D. E. Holbrook, Jr., J.
Defendant-appellant William Edward Suiter was convicted by jury of arson of real property, MCLA 750.73; MSA 28.268, after [217]*217a trial on January 14 and 15, 1976, the Honorable Joseph P. Swallow, Montmorency County Circuit Court Judge, presiding. The charge resulted from a fire in the Atlanta Coin Laundry, west of Gerber Road, Atlanta, Montmorency County, Michigan, on May 9, 1975. On February 23, 1976, appellant was sentenced to two to ten years imprisonment. He appeals as of right raising three issues on appeal.
The first reason advanced by appellant for reversing his conviction is that the county prosecutor acted as defense counsel at defendant’s trial in violation of MCLA 776.14; MSA 28.1271. While it is true that he did we do not believe such practice to automatically require reversal. The defendant cites People v LaPine, 61 Mich App 345; 232 NW2d 401 (1975), as authority for the proposition that defendant’s conviction must be reversed. This is not, in our opinion, what LaPine stands for. In LaPine this Court found waiver and no showing of prejudice and affirmed. While it is true the Court stated at 349 thereof: "While the actions of defense counsel in similar cases should be avoided, we see no reason to reverse defendant’s conviction where he has not been prejudiced”, such language supports the appellee’s position and not that of the defendant.
Review of the court file indicates that defense counsel filed his appearance on behalf of the defendant on May 16, 1975. On July 24, 1975, the then prosecutor of Montmorency County filed a motion with the trial court to have one Jon L. Rise appointed special prosecutor for this particular case. An order granting such relief was issued by the court. On July 28, 1975, defendant was arraigned with his counsel being present. Defense counsel had previously represented defendant at the preliminary examination. On September 1, 1975, defendant’s counsel was appointed prosecu[218]*218tor of Montmorency County. The instant case was noticed for trial on November 20, 1975, and trial took place on January 14 and 15 of 1976. The record fails to reveal that while acting as prosecutor defense counsel performed any acts pertaining to defendant’s case. The same was true in LaPine, supra.
Prior to the taking of any testimony in defendant’s case the following colloquy transpired between the trial judge and defendant:
"THE COURT: * * * All right. Now, before we proceed, I think — and call the jury — the record should reflect we are out of the presence of the jury at this time. And there has been prior discussions with the Court among counsel relative to the fact that Mr. Tibbetts is now the prosecuting attorney. But he is representing Mr. Suiter as defense counsel.
"Now, Mr. Suiter, I understand that you are satisfied with Mr. Tibbetts as your defense counsel, even though the fact that he is now prosecutor. Is that correct?
"MR. SUITER: Yes, sir.
"THE COURT: All right. And you want to proceed with Mr. Tibbetts as your attorney?
"MR. SUITER: Yes, sir.
"THE COURT: Even understanding the fact that this may constitute — while Mr. Tibbetts is bound by his oath as a lawyer to do the best job that he can for you, and I’m sure he will, but even under that circumstance, it is possible for you to raise an objection of conflict of interest and have another attorney appointed for you. But even realizing that, it’s my understanding, it has been expressed to me by Mr. Tibbetts, that you desire to proceed with him as your defense counsel. Is that correct?
"MR. SUITER: I am satisfied.
"THE COURT: All right. And you want to proceed with him as your counsel?
"MR. SUITER: Right.”
[219]*219From the foregoing it is apparent that defendant wanted to proceed with his attorney despite repeated advice by the court that he did not have to do so and that the court would appoint substitute counsel if defendant so wished. Such conduct by the defendant, in our opinion, constitutes both acquiesence and waiver. Such also was the case in LaPine, supra.
The circumstances herein are most analagous to LaPine and absent a showing of prejudice or an affirmative showing that while serving as prosecutor defendant’s counsel did something as prosecutor which pertained to defendant’s case reversal is not mandated on the basis of the prosecutor’s violation of MCLA 776.14; MSA 28.1271. We find no such affirmative action on the part of the prosecutor nor any prejudice. Moreover, when a defendant attempts to use a possible error to his tactical advantage and the results are not to his liking, this Court will not allow him to use that as grounds for reversal. People v Baines, 68 Mich App 385, 388; 242 NW2d 784 (1976). While the prosecutor may or may not be subject to criminal prosecution and/or disciplinary action for violation of the statute such violation by the prosecutor, under the facts in this case, is not grounds for reversal of defendant’s conviction.
The second reason given by appellant for reversal of his conviction are the following remarks made by the prosecutor during closing argument:
"Now, let’s review the facts. First of all, did he start the fire? I feel he did. If I didn’t feel he did, I wouldn’t be here.”
Appellant claims that People v Humphreys, 24 Mich App 411; 180 NW2d 328 (1970), prohibits such remarks and labels them "prejudicial error”. [220]*220We submit this is not the case at all. While it is true that the foregoing remarks, standing alone, might well constitute reversible error, when the special prosecutor relates his personal beliefs to the evidence same do not. Humphreys, supra at 414. Following the above quoted remarks the special prosecutor continued:
"And there are several things that indicate that to me. I think the strongest point is the fact that Deputy Teets and Deputy Baker saw him leaving, running from a burning building. Now, to say that he could not have known that building was on fire when a few seconds after he left it was completely filled with smoke, is ridiculous. He had to know it was on fire. And since he was the only one in the building, I feel he had to have started it.
"Now, what did he do after he left this burning building? Now, you will notice from this map that the laundromat is here, the Standard Station is here. What is in between? The Sheriff’s Department. Now, did he call the Sheriff’s Department to report the fire? No. Did he stop off at the Sheriff’s Department and report the fire? No. In fact, when he was arrested — and remember at the time he was arrested the police officers testified that his car was parked in front of the Standard Station, the door open, the motor running, which indicates to me a hasty retreat from the auto — he denied knowing anything about a fire.
"Now, we didn’t see him light the match. Be a heck of a lot easier if we did. We didn’t. But you can, without any question in your mind, indicate from the circumstances involving this thing that he did in fact start that fire.”
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D. E. Holbrook, Jr., J.
Defendant-appellant William Edward Suiter was convicted by jury of arson of real property, MCLA 750.73; MSA 28.268, after [217]*217a trial on January 14 and 15, 1976, the Honorable Joseph P. Swallow, Montmorency County Circuit Court Judge, presiding. The charge resulted from a fire in the Atlanta Coin Laundry, west of Gerber Road, Atlanta, Montmorency County, Michigan, on May 9, 1975. On February 23, 1976, appellant was sentenced to two to ten years imprisonment. He appeals as of right raising three issues on appeal.
The first reason advanced by appellant for reversing his conviction is that the county prosecutor acted as defense counsel at defendant’s trial in violation of MCLA 776.14; MSA 28.1271. While it is true that he did we do not believe such practice to automatically require reversal. The defendant cites People v LaPine, 61 Mich App 345; 232 NW2d 401 (1975), as authority for the proposition that defendant’s conviction must be reversed. This is not, in our opinion, what LaPine stands for. In LaPine this Court found waiver and no showing of prejudice and affirmed. While it is true the Court stated at 349 thereof: "While the actions of defense counsel in similar cases should be avoided, we see no reason to reverse defendant’s conviction where he has not been prejudiced”, such language supports the appellee’s position and not that of the defendant.
Review of the court file indicates that defense counsel filed his appearance on behalf of the defendant on May 16, 1975. On July 24, 1975, the then prosecutor of Montmorency County filed a motion with the trial court to have one Jon L. Rise appointed special prosecutor for this particular case. An order granting such relief was issued by the court. On July 28, 1975, defendant was arraigned with his counsel being present. Defense counsel had previously represented defendant at the preliminary examination. On September 1, 1975, defendant’s counsel was appointed prosecu[218]*218tor of Montmorency County. The instant case was noticed for trial on November 20, 1975, and trial took place on January 14 and 15 of 1976. The record fails to reveal that while acting as prosecutor defense counsel performed any acts pertaining to defendant’s case. The same was true in LaPine, supra.
Prior to the taking of any testimony in defendant’s case the following colloquy transpired between the trial judge and defendant:
"THE COURT: * * * All right. Now, before we proceed, I think — and call the jury — the record should reflect we are out of the presence of the jury at this time. And there has been prior discussions with the Court among counsel relative to the fact that Mr. Tibbetts is now the prosecuting attorney. But he is representing Mr. Suiter as defense counsel.
"Now, Mr. Suiter, I understand that you are satisfied with Mr. Tibbetts as your defense counsel, even though the fact that he is now prosecutor. Is that correct?
"MR. SUITER: Yes, sir.
"THE COURT: All right. And you want to proceed with Mr. Tibbetts as your attorney?
"MR. SUITER: Yes, sir.
"THE COURT: Even understanding the fact that this may constitute — while Mr. Tibbetts is bound by his oath as a lawyer to do the best job that he can for you, and I’m sure he will, but even under that circumstance, it is possible for you to raise an objection of conflict of interest and have another attorney appointed for you. But even realizing that, it’s my understanding, it has been expressed to me by Mr. Tibbetts, that you desire to proceed with him as your defense counsel. Is that correct?
"MR. SUITER: I am satisfied.
"THE COURT: All right. And you want to proceed with him as your counsel?
"MR. SUITER: Right.”
[219]*219From the foregoing it is apparent that defendant wanted to proceed with his attorney despite repeated advice by the court that he did not have to do so and that the court would appoint substitute counsel if defendant so wished. Such conduct by the defendant, in our opinion, constitutes both acquiesence and waiver. Such also was the case in LaPine, supra.
The circumstances herein are most analagous to LaPine and absent a showing of prejudice or an affirmative showing that while serving as prosecutor defendant’s counsel did something as prosecutor which pertained to defendant’s case reversal is not mandated on the basis of the prosecutor’s violation of MCLA 776.14; MSA 28.1271. We find no such affirmative action on the part of the prosecutor nor any prejudice. Moreover, when a defendant attempts to use a possible error to his tactical advantage and the results are not to his liking, this Court will not allow him to use that as grounds for reversal. People v Baines, 68 Mich App 385, 388; 242 NW2d 784 (1976). While the prosecutor may or may not be subject to criminal prosecution and/or disciplinary action for violation of the statute such violation by the prosecutor, under the facts in this case, is not grounds for reversal of defendant’s conviction.
The second reason given by appellant for reversal of his conviction are the following remarks made by the prosecutor during closing argument:
"Now, let’s review the facts. First of all, did he start the fire? I feel he did. If I didn’t feel he did, I wouldn’t be here.”
Appellant claims that People v Humphreys, 24 Mich App 411; 180 NW2d 328 (1970), prohibits such remarks and labels them "prejudicial error”. [220]*220We submit this is not the case at all. While it is true that the foregoing remarks, standing alone, might well constitute reversible error, when the special prosecutor relates his personal beliefs to the evidence same do not. Humphreys, supra at 414. Following the above quoted remarks the special prosecutor continued:
"And there are several things that indicate that to me. I think the strongest point is the fact that Deputy Teets and Deputy Baker saw him leaving, running from a burning building. Now, to say that he could not have known that building was on fire when a few seconds after he left it was completely filled with smoke, is ridiculous. He had to know it was on fire. And since he was the only one in the building, I feel he had to have started it.
"Now, what did he do after he left this burning building? Now, you will notice from this map that the laundromat is here, the Standard Station is here. What is in between? The Sheriff’s Department. Now, did he call the Sheriff’s Department to report the fire? No. Did he stop off at the Sheriff’s Department and report the fire? No. In fact, when he was arrested — and remember at the time he was arrested the police officers testified that his car was parked in front of the Standard Station, the door open, the motor running, which indicates to me a hasty retreat from the auto — he denied knowing anything about a fire.
"Now, we didn’t see him light the match. Be a heck of a lot easier if we did. We didn’t. But you can, without any question in your mind, indicate from the circumstances involving this thing that he did in fact start that fire.”
Prosecutorial remarks must be read as a whole and it is readily apparent from a reading of same together with the transcript that the special prosecutor related his personal beliefs to the evidence in the case and properly before the jury. Hence no reversible error. Furthermore, there was no objec[221]*221tion to said remarks nor was there a request for a curative instruction.
As to the final issue advanced by appellant we find same to be equally lacking in merit. Appellant claims that the trial court was in error when it told the jury that it was not permitted to allow the jury, once deliberations had commenced, to view certain geographical areas. While we agree that the trial court has discretion to allow a jury a view of the premises even after deliberations have commenced, here the jury was not requesting to view the premises where the crime was committed. The request of the jury was stated thus:
"We, the jury, would like to know if it is at all possible if we could walk a couple of the routes on the map and visit a few of the spots referred to during the trial.”
At no point in the request did the jury specifically request to view the premises where the crime took place. The law applicable to this final issue is set forth in 1 Gillespie, Michigan Criminal Law and Procedure (2d ed), § 462, p 574, where it is stated:
"The question of whether or not the jury shall view the premises where a crime has been committed * * * rests in the sound discretion of the trial court.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Since this is not what the jury requested there was no failure to recognize or exercise discretion on the part of the trial judge.
Affirmed.
Allen, J., concurred.