People v. Taman

Opinion

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF GUAM 2

) CRIMINAL CASE NO. CM1l83-11 4 vs. ) 5 ) DECISION AND ORDER CANDIDO STEVEN TAMAN, ) 6 ) Defendant. ) 7

8 INTRODUCTION 9 This matter came before the Honorable James L. Canto II on Defendant's motion to 10 suppress, filed September 27,2012. Oral arguments were heard on October 15,2012. Assistant II Attorney General Gabrielle L. Rossi, Esq. appeared on behalf of the Government and Assistant 12 Public Defender Suresh Sampath, Esq. represented Defendant. Having considered the parties' 13 briefs, oral arguments, and the applicable law, the Court now issues the following Decision and 14 Order. 15 BACKGROUND 16 Defendant is charged with driving under the influence of alcohol and driving without a 17 license based upon the following events. On November 25,2011, Guam Police Officer Jesse J. 18 Mendiola responded to the scene of Defendant's traffic accident. (Testimony of Jesse J. 19 Mendiola, Record Log at 2:59, Oct. 15, 2012.) Officer Mendiola stopped and questioned 20 Defendant about the accident at approximately 2:32 a.m. Id. Officer Mendiola observed that 21 Defendant had bloodshot, watery eyes, slurred speech and smelled of alcohol. Id. At 2:37 a.m., 22 Defendant affirmed that he consumed alcohol before his accident, but he could not remember 23 how much beer he had to drink. Id. 24 At 2:45 a.m., Officer Mendiola asked Defendant to participate in a standardized field 25 sobriety test. Id. Defendant failed the sobriety test and was placed under arrest in handcuffs at 26 some time near 3:00 a.m. Id. Defendant did not have his driver's license with him. !d. 27 Defendant was transported to the Precinct Station where he was advised of his rights which he 28 waived by signing a custodial interrogation fonn before he made statements to the police. Id.

Page I of9 On September 27, 2012 Defendant moved to suppress all evidence obtained from the 2 investigative detention because it lasted longer than fifteen (15) minutes in violation of 8 GCA 3 § 30.30. Defendant asserts that his initial detention was an unreasonable seizure and that all 4 evidence obtained during or as a result of the seizure must be suppressed. 5 The Government opposes suppression on the bases that: 1) a detention did not occur; 2) 6 Defendant consented to an extended detention when he participated in field sobriety tests; 3) 7 probable cause to arrest appeared before 15 minutes of alleged detention; 4) suppression should 8 be limited to evidence obtained after 15 minutes of detention and before arrest; and 5) evidence 9 obtained after the voluntary waiver of rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) is 10 attenuated from an unreasonable detention and admissible. 12 1. The Stop and Frisk Statutes 13 The Fourth Amendment permits brief investigative detentions that are based upon a 14 reasonable suspicion of illegal conduct. People v. Johnson, 1997 Guam 9 ~ 4 (citing Terry v. 15 Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868 (1968)). This principle is codified in the "Stop and Frisk" 16 statutes at 8 GCA Chapter 30. See People v. Cundiff, 2006 Guam 12 ~ 40. 17 Title 8 GCA § 30.10 states: 18 Whenever a peace officer encounters any person under circumstances which reasonably indicate that such person has committed, is committing or is about to 19 commit a criminal offense, the peace officer may detain such person. 20 Title 8 GCA § 30.20 states: 21 Detention pursuant to § 30.1 0 shall be for the purpose of ascertaining the 22 identity of the person detained and the circumstances surrounding his presence abroad which lead the officer to believe that he had committed, was committing, 23 or was about to commit a criminal offense, but such person shall not be 24 compelled to answer any inquiry of the peace officer.

25 Title 8 GCA § 30.30 states: 26 No person shall be detained under the provisions of § 30.10 longer than is reasonably necessary to effect the purposes of that section, and in no event 27 longer than fifteen (15) minutes. Such detention shall not extend beyond the 28 place where it was first effected or the immediate vicinity thereof.

Page 2 of9 Title 8 GCA § 30.40 states: 2 If at any time after the onset of the detention authorized by § 30.10, probable cause for arrest of the person shall appear, the person shall be arrested. If after 3 an inquiry into the circumstances which prompted the detention, no probable 4 cause for the arrest of the person shall appear, he shall be released.

5 Thus under Guam law, a police officer having a reasonable suspicion regarding criminal 6 activity by a particular individual may detain that person to investigate said suspected criminal 7 activity." 8 GCA §§ 30.10 & 30.20. When this investigative detention reveals probable cause 8 for arrest, "the person shall be arrested." 8 GCA § 30.40. However, "in no event [shall a 9 person be detained] longer than fifteen (15) minutes," and the person "shall be released," if no 10 probable cause for arrest appears. 8 GCA §§ 30.30 and 30.40. 11 In this case, the parties dispute the application and effect of the 15 minute time limit for 12 investigative detentions. The Government argues that any appearance of probable cause to l3 arrest within 15 minutes removes the need to apply the time limitation. Alternatively, the 14 Government contends that any suppression applies only to evidence obtained after 15 minutes 15 and before arrest. Defendant asserts that if he is not arrested or released within 15 minutes 16 pursuant to the Stop and Frisk statutes, then all evidence from the investigative detention must 17 be suppressed unless it comes from an independent source. 18

19 2. Violation of the IS-Minute Time Limit 20 a. Meaning of the "Stop and Frisk" Act. 21 Title 8 GCA Chapter 30 and the IS-minute time limit are derived from fonner Penal 22 Code Sections 735 through 736.4. See 8 GCA § 30.10, COMMENT; Guam Pub. L. 10-99 (June 23 19, 1969). Former Sections 735 through 736.4 were enacted as original statutes and without 24 any statement of legislative findings or intent. P.L. 10-99. There is an absence of controlling 25 authority to interpret the 15 minute time limit. l Without clear legislative intent or authority to 26

27 I For example, Guam law does not explicitly discredit any detention beyond the time limit nor does it converse I 28 hold that the time limit is merely a guide for law enforcement. Compare Florida v. Royer, 460, U.S. 491, 500, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 1325 (1983) ("[A]n investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary t

Page 3 of9 the contrary, the Court shall interpret the Stop and Frisk statutes according to their plain 2 meaning. See Guam Resorts, Inc. v. G. C. Corporation, 2012 Guam 13 ~ 7 ("When the plain 3 reading of a statute is 'clear on its face' and yields to an unambiguous definition, we will not 4 look past that plain reading."); Castino v. G.C Corp., 2010 Guam 3 ~ 29 ("A plain reading 5 construction is appropriate where the statute lays out specific requirements and indicates exactly 6 what is necessary for compliance without ambiguous terms."); People v. Lau, 2007 Guam 4 ~~ 7 11-14. 8 An examination of the plain language of the 15-minute time limit within the context of 8 9 GCA Chapter 30 does not reveal ambiguity or absurd and unworkable consequences. See 10 Sumitomo Const., Co., Ltd. v. Government of Guam, 2001 Guam 23 ~ 17; People v. Flores, 11 2004 Guam 18 ~ 18. The Stop and Frisk statutes state that a person shall be detained, "in no 12 event longer than fifteen (15) minutes." 8 GCA § 30.30. Ifprobable cause to arrest appears, "at 13 any time after the onset of the detention ... the person shall be arrested." 8 GCA § 30.40. If 14 probable cause does not appear, "he shall be released." /d. This language clearly contemplates 15 that any investigative detention must end by arrest or release within 15 minutes. Even where 16 probable cause to arrest appears within 15 minutes of detention, the plain language of 8 GCA § 17 30.30 does not allow the detention to continue beyond 15 minutes. When a person is detained 18 without arrest for more than 15 minutes, although probable cause to arrest may appear, the Stop 19 and Frisk statutes are violated. 20 To posit that probable cause arising before the expiration of 15 minutes somehow 21 negates the statute's time limit is to say that an officer may detain an individual indefinitely 22 without an arrest just because probable cause arose within the first 15 minutes. This would be 23 an illogical reading of the statute that subverts its entire purpose, and one which this Court 24

26 effectuate the purpose of the stop."), and u.s. v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 1575 (1985) ("I assessing whether a detention is too long in duration to be justified as an investigative stop, we consider i 27 appropriate to examine whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to confirm 0 their suspicions quickly, during which time it was necessary to detain the defendant."), with U.S. v. Place, 46 28 U.S. 696,709 n.IO, 103 S.Ct. 2646 (1983) ("We understand the desirability of providing law enforcemen authorities with a clear rule to their conduct we question the wisdom of a rigid time limitation.

Page 4 of9 cannot reasonably adopt. The Guam Legislature has apparently narrowed the ability of any 2 officer to graduate an investigative detention according to the demands of a particular situation, 3 as the U.S. Supreme Court might otherwise afford in the absence of an explicit time limit. 4 Based upon the plain meaning of the Stop and Frisk statutes, the Court holds that an 5 investigative detention must cease by arrest or release within 15 minutes of its initiation? 6 The Government argues that Defendant's voluntary consent to undergo a Standardized 7 Field Sobriety Test vitiates the effect of 8 GCA § 30.30, tolling the IS-minute clock.3 However, 8 the plain language of the statute is inescapable. It states in pertinent part: "No person shall be 9 detained ... longer than is reasonably necessary to effect the purposes of [Section 30.10], and in 10 no event longer than fifteen (15) minutes. 8 GCA § 30.30 (emphasis added). This 11 unconditional language unequivocally imparts that no circumstance may serve as an exception 12 to the time limit, be it exigency or even an express waiver by the detainee. 13 b. Application to the Facts of this Case. 14 In order to apply this rule to the present case, the Court must further examine the 15 difference between an investigative detention and an arrest. Under Guam law, "a person has 16 been seized under the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all the circumstances surrounding 17 the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave." Cundiff, 18 2006 Guam 12 at ~ 21 (quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544,554, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 19 1877 (1980)). An investigative detention under 8 GCA Chapter 30 is consistent with a Fourth 20 Amendment seizure. See e.g. Cundiff, 2006 Guam 12 at ~ 40; Terry, 392 U.S. at 16 ("It must be 21 recognized that whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to 22

24 Such a limit would undennine the equally important need to allow authorities to graduate their responses to th 25 demands of any particular situation."). 2 The Court recognizes this law's possibly impairing effect upon meaningful law enforcement investigatio 26 technique; however, this Court is duty-bound to administer the law as the Legislature intended and may do no more The only alternative is for the Legislature to re-examine whether the statute indeed withstands an effectiv 27 application to real-world circumstances within the reasonable balance between individual liberty interests and th Government's law enforcement interests. 28 3 See generally, People v. Santos, 1999 Guam 1 ~'133-37; People v. Chargualaf, 2001 Guam I ~~ 14-15

Page 5 of9 walk away, he has 'seized' that person."). For this reason, an investigative detention occurs 2 when a reasonable person would believe he is not free to leave under the circumstances. 3 Guam law defines an arrest as, "an actual restraint of the person, or. .. submission to the 4 custody of the person making the arrest." 8 GCA § 20.10. An officer must announce the arrest 5 pursuant to 8 GCA § 20.25, but the declaration is not an absolute requirement for a lawful arrest 6 based upon probable cause. Cundiff, 2006 Guam 12 at ~~ 35-36 and 25-26 (quoting People v. 7 Maddox, 294 P.2d 6, 9 (CaL 1956); and Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91, 85 S.Ct. 223, 225 8 (1964)). Any physical restraint that curtails movement constitutes an arrest. Id. at ~~ 19-20 9 (quoting Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 67, 88 S.Ct. 1889 (1968)).4 Even without physical 10 restraint, a severely intrusive detention may constitute an arrest. !d. at ~~ 21-22 (quoting 11 Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 216, 99 S.Ct. 2248 (1979) (custodial interrogation is an 12 arrest and requires probable cause)). 13 In this case, Officer Mendiola responded to the scene of Defendant's traffic accident. At 14 approximately 2:32 a.m., Officer Mendiola stopped and questioned Defendant about his 15 accident. Defendant presented evidence in the form of his written declaration made under 16 penalty of perjury (thus an affidavit per 6 GCA §§ 4308 & 7302, and acceptable as testimony 17 per 6 GCA § 7301), stating that police took physical possession of his driver's license before 18 questioning him. Decl. o/Candido Steven Taman, ~ 7 (Oct. 15,2012). The Government did 19 not dispute this assertion at the motion hearing, nor controvert it by Officer Mendiola's 20 testimony. Under these circumstances Defendant was detained under 8 GCA Chapter 30 21 because he could not reasonably believe that he was free to disregard Officer Mendiola and th 22 walk away without his identification. See Us. v. Cordell, 723 F.2d 1283, 1285 (7 Cir.l983), 23 cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1029, 104 S.Ct. 1291 (1984); Us. v. Thompson, 712 F.2d l356, 1359 24 (11 th Cir.1983); Us. v. Jordan, 958 F.2d 1085, 1087 (D.C.Cir.1992). 5 Defendant was not 25 physically restrained or interrogated under custody until about 3:00 a.m. when he was placed in 26

27 People v. Farata, 2007 Guam 8 11 v. Santos, 2003 Guam 1 151 (police custody ultimatel) determiued by use of physical restraiut comparable to formal arrest). 28 5 See also Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554 (no detention if person can disregard and walk away); 16 GCA § 3501 (drivers in traffic accidents must stop at the scene of the accident).

Page 6of9 handcuffs and formally arrested. The detention lasted almost thirty minutes before it ended 2 with an arrest. For this reason, the investigative detention violated the IS-minute time limit of

3 the Stop and Frisk statutes. 4

5 3. The Exclusionary Remedy 6 The Stop and Frisk statutes do not provide an explicit remedy for a person who is 7 detained by law enforcement for more than 15 minutes. See 8 GCA Chapter 30. However, an 8 unreasonable investigative detention implicates the Fourth Amendment under Guam law. See 9 e.g. Cundiff, 2006 Guam 12 at ~ 40; People v. Chargualaf, 2001 Guam 1 ~ 20 ("[T]he Fourth 10 Amendment is only at issue where the police detain or seize an individual while posing II investigative questions.") (citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 1324 12 (1983)). When the Fourth Amendment is violated by an unlawful seizure or investigative 13 detention, evidence obtained during the detention must be suppressed pursuant to the 14 exclusionary rule. See e.g. Cundiff, 2006 Guam 12 at ~ 51; Terry, 392 U.S. at 13-15. Evidence 15 that is obtained during or derived from an unlawful detention must be suppressed pursuant to 16 the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine. Cundiff, 2006 Guam 12 at ~ 41 (citing Wong Sun v. 17 United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); People v. Santos, 2003 Guam 1 ~ 64).6 On this basis, the 18 Court shall apply the ordinary exclusionary rule and fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine to the 19 Stop and Frisk statutes and suppress all evidence obtained or derived from an unlawful 20 detention that exceeds the time limit; specifically meaning any and all evidence obtained during 21 the entire detention, and not just that evidence obtained after the IS-minute time limit has 22 elapsed. 23

25 6 See also Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 442-443,104 S.Ct. 2501,2508 (1984) ("The core rationale consistently 26 advanced by this Court for extending the exclusionary rule to evidence that is the fruit of unlawful police conduc has been that this admittedly drastic and socially costly course is needed to deter police from violations 0 27 constitutional and statutory protections. This Court has accepted the argument that the way to ensure suc protections is to exclude evidence seized as a result of such violations notwithstanding the high social cost of lettin 28 persons obviously guilty go unpunished for their crimes. On this rationale, the prosecution is not to be put in a bette position than it would have been in if no illegality had transpired.").

Page 70f9 In order to suppress evidence under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, the Court 2 must determine, "whether the challenged evidence was come at by exploitation of the initial 3 illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint." 4 Cundiff, 2006 Guam 12 at ~ 41; Santos, 2003 Guam 1 at ~ 65 (quoting Segura v. United States, 5 468 U.S. 796, 805-805, 104 S.Ct. 3380, 3385 (1984)). See also Segura, 468 U.S. at 815 6 ('"[E]vidence will not be excluded as 'fruit' unless the illegality is at least the 'but for' cause of 7 the discovery of the evidence."). The coercive effect of an illegal seizure may attenuate and 8 dissipate with the passage of time. Santos, 2003 Guam 1 at ~ 65 (quoting Oregon v. Elstad,470 9 U.S. 298, 311-312, 105 S.Ct 1285, 1294 (1985)). 10 In this case, the unlawful Stop and Frisk detention ended when Defendant was arrested 11 and placed in handcuffs. Thereafter, Defendant was transported to the police station where he 12 waived his Miranda rights in writing and made statements to the police. The short passage of 13 time between the illegal detention and the custodial statements by itself does not likely dissipate 14 and purge the taint of the illegality. See Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 604-605, 95 S.Ct. 15 2254, 2262 (1975) (statement separated from illegal arrest by less than two hours does not purge 16 the taint of illegal arrest). Furthermore, the Miranda warning alone does not purge the taint of 17 the illegal detention. Id. at 601-603. In order to determine whether Defendant's statements are 18 purged of the taint of the illegal detention, the Court should consider the totality of the 19 circumstances, including: 1) the temporal proximity between the illegal detention and the 20 statements; 2) the presence of intervening circumstances; and 3) particularly, the purpose and 21 flagrance of the illegal conduct. Chargualaf, 2001 Guam 1 at ~ 53 (citing Brown, 422 U.S. at 22 603-604). 23 As discussed above, the temporal proximity between the illegal detention and custodial 24 statements does not purge the taint of illegality. Furthermore, there are no intervening 25 circumstances to purge the taint of the illegal detention. See Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 26 356, 365, 92 S.Ct. 1620, 1626 (1972) (lineup identification is purged of illegal arrest when 27 conducted with counsel and after magistrate hearing to advise rights and commit under bail). 28 However, it is particularly important here that the illegal detention did not have an illegal

Page 8 of9 purpose or constitute flagrant illegal conduct. During the period of unlawful detention Officer 2 Mendiola observed indicators of Defendant's intoxication, asked Defendant questions about 3 intoxication, conducted standardized field sobriety tests and arrested Defendant when he failed 4 the tests. These actions are reasonably tailored to quickly confinn or dispel Officer Mendiola's 5 suspicions that Defendant drove under the influence of alcohol. See u.s. v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 6 675, 686, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 1575 (1985). On this basis, the 30 minute detention was not 7 conducted for an illegal purpose nor did it constitute flagrant illegal conduct and Defendant's 7 8 statements are purged of the taint of the illegal detention. 9 For all of these reasons, the police obtained Defendant's custodial statements by means 10 sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint of the illegal detention, and those 11 particular statements shall not be excluded under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine. See 12 Cundiff, 2006 Guam 12 at ~ 41. 13 III 14 III 15 CONCLUSION 16 Based upon the foregoing, Defendant's motion to suppress is hereby GRANTED and all 17 evidence obtained from the onset of the detention until his waiver of custodial interrogation 18 rights shall not be admissible against Defendant. 19

20 SO ORDERED this 2O-rn day of December, 2012. 21

23 HON. JAMES L. CANTO II 24 Judge, Superior Court of Guam

26 7 One examJe of an illegal purpose or flagrant illegal conduct under the Stop and Frisk statutes is a detention an 27 investigation that exceeds the scope of the officer's reasonable suspicions, and which reveals evidence of wholly unrelated conduct after more than 15 minutes, only because the detention continued indefinitely. See generall; 28 Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 218-219 (confession inadmissible where defendant was seized without probable cause in til hope that something might turn up).

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