People v. Taman

Opinion

FILED SUPFRIOR COURT ·-··. OF GUAM IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF GUAM --· .... __,.,-- ~~;1; , ,.,~ ~::: :ti !ffO - 2 THE PEOPLE OF GUAM, ) 3 ) 4 vs. ) ) ' CANDIDO STEVEN TAMAN, ) ) 6 Defendant. ) 7 11-------------~) 8 INTRODUCTION 9 This matter came before the Honorable James L. Canto II on Defendant's motion to 10 suppress, filed September 27,2012. Oral arguments were heard on Oetober 15,2012. Assistant ll Attorney General Gabrielle L. Rossi appeared on behalf of the Government and Assistant Public 12 Defender Suresh Sampath represented Defendant. On December 20, 2012, the Court issued a 13 Decision and Order granting Defendant's motion to suppress. On November 8, 2013, the 14 Supreme Court of Guam reversed the Court's decision and remanded the matter for the Court to " determine whether Defendant's motion should be granted after a review of the factual record 16 consistent with the Supreme Court of Guam's interpretation of Guam's Stop and Frisk Act. On 17 February 14,2014, the Government, the party having the burden of proof for the motion, filed a 18 notice that it relies upon the evidence presented at the initial suppression hearing for purposes of 19 determining the remanded issues. Having considered the parties' briefs, oral arguments, the 20 applicable law, and People v. Taman, 2013 Guam 22, the Court now issues the following 21 Decision and Order. 22 BACKGROUND 23 Defendant is charged with driving under the influence of alcohol and driving without a 24 license based upon the following alleged events. On November 25, 2011, Guam Police Officer 2S Jesse J. Mendiola responded to the scene of Defendant's traffic accident. (Testimony of Jesse J. 26 Mendiola, Record Log at 2:59, Oct. 15, 2012). Officer Mendiola stopped and questioned 27 Defendant about the accident at approximately 2:32 a.m. ld. Officer Mendiola observed that 28

Pagelof8 Defendant had bloodshOk\V!!t~ry eyes, slurred speech and smelled of alcohol. Id.,,At)-:37 a.m., 2 Defendant affirmed that he consumed alcohol before his accident, but he could not remember 3 how much beer he had to drink. /d. 4 At 2:45 a.m., Officer Mendiola asked Defendant to participate in a standardized flied 5 sobriety test. Id. Defendant failed the sobriety test and was placed under arrest in handcuffs at 6 some time near 3:00 a.m. !d. Defendant did not have his driver's license with him. ld. 1 Defendant was transported to the Precinct Station where he was advised of his rights which he 8 waived by signing a custodial interrogation form before he made statements to the police. /d. 9 On September 27, 2012, Defendant moved to suppress all evidence obtained from the to investigative detention because it lasted longer than fifteen (15) minutes in violation of 8 GCA § 11 30.30. Defendant asserted that his initial detention was an unreasonable seizure and that all 12 evidence obtained during or as a result of the seizure must be suppressed. t3 The Government opposed suppression on the bases that: 1) a detention did not occur; (2) 14 Defendant consented to an extended detention when he participated in field sobriety tests; 3) 15 probable cause to arrest appeared before 15 minutes of alleged detention; 4) suppression should

16 be limited to evidence obtained after 15 minutes of detention and before arrest; and 5) evidence 11 obtained after the voluntary waiver of rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) is 18 attenuated from an unreasonable detention and admissible. 19 On December 20, 2012, the Court issued a Decision and Order granting Defendant's 20 motion to suppress and holding that all evidence obtained from the onset of detention until his 21 waiver of custodial interrogation rights shall not be admissible against Defendant. (Dec. & 22 Order, 9, Dec. 20, 2012). 23 On November 8, 2013, the Supreme Court of Guam in People v. Taman, 2013 Guam 22 24 issned an opinion clarifying 8 GCA §30.30, the "15 minute rule," of Guam's Stop and Frisk 25 Act. The Supreme Court of Guam held, as a matter oflaw, that voluntary consent tolls the 15 26 minute rule and that the development of probable cause obviates that fifteen minute limit 27 imposed by Guam's Stop and Frisk Act on investigative detentions that are supported by 28 reasonable suspicion. People v. Taman, 2013 Guam 2211'\115, 27.

Page 2 of8 -------~'"""- DISCUSSION 2 I. The Stop and Frisk Statutes 3 The Fourth Amendment permits brief investigative detentions that are based upon a 4 reasonable suspicion of illegal conduct. People v. Johnson, 1997 Guam 9 ~ 4 (citing Terry v.

' Ohio. 392 U.S. 1 (1968)). This principle is codified in the "Stop and Fnsk" statutes at 8 GCA 6 Chapter 30. See People v. Cundiff, 2006 Guam 12, 40. 7 Title 8 GCA § 30.10 states: Whenever a peace officer encounters any person under circumstances which 8 reasonably indicate that such person has committed, is committing or is about to 9 commit a criminal offense, the peace officer may detain such person. 10 Title 8 GCA § 30.20 states: II Detention pursuant to§ 30.10 shall he for the purpose of ascertaining the identity of the person detained and the circumstances surroWlding his presence abroad which 12 lead the officer to believe that he had committed, was committing, or was about to 13 commit a criminal offense, but such person shall not be compelled to answer any inquiry of the peace officer. 14

" 16 Title 8 GCA § 30.30 states: No person shall be detained under the provisions of§ 30.10 longer than is reasonably necessary to effect the purposes of that section, and in no event longer than fifteen 17 (I 5) minutes. Such detention shall not extend beyond the place where it was first effected or the immediate vicinity thereof. 18

19 Title 8 GCA § 30.40 states: 20 If at aoy time after the onset of the detention authorized by § 30.1 0, probable cause for arrest of the person shall appear, the person shall he arrested. If after an inquiry 21 into the circumstances which prompted the detention, no probable cause for the arrest of the person shall appear, he shall be released. 22 8 GCA §§ 30.10-30.40 (2005). 23 Thus under Guam law, a police officer having a reasonable suspicion regarding criminal 24 activity by a particular individual may detain that person to investigate said suspected criminal 2S activity. 8 GCA §§ 30.10-30.20 (2005). When this investigative detention reveals probable 26 cause for arrest, "the person shall he arrested." 8 GCA § 30.40 (2005). Although "in no event 27 [shall a person he detained] longer than fifteen (IS) minutes," voluntary consent will toll the 28

Page 3 of8 $1e_-_~it aDd the appearance of probable cause to arres~ _q~~ ihe fifteen minute time limit.

2 8 GCA § 30.30 (2005); Taman, 2013 Guam 22, 30. 3 In order to apply this rule to the present case, the Court must first determine whether 4 there was an investigative detention. Under Guam law, "a person has been seized under the 5 Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all the circumsfiillces surrounding the incident, a 6 reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave." Cundiff, 2006 Guam 12 7 at~ 21 (quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 1877 (1980)).

8 An investigative detention under 8 GCA Chapter 30 is consistent with a Fourth Amendment

9 seizure. See e.g. Cundiff, 2006 Guam 12 at~ 40; Terry, 392 U.S. at 16 (''It must be recognized 10 that whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he 11 has 'seized' that person."). For this reason, an investigative detention occurs when a reasonable 12 person would believe he is not free to leave under the circumstances. In the Decision & Order 13 issued on December 20, 2012, the Court found that Defendant was detained by Officer 14 Mendiola under 8 GCA Chapter 30 at 2:32a.m. because he could not reasonably believe that he 15 was free to disregard Officer Mendiola and walk away without his identification. (Dec. & 16 Order, 6, Dec. 20, 2012). 17 Having determined that there was an investigative detention, the Court must next 18 determine whether Defendant consented to ~Y continued police contact beyond the initial 15 19 minutes of his detention. If Defendant gave voluntary consent to continued police contact, the 20 IS-minute time limit is tolled. Taman, 2013 Guam 22 ~ 15. However, "absent obtaining 21 voluntary consent or establishing probable cause within fifteen minutes from the onset of an 22 investigative detention, an investigative detention exceeding the statutory limit violates Guam's 23 Stop and Frisk Act." ld. at~ 31. 24

25 II. Voluntary Consent 26 The Supreme Court of Guam held that voluntary consent tolls the 15 minute rule. 27 Taman, 2013 Guam 22 ~ 15. "If consent is given during either a lawful encounter or a lawful 28 detention, ... the validity of the consent turns on whether it was voluntarily given." People v.

Page4of8 __..,J Chargualaf, 2001 Guam I ~ 15. The Gove~tbas ihe burden to prove by a preponderance 2 of the evidence that a defendant gave consent voluntarily, and voluntariness is determined from 3 the totality of the circumstances. /d. at , 25. To determine whether consent was given 4 voluntarily, the Supreme Court of Guam has instructed to consider the following factors: 5 I) whether the defendant was detained and the length of time of the questioning; 6 2) whether the defendant was threatened or intimidated by the police; 3) whether the defendant relied on misrepresentations or promises made by the police; 4) 7 whether the person was in custody or under arrest when the consent was given; 5) whether the person was in a public or a secluded place; and 6) whether the 8 defendant objected to the search. 9 Id. (citing People v. Santos, 1999 Guam I ~ 36). 10 In this case, Officer Mendiola asked Defendant "[a]re you willing to ... submit to a 11 standardized field sobriety test" and Defendant agreed to the test before he was arrested. (Tr. of 12 Hearing on Mot. Suppress, 12-13, Oct. 15, 2012). Officer Mendiola indicated that the test was 13 voluntary and did not threaten Defendant in aoy way. ld. at 12. He did not place his hands on 14 Defendant as to physically prevent him from leaving. !d. at 13. The test was administered at 15 approximately 2:45 a.m., 13 minutes from the initial contact. Id. The test was conducted at the 16 scene of the accident at the intersection of Route I and 14, a public place. Id. at 10-13. The test 17 lasted for approximately 15 minutes and concluded at 3:00 a.m. /d. at 23. 18 Considering that (I) Defendant was detained and the test lasted for approximately 15 19 minutes; (2) Defendant was neither threatened nor intimidated by Officer Mendiola, (3) no 20 evidence was presented to show that Defendant relied on misrepresentations or promises made 21 by Officer Mendiola, (4) Defendant was neither in cnstody nor under arrest when the consent 22 was given; (5) Defendaot was in a public place; and (6) Defendant consented to the search; the 23 Court finds that Defendant gave voluntary consent to the standardized field sobriety test. 24 Chargua/af, 2001 Guam I ~ 15. Fnrthermore, Defendant voluntarily consented to the test 25 within 15 minutes of the initial detention. Therefore, Defendant's voluntary consent tolled the 26 15 minute rule. Taman, 2013 Guam 22 ~ 15. Because Defendant was arrested after the 27 completion of the standardized field sobriety test, the Court holds that there was no violation of 28 the 15 minute rule.

Page 5 of8 III. Probable Cause ----~-

2 Out of an abundance of caution, the Court will analyze whether police had probable 3 cause to arrest Defendant. This is because, despite the tolling of the 15-minute rule by 4 Defendant's consent to a longer police detention, the police officer must at some reasonable 5 point in time ascertain sufficient probable cause to legally justify arresting the Defendarit~ See-8 6 GCA §20.15. To determine if a police officer had probable cause to make an arrest, a court 7 must determine "whether at that moment the facts and circumstances within their knowledge 8 and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent 9 man in believing that the (defendant] had committed or was committing an offense." Beck v.

to Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964) (citations omitted). Thus, the existence of probable cause to arrest 11 requires a determination of whether the arresting officer had "reasonably trustworthy 12 information." People v. Cundiff, 2006 Guam 12 ~ 27. 13 In this case, Officer Mendiola responded to the scene of Defendant's vehicle collision. 14 (Tr. of Hearing on Mot. Suppress, 10, Oct. 15, 2012). At approximately 2:32 a.m., Officer 15 Mendiola ascertained that Defendant was driving one of the vehicles involved in the collision, 16 and he stopped and questioned Defendant about that collision. Id. at 10-11. Within five 17 minutes, Officer Mendiola smelled the odor of an intoxicating beverage coming from 18 Defendant's mouth and his person. Id. During this time, Officer Mendiola also observed 19 Defendant's bloodshot and watery eyes, and he noticed that Defendant's speech was slurred and 20 mumbled. !d. When Officer Mendiola asked Defendant if he bad anything to drink, Defendant 21 stated as follows: "Yeah. Even if I did, I couldn't tell you how much Bud Light I put down."

22 ld. at 12. Officer Mendiola asked this question before the Standardized Field Sobriety Test 23 ("SFST"), which was conducted at 2:45 a.m. !d. at 12-13. While giving Defendant instructions

24 on how to perform the SFST, Officer Mendiola observed Defendant swaying left to right and 25 back and forth. Id. at 13. When Officer Mendiola administered the horizontal gaze nystagmus 26 portion of the SFST, the officer foWld Defendant to exhibit a lack of smooth pursuit, nystagmus 27 prior to 45 degrees, and nystagmus at maximum deviation, from which the officer concluded 28 Defendant was intoxicated. Id.

Page 6 of8 Based on the evidem;e _,·-- a.Oduced at the suppression hearing, the Court finds that the ----- 2 Government did satisfy its burden to prove that Officer Mendiola had probable cause to arrest 3 Defendant for suspicion of driving while under the influence of alcohol. In this case, Defendant 4 is being charged for driving while under the influence of alcohol, as a misdemeanor, under 16 5 GCA § 18102 (a), which proVides as follows:

6 It is unlawful for any person, while under the influence of an alcoholic 7 bevemge or any controlled substance, or under the combined influence of an alcoholic beverage and any controlled substance, to operate or be in 8 physical control of a motor vehicle. 9 16 GCA § 18102 (a) (2005). 10 Driving under the influence or while intoxicated is defined as follows: II (a) Driving under the influence ("DUI") or while intoxicated means any 12 person driving a vehicle under the influence of an alcoholic beverage or a 13 controlled substance or a combination thereof, when as a result of consuming such alcoholic beverage or controlled substance or the 14 combination thereof, his or her physical or mental abilities are impaired to 15 such a degree that he or she no longer has the ability to drive a vehicle with the caution characteristics [sic] of a sober person of ordinary 16 prudence, under the same or similar circumstance, and includes any person operating or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle who has eight 17 one-hundredths of one percent (0.08%) or more, by weight, of alcohol in 18 his or her blood. 16 GCA §18101 (a) (2005). 19

20 Therefore, for probable cause to have existed, Officer Mendiola must have had

21 reasonably trustworthy information indicating that Defendant was driving a vehicle under the influence of an alcoholic beverage where his physical or mental abilities were impaired to such 22

23 a degree that he no longer had the ability to drive a vehicle with that degree of caution which is characteristic of a sober person of ordinary prudence. Id.; Cundiff, 2006 Guam 12 ~ 27. 24

25 Officer Mendiola identified Defendant as having operated a vehicle that was involved in a vehicle-to-vehicle collision. Officer Mendiola observed Defendant to display an aggregate of 26 physical indicators of alcohol intoxication, including bloodshot, watery eyes; slurred speech; 27 swaying while standing; and horizontal gaze nystagmus. Additionally, Defendant admitted to 28

Page 7 of8 having cons~~oholic beverages, and the officer smelled the ~9q?f.~c0holic beverage on 2 his breath. The combination of these factors is sufficient to constitute reasonably trustworthy 3 information to arrest for driving while under the influence of alcohol. Those factors show 4 Defendant's physical and mental abilities were most likely impaired to such a degree that he no 5 longer had the ability to drive a vehicle with the caution charaCteristic of a sober person of

6 ordinary prudence. 16 GCA §18101 (a) (2005); Cundiff, 2006 Guam 12 ~ 27. For these 7 reasons, the Court finds that probable cause to arrest Defendant emerged during Defendant's s detention, and this detention was reasonable in its scope and duration.

10 For the above reasons, Defendant's motion to suppress is denied. 11

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16 Based upon the foregoing, Defendant's motion to suppress is hereby DENIED. This

11 matter is set for trial setting on May I, 2014.

19 SO ORDERED this -;22/'lp day of April, 2014. 20

22 ' JAMES L. CANTO II HON. 23 Judge, Superior Court of Guam 24

25 SERVICE VIA COURT SOX 26 I acknowlldge a.l: a copy r.-f lfle Orl\il... l hiNto- ptaee.d n, the

27 "ii~...~j) 28

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