People v. Terdeman

175 Misc. 2d 379, 669 N.Y.S.2d 136, 1997 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 644
Criminal Court of the City of New York·Decided November 13, 1997·Published·Cited by 7 cases

Opinion

OPINION OF THE COURT

Jeffrey D. Lebowitz, J.

On October 10, 1997, a sex offender registration (Megan’s Law) hearing was conducted in Part AP-4 to determine defendant’s risk classification for purposes of his registration as a sex offender. The People contend that defendant is a level 2 (moderate) risk of repeat offense and danger to the community while defendant contends that he is a level 1 (low) risk.

The court’s findings of fact and risk assessment are as follows:

PROCEDURAL AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

On August 11, 1997, defendant pleaded guilty to Penal Law §§ 110.00 and 130.25 (2), attempted rape in the third degree, a class A misdemeanor, for engaging in sexual intercourse with the victim when she was 16 years old and the defendant was 45 years old. As such, defendant is defined as a sex offender and is subject to the notification procedures set forth in the New York Sex Offender Registration Act (hereinafter the Act). (Correction Law, art 6-C, § 168 et seq.) .

The Act is New York’s version of Megan’s Law, which was adopted in New Jersey after seven-year-old Megan Kanka was abducted, sexually assaulted and murdered by a neighbor who was a repeat sex offender. The Act provides for three levels of risk classification depending upon the offender’s danger to the community: level 1 (low risk), level 2 (moderate risk), and level [381]*3813 (high risk) (Risk Assessment Guidelines and Commentary, at 1 [1996 ed]). The offender’s risk level determines the amount of information that can be disseminated about him to law enforcement personnel or to the public, or both, under the Act’s notification procedures.

Under the Act, the Board of Examiners of Sex Offenders1 promulgated an objective “Sex Offender Risk Assessment Instrument” to be utilized by the courts in determining a “presumptive risk level”. (Risk Assessment Guidelines and Commentary, at 3-7; Correction Law § 168-Z [5].) The risk assessment instrument assigns numerical values to specific risk factors under the topical headings: Current Offense(s); Criminal History; Post-Offense Behavior; and Release Environment. A presumptive risk level is calculated by adding the total number of points scored in each category. If the total score is 70 points or less, the offender is presumptively level 1; if more than 70 but less than 100, he is presumptively level 2; if 110 or more, he is presumptively level 3. (Risk Assessment Guidelines and Commentary, at 3.)

RISK ASSESSMENT

In the case at bar, a sentence of incarceration is not being imposed;2 therefore, the court is required, pursuant to the Act, to independently determine the duration of registration and level of notification appropriate for this defendant. (Correction Law § 168-d [3].) On October 10, 1997, the court conducted a Megan’s Law hearing where the defendant, defense counsel and the prosecutor were present. Each side was afforded the opportunity to argue and present evidence.

In accordance with the Act, the victim was allowed to make a statement and the defendant was given the opportunity to be heard and to submit materials relevant to the court’s determination. (Correction Law § 168-d [3].) The victim made a victim impact statement in open court. The defendant declined the opportunity to be heard on the issue but offered the testimony of his wife, Florence Terdeman, to establish the nature of [382] defendant’s relationship with the victim. The People ware permitted to cross-examine defendant’s wife. Additionally, defendant presented two letters, purportedly from the victim, to support defendant’s argument that the relationship between the defendant and the victim was familial in nature. In making its determination, the court has reviewed the evidence and arguments set forth at the hearing, as well as the court file, the probation report and defendant’s memorandum of law. (See, Risk Assessment Guidelines and Commentary, at 5.)

At the commencement of the hearing, both sides informed the court that they had stipulated to scores for all factors in the risk assessment instrument except two: factor four, “duration of offense conduct with victim” (continuing course of sexual misconduct), and factor seven, “relationship with victim” (stranger or established for the purpose of victimizing or professional relationship). (Hearing transcript, at 3-6.) The People contend that defendant is a level 2 (moderate) risk, with a total score of 85; while the defendant contends that he is a level 1 (low) risk, with a total score of 45 points. The contested factors, four and seven, are valued at 20 points each.

The court has reviewed the undisputed factors and finds no reason to disturb the stipulation of the parties: the agreed upon scores have a rational basis in fact and comport with the Guidelines. The only issue remaining before the court, therefore, is whether there is clear and convincing evidence of the existence of the two contested factors. (Risk Assessment Guidelines and Commentary, at 6.) The court has utilized the Risk Assessment Guidelines and Commentary in making the following determination.3

FACTOR four: DURATION OF OFFENSE CONDUCT WITH VICTIM

Factor four of the risk assessment instrument assesses points if the offender “engaged in a continuing course of sexual misconduct with at least one victim”. According to the Guidelines, “[t]his category is designed to reflect the fact that some offenders, particularly those who prey on young children, [383] manifest their compulsive behavior by engaging in a continuing course of sexual misconduct with the same victim.” (Risk Assessment Guidelines and Commentary, at 10.)

Defendant contends that he should not be assessed points in this category because he pleaded guilty to “one charge and one incident only,” which took place on February 26, 1993, and that his plea restricts a finding of continuous conduct. (Defendant’s mem, at 4.) Defendant further contends that this factor is inapplicable to him because “there has been no demonstration to this Court by clear and convincing evidence that there have [sic] been any other sexual misconduct committed by the Defendant since February 1993.” (Defendant’s mem, at 4.)

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People v. Terdeman, 175 Misc. 2d 379, 669 N.Y.S.2d 136, 1997 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 644 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1997).

175 Misc. 2d 379 (People v. Terdeman) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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