Filed 8/28/26 P. v. Sinigur CA3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Sacramento)
THE PEOPLE, C103367 Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. 18FE004949)
v.
VLADIMIR SINIGUR, Defendant and Appellant.
This is defendant Vladimir Sinigur’s second appeal. After a jury found defendant guilty of 18 sexual offenses against his three young children, the trial court sentenced him to 10 consecutive terms of 25 years to life for an aggregate sentence of 250 years to life. In his first appeal, we vacated his sentence and remanded for the trial court to consider exercising its discretion to sentence defendant to concurrent instead of consecutive terms. On remand, the trial court reimposed the same aggregate term of 250 years to life. In this appeal, defendant contends his lengthy sentence is cruel and unusual under both the federal and California Constitutions. We disagree and affirm.1
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND In January 2018, while engaging in an intimate act with his wife, defendant asked her when she was going to let him “have,” meaning have sex with N.S., their six-year-old child. (People v. Sinigur (Aug 19, 2024, C091622) [nonpub. opn.] review granted May 17, 2023, S279466, & matter transferred with directions (Sinigur).)2 When wife asked defendant whether he had done anything to N.S., defendant admitted to “having oral, vaginal, and anal sex” with N.S. (Ibid.) After defendant fell asleep, wife took N.S. into the bathroom and asked if defendant did anything that N.S. did not like and whether he asked N.S. to keep those things “secret.” (Ibid.) N.S. confirmed the abuse. The next day, wife reported the abuse to defendant’s therapist, who then reported the abuse to police. (Ibid.)
During interviews with police and forensic interview specialists at a Special Assault Forensic Evaluation Center, N.S. reported that the abuse began when N.S. was around four years old and occurred daily. (Sinigur, supra, C091622.) After each incident, defendant gave N.S. candy. He also told N.S. that he would not like N.S. anymore if N.S. “[told] anyone.” (Ibid.) During their interviews, the other two children I.S. and C.S., who were four and seven when the abuse was discovered, reported separate incidents where defendant touched their genitals. (Ibid.)
A jury found defendant guilty of 18 sex offenses. Sixteen of the offenses were committed against N.S. and included two counts of sexual intercourse (counts one and three), five counts of oral copulation (counts five, seven, nine, eleven, and thirteen), one count of sexual penetration (count fifteen), and eight counts of lewd or lascivious conduct with a child under the age of 14 years (counts two, four, six, eight, ten, twelve, fourteen, and sixteen). (Sinigur, supra, C091622.) The two remaining offenses of lewd or
2 Our unpublished opinion on transfer in defendant’s prior appeal has been incorporated as part of the record on appeal. (Sinigur, supra, C091622.)
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lascivious conduct with a child under the age of 14 years (counts seventeen and eighteen) were committed against I.S. and C.S. (Ibid.) The jury also found defendant committed the offenses against more than one victim, which subjected him to sentencing under the one strike law. (§ 667.61, subds. (e)(4), (j)(2).) Based on the one strike sentencing scheme, the trial court sentenced defendant to 10 consecutive terms of 25 years to life on 10 of the 18 counts and stayed the sentences for the remaining counts under section 654 for an aggregate prison term of 250 years to life.
In his first appeal, we agreed with defendant that the trial court “ ‘may not have recognized it had discretion to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences on [defendant’s] convictions’ ” and remanded for the trial court to exercise its informed discretion. (Sinigur, supra, C091622.) Because we were remanding for resentencing, we concluded it was unnecessary to address defendant’s argument that his sentence, as originally imposed, amounted to cruel and/or unusual punishment in violation of the federal and California Constitutions. (Ibid.)
At resentencing, defendant argued the trial court should exercise its discretion and impose concurrent sentences because, given defendant’s history of mental illness, the imposition of a 250-year-to life aggregate sentence amounted to cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. The prosecution argued that the court should impose the same sentence given the “extremely egregious facts of this case as well as the multiple victims and their young age[s] and the planning and sophistication and heinous acts that went into the conduct.” The prosecution also noted that defendant would be eligible for elder parole.
The trial court declined to exercise its discretion to impose concurrent sentences and resentenced defendant to an aggregate term of 250 years to life. The court explained that even though it considered and placed great weight on defendant’s history of mental illness, “the crimes and the commission in which they were done as well as the multiple victims is much weightier in the Court’s view.” The court also explained that as the
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biological father to the three very young victims, defendant “occupied a position of trust.” Defendant had the opportunity “to pause and reflect and discontinue the sexual assault” of his children but did not do so. Based on the evidence at trial, the incidents against N.S. occurred “daily” and took place “in excess of 20 times” even if defendant was not charged with all of them. “The only reason these incidents stopped was because these children had a mother who believed them and stopped the conduct.” The court considered defendant a “super-striker,” who “poses a significant risk,” and is “subject to the Sexually Violent Predator Program.” The court did not believe the “250-year[]-tolife ” sentence amounted to “cruel and unusual punishment with respect to [a defendant] who committed these offenses on a daily basis.”
Defendant timely appeals.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, defendant contends that his aggregate 250-year-to-life sentence violates both the California and federal Constitutions’ prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. The People contend defendant forfeited his claims that his sentence is grossly disproportionate under the Eighth Amendment and cruel or unusual under the California Constitution because he failed to raise them below. The People also contend that even if not forfeited, defendant’s claims are without merit.
A. Standard of Review and Background Legal Principles “Cruel and unusual punishment is prohibited by the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 17 of the California Constitution.” (People v. Mantanez (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 354, 358.) A sentence violates the Eighth Amendment if it is “ ‘grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime.’ ” (Ewing v. California (2003) 538 U.S. 11, 21; see also Graham v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48, 59 (Graham) [“ ‘punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned’ ”].) Under the California Constitution, “[p]unishment is cruel and unusual if it is so disproportionate to the crime committed that it shocks the conscience and offends fundamental notions of
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human dignity.” (Mantanez, at p. 358; see also In re Lynch (1972) 8 Cal.3d 410, 424 (Lynch), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in In re Palmer (2021) 10 Cal.5th 959.) Thus, the touchstone for the inquiry under both the federal and California Constitutions is the gross disproportionality of a sentence when compared to the gravity of the offenses for which defendant was convicted. (People v. Baker (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 711, 733.)
“Whether a punishment is cruel or unusual is a question of law for the appellate court, but the underlying disputed facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the judgment.” (People v. Martinez (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 489, 496.) When faced with a claim that a particular sentence amounts to cruel and unusual punishment, “ ‘[w]e approach this issue with full awareness of and respect for the distinct roles of the Legislature and the courts in such an undertaking.’ ” (People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441, 477 (plur. opn.), superseded by statute on different grounds as stated in People v. Morris (2026) 19 Cal.5th 671, 683, fn. 4.) While the Legislature is “accorded the broadest discretion possible in enacting penal statutes and in specifying punishment for crime, . . . the final judgment as to whether the punishment it decrees exceeds constitutional limits is a judicial function.” (Dillon, at p. 478 (plur. opn.).)
B. Analysis 1. Eighth Amendment Claim “ ‘The Eighth Amendment does not require strict proportionality between crime and sentence. Rather, it forbids only extreme sentences that are “grossly disproportionate” to the crime.’ ” (Ewing v. California, supra, 538 U.S. at p. 23.) Therefore, an analysis of whether defendant’s sentence is grossly disproportionate in violation of the Eighth Amendment begins with a comparison of the “gravity of the offense and the severity of [defendant’s] sentence.” (Graham, supra, 560 U.S. at p. 60.) “ ‘[I]n the rare case in which [this] threshold comparison … leads to an inference of gross disproportionality’ the court should then compare the defendant’s sentence with the
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sentences received by other offenders in the same jurisdiction and with the sentences imposed for the same crime in other jurisdictions. [Citation.] If this comparative analysis ‘validate[s] an initial judgment that [the] sentence is grossly disproportionate,’ the sentence is cruel and unusual.” (Ibid.)
a) Defendant Did Not Forfeit His Eighth Amendment Claim As an initial matter, we disagree with the People’s contention that defendant forfeited his claim that his sentence is grossly disproportionate under the Eighth Amendment for two reasons. First, defendant raised this claim in his first appeal. We did not address it then because we remanded the matter so that the trial court could consider exercising its discretion to impose concurrent instead of consecutive sentences. (Sinigur, supra, C091622.)
Second, and more importantly, the record shows the trial court considered and rejected the contention that defendant’s aggregate sentence totaling 250 years to life was grossly disproportionate to defendant’s crimes at resentencing even if the claim was not explicitly raised. Specifically, in deciding to reimpose consecutive sentences, the court compared defendant’s sentence to the gravity of his offenses, stating that it did not believe the sentence amounted to “cruel and unusual punishment with respect to [defendant] who committed these offenses on a daily basis.” Because the court addressed whether defendant’s sentence was disproportionate to the gravity of his offenses at resentencing, the claim was not forfeited. (See People v. Speight (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1247 [explaining a claim that “a sentence is cruel and unusual is forfeited on appeal if it is not raised in the trial court, because the issue often requires a fact-bound inquiry”].)
b) Defendant’s Sentence Does Not Violate The Eighth Amendment Although we conclude that defendant did not forfeit his Eighth Amendment disproportionality claim, we agree with the People that defendant’s claim fails on the merits.
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Section 667.61 expresses the Legislature’s intent to impose greater punishments for sexual crimes against children under a certain age. (People v. Betts (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 294, 299-300.) The statute requires courts to sentence a defendant who committed a violation of section 288, subdivision (a) against more than one child under 14 to an indeterminate sentence of 25 years to life. (§ 667.61, subds. (c), (e)(4), (j)(2).) And it does not prohibit a court from imposing “multiple indeterminate terms for multiple offenses committed against multiple [child] victims on multiple occasions.” (People v. Jones (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 693, 719.)
Comparing defendant’s 10 consecutive 25-year-to-life terms under section 667.61 with the gravity of the sexual abuse he committed against his young children for two years, the trial court concluded that the defendant’s sentence did not amount to cruel and unusual punishment. Our independent review of the record leads to the same conclusion. (People v. Martinez, supra, 76 Cal.App.4th at p. 496.)
The evidence at trial showed defendant committed far more than the 18 offenses the People charged him with. Defendant used his position of trust as the children’s biological father to not only abuse his children for two years but to also threaten and bribe N.S. to keep his daily abuse of N.S. secret. (Sinigur, supra, C091622.) The gravity of the offenses this father committed against his very young children and the resulting long-term harm to them as a result is egregious.
Considering the extent and duration of the sexual abuse defendant inflicted on his young children, a sentence of 10 consecutive terms of 25 years to life for each of the 10 convictions subject to a term of 25 years to life under section 667.61, subdivision (j)(2) does not lead to an inference that his sentence is so grossly disproportionate as to amount to cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. (Graham, supra, 560 U.S. at p. 60.) This is not the “extraordinary case” where “gross disproportionality” amounts to a violation of the Eighth Amendment. (Lockyer v. Andrade (2003) 538 U.S. 63, 77.) Defendant’s claim therefore is without merit.
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2. California’s Prohibition Against Cruel or Unusual Punishment Defendant also contends that his sentence violates California’s prohibition against cruel or unusual punishment. The People contend that defendant forfeited his claim, and even if not forfeited, the claim fails on the merits based on the criteria in Lynch. We agree with the People’s second point.
Under the California Constitution, a sentence is unconstitutional if “it is so disproportionate to the crime for which it is inflicted that it shocks the conscience and offends fundamental notions of human dignity.” (Lynch, supra, 8 Cal.3d at p. 424.) In determining whether a sentence violates this standard, California courts consider: (1) the nature of the offense and the offender; (2) a comparison of the penalty imposed for the offense with those imposed for more serious crimes; and (3) a comparison of the penalty imposed with those imposed for the same offense in other jurisdictions. (Id. at pp. 425- 427.)
Defendant bears the burden of establishing that his sentence is unconstitutional.
(In re Nunez (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 709, 725.) In making this showing, defendant need not establish that a sentence is disproportionate based on all three criteria identified in Lynch. (People v. Dillon, supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 487, fn. 38 (plur. opn.).) Our Supreme Court has “neither held nor implied that a punishment cannot be ruled constitutionally excessive unless it is disproportionate in all three respects.” (Ibid. (plur. opn.).) A showing that a sentence “ ‘shocks the conscience and offends fundamental notions of human dignity’ ” under any one of these three criteria is sufficient. (Ibid. (plur. opn.).)
Here, defendant addresses only whether his sentence is disproportionate as to the first Lynch criteria, the nature of the offense and the offender. Where a defendant “makes no effort to compare his sentence with more serious offenses in California or with punishments in other states for the same offense, ... we take [it] as a concession that his sentence withstands a constitutional challenge on either basis.” (People v. Retanan (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 1219, 1231.)
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As to the offender and the nature of the offense criteria, defendant argues that although his crimes against his children “appears reprehensible,” his sentence violates the California Constitution based on his mental health issues, “minimal prior record,” and “low risk of reoffense.” We disagree. The one strike sentencing scheme in section 667.61, “reflects the Legislature’s zero tolerance toward the commission of sexual offenses against particularly vulnerable victims.” (People v. Alvarado (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 178, 200-201.) Based on that sentencing scheme, the trial court sentenced defendant to 10 consecutive 25-year-to-life terms for 10 of the sexual assaults the jury found he committed against his three young children for two years. (§ 667.61, subd. (j)(2).) Defendant has not demonstrated that this sentence, considering his mental health issues and minimal prior criminal record, “is so disproportionate to the [offenses] for which it [was imposed] that it shocks the conscience and offends fundamental notions of human dignity.” (Lynch, supra, 8 Cal.3d at p. 424.)
Relying on the concurring opinion in People v. Deloza (1998) 18 Cal.4th 585, 600-602 (conc. opn. of Mosk, J.), defendant also argues “that a term ‘impossible for a human being to serve’ violates both the state and federal cruel and unusual prohibitions.” We disagree.
In Retanan, this court rejected this precise argument, including the defendant’s reliance on the concurrence in Deloza, stating that the concurrence has no precedential value. (People v. Retanan,154 Cal.App.4th at p. 1231.) “[T]here [was] no authority for defendant’s argument.” (Ibid.) That remains true. Moreover, California courts repeatedly have upheld similar sentences for sexual offenses, especially those committed against children. (See, e.g., Ibid. [upholding aggregate prison term of 135 years to life for numerous sex crimes against four young girls]; People v. Reyes (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 62 [upholding sentence of life without parole for burglary and rape of a minor]; People. v. Ellis (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 536 [upholding sentence of 145 years to life for 13 sexual offenses against defendant’s minor stepdaughters]; People v. Andrade
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(2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 1274 [upholding sentence of 195 years to life for sexual offenses against vulnerable young women, including one minor, despite defendant’s lack of prior criminal record].)
In sum, defendant has not met his burden of establishing that his sentence of 10 consecutive terms of 25 years to life is so disproportionate to the abuse he inflicted on his young children that “it shocks the conscience and offends fundamental notions of human dignity.” (Lynch, supra, 8 Cal.3d at p. 424.) Therefore, his claim that his sentence violates California’s prohibition against cruel or unusual punishment also fails.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
/s/ MESIWALA, J.
We concur:
/s/ ROBIE, Acting P. J.
/s/ WISEMAN, J.
Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.