MR. JUSTICE KLUCZYNSKI
delivered the opinion of the court:
Defendant, in a jury trial held in the circuit court of Cook County, was convicted of unlawful possession of narcotics. The appellate court affirmed the conviction and remanded to determine the proper sentence. (People v. Sturgis, 14 Ill. App. 3d 181.) We granted leave to appeal. The sole issue before us is whether reversible error occurred when the trial court allowed the State to use for impeachment purposes certain statements sworn to and signed by the defendant which were included in a “Motion to Quash Arrest and Suppress Evidence.” The facts are fully set out in the appellate court opinion and we recite only such matters as we deem necessary to determine the issue before us.
On Friday, April 23, 1971, appointed defense counsel filed the motion which bore defendant’s signature and that date. The motion in relevant part is set forth as follows:
“PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS)
)
-vs- ) Indictment No. 70-2545
)
LONNIE STURGIS )
MOTION TO QUASH ARREST AND SUPPRESS EVIDENCE
Petitioner, LONNIE STURGIS , the defendant in the above-entitled cause, moves this Honorable Court to quash his arrest and suppress from introduction into evidence the direct and indirect products of said arrest.
In support whereof, petitioner states:
1. On 9th of July, 1970 , petitioner was arrested at or near 2114 W. Madison, Chicago, Ill.
* * *
8. During the arrest and subsequent detention, the police and prosecution became aware of the existence of physical evidence, witnesses, and other evidence all the direct and indirect fruits of the arrest and detention, which connect petitioner with a crime.”
The substance of the motion was in typewritten form except for the italicized portions which were handwritten. It was stipulated and agreed that the evidence that was to be heard during the course of the trial would be considered as evidence presented on behalf of the defendant on this motion which was thereafter denied at trial. A jury was selected that day and the cause continued until Monday, April 26, when trial commenced.
The facts presented by the State established that an undercover police officer while observing defendant sitting in a doorway area at 2114 W. Madison in Chicago saw him pick up a cigarette package, remove tinfoil from it and give it to an unknown party after an exchange of money. The officer then gave a prearranged signal to two other police officers. They approached and placed defendant in custody pursuant to an arrest warrant for a previous narcotics charge and found the cigarette package near his feet. It contained 26 tinfoil packets. Three were randomly selected, tested and found to contain heroin.
Defendant testified that he was a drug addict looking for a “fix” and that he was with several men in a tavern doorway at 2117 W. Madison when the police approached. He said that after his arrest he was placed in a squad car. At this time one of the officers returned from the lot near the tavern, displayed a cigarette package to defendant and then inquired if the package belonged to him.
On cross-examination, over defense objection, the State put questions to defendant about certain matters contained in the motion. The trial court permitted this and admitted the motion into evidence for purposes of impeachment, but the jury was not allowed to take the exhibit to the jury room during subsequent deliberations. The State asked defendant if the police had taken any physical evidence from him and defendant denied' that they had. It then challenged the credibility of this testimony by noting the variance of the addresses where the arrest was said to have been made and the allegation contained in paragraph 8 of the motion pertaining to the seizure of physical evidence. On redirect examination defendant testified that he did not know the contents of the motion but that he signed it as counsel had instructed him to do.
Relying principally on Simmons v. United States (1968), 390 U.S. 377, 19 L. Ed. 2d 1247, 88 S. Ct. 967, Brown v. United States (1973), 411 U.S. 223, 36 L. Ed. 2d 208, 93 S. Ct. 1565, and People v. Luna (1967), 37 Ill.2d 299, defendant argues that it was reversible error to permit the utilization of the suppression motion for impeachment purposes at trial. He contends that an accused in many instances must allege in the motion to suppress either possession of the item seized or the premises which were searched in order to establish standing to raise the issue as to the propriety of the search and seizure conducted by the police. (People v. McNeil (1972), 53 Ill.2d 187.) He argues that, if an accused elects to proceed with the motion, he may later be impeached at trial by matters raised at the suppression hearing if he denies implication in the offense. He claims that “tension” is created between exercise of rights granted by the fourth and fifth amendments. Defendant therefore generally argues that a damaging admission necessary to raise a fourth amendment claim may not be used against him at the subsequent trial.
Citing Harris v. New York (1971), 401 U.S. 222, 28 L. Ed. 2d 1, 91 S. Ct. 643, the State argues that a defendant’s credibility may be challenged by pretrial statements in support of his motion to suppress where there is no coercion demonstrated in obtaining these statements. The State maintains that a defendant in a criminal case should not be permitted to perjure himself in order to be acquitted. (Commonwealth v. Ravenell (1972), 448 Pa. 162, 173-174, 292 A.2d 365, 371.) Finally, the State has contended, in oral argument before us, that under the applicable law in this case it was unnecessary to establish a possessory interest in the narcotics in order to question the validity of the search. (Jones v. United States (1960), 362 U.S. 257, 4 L. Ed. 2d 697, 80 S. Ct. 725.) Thus the State concludes that defendant cannot now complain that he was prejudiced by possible incriminating statements which he voluntarily made relating to possession of any items.
We must reject defendant’s position concerning the applicability of the decisions of the United States Supreme Court in Simmons and Brown to this appeal. In Simmons that court held “that when a defendant testifies in support of a motion to suppress evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds, his testimony may not thereafter be admitted against him at trial on the issue of guilt unless he makes no objection.” (Emphasis added.) (390 U.S. at 394, 19 L. Ed.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
MR. JUSTICE KLUCZYNSKI
delivered the opinion of the court:
Defendant, in a jury trial held in the circuit court of Cook County, was convicted of unlawful possession of narcotics. The appellate court affirmed the conviction and remanded to determine the proper sentence. (People v. Sturgis, 14 Ill. App. 3d 181.) We granted leave to appeal. The sole issue before us is whether reversible error occurred when the trial court allowed the State to use for impeachment purposes certain statements sworn to and signed by the defendant which were included in a “Motion to Quash Arrest and Suppress Evidence.” The facts are fully set out in the appellate court opinion and we recite only such matters as we deem necessary to determine the issue before us.
On Friday, April 23, 1971, appointed defense counsel filed the motion which bore defendant’s signature and that date. The motion in relevant part is set forth as follows:
“PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS)
)
-vs- ) Indictment No. 70-2545
)
LONNIE STURGIS )
MOTION TO QUASH ARREST AND SUPPRESS EVIDENCE
Petitioner, LONNIE STURGIS , the defendant in the above-entitled cause, moves this Honorable Court to quash his arrest and suppress from introduction into evidence the direct and indirect products of said arrest.
In support whereof, petitioner states:
1. On 9th of July, 1970 , petitioner was arrested at or near 2114 W. Madison, Chicago, Ill.
* * *
8. During the arrest and subsequent detention, the police and prosecution became aware of the existence of physical evidence, witnesses, and other evidence all the direct and indirect fruits of the arrest and detention, which connect petitioner with a crime.”
The substance of the motion was in typewritten form except for the italicized portions which were handwritten. It was stipulated and agreed that the evidence that was to be heard during the course of the trial would be considered as evidence presented on behalf of the defendant on this motion which was thereafter denied at trial. A jury was selected that day and the cause continued until Monday, April 26, when trial commenced.
The facts presented by the State established that an undercover police officer while observing defendant sitting in a doorway area at 2114 W. Madison in Chicago saw him pick up a cigarette package, remove tinfoil from it and give it to an unknown party after an exchange of money. The officer then gave a prearranged signal to two other police officers. They approached and placed defendant in custody pursuant to an arrest warrant for a previous narcotics charge and found the cigarette package near his feet. It contained 26 tinfoil packets. Three were randomly selected, tested and found to contain heroin.
Defendant testified that he was a drug addict looking for a “fix” and that he was with several men in a tavern doorway at 2117 W. Madison when the police approached. He said that after his arrest he was placed in a squad car. At this time one of the officers returned from the lot near the tavern, displayed a cigarette package to defendant and then inquired if the package belonged to him.
On cross-examination, over defense objection, the State put questions to defendant about certain matters contained in the motion. The trial court permitted this and admitted the motion into evidence for purposes of impeachment, but the jury was not allowed to take the exhibit to the jury room during subsequent deliberations. The State asked defendant if the police had taken any physical evidence from him and defendant denied' that they had. It then challenged the credibility of this testimony by noting the variance of the addresses where the arrest was said to have been made and the allegation contained in paragraph 8 of the motion pertaining to the seizure of physical evidence. On redirect examination defendant testified that he did not know the contents of the motion but that he signed it as counsel had instructed him to do.
Relying principally on Simmons v. United States (1968), 390 U.S. 377, 19 L. Ed. 2d 1247, 88 S. Ct. 967, Brown v. United States (1973), 411 U.S. 223, 36 L. Ed. 2d 208, 93 S. Ct. 1565, and People v. Luna (1967), 37 Ill.2d 299, defendant argues that it was reversible error to permit the utilization of the suppression motion for impeachment purposes at trial. He contends that an accused in many instances must allege in the motion to suppress either possession of the item seized or the premises which were searched in order to establish standing to raise the issue as to the propriety of the search and seizure conducted by the police. (People v. McNeil (1972), 53 Ill.2d 187.) He argues that, if an accused elects to proceed with the motion, he may later be impeached at trial by matters raised at the suppression hearing if he denies implication in the offense. He claims that “tension” is created between exercise of rights granted by the fourth and fifth amendments. Defendant therefore generally argues that a damaging admission necessary to raise a fourth amendment claim may not be used against him at the subsequent trial.
Citing Harris v. New York (1971), 401 U.S. 222, 28 L. Ed. 2d 1, 91 S. Ct. 643, the State argues that a defendant’s credibility may be challenged by pretrial statements in support of his motion to suppress where there is no coercion demonstrated in obtaining these statements. The State maintains that a defendant in a criminal case should not be permitted to perjure himself in order to be acquitted. (Commonwealth v. Ravenell (1972), 448 Pa. 162, 173-174, 292 A.2d 365, 371.) Finally, the State has contended, in oral argument before us, that under the applicable law in this case it was unnecessary to establish a possessory interest in the narcotics in order to question the validity of the search. (Jones v. United States (1960), 362 U.S. 257, 4 L. Ed. 2d 697, 80 S. Ct. 725.) Thus the State concludes that defendant cannot now complain that he was prejudiced by possible incriminating statements which he voluntarily made relating to possession of any items.
We must reject defendant’s position concerning the applicability of the decisions of the United States Supreme Court in Simmons and Brown to this appeal. In Simmons that court held “that when a defendant testifies in support of a motion to suppress evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds, his testimony may not thereafter be admitted against him at trial on the issue of guilt unless he makes no objection.” (Emphasis added.) (390 U.S. at 394, 19 L. Ed. 2d at 1259.) In Brown the court interpreted Simmons to prohibit the direct admission at trial of an accused’s testimony given during a suppression hearing in order to establish the requisite standing to seek the exclusion of certain evidence on the basis of a fourth amendment violation. 411 U.S. at 228, 36 L. Ed. 2d at 213.
We believe that Simmons and Brown must be construed in harmony with Harris v. New York (1971), 401 U.S. 222, 28 L. Ed. 2d 1, 91 S. Ct. 643, where the United States Supreme Court held that a defendant might be impeached at trial by introduction of his prior statements rendered otherwise inadmissible under Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 86 S. Ct. 1602. The court in Harris relied upon Walder v. United States (1954), 347 U.S. 62, 65, 98 L. Ed. 503, 507, 74 S. Ct. 354, wherein it was stated:
“It is one thing to say that the Government cannot make an affirmative use of evidence unlawfully obtained. It is quite another to say that the defendant can turn the illegal method by which evidence in the Government’s possession was obtained to his own advantage, and provide himself with a shield against contradiction of his untruths. Such an extension of the Weeks doctrine would be a perversion of the Fourth Amendment.
*** [T] here is hardly justification for letting the defendant affirmatively resort to perjurious testimony in reliance on the Government’s disability to challenge his credibility.”
Thus in Harris the court concluded that “[e] very criminal defendant is privileged to testify in his own defense, or to refuse to do so. But that privilege cannot be construed to include the right to commit perjury. [Citations.] Having voluntarily taken the stand, petitioner was under an obligation to speak truthfully and accurately, and the prosecution here did no more than utilize the traditional truth-testing devices of the adversary process.” 401 U.S. at 225, 28 L. Ed. 2d at 4; cf. United States v. Kahan (1974), 415 U.S. 239, 39 L. Ed. 2d 297, 94 S. Ct. 1179.
We therefore hold that the testimony of a defendant or documents voluntarily attested to by him in conjunction with his motion to suppress evidence may not be introduced by the State directly in its case in chief but may be used for purposes of impeachment should the defendant choose to testify at trial. To the extent that our present holding conflicts with People v. Luna (1967), 37 Ill.2d 299, which was decided prior to Harris v. New York, that decision is overruled. In the present case the introduction of matters contained in the suppression motion for impeachment purposes was not error.
Accordingly the judgment of the appellate court is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.