People v. Terrell

2025 IL App (3d) 240567

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: August 22, 2025
• Docket: 3-24-0567
• Status: Published

Opinion

2025 IL App (3d) 240567

Opinion filed August 22, 2025 ____________________________________________________________________________

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

THIRD DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ILLINOIS, ) of the 12th Judicial Circuit, ) Will County, Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellant, ) ) Appeal No. 3-24-0567 v. ) Circuit No. 22-CF-123 ) TRAVION D. TERRELL, ) Honorable ) Amy M. Bertani-Tomczak, Defendant-Appellee. ) Judge, Presiding. ____________________________________________________________________________

PRESIDING JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Justices Peterson and Anderson concurred in the judgment and opinion. ____________________________________________________________________________

OPINION

¶1 The State appeals from the trial court’s order granting defendant’s motion to suppress

evidence obtained as a result of the execution of a search warrant for the content of defendant’s

cell phone records and denying its motion to reconsider. For the following reasons, we affirm in

part, reverse in part, and remand the case for further proceedings.

¶2 I. BACKGROUND

¶3 Defendant, Travion D. Terrell, was charged with numerous felony offenses arising out of

a January 15, 2022, shooting into a Chevrolet Tahoe, wherein Zania Walker and Jaron Nabors were injured. Specifically, count I of the indictment alleged aggravated battery in violation of

section 12-3.05(e)(1) and (h) of the Criminal Code of 2012 (Code) (720 ILCS 5/12-3.05(e)(1),

(h) (West 2022)); count II alleged aggravated discharge of a firearm in violation of section 24-

1.2(a)(2) and (b) of the Code (id. § 24-1.2(a)(2), (b)); count III alleged reckless conduct in

violation of section 12-5(a)(2) and (b) of the Code (id. § 12-5(a)(2), (b)); count IV alleged

aggravated reckless driving in violation of sections 11-503(a)(1) and (c) of the Illinois Vehicle

Code (625 ILCS 5/11-503(a)(1), (c) (West 2022)); counts V and VI alleged aggravated unlawful

use of a weapon in violation of section 24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(A-5), (a)(3)(C), and (d)(2) of the

Code (720 ILCS 5/24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(A-5), (C), (d)(2) (West 2022)) and section 24-1.6(a)(1),

(a)(3)(C), and (d)(1) of the Code (id. § 24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(C), (d)(1)), respectively; and count

VII alleged violation of bail bond in violation of section 32-10(a-5) of the Code (id. § 32-10(a-

5)) in that defendant knowingly violated a prior condition of bail bond to not possess a firearm. 1

¶4 A. Complaint for Search Warrant

¶5 On January 19, 2022, Jeffrey German, a detective with the Investigations Division of the

Joliet Police Department (JPD), presented a sworn complaint for search warrant, requesting a

warrant to search all T-Mobile subscriber account information for T-Mobile cellular phones with

the numbers of (***) ***-**17 and (***) ***-**54, along with “cellular call, texting, photos or

other records for the same phone numbers under the control of T-Mobile,” and to seize the call

detail and data records and cellular-site location information from November 1, 2021, to January

19, 2022, and “Truecall/TDOA/Timing Advance Information” from January 13, 2022, to January

19, 2022. The complaint further specified items being sought, including, inter alia, addresses,

1 The offenses charged in Counts V through VII (aggravated unlawful use of a weapon and violation of bail bond) were alleged to have occurred on January 21, 2022—a few days after the January 15, 2022, shooting. 2 telephone numbers, Social Security numbers, and dates of birth of subscribers; any email

addresses associated with the account; phone call and text message records; subscriber

information of any other T-Mobile customers identified in the call records; cell site and tower

location; historical GPS information; location information; text message content; and cloud data.

German recounted his 18-year employment with the JPD, including his involvement in over

1,000 felony-level investigations, certification as a lead homicide investigator, and certifications

in forensic cell phone and call detail records.

¶6 German’s sworn complaint included a 12-page sworn “INVESTIGATION

NARRATIVE,” summarized in relevant part as follows. On January 15, 2022, at 3:22 p.m., the

JPD responded to a 911 call reporting a three-vehicle crash near the Louis Joliet Mall, in which

the driver of one vehicle had been shot. At the scene, a police officer spoke with Walker (the

driver) and Nabors (the passenger and Walker’s boyfriend). Nabors recounted that “a black or

dark colored Chevrolet Impala or Malibu pulled up next to them on Ring Road and started to

shoot at them at which time [Walker] was shot in her face.” Nabors stated that they had first seen

the dark colored vehicle when they pulled into a Hooters restaurant to get food. At the restaurant,

the occupants of the dark colored vehicle (whom Nabors indicated he could not describe given

the vehicle’s dark tinted windows) were looking at Nabors and Walker, so Nabors told Walker to

leave. Walker drove onto Mall Loop Drive, but the dark-colored vehicle followed and started to

shoot at them. Walker was shot in the cheek, turned onto Tonti Drive, sped up, and then struck

two vehicles at the intersection of Tonti Drive and Colorado Avenue. The dark-colored vehicle

continued west on Mall Loop Drive. In the ambulance, Walker recounted that a dark-colored car

followed them around the mall from Hooters and started shooting at them. After Walker was

struck in the face, she kept driving until she hit other vehicles. Walker told German that she did

3 not recognize the dark-colored car or its occupants. Walker’s Tahoe had a bullet hole in the

driver’s side window and tailgate, and three nine-millimeter shell cartridges were recovered on

Mall Loop Drive near Tonti Drive.

¶7 German and JPD Detective Rutkoski also responded to the scene and met with Nabors,

who was visibly distraught and had blood on his clothing and a bandage on his hand. When

asked what happened, Nabors stated that he had already spoken with police officers. In response

to whether he could repeat what happened, Nabors recounted that Walker had pulled into

Hooters where they were planning to eat. However, Nabors saw a black Chevrolet Malibu

following their car. At that point, Walker pulled out of the restaurant; the Malibu chased them;

and the Malibu’s occupants shot at them. Nabors stated that he did not know who shot at them or

whether the shots came from the driver or passenger side. He further related that, prior to

stopping at Hooters, he had been to Rise Recreational Dispensary (Rise) to purchase cannabis.

¶8 The detectives proceeded to Rise, where the manager shared video footage showing that,

at approximately 3:21 p.m., Walker’s Tahoe was traveling at a high rate of speed and was

followed shortly after by a black Chevrolet Malibu or Impala, also traveling at a high rate of

speed. The vehicles traveled off camera until approximately 3:22 p.m., at which point Walker’s

Tahoe was shown traveling on Tonti Drive and crashing into another vehicle at Tonti Drive and

Colorado Avenue.

¶9 Another JPD detective met with Walker in a trauma area in the hospital emergency room.

Hospital staff stated that Walker was shot in the left cheek with the bullet lodging in her cervical

spine; Walker was stable but likely to be intubated and transported to another hospital for

precautionary measures and for surgery to remove the bullet. Walker told the detective at the

hospital that, after she and Nabors left Rise and arrived at Hooters to eat, she observed a black

4 Chevy vehicle with two male black occupants, and Nabors had apparently believed there was

going to be a problem with the occupants of that car because he told her to go home. Walker

stated that she was attempting to get away from the subjects in the black car and attempting to

stop at stop signs to avoid a crash. She did not know exactly how the crash occurred, and she

neither saw nor heard gunshots.

¶ 10 Initially, Walker did not identify anyone in the vehicle, but when her mother arrived,

Walker told her that the passenger of the offending vehicle looked like “Junior Barfield.” Walker

subsequently clarified to the detective that she recognized the person in the passenger seat as

Junior Barfield, whom she only knew through social media. Walker further stated that she did

not see Barfield with a gun. Walker described Barfield as a “male black, approximately in his

mid 20’s, who had a child’s mother named Nashay.” Detective Rutkoski located a profile for

Junior Barfield on Facebook. From previous incidents, Rutkoski knew the person in the profile

picture as Levelle Barfield. According to a JPD report, Barfield had a child with Nashay

Chambers, and, on August 27, 2019, Barfield shot their minor child in Nashay’s presence at her

home in Joliet.

¶ 11 Surveillance videos from Hooters showed that, at approximately 3:15 p.m. on the day of

the shooting, Walker’s Tahoe pulled into the parking lot through the rear entrance, then pulled

around to the front of the parking lot by the front entrance before backing into a parking spot

facing the front door to the restaurant. At approximately 3:16 p.m., a dark colored sedan pulled

into the front parking lot and stopped in front of the Tahoe before backing into a parking spot

facing the Tahoe. About a minute later, the Tahoe pulled out of the parking spot and looped

around the side parking lot, followed by the sedan shortly thereafter. Both cars then traveled off

camera.

5 ¶ 12 Video footage from Rise’s three exterior cameras (capturing Colorado Avenue between

Voyager Lane and Tonti Drive) showed Walker’s Tahoe traveling west on Colorado Avenue,

passing Rise at approximately 3:20 p.m. The video then showed the offending vehicle traveling

west on Colorado Avenue, passing Rise about 15 seconds later. According to German, based on

the video footage and a video stillshot of the offending vehicle, it appeared to be “a black 2016-

2018 Chevrolet Malibu with black rims.”

¶ 13 German searched Flock Safety License Plate Recognition (Flock) cameras for “any black

2016-2018 Chevrolet Malibu vehicles with tinted windows and black rims that match the

offender vehicle.” He based the search criteria on “unique features such as chrome rear window

trim which comes to a point unlike a Chevrolet Impala which has a different window trim” and

the Malibu fog light that was only made between 2016 and 2018. Also, “Impalas typically have

an Impala logo on each side of the vehicle.” German searched in “Flock Safety” the criteria of

“Black Chevrolet Sedan” in “the JPD, Crest Hill, and Shorewood cameras” from January 14,

2022, to January 17, 2022, for daylight views. He then compared the results of hundreds of

vehicles for each day and located only one that was similar to the offending vehicle. “The

vehicle appeared to be dirty with snow/salt on the passenger side of the vehicle on Flock Safety

images on 01/15/2022 which is similar to the video surveillance of the offending vehicle.” The

offending vehicle and the vehicle identified on the Flock images—a Black 2018 Chevrolet

Malibu with Illinois Registration *******—both had “heavily tinted windows as well as dark

rims with a similar rim pattern and are within the same model year range.” The January 15, 2022,

Flock camera hits were at 12:44:57 p.m. at the Cass Street Bridge, traveling westbound, and at

12:52:30 p.m. at the McDonough Street Bridge, traveling eastbound.

6 ¶ 14 A check of LEADS for the identified vehicle listed Travion Terrell and Tiffany Terrell as

owners of the vehicle with a registration address of *** Plainfield Road in Joliet. German

searched for them in Joliet Police Department records and other databases. He located Travion

D. Terrell, born June 8, 2000, with the address of *** Plainfield Road in Joliet and a phone

number of (***) ***-**54 (also listed as defendant’s phone number in court records). A “ZetX

TraX Carrier Lookup” search listed the number as a T-Mobile number. A search of open-source

social media located two Facebook accounts with profiles and uploaded photos matching known

booking photos of defendant. One of the profiles listed a Facebook friend with the account of

“Junior Barfield.”

¶ 15 JPD Officer Ben Briddell informed German that a confidential informant (who was

working for “monetary purposes,” did not have any pending court cases, and had been proven

reliable, having provided information “more than five times which led to multiple Class X felony

arrests, including seizures of Class X amounts of narcotics and multiple firearm seizures”)

advised that Levelle Barfield’s current phone number was (***) ***-**17 and that Levelle had

used the phone number “within the last seven days.” A “ZetX TraX Carrier Lookup” search

listed the number as a T-Mobile number. The confidential informant further stated that Levelle

had “been known to drive in a black Chevrolet Malibu recently.”

¶ 16 The final three pages of the investigative narrative in the sworn complaint for search

warrant detailed investigations into other shootings and Barfield’s connection to them, namely,

shootings at **** Ruth Fitzgerald Drive in Plainfield on January 18, 2022, and December 7,

2021, and a shooting at **** (a different house number) Ruth Fitzgerald Drive in Plainfield on

November 7, 2021. Shell casings recovered on December 7, 2021 “indicated a NIBIN link to a

.40 caliber casings recovered from” the November 7, 2021, shooting. Home surveillance cameras

7 recorded a small white Ford SUV with tinted windows driving slowly near the scene minutes

before one of the shootings. A Flock camera captured a small white Ford Escape SUV with

tinted windows about three miles away from the scene of the shooting about three minutes after

the shooting. The Ford Escape was registered to Jeraya McClellan, who had a child with

“Levelle Barfield Jr.” A December 22, 2021, police report reflected that Barfield rented a hotel

room for Jeraya and that Jeraya was arrested for assaulting hotel employees after becoming upset

with them for giving her room key to Barfield.

¶ 17 On January 18, 2022, a male black subject in a small white Ford Escape sped away from

a police officer, while turning off its lights and disobeying a stop sign. The police officer lost

sight of the vehicle, but assisting officers then saw the white Ford Escape unoccupied in a

parking lot. A bystander reported seeing a male black subject hopping a fence and fleeing the

area on foot, about 160 feet away from where the vehicle was parked. In plain view on the front

passenger seat of the white Ford Escape was a semi-automatic handgun, and an iPhone was on

the driver’s seat.

¶ 18 German concluded that the T-Mobile cell phone provider records for (***) ***-**17 and

(***) ***-**54 would show evidence related to the January 15, 2022, shooting, as well as the

November 7, 2021, December 7, 2021, and January 18, 2022, shootings on Ruth Fitzgerald

Drive. He requested records from November 1, 2021, to January 19, 2022 “to establish an

accurate and reliable frequency report in reference to call patterns and location information.”

German stated that, based on his training and experience, the ability to establish such data could

be exculpatory, i.e., when “a subject is regularly at a location identified, the significance of the

subject at that location may be diminished.” He was also “aware that obtaining a subject’s cell

phone records and call detail records can assist in determining the location of the mobile device,

8 routes of travel, and communication to other individuals” and that failure to preserve the records

could result in their deletion given cellular providers’ varying retention periods.

¶ 19 The judge signed the search warrant on January 19, 2022, indicating that, “[u]pon

examination of the written complaint, I find that said complaint on its face states facts sufficient

to show probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant” for the specified records or data in

the possession or control of T-Mobile, commanding that the records, documents, or data be

seized for T-Mobile cellular phones with the numbers of (***) ***-**17 and (***) ***-**54,

“along with cellular call, texting, photos or other records for the same phone numbers under the

control of T-Mobile all of which constitute evidence of the offense of Aggravated Battery with

Firearm.” The warrant identified “Call Detail Records and cellular site location information” and

“Data Records and cellular site location information” from November 1, 2021, to January 19,

2022, and “Truecall/TDOA/Timing Advance Information” from January 13, 2022, to January 19,

2022. The warrant further outlined the following categories of records and information (as

requested in the complaint): (1) all customer information, including all customer identifying

information; (2) the date, time, and location of where the device was purchased; (3) any e-mail

address associated with the account; (4) call detail records in reference to all known outgoing

and incoming calls, the dates and times the calls were made, and the duration of all calls made or

received, as well as any records showing text messages or other data activity; (5) if requested,

subscriber information for other T-Mobile customers identified in incoming or outgoing calls;

(6) cell-site information, including all known cell towers associated with incoming and outgoing

calls; (7) cell-site locations for all T-Mobile cell sites and sector information in the regional

market associated with the requested cell-site information; (8) “Pen Register,” meaning “a device

or process which records or decodes dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling information

9 transmitted by an instrument or facility from which a wire or electronic communication is

transmitted, provided, however, that such information shall not include the contents of any

communication,” with a notation to “not provide the Pen Register and only provide the Historical

GPS related information”; (9) location information, including “any estimated or known

Longitude and Latitude of the cellular device’s current location, or approximate location,

information received by cell tower(s) in reference to direction and distance from the tower a

device may be located (timing and triangulation information)” and which could be provided in

the form of historical records; (10) “[a]ll text message and/or MMS messages, including message

content, currently stored in the normal course of business for T-Mobile, to include any cloud

services which allow for the long-term storage of both voicemails and SMS/MMS messages”;

and (11) “Cloud Data, any content that may have been backed up to Cloud Storage for the listed

dates/times.”

¶ 20 B. Motion to Suppress

¶ 21 Defendant filed a pretrial “Motion To Suppress Evidence From Search Of Defendant’s

Phone Records As Search Warrant Was Issued Without Probable Cause,” seeking to suppress:

(1) all cell phone records returned as a result of the warrant; (2) “[a]ll fruits of the poisonous tree

resulting from the use of this cell phone data,” including defendant’s statements and “the vehicle

that was ultimately seized and towed and the firearm ultimately recovered from it”; and (3) “[a]ll

other knowledge and fruits thereof, which is the direct and indirect product of the seizure and

arrest.” Defendant argued that the search warrant amounted to an unlawful “fishing expedition”

that “resulted in the T-Mobile location data, as well as other information, being used to implicate

the Defendant in the shooting.” According to the motion, after obtaining “this information,” JPD

and the Will County Sheriff’s Office “detained the Defendant and [JPD] subjected him to a

10 custodial interrogation with respect to the shooting.” In addition, defendant argued that the good-

faith exception to the exclusionary rule did not apply for two reasons. First, defendant argued

that the evidence presented as a basis to obtain defendant’s phone records “was so limited as to

effectively constitute a ‘bare bones’ search warrant.” Distilled to its essentials, defendant’s

position was that the basis for the warrant was that a vehicle similar to the offending vehicle had

been seen on surveillance video approximately two and a half hours before the shooting and

miles away and that defendant was Facebook friends with Barfield. Specifically, relying upon

maps attached as exhibits to his motion to suppress, defendant argued that the crash occurred at

approximately 3:22 p.m., and the Flock camera hits were at 12:44:57 p.m. at the Cass Street

Bridge (5.5 miles from the shooting) traveling westbound, and at 12:52:30 p.m. at the

McDonough Street Bridge (6.4 miles from the shooting) traveling eastbound—the opposite

direction from the shooting. Second, defendant argued that the good-faith exception did not

apply because the warrant was “so facially deficient that the executing officers cannot reasonably

presume it to be valid.” Specifically, defendant argued that, despite German’s claim that

evidence of “other shootings linked to Levelle Barfield” could be found on defendant’s phone,

there was “no indication, hunch or otherwise, that [defendant’s] phone would be linked to the

shootings Detectives asserted may have been committed by Levelle Barfield.” Moreover,

defendant asserted that “the scope of the search warrant was not narrowly tailored and asked for

all of his cell phone information.”

¶ 22 The State responded that there was probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant,

given that the vehicles in the Flock images and Rise surveillance were the same. According to

the State, German used very specific criteria to identify defendant’s car on the Flock cameras,

i.e., any black 2016-2018 Chevrolet Malibu vehicles with tinted windows and black rims that

11 matched the offender vehicle. The search yielded only one matching vehicle—defendant’s

Malibu, which, like the offending vehicle, also appeared to be dirty with snow and salt on the

passenger side. Further, defendant’s Facebook account reflected that he was Facebook friends

with Barfield, whom Walker identified as being the passenger in the offending vehicle. The State

also acknowledged in its response that “[t]he complaint also detailed approximately 4 pages of

information for 3 unrelated shootings that police suspected Levelle Barefield [sic] to be involved

in.”

¶ 23 Regarding the scope of the records requested, the State argued:

“Another of defendant’s complaints appears to be that the search warrant was

overbroad, in that it requested certain data from the cell phones[;] however, save for

listing the data requested, defendant makes no assertion why this request is overbroad.

The plain language of the warrant issued in this case limits the scope of the search to

specific file types and to evidence related to the offense with which the defendant was

charged. The fourth amendment’s particularity requirement with respect to cell phones

may be satisfied by describing the ‘nature of the items to be searched for *** without

precise specification of file names or locations.’ People v. Zarif, 2023 IL App (3d)

210176-U, ¶ 32. The items described in the search warrant sought by police in this case

were, therefore, particular to the crime under investigation. Thus, the search warrant

issued in this case met the fourth amendment’s particularity requirements and the

warrant’s scope was not overly broad.”

¶ 24 The State also argued that, to the extent defendant challenged the search warrant as

overbroad, the warrant was not in fact overbroad since its scope was limited to specific file types

and evidence related to the offense with which defendant was charged. In addition, the State

12 argued that, even if the trial court disagreed that the warrant was supported by probable cause,

the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule precluded suppression of the evidence. The

State disputed that the warrant and affidavit were bare-bones or that the officers unreasonably

relied on the warrant, given the supporting information alleged.

¶ 25 Following argument, on June 21, 2024, the trial court first recounted “[t]he connection in

the search warrant, from what I can see,” including (1) “they connect your client to [Barfield]

due to the fact that your—the car was registered to the defendant and Tiffany Terrell”;

(2) defendant and Barfield were Facebook friends; (3) “[t]here was a CS that said something

about Barefield [sic] known to be seen in a black sedan as opposed to actually seeing them”;

(4) the car used in the shooting of Walker was a black sedan; (5) three hours after the shooting,

Walker described the car and stated her belief that the front passenger was Barfield and that there

were two black makes in the car but “no ID on who was driving the car” and “[d]idn’t see a

gun”; (6) defendant co-owned a similar car with a female; and (7) the car registered to defendant

and Tiffany was seen traveling west on Cass Street and east at the McDonough Street bridge at

12:44 p.m., and 12:52 p.m., respectively. The trial court concluded that, “based upon all the

evidence and arguments on this four corner motion, I find that there was no probable cause to

issue the warrant as to [defendant’s] phone records based upon what’s in the four corners of this

search warrant.” Accordingly, the trial court entered an order finding that “there was no probable

cause to issue search warrant for the T-Mobile phone records relating to the phone number

attributed to [defendant],” granting defendant’s motion to suppress, and holding that “any phone

13 records obtained from the search warrant shall be excluded from trial and future hearings, limited

to this Defendant’s records only.” 2

¶ 26 The State filed a motion to reconsider, reiterating its argument that there was probable

cause to issue the warrant and that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied. The

State argued that an affidavit in support of a search warrant is presumed valid and that the trial

court failed to show proper deference to the warrant-issuing judge’s probable cause

determination. The State also requested that the trial court consider the original search warrant,

which included color photographs of the offending vehicle and the vehicle in the Flock images,

rather than the copy, which had contained only black and white copies of the photographs. The

trial court ultimately agreed to do so.

¶ 27 In opposition to the motion to reconsider, defendant argued that the trial court properly

determined that there was no probable cause for a search of defendant’s phone records.

Defendant maintained there was not a substantial basis for concluding that evidence of the

shooting would be contained in defendant’s cell phone records and that the complaint for search

warrant attempted to establish probable cause for the January 15, 2022, shooting by alleging a

connection to Barfield and the Ruth Fitzgerald Drive shootings. Defendant also reiterated that the

good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule did not apply because German’s complaint was

bare-bones and because the warrant was so facially deficient that the executing officers could not

reasonably presume its validity. Defendant further argued that—given the stated purpose of

requesting phone records from November 1, 2021, to January 19, 2021, to establish an accurate

and reliable frequency report regarding call patterns and location information—the scope of the

2 The trial court’s ruling did not address defendant’s request to suppress evidence related to the search of defendant’s car and defendant’s statements as fruit of the poisonous tree. 14 search warrant was exceedingly broad in its request for all the delineated categories of data.

According to defendant,

“the Detectives attempted to obtain and read Defendant’s text messages, data activity

including internet activity, and call data in addition to location data. This shows a

disregard for the protections of the Constitution and suggests that Officers did not

reasonably believe they had probable cause for all of Defendant’s cell phone records.”

Moreover, defendant asserted that the timeframe for the request began on November 1, 2021,

because information about unrelated shootings was included in the application.

¶ 28 Following briefing and argument, on August 27, 2024, the trial court denied the State’s

motion to reconsider. The trial court noted that it had given “great deference” to the warrant-

issuing judge’s decision but that there was no probable cause for the warrant. The trial court

reasoned that the information in the complaint about the other shootings, which comprised “I

don’t know, 50, 60 percent of the search warrant” and “had nothing to do with this defendant,”

had “confused everything” and “obscured the whole warrant.” Moreover, the trial court held that

the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule did not apply because the warrant was based on

an affidavit that was bare-bones such that it was unreasonable to believe that there was probable

cause. The trial court noted that it was a “great warrant” for Barfield, given “he’s all over there.”

However, the trial court found that, “as far as this defendant, the only thing that I see that he even

has anything to do with the defendant [sic], that he’s one of two owners of the car that most

likely or possibly was involved” and that he was Facebook friends with Barfield. The trial court

pointed out that, while there was a search on the Flock cameras for four days, “the only time that

car shows up is two hours before the alleged shooting near the mall.” Accordingly, the trial court

denied reconsideration of its order granting defendant’s motion to suppress.

15 ¶ 29 The State filed a certificate of impairment and notice of appeal pursuant to Illinois

Supreme Court Rule 604(a)(1) (eff. Apr. 15, 2024).

¶ 30 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 31 On appeal, the State argues that the trial court’s probable cause determination was

erroneous and that, even if the complaint for search warrant and accompanying affidavit lacked

sufficient facts to support probable cause, the evidence was admissible under the good-faith

exception to the exclusionary rule. As explained below, we agree that there was probable cause

to search defendant’s phone records regarding the January 15, 2022, shooting. However, we

disagree that there was probable cause as to the Ruth Fitzgerald Drive shootings and further hold

that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule does not apply to evidence relating to the

Ruth Fitzgerald Drive shootings.

¶ 32 The fourth amendment of the United States Constitution and article I, section 6 of the

Illinois Constitution of 1970 protect the right of individuals to be free from unreasonable

searches and seizures and require that search warrants be supported by probable cause. U.S.

Const., amend. IV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 6. A detached judicial officer must resolve whether

there is sufficient probable cause to justify the issuance of a search warrant. People v. Manzo,

2018 IL 122761, ¶ 29. A sworn complaint in support of a search warrant is presumed valid, and

the resolution of “doubtful or marginal cases” should be resolved by the preference for searches

based on warrants. Id. ¶¶ 31-32. A “reviewing court must not substitute its judgment for that of

the magistrate in construing an affidavit but must instead merely decide whether the magistrate

had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed.” Id. ¶ 31 (citing People v.

McCarty, 223 Ill. 2d 109, 153 (2006)).

16 ¶ 33 Probable cause exists if the totality of the facts and circumstances known to the affiant at

the time of application is sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that the

law was violated and that evidence of the offense is at the location to be searched. Id. ¶ 29. There

must be an established nexus, which may be drawn by reasonable inferences, between the place

to be searched and the evidence sought. Id. ¶ 35; People v. Rojas, 2013 IL App (1st) 113780,

¶ 15. The standard for determining the existence of probable cause is the probability of criminal

activity rather than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Manzo, 2018 IL 122761, ¶ 29. “Whether

the necessary probability exists is governed by commonsense considerations that are factual and

practical, rather than by technical rules.” Id. ¶ 30. In addition to the requirement that a warrant be

supported by probable cause, the warrant must include a particularized descriptions of “ ‘the

place to be searched’ ” and “ ‘the persons or things to be seized.’ ” People v. McCavitt, 2021 IL

125550, ¶ 56 (quoting U.S. Const., amend. IV).

¶ 34 A trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence presents questions of both fact and

law. Manzo, 2018 IL 122761, ¶ 25. We will not reverse the trial court’s findings of fact unless

they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. Id. We review de novo the issue of whether

the trial court properly granted a motion to quash a search warrant and suppress evidence. Id.

Here, there was no evidentiary hearing, and we are in essentially the same position as the trial

court; thus, we review the order granting the motion to suppress de novo. See Rojas, 2013 IL

App (1st) 113780, ¶ 16 (“[B]ecause there was no evidentiary hearing on the defense motion, and

we are essentially presented with the same complaint and search warrant as the trial court, our

review of the order granting the motion to suppress is de novo.”). Our review of the magistrate’s

decision to issue the search warrant remains deferential. Id.

17 ¶ 35 We turn first to the State’s argument that the trial court erred because the facts set forth in

the complaint for search warrant and affidavit sufficiently established probable cause to search

defendant’s phone records. In setting forth the totality of the facts and circumstances presented to

the warrant-issuing judge, the State highlights the distinctive similarities between the offending

vehicle and the vehicle that was seen in the Flock images. Defendant counters that the

connection between the two vehicles was “tenuous at best.” According to defendant, Walker and

Nabors did not identify the license plate number of the offending vehicle; a Chevrolet Malibu is

a common make and model; and the mere fact that a vehicle similar to the offending vehicle was

seen approximately two and half hours before the shooting, at locations 5.5 miles and 6.4 miles

away, and in a densely populated area, was insufficient to establish that the vehicles were the

same.

¶ 36 While the license plate number was not identified, the police officers conducted a focused

investigation in their search for the offending vehicle. As German averred, the criteria to search

for the offending vehicle in the Flock images was particularized—a black 2016-2018 Chevrolet

Malibu vehicle with tinted windows, black rims, and “unique features such as chrome rear

window trim which comes to a point unlike a Chevrolet Impala which has a different window

trim” and a certain fog light that was only made between 2016 and 2018. German compared the

results from the search of the Flock images, yielding hundreds of vehicles for the four-day time

period of the search, and located only one with features similar to those of the offending vehicle.

The vehicle identified also appeared to be dirty with snow and salt on the passenger side—again,

consistent with that of the offending vehicle. Based upon these similarities, and notwithstanding

that the Flock images of defendant’s vehicle were captured approximately two and a half hours

18 earlier some five to six miles away from the location of the incident, it was reasonable to

conclude that defendant’s vehicle was the offending vehicle.

¶ 37 Assuming for the sake of analysis that his car was the offending vehicle, defendant

argues it was unreasonable to assume that he was in the vehicle at the time of the incident

because he co-owned the Malibu with Tiffany Terrell and he was not identified as being in the

vehicle. However, German’s affidavit recounted Walker’s statement that she observed two black

male occupants in the offending vehicle, and defendant does not dispute that he was the only

male owner. As the State argues, it is a commonsense inference that a vehicle’s owner is its

driver (see Kansas v. Glover, 589 U.S. 376, 381 (2020); Village of Lake in the Hills v. Lloyd, 227

Ill. App. 3d 351, 353 (1992); People v. Barnes, 152 Ill. App. 3d 1004, 1006 (1987)).

Furthermore, defendant’s Facebook account reflected that he was Facebook friends with

Barfield, whom Walker identified as being the passenger in the offending vehicle. As for

defendant’s suggestion that the dark tinted windows precluded Walker from identifying the

occupants in the offending vehicle as black males and one of the occupants as Barfield,

German’s affidavit recounted Walker’s statement that she made these identifications. We accept

these statements by Walker because, absent evidence challenging its veracity, the information set

forth in a sworn complaint seeking a search warrant is presumed true. See McCarty, 223 Ill. 2d at

154 (citing People v. Gardner, 121 Ill. App. 3d 464, 467 (1984)). Under these circumstances, it

was reasonable to assume defendant was in his vehicle at the time of the shooting.

¶ 38 Finally, defendant maintains that, even if the above facts established that he was present

in the offending vehicle at the time of the shooting, the complaining officer improperly assumed

that he was in possession of his cell phone at the time and that his phone records contained

evidence of the offense. We disagree. Initially, it is a reasonable, commonsense inference that

19 defendant was in possession of his cell phone while in his car. See Riley v. California, 573 U.S.

373, 395 (2014) (“Now it is the person who is not carrying a cell phone, with all that it contains,

who is the exception.”). Moreover, German’s affidavit reflects more than an assumption that the

cell phone records would show evidence related to the January 15, 2022, shooting, stating that,

based upon his training and experience, obtaining a subject’s cell phone records and call detail

records may assist in determining the location of the mobile device, routes of travel, and

communication to other involved individuals.

¶ 39 In this regard, we parenthetically note defendant’s contention (argued in the context that

the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule does not apply) that the warrant authorized a

search “into the entire contents of [defendant’s] cell phone records for an approximately 14 and a

half month time period.” This assertion is factually inaccurate. The search warrant authorized

call detail records, data records and cellular site location information for the less than three-

month time period from November 1, 2021, to January 19, 2022, and “Truecall/TDOA/Timing

Advance Information” for the one-week time period from January 13, 2022, to January 19, 2022.

We further note that, in response to defendant’s contention, the State cites the unpublished order

in People v. Weis, 2022 IL App (5th) 210076-U. There, the court rejected the defendant’s

overbreadth challenge to a warrant that authorized a search for, inter alia, “ ‘all data within’ ” the

defendant’s phone and “ ‘any or all’ ” things that were “ ‘used in the commission of or may

constitute evidence of the offense(s) in connected with which this warrant is issued, being

Criminal Sexual Assault,’ ” as the language was no more broad than that found permissible in

United States v. Bishop, 910 F.3d 335, 336 (7th Cir. 2018), allowing a search warrant “to look at

every file on [the defendant’s] phone” to search for evidence related to the crimes listed in the

warrant. Weis, 2022 IL App (5th) 210076-U, ¶¶ 61-62 (citing Bishop, 910 F.3d at 336-37).

20 ¶ 40 Accordingly, as to the January 15, 2022, shooting, we agree with the State that the

totality of the facts and circumstances presented to the warrant-issuing judge were sufficient to

lead a person of reasonable caution to believe that the law was violated and that evidence of the

offense would be found in defendant’s cell phone records. See Manzo, 2018 IL 122761, ¶ 29.

Keeping in mind the preference for searches based on warrants and according due deference to

the warrant-issuing judge’s determination, we hold that the judge was provided with a substantial

basis to conclude that there was probable cause for issuance of the search warrant as it relates to

the January 15, 2022, shooting.

¶ 41 While we have concluded that there was probable cause as it relates to the January 15,

2022, shooting, we reach the opposite conclusion as it relates to the search of defendant’s cell

phone records concerning the Ruth Fitzgerald Drive shootings. German’s complaint for search

warrant stated that defendant’s cell phone records would show evidence related not just to the

January 15, 2022, shooting, but also to the November 7, 2021, December 7, 2021, and January

18, 2022, shootings on Ruth Fitzgerald Drive. He therefore requested the records from

November 1, 2021, to January 19, 2022, to establish a frequency report regarding call patterns

and location information. In turn, the warrant identified “Call Detail Records and cellular site

location information” and “Data Records and cellular site location information” from November

1, 2021 (six days before the first Ruth Fitzgerald Drive shooting but over two months before the

January 15, 2022, shooting) to January 19, 2022, and “Truecall/TDOA/Timing Advance

Information” from January 13, 2022, to January 19, 2022. Yet the affidavit established no

connection between defendant and the Ruth Fitzgerald Drive shootings, and the State makes no

persuasive argument that there is any nexus between defendant’s cell phone records and the Ruth

Fitzgerald Drive shootings. Thus, the judge was not provided with a substantial basis to conclude

21 that there was probable cause for issuance of the search warrant as it relates to the Ruth

Fitzgerald Drive shootings.

¶ 42 The State argues that, even if this court were to hold that the search warrant was not

supported by probable cause, the evidence was nonetheless admissible because the officers relied

in good faith on the search warrant. We address this argument as it pertains to issuance of a

search warrant relating to the Ruth Fitzgerald Drive shootings.

¶ 43 The exclusionary rule provides for suppression of evidence obtained in violation of the

protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. Rojas, 2013 IL App (1st) 113780, ¶ 15

(citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984), and citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,

654 (1961)). The purpose of the rule is to deter law enforcement from recklessly preparing

search warrant affidavits and obtaining warrants based on false or misleading information. Id.

However, the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule prevents suppression of evidence

obtained by a police officer acting in objectively reasonable reliance on a facially valid warrant

later found invalid for lack of probable cause. Manzo, 2018 IL 122761, ¶ 63; see 725 ILCS

5/114-12(b)(1) (West 2022) (a court should not suppress otherwise admissible evidence if a

police officer seized the evidence in good faith); id. § 114-12(b)(2)(i) (“ ‘[g]ood faith’ ” means

whenever a peace officer obtains evidence “pursuant to a search or an arrest warrant obtained

from a neutral and detached judge, which warrant is free from obvious defects other than non-

deliberate errors in preparation and contains no material misrepresentation by any agent of the

State, and the officer reasonably believed the warrant to be valid”). For this reason, a police

officer’s decision to obtain a search warrant “ ‘is prima facie evidence that he was acting in good

faith.’ ” People v. Bryant, 389 Ill. App. 3d 500, 525 (2009) (quoting United States v. Peck, 317

F.3d 754, 757 (7th Cir. 2003)).

22 ¶ 44 To rebut the prima facie evidence of good faith, a defendant must demonstrate that “ ‘the

magistrate simply rubber-stamped the warrant application, the officers were dishonest or reckless

in preparing the affidavit, or the warrant was so lacking in probable cause that no officer could

have relied on it.’ ” Id. (quoting Peck, 317 F.3d at 757). Here, defendant argues, inter alia, that

the affidavit is so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence

entirely unreasonable. See Manzo, 2018 IL 122761, ¶ 64 (citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 923). A police

officer may not “ ‘obtain a warrant on the basis of a “bare bones” affidavit and then rely on

colleagues who are ignorant of the circumstances under which the warrant was obtained to

conduct the search.’ ” Id. (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 923 n.24). A bare-bones affidavit is “ ‘one

that states only “suspicions, beliefs, or conclusions, without providing some underlying factual

circumstances regarding veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge.” ’ ” Id. ¶ 67 (quoting

United States v. White, 874 F.3d 490, 496 (6th Cir. 2017), quoting United States v. Laughton,

409 F.3d 744, 748 (6th Cir. 2005)).

¶ 45 As it pertains to issuance of a search warrant relating to the Ruth Fitzgerald Drive

shootings, the warrant was based on an affidavit that was bare bones such that it was

unreasonable to believe that there was probable cause. In reaching this conclusion, we consider a

line of cases, including Rojas, where the appellate court rejected the State’s argument that the

good-faith exception applied to the search of the defendant’s home. Rojas, 2013 IL App (1st)

113780, ¶ 22. The State in Rojas asserted that the complaint was not bare bones because “ ‘it set

forth details of an extensive investigation and described the affiant agent’s considerable

experience,’ together with evidence of defendant’s ongoing criminal activity” and, thus, the

officer’s belief in the validity of the warrant was not unreasonable. Id. In concluding otherwise,

the appellate court held, “While the 20-page complaint is not bare-bones in and of itself, it is

23 bare-bones with regard to defendant’s Cromwell address. As stated, the nearly two pages of

‘probable cause’ evidence attempting to create a nexus between defendant’s criminal drug

trafficking activity and his family’s Cromwell home was entirely lacking.” (Emphasis in

original.) Id.

¶ 46 Similarly, here, the lengthy complaint presented no factual basis for concluding that

evidence of the Ruth Fitzgerald Drive shootings would be found in defendant’s cell phone

records; at best, it only established a connection between Barfield and the Ruth Fitzgerald Drive

shootings. Thus, as it pertains to issuance of a search warrant for defendant’s phone relating to

the Ruth Fitzgerald Drive shootings, the warrant was based on an affidavit that was bare bones

such that it was unreasonable to believe that there was probable cause. Accordingly, we reject

the State’s reliance on the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule for the evidence relating

to the Ruth Fitzgerald Drive portion of the warrant. Having so concluded, we do not reach

defendant’s alternative arguments for why the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule

should not apply.

¶ 47 Notwithstanding, the State urges that, “[s]hould this court find that any part of the

warrant was invalid, the remainder of the warrant would remain valid and items not tainted by

the invalid portions should not be suppressed.” In support, the State cites People v. Zarif, 2023

IL App (3d) 210176-U, ¶ 35 (“The partial invalidity of a warrant does not taint the entire

warrant, and the invalid portion can be extracted from the warrant and the tainted items

suppressed.” (citing People v. McCoy, 135 Ill. App. 3d 1059, 1067 (1985) (same))). Ultimately,

the State requests a remand for the trial court to identify which portions of the warrant were

invalid and “what evidence related to valid portions and thus need not be suppressed.” Defendant

counters that the State forfeited this argument by failing to raise it in the trial court and by failing

24 to develop the argument in its opening brief in violation of Illinois Supreme Court Rule

341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020). The State disagrees that it forfeited the argument, noting, inter alia,

that it had no occasion to make this request in the trial court, since the trial court did not base its

holding on overbreadth of the warrant. According to the State, “[t]here was no determination

made by the trial court that any part of the warrant was overly broad, so there was no explicit

determination that evidence like location data was not within a proper scope.”

¶ 48 We agree with the State and decline to find forfeiture. While the State did not squarely

seek a determination as to the partial validity of the warrant, the State made a similar argument in

response to defendant’s overbreadth claim below. See Brunton v. Kruger, 2015 IL 117663, ¶ 76

(“We require parties to preserve issues or claims for appeal; we do not require them to limit their

arguments here to the same arguments that were made below.”). Namely, the State addressed the

scope of the records requested in arguing that the items sought in the search warrant met the

fourth amendment’s particularity requirement, citing Zarif, 2023 IL App (3d) 210176-U—the

same (unpublished) order upon which it now relies in support of its argument regarding the

partial validity of a warrant and request for a remand.

¶ 49 Moreover, the doctrine of severance and its availability as a remedy is well established.

As the appellate court in McCoy noted, “[I]t is generally held that partial invalidity of a search

warrant does not taint the whole warrant.” McCoy, 135 Ill. App. 3d at 1067 (citing People v.

Hellemeyer, 28 Ill. App. 3d 491, 497-98 (1975)); accord People v. Cooke, 299 Ill. App. 3d 273,

280 (1998). Rather than quashing a search warrant in its entirety, “[a] court will just sever the

tainted part from the rest of the warrant,” with “[t]he only apparent condition [being] that the

scope of the search pursuant to a severed warrant must be limited to only the untainted items.”

25 McCoy, 135 Ill. App. 3d at 1067-68 (citing 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 4.6(f), at

111-12 (1978)).

¶ 50 Hellemeyer is illustrative. There, the appellate court rejected the argument that the entire

search warrant was invalid where the complaint established probable cause to believe that items

stolen from a particular tavern may be found in the defendant’s car, albeit not items stolen from

certain other taverns. Hellemeyer, 28 Ill. App. 3d at 497-98. Similarly, here, as discussed infra,

excising the Ruth Fitzgerald Drive shootings from the search warrant complaint, there was

probable cause to search defendant’s cell phone records as requested relating to the January 15,

2022, shooting. The partial invalidity of the search warrant for defendant’s phone records related

to the Ruth Fitzgerald Drive shootings does not require that the entire search warrant be quashed.

Rather, the appropriate remedy is a remand for the trial court to determine what evidence relates

to the January 15, 2022, shooting and what evidence relates to the Ruth Fitzgerald Drive

shootings, after which the trial court shall suppress only the Ruth Fitzgerald Drive evidence.

¶ 51 In sum, we hold that there was probable cause to search defendant’s phone records

regarding the January 15, 2022, shooting. However, there was no probable cause as to the Ruth

Fitzgerald Drive shootings, and the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule does not apply

to evidence relating to the Ruth Fitzgerald Drive shootings. Accordingly, we remand for the trial

court to determine what evidence relates to the January 15, 2022, shooting and what evidence

relates to the Ruth Fitzgerald Drive shootings, after which the trial court shall suppress only the

Ruth Fitzgerald Drive evidence.

26 ¶ 52 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 53 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of the

circuit court of Will County and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this

order.

¶ 54 Affirmed in part and reversed in part; cause remanded.

27 People v. Terrell, 2025 IL App (3d) 240567

Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Will County, No. 22-CF-123; the Hon. Amy M. Bertani-Tomczak, Judge, presiding.

Attorneys James W. Glasgow, State’s Attorney, of Joliet (Patrick Delfino, for Thomas D. Arado, and Laura Bialon, of State’s Attorneys Appellant: Appellate Prosecutor’s Office, of counsel), for the People.

Attorneys James E. Chadd, Santiago A. Durango, and Andrew J. Boyd, of for State Appellate Defender’s Office, of Ottawa, for appellee. Appellee: