant by information with one count of
burglary. 720 ILCS 5/19-1(a) (West 2022). The court appointed a public defender, and the
defendant was advised of his rights and the nature of the charges. A detention hearing was held,
after which the defendant was released with conditions pending further proceedings. On October
8, 2024, the State filed a superseding information upgrading the defendant’s charge from burglary
to residential burglary, a Class 1 felony. The State alleged that the defendant “knowingly and
without authority entered into the residence of Larry Brunken, *** with the intent to commit
therein a theft ***.” 720 ILCS 5/19-3(a) (West 2022). The case was set for jury trial on October
15, 2024. On that date, the trial court acknowledged the superseding information and addressed
three motions in limine that were filed by the State. The first was a Montgomery 1 motion to allow
the State to impeach the defendant with his prior domestic battery conviction if he testified. The second
was a motion to bar discussion of possible penalties for the charged offense. The third was a motion to
allow the State to introduce the defendant’s conduct in an unrelated drug possession case. The
defendant’s trial counsel did not object to any of these motions. The trial court granted all three
motions in limine.
¶5 That same day, at the start of jury selection, the trial court read the charge against the
defendant and admonished the prospective jurors. Among the instructions given by the trial court
to the prospective jurors was that their verdict “must be based solely on the evidence presented in
this courtroom.” During voir dire, two prospective jurors indicated that they had recent
experiences with burglaries. Both prospective jurors additionally indicated that they had, to some
extent, personal connections with police officers. Upon further questioning, each of these
1 People v. Montgomery, 47 Ill. 2d 510 (1971). 2 prospective jurors indicated that they could be fair and impartial. Defense counsel did not use a
peremptory challenge or request that the prospective jurors be stricken for cause. Subsequently,
both prospective jurors were selected as jurors for the defendant’s trial.
¶6 The defendant’s jury trial began on October 16, 2024. The State first called Larry Brunken.
Brunken testified that the weekend prior to April 23, 2024, he had a yard sale. Following the yard
sale, Brunken put signs on some of the items that remained outside, that said, “Free. Take what
you want.” Brunken additionally posted on Facebook about the free items. By April 23, 2024,
“everything had been cleaned up already.”
¶7 On April 23, 2024, Brunken was at a local bar and he saw the defendant. Brunken knew
the defendant from Brunken’s work with a non-profit that helped the homeless. Brunken testified
that the defendant was playing video slots at the bar. After the defendant finished with the video
slots, he pointed at Brunken and then left on his bicycle, heading in the direction of Brunken’s
home. Shortly after, Brunken left the bar and walked home. As Brunken approached his home
from the alley, he saw the defendant and another individual carrying Brunken’s safe out of the
back door of his home. The defendant and the other individual put the safe in the bed of a green
truck. The defendant got into the passenger seat of the truck. Brunken was able to get in front of
the truck, put his hand up, and ordered the truck to stop. The driver of the truck started “revving
the clutch really hard on the engine.” The truck then began moving forward in Brunken’s direction.
Brunken moved out of the way to avoid getting hit. The defendant leaned outside of the window
of the truck and said, “I’ll be back.” Brunken took note of the truck’s license plate and called the
police. After police arrived, Brunken saw that his front door had been damaged and that it was not
able to lock properly. Brunken further testified that his safe, prior to being stolen, was located in
the corner of his dining room. The State presented Brunken with “People’s Exhibit 12” which was
3 a photograph depicting the vacant corner of his dining room where the safe had previously been
located. Brunken authenticated the photograph as a fair and accurate depiction of where his safe
had been placed before it was taken. Brunken stated that the safe still had its door attached prior
to the defendant taking it. Brunken kept several items in the safe. Among these items was
paperwork and a jewelry box with loose gems inside.
¶8 The State next called Officer Pawel Sawicki, employed by the Carbondale Police
Department. Sawicki testified that on April 23, 2024, he was dispatched to investigate a burglary
that had just occurred. The description of the suspect vehicle was an older green truck with some
rust. Sawicki was provided with a partial license plate number by dispatch. Sawicki ran the partial
license plate number through his “Record Management System” and the system returned a
potential vehicle and an associated address. The registered owner of the potential vehicle was
Richard Dunson. Sawicki went to the Dunson address and saw an older model green truck parked
outside. Dunson was standing on the porch when Sawicki arrived. Sawicki spoke with Dunson
who indicated that he had been driving the truck and the defendant was a passenger. Dunson told
Sawicki that he and the defendant had gone to “pick up a safe” and that they brought it back to
Dunson’s residence. Dunson informed Sawicki that the defendant went inside of the home by
himself and removed the safe from inside of the home. The defendant then placed the safe in the
bed of Dunson’s truck. Sawicki testified that while he was speaking with Dunson, other officers
who had arrived to assist located the defendant outside of the residence and placed him under
arrest.
¶9 Sawicki was present when the other officers retrieved the safe approximately 15 feet away
from Dunson’s residence. Additionally, Sawicki found the door to the safe that Dunson said was
removed by the defendant. The door was located “several yards” away from the main part of the
4 safe. Sawicki indicated that another officer collected an “angle grinder” from Dunson’s residence
which Dunson said was used to cut the door off of the safe. Sawicki also learned from Dunson that
a backpack on the porch belonged to the defendant. After confirming that the backpack belonged
to the defendant, Sawicki loaded the safe and the backpack into his patrol vehicle and drove to
Brunken’s residence. Brunken was able to identify the backpack as the defendant’s, noting that he
saw the backpack earlier in the week when the defendant was at Brunken’s yard sale. Sawicki
found several items inside the backpack that belonged to Brunken, including a jewelry box with a
plastic bag inside that contained several loose gems. In addition to Brunken’s items, the
defendant’s backpack also contained tools.
¶ 10 After Brunken looked at the items removed from the defendant’s backpack, Brunken
provided Sawicki with a list of items that were still missing. Sawicki returned to Dunson’s
residence, and Dunson gave Sawicki a trash bag full of items that Dunson found in his bathroom
under the sink. These items included a “data recovery kit” and paperwork that Brunken had
described to Sawicki when he returned the safe to Brunken’s home. During his testimony, Sawicki
verified multiple body camera videos and “still frames” derived from his footage, which he had
captured during his investigation. Sawicki additionally authenticated several photographs that he
had taken during his investigation, which included the tools, the safe, and the door. These exhibits
were subsequently entered into evidence.
¶ 11 The next witness called by the State was Richard Dunson, who testified that the defendant
had “come by the house and ask[ed] if I’d go help him remove an item from a house.” The
defendant provided Dunson with directions to the house. Once they arrived at the residence, the
defendant told Dunson to back up his truck to the porch, and the defendant went into the home.
The defendant told Dunson that the man who lived at the home had given the defendant a safe in
5 exchange for the defendant helping clean out the home. According to Dunson, the defendant “drug
out” the safe and threw it in the back of the truck. Dunson stated that he never got out of the truck
when they were at Brunken’s home. Once Dunson and the defendant returned to Dunson’s
residence, the defendant took the safe out of the truck, placed it on the front porch, and cut the
door off “with a grinder with a cut-off disk on it.” The defendant then took the safe through the
inside of Dunson’s residence to the back door and “threw it out.” When asked by the State why
Dunson was so cooperative with police when they arrived at his home on the day of the theft he
stated, “I didn’t know what the heck was going on.”
¶ 12 The State’s next witness was Officer Morgan Penrod, who was employed by the
Carbondale Police Department. Penrod interviewed the defendant at the Carbondale Police
Department following the defendant’s arrest in connection with the theft of the safe. Penrod
authenticated the video as a true and accurate depiction, and the recorded video of the interview
with the defendant was played for the jury. During the interview, the defendant admitted the
backpack was his and said he took the safe from Brunken’s yard and put it in the truck. The
defendant told Penrod that he thought that the safe was free.
¶ 13 Additional police officers were called to testify, and they further corroborated the
testimony of the State’s witnesses. Finally, the State called Officer Zach Whitecotton, employed
by the Carbondale Police Department. Whitecotton testified that the defendant was arrested a
month following the burglary and had in his possession two credit or debit cards that belonged to
Brunken. Following Whitecotton’s testimony, the State rested.
¶ 14 The defendant called two witnesses in his defense: Dale Bogenphol and Matthew Kren.
Bogenphol testified that he had been staying at Brunken’s house around the time that the defendant
had taken the safe. Bogenphol also stated that he had never seen the safe inside of Brunken’s home.
6 Kren testified that he went to a yard sale at Brunken’s home and saw the safe outside on the back
porch. Kren attempted to purchase the safe, but Brunken told Kren that the safe was already sold
to the defendant. On cross-examination by the State, Kren stated that he was undergoing court-
ordered drug treatment. Kren also admitted that he had prior convictions, including one for
burglary. Following Kren’s testimony, the defense rested.
¶ 15 After closing arguments by the State and defense counsel, the jury deliberated and found
the defendant guilty of residential burglary. Defense counsel did not file any posttrial motions. On
November 25, 2024, the trial court held a sentencing hearing and heard evidence in aggravation
and mitigation. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court considered the defendant’s residential
burglary conviction and the defendant’s other outstanding cases. 2 The State requested a total
sentence of 17 years in IDOC, which included consecutive sentencing on his other matters.
Defense counsel argued that the defendant be given probation. Alternatively, if the trial court found
that the defendant was to be sentenced to IDOC, defense counsel requested that the defendant
receive mental health treatment during his incarceration. The trial court sentenced the defendant
to three years in IDOC on the defendant’s plea to the drug charge and three years in IDOC for the
unlawful possession of credit cards of another. The sentences on these charges were to run
concurrently. The trial court then sentenced the defendant to 12 years in IDOC for the residential
burglary conviction, to be served at 50% with no more than 2 years of mandatory supervised
release. The trial court ordered that the sentence for the residential burglary was to run
consecutively with the other convictions. The defendant’s total sentence in IDOC was 15 years.
Defense counsel did not file a motion to reconsider the defendant’s sentence.
2 The defendant entered an open plea on the morning of trial to one count of possession of methamphetamine and one count of unlawful possession of a credit or debit card of another. 7 ¶ 16 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 17 On appeal, the defendant claims that the evidence was insufficient to find him guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt, that trial counsel was ineffective, and that the defendant’s sentence
was excessive.
¶ 18 A. Sufficiency of the Evidence
¶ 19 First, we consider whether the evidence was sufficient to find the defendant guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt. When reviewing a claim that the State’s evidence was insufficient to support
a conviction, the relevant question is “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of
the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Emphasis in original.) Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307,
319 (1979). “Under this standard, the reviewing court does not retry the defendant, and the trier of
fact remains responsible for making determinations regarding the credibility of witnesses, the
weight to be given their testimony, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence.”
People v. Ross, 229 Ill. 2d 255, 272 (2008). However, “merely because the trier of fact accepted
certain testimony or made certain inferences based on the evidence does not guarantee the
reasonableness of its decision.” Ross, 229 Ill. 2d at 272. A conviction will be reversed where the
evidence is “so unreasonable, improbable, or unsatisfactory” that there remains a reasonable doubt
about the defendant’s guilt. Ross, 229 Ill. 2d at 272. Whether the required intent exists is a question
for the trier of fact, and that determination will not be disturbed on review unless there is a
reasonable doubt as to the defendant’s guilt. People v. Maggette, 195 Ill. 2d 336, 354 (2001).
¶ 20 The defendant specifically claims that the State failed to prove two essential elements of
the charged offense: (1) that the defendant entered Brunken’s home without authority and (2) that
the defendant entered Brunken’s home with the specific intent to commit a theft. We consider each
8 in turn. First, there were multiple witnesses who testified that the defendant entered Brunken’s
home while Brunken was not at home. Dunson, who was driving his green truck, testified that the
defendant entered the home alone, came out with the safe, and put it in the bed of Dunson’s truck.
Brunken testified that when he came home from the bar, the defendant and Dunson were walking
out of the back door of Brunken’s home with the safe. Brunken also testified that the front door of
his home had been damaged and that it was not damaged before he left for the bar. Brunken
testified he had told the defendant “multiple times” that he was not allowed on Brunken’s property.
In addition, following the removal of the safe, the defendant and Dunson fled Brunken’s home in
Dunson’s truck. During their attempt to escape the area near Brunken’s home Dunson revved the
engine, threatening to run down Brunken. The defendant was not the driver, but the defendant did
nothing to stop Dunson threatening to hit Brunken with the truck. Finally, the defense called
Bogenphol as a witness who testified on cross-examination that he never heard Brunken give the
defendant permission to take Brunken’s safe. The evidence at trial was sufficient to prove, beyond
a reasonable doubt, that the defendant entered Brunken’s home without authority.
¶ 21 The defendant further claims that the State failed to prove that the defendant had the
specific intent to commit the theft because the evidence presented by the State was circumstantial.
Intent to commit a criminal offense, however, need not be expressed, but may be inferred from the
conduct of the defendant and the surrounding circumstances. See People v. Grayer, 2023 IL
128871, ¶ 28. As stated previously, when Brunken arrived home, he saw the defendant and Dunson
exit his home with his safe and load it into the bed of Dunson’s truck. Brunken told the defendant
and Dunson to stop the truck. Despite this command, Dunson did not comply, and revved his
engine, moving the truck forward toward Brunken. As the truck moved toward him, Brunken
moved so that he would not be hit by the driver fleeing the area near Brunken’s home. Dunson
9 reported that the defendant had taken the safe, by himself, out of Brunken’s home, loaded the safe
in the truck, cut the safe open, placed some of the contents in his backpack, and disposed of the
safe. The defendant’s removal of the safe from Brunken’s residence, concealment of the safe at
Dunson’s property, and considerable efforts to access its contents collectively constitute
circumstantial evidence indicating an intent to commit theft. The defendant also placed some of
the stolen items from the safe into his backpack, while hiding other objects from the safe in a trash
bag under Dunson’s sink. The items found in the defendant’s backpack and in the trash bag were
identified by Brunken as items that were originally in the safe before it was taken. This conduct of
parsing some of the stolen items for his immediate use, and retaining other items in a secret place,
is further circumstantial evidence of the defendant’s intent to commit a theft. All of these facts,
when considered together in the light most favorable to the State, were sufficient to prove the
defendant’s intent to commit a theft.
¶ 22 The defendant challenges our findings that the evidence before the jury was sufficient
because the defendant claims that the facts were introduced by “objectively unreliable witness
testimony.” Simply put, the defendant challenges the credibility of the witnesses. The jury, however,
had the opportunity to view the witnesses as they testified and assess their credibility on both direct
and cross-examination. In conjunction with the testimony, photographs and other exhibits were
entered into evidence and considered by the jury. We will not disturb the jury’s verdict as there is
no indication that the evidence was so unreasonable, improbable, or unsatisfactory that there
remains a reasonable doubt about the defendant’s guilt. Therefore, considered together, the facts
in evidence were sufficient to prove the defendant guilty of residential burglary beyond a
reasonable doubt.
10 ¶ 23 B. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel
¶ 24 A criminal defendant has a constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel at all
stages of the proceedings as guaranteed by the sixth amendment. People v. Brown, 2017 IL
121681, ¶ 25. To establish an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a defendant must show that
counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that, but for
counsel’s deficient performance, the result would have been different. Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). Simply put, two prongs make up the Strickland test: deficiency and
prejudice. First, counsel must have made errors so serious, and counsel’s performance was so
deficient, that counsel was not operating as the “counsel” guaranteed by the sixth amendment.
People v. Evans, 186 Ill. 2d 83, 93 (1999). “A court measures counsel’s performance by an
objective standard of competence under prevailing professional norms. To establish deficiency,
the defendant must overcome the strong presumption that the challenged action or inaction might
have been the product of sound trial strategy.” Evans, 186 Ill. 2d at 93. The second prong of the
Strickland test requires that, “but for” counsel’s deficient performance, the result would have been
different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. In other words, the defendant must show deficient
performance and that the deficient performance resulted in prejudice. People v. Hughes, 2012 IL
112817, ¶ 44. To prove that the defendant suffered prejudice, “the defendant must show that, ‘but
for’ counsel’s deficient performance, there is a reasonable probability that the result of the
proceeding would have been different.” People v. Lacy, 407 Ill. App. 3d 442, 457 (2011). The
defendant bears the burden of showing that both prongs of the Strickland test are proved. People
v. Morris, 2014 IL App (1st) 130512, ¶ 32. We do not, however, need to evaluate whether
counsel’s performance was deficient if we conclude that the defendant cannot show prejudice.
11 People v. Hale, 2013 IL 113140, ¶ 17. We review ineffective assistance of counsel claims de novo.
In re Harlin H., 2022 IL App (5th) 190108, ¶ 78.
¶ 25 The defendant raises seven instances of ineffective assistance by his trial counsel.
Specifically, the defendant claims that trial counsel failed to: (1) oppose the State’s pretrial motion
and he allowed testimony regarding an “irrelevant” crime; (2) oppose two burglary victims’
participation in the defendant’s trial as jurors; (3) introduce Brunken’s inconsistent statement that
he gave at the scene for impeachment or substantive evidence; (4) object to Brunken’s claim that
the defendant tried to kill him; (5) submit a jury instruction regarding the accomplice testimony of
Dunson; (6) object to the State’s characterization of the law in closing arguments; and finally that
trial counsel failed to (7) file any posttrial motions.
¶ 26 Here, the evidence against the defendant was so overwhelming that despite trial counsel’s
performance, the outcome of these proceedings would not have been different. Therefore, under
Strickland, the defendant cannot show prejudice. We have already recited those facts that we
deemed sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction for residential burglary beyond a
reasonable doubt. Therefore, we need not repeat those facts in depth here, except to say these facts
overwhelmingly proved the defendant’s guilt. Briefly, the evidence showed that Brunken’s front
door was broken, and that Brunken’s safe was in his home prior to Brunken leaving his residence
on April 23, 2024. Dunson and the defendant jointly traveled to Brunken’s home. Dunson indicated
that the defendant removed the safe from Brunken’s home, although Brunken saw the defendant
and another individual removing the safe and placing it into the green truck. Brunken took down
a partial license plate number which led directly to Dunson and the defendant. The officers who
responded to Dunson’s home found the safe, the door which had been forcibly removed, and the
grinder that had been used to remove the door. Several items described by Brunken as being in the
12 safe were found in the defendant’s backpack. Further police investigation revealed additional items
had been secreted in a trash bag in Dunson’s home. The defendant did not deny that he took the
safe and his only claim was that the safe was free. Notably, the defendant was released on bond
conditions and later found to be in possession of credit cards stolen from Brunken. In sum, we
conclude that the evidence against the defendant was so overwhelming that there is no reasonable
probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different, and therefore, the defendant
cannot meet his burden of showing that he suffered prejudice. Where the defendant cannot show
prejudice, we need not evaluate whether counsel’s performance was deficient.
¶ 27 C. Sentencing
¶ 28 The defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing the defendant
to a 12-year term in IDOC. Trial counsel, however, failed to raise this issue in a posttrial motion.
Therefore, we find the issue forfeited. See People v. Johnson, 2024 IL 130191, ¶ 40. In the
alternative, the defendant requests that his sentence be reviewed under the plain error doctrine.
The plain error doctrine allows a reviewing court to reach a forfeited error under two
circumstances. People v. Moon, 2022 IL 125959, ¶ 20. First-prong plain error review is appropriate
when a “clear or obvious error occurred and the evidence is so closely balanced that the error alone
threatened to tip the scales of justice against the defendant.” Moon, 2022 IL 125959, ¶ 20. Under
second-prong plain error, review is warranted when a “clear or obvious error occurred and the
error is so serious that it affected the fairness of the defendant’s trial and challenged the integrity
of the judicial process, regardless of the closeness of the evidence.” Moon, 2022 IL 125959, ¶ 20.
Under both prongs, the burden of persuasion remains with the defendant. People v. Herron, 215
Ill. 2d 167, 187 (2005). If the defendant fails to satisfy this burden, the procedural default must be
honored. People v. Walker, 232 Ill. 2d 113, 124 (2009). When presented with a claim of plain
13 error, the relevant inquiry begins with whether an error occurred at all. People v. Hensley, 2014 IL
App (1st) 120802, ¶ 45. “The failure of a defendant to show that error occurred at all defeats both
an ineffective assistance claim and a claim of error under either prong of the plain error doctrine.”
Hensley, 2014 IL App (1st) 120802, ¶ 47. To begin our review of the defendant’s claims under the
plain error doctrine, we first consider whether there was any error at all. Hensley, 2014 IL App
(1st) 120802, ¶ 45.
¶ 29 Here, the defendant claims that the trial court committed error when it considered an
“improper” factor in aggravation. 3 The defendant specifically claims that the trial court considered
the State’s argument in aggravation that “the defendant’s conduct caused or threatened serious
harm.” The defendant argues that the residential burglary statute implicitly includes conduct
causing or threatening serious harm. This argument has some merit, as the crime charged is a Class
1 felony, and requires proof of entry into a dwelling place. 720 ILCS 5/19-3(a) (West 2022).
¶ 30 The State’s argument before the trial court in aggravation claimed, “We believe that
conduct causes or threatened serious harm, specifically notating [sic] the threatened part of it.
When you enter somebody’s home you threaten—you definitely threaten serious harm if there are
people in there.” In the next sentence, the State argued that the defendant was complicit in the
attempt by Dunson to use his truck to run over Brunken. The State went on to argue other factors
in aggravation, such as the defendant’s prior history of criminality, the necessity to deter others
from committing similar crimes, and the fact that the defendant had committed crimes after being
released prior to the residential burglary trial. The State further argued the lack of applicable
mitigating factors.
3 The factors that “shall be accorded weight in favor of imposing a term of imprisonment or may be considered by the court as reasons to impose a more severe sentence” can be found in section 5-5-3.2 of the Unified Code of Corrections. 730 ILCS 5/5-5-3.2(a) (West 2022). 14 ¶ 31 We acknowledge the generally accepted rule of law which states that “a factor inherent in
the offense should not be considered as a factor in aggravation at sentencing. [Citations.]” People
v. Dowding, 388 Ill. App. 3d 936, 942 (2009). In considering whether the trial court erred in its
sentencing determination, we “consider the record as a whole, rather than focusing on a few words
or statements by the trial court.” Dowding, 388 Ill. App. 3d at 943. We agree that a distinction
exists between the classification of the offenses of burglary and residential burglary.
“ ‘[R]esidential burglary contains more possibility for danger and serious harm than that of places
not used as dwellings. There is a considerably greater chance of injury and danger to persons in
the home context than in the burglary of a place of business.’ ” People v. Bales, 108 Ill. 2d 182,
193 (1985) (quoting People v. Gomez, 120 Ill. App. 3d 545, 549 (1983)). Thus, the crime of
residential burglary recognizes, intuitively, that the entry into a dwelling place, where people may
be present, poses a threat of serious harm to the occupants.
¶ 32 The trial court gave defense counsel the opportunity to respond to the State’s arguments,
and defense counsel argued the relevant mitigating factors that should be considered by the trial
court. Additionally, the defendant made a statement on his own behalf. Notably, after hearing all
of the arguments, the trial court indicated that it had considered the very thorough presentence
investigation report of approximately 250 pages that detailed the defendant’s life “from birth on.”
The trial court also acknowledged that the State and defense counsel strongly disagreed on whether
the defendant’s conduct should be considered as an aggravating factor, but did not make a finding
regarding the merits of these arguments. The trial court then proceeded to impose the sentences on
the various cases. Just prior to imposing the sentence on the residential burglary conviction, the
trial court indicated it had “considered everything as cited here today.” The trial court then
sentenced the defendant to 12 years in IDOC. There is no mention in the record that the trial court
15 improperly relied on the State’s argument in aggravation that the defendant’s conduct caused or
threatened to cause serious harm. Therefore, contrary to the defendant’s arguments, and reviewing
the record as a whole, we find that the trial court did not consider any one factor more than the
others.
¶ 33 Finally, we find that the trial court did not err by imposing the defendant’s sentence. The
range of a sentence of imprisonment for residential burglary, a Class 1 felony, “shall be a
determinate sentence of not less than 4 years and not more than 15 years ***.” 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-
30(a) (West 2022). The defendant was sentenced to 12 years. Therefore, the defendant was
sentenced within the statutory range for residential burglary, and his sentence was presumptively
valid. See People v. Sauseda, 2016 IL App (1st) 140134, ¶ 12. Further, the trial court did not use
the aggravating factor of the defendant’s conduct that threatened or caused serious harm, to
effectuate a harsher sentence than would otherwise be given. See People v. Phelps, 211 Ill. 2d 1,
13 (2004).
¶ 34 In sum, we find that the defendant has failed to overcome his burden of establishing that
the trial court committed error. Accordingly, without error, there cannot be relief pursuant to the
plain error doctrine.
¶ 35 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 36 The judgment of the circuit court of Jackson County is affirmed.
¶ 37 Affirmed.