Lesinski, C. J.
Defendant John Sinclair was convicted by a jury of illegal possession of marijuana (MCLA §335.153 [Stat Ann 1957 Rev §18.1123]), and was sentenced to a prison term of 9-1/2 to 10 years. He appeals as of right.
On December 22, 1966, defendant gave two marijuana cigarettes to undercover policemen. He was arrested 33 days later.
Prior to trial, defendant challenged the constitutionality of the statute prohibiting the unlawful sale and possession of marijuana by raising issues of equal protection of law, due process of law, and the right to privacy. A special three-judge panel found the statute constitutional.
Defendant was originally charged with both possession and sale of narcotics. The trial court sus[478]*478tained a motion to dismiss the charge of illegal sale on the ground of entrapment. Defendant moved to suppress the two cigarettes on the ground that they were seized by reason of the illegal entrapment. This motion was denied.
The statute prohibiting the possession of narcotic drugs is an exercise of the police power of the state designed to protect the public health, safety, and welfare. See People v. Baker (1952), 332 Mich 320. The inclusion of marijuana in that statute does not offend equal protection or due process of law. People v. Stark (1965), 157 Colo 59 (400 P2d 923). A narcotic, as defined in Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, p 1503, is “a drug # * * that in moderate doses allays sensibility, relieves pain, and produces profound sleep but that in poisonous doses produces stupor, coma, or convulsions”. The evidence advanced by both the defendant and the prosecution showed that marijuana possesses those properties. We recognize the difference of medical opinion over the proscription against marijuana; however, the determination that marijuana is a harmful substance is for the legislature. The presumption of constitutionality favors validity of the statute. If the relationship between the statute and the public welfare is debatable, the legislative judgment must be accepted. Grocers Dairy Company v. Department of Agriculture Director (1966), 377 Mich 71.
The exclusion of other drugs, such as alcohol, from the statute does not violate equal protection or due process of law. As stated in Kelley v. Judge of Recorder’s Court of Detroit (1927), 239 Mich 204, 215:
“A statute does not violate the equal protection clause merely because it is not all-embracing. # * * A State may properly direct its legislation against what it deems an existing evil without covering the [479]*479whole field of possible abuses. * * * The statute must be presumed to be aimed at an evil where experience shows it to be most felt, and to be deemed by the legislature coextensive with the practical need; and is not to be overthrown merely because other instances may be suggested to which also it might have been applied.”
In the instant case, it is clear that the legislature has determined the danger of marijuana, and other crimes linked with it, is sufficient to justify the prohibition. The exclusion of alcohol, or other drugs, from the statute does not make marijuana any less dangerous.
Defendant relies on Stanley v. Georgia (1969), 394 US 557 (89 S Ct 1243, 22 L Ed 2d 542), in his argument that possession of marijuana in the home is protected by the right of privacy. The Stanley case held that the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Federal Constitution prohibit making private possession of obscene material a crime. Defendant’s confidence in Stanley, supra, is misplaced. In a footnote to that opinion, at 568, the United States Supreme Court cautioned that:
“What we have said in no way infringes upon the power of the State or Federal Government to make possession of other items, such as narcotics, firearms, or stolen goods, a crime. * * * No First Amendment rights are involved in most statutes making mere possession criminal.”
Correspondingly, we find no First Amendment rights involved with possession of marijuana.
Defendant argues that the 33-day delay between the alleged commission of the crime and his subsequent arrest denied him due process of law. People v. Hernandez (1968), 15 Mich App 141, 147, held that undue prejudice which results from a delay in the arrest of a suspect is a denial of procedural due [480]*480process. However, a delay is permissible “(1) when the delay is explainable, (2) when it is not deliberate, (3) where no undue prejudice attaches to the defendant”. We find no such prejudice in the instant case. Defendant was not denied access to critical evidence.
The tardiness of the police in arresting defendant was justified. The two police agents were conducting extensive undercover operations as to other persons in the general area and did not desire to reveal their identities prematurely. People v. Rios (1970), 27 Mich App 54. People v. Albert White (1970), 27 Mich App 432.
Furthermore, as stated in Hoffa v. United States (1966), 385 US 293, 310 (87 S Ct 408, 417, 17 L Ed 2d 374, 386):
“There is no constitutional right to be arrested. The police are not required to guess at their peril the precise moment at which they have probable cause to arrest a suspect. * * # Law enforcement officers are under no constitutional duty to call a halt to a criminal investigation the moment they have the minimum evidence to establish probable cause, a quantum of evidence which may fall far short of the amount necessary to support a criminal conviction.”
Assuming, without deciding, that the trial court properly dismissed the charge of illegal sale on the grounds of entrapment, we hold that it was not error to admit the two marijuana cigarettes into evidence. Defendant does not contend that the possession of the drug was unlawfully induced, but argues that the evidence should be suppressed as the fruit of illegal police activity.
There can be no entrapment when the criminal activity pre-exists the unlawful inducement. United States v. Stephan (ED Mich, 1943), 50 F Supp 445; [481]*481People v. Smith (1941), 296 Mich 176. We adopt the persuasive reasoning of State v. Hochman (1957), 2 Wis 2d 410, 419, 420 (86 NW2d 446, 451, 452), where the Supreme Court of Wisconsin noted:
“The defense of entrapment is to be determined upon the trial, — it pertains to the merits of the cause — it is not to be raised in a preliminary or collateral manner — it affects the substance of the charge and is not a ground for excluding evidence. Evidence illegally obtained will be suppressed or excluded in a criminal case only upon a showing that it was obtained in violation of a constitutional right. * * *
“With respect to the defense of entrapment, the court is not called upon to deal with constitutional considerations as it is in the case of the validity of a search warrant or of a search made without a warrant. A challenge to an unlawful search is a collateral matter. The defense of entrapment is not in such category.”1
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Lesinski, C. J.
Defendant John Sinclair was convicted by a jury of illegal possession of marijuana (MCLA §335.153 [Stat Ann 1957 Rev §18.1123]), and was sentenced to a prison term of 9-1/2 to 10 years. He appeals as of right.
On December 22, 1966, defendant gave two marijuana cigarettes to undercover policemen. He was arrested 33 days later.
Prior to trial, defendant challenged the constitutionality of the statute prohibiting the unlawful sale and possession of marijuana by raising issues of equal protection of law, due process of law, and the right to privacy. A special three-judge panel found the statute constitutional.
Defendant was originally charged with both possession and sale of narcotics. The trial court sus[478]*478tained a motion to dismiss the charge of illegal sale on the ground of entrapment. Defendant moved to suppress the two cigarettes on the ground that they were seized by reason of the illegal entrapment. This motion was denied.
The statute prohibiting the possession of narcotic drugs is an exercise of the police power of the state designed to protect the public health, safety, and welfare. See People v. Baker (1952), 332 Mich 320. The inclusion of marijuana in that statute does not offend equal protection or due process of law. People v. Stark (1965), 157 Colo 59 (400 P2d 923). A narcotic, as defined in Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, p 1503, is “a drug # * * that in moderate doses allays sensibility, relieves pain, and produces profound sleep but that in poisonous doses produces stupor, coma, or convulsions”. The evidence advanced by both the defendant and the prosecution showed that marijuana possesses those properties. We recognize the difference of medical opinion over the proscription against marijuana; however, the determination that marijuana is a harmful substance is for the legislature. The presumption of constitutionality favors validity of the statute. If the relationship between the statute and the public welfare is debatable, the legislative judgment must be accepted. Grocers Dairy Company v. Department of Agriculture Director (1966), 377 Mich 71.
The exclusion of other drugs, such as alcohol, from the statute does not violate equal protection or due process of law. As stated in Kelley v. Judge of Recorder’s Court of Detroit (1927), 239 Mich 204, 215:
“A statute does not violate the equal protection clause merely because it is not all-embracing. # * * A State may properly direct its legislation against what it deems an existing evil without covering the [479]*479whole field of possible abuses. * * * The statute must be presumed to be aimed at an evil where experience shows it to be most felt, and to be deemed by the legislature coextensive with the practical need; and is not to be overthrown merely because other instances may be suggested to which also it might have been applied.”
In the instant case, it is clear that the legislature has determined the danger of marijuana, and other crimes linked with it, is sufficient to justify the prohibition. The exclusion of alcohol, or other drugs, from the statute does not make marijuana any less dangerous.
Defendant relies on Stanley v. Georgia (1969), 394 US 557 (89 S Ct 1243, 22 L Ed 2d 542), in his argument that possession of marijuana in the home is protected by the right of privacy. The Stanley case held that the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Federal Constitution prohibit making private possession of obscene material a crime. Defendant’s confidence in Stanley, supra, is misplaced. In a footnote to that opinion, at 568, the United States Supreme Court cautioned that:
“What we have said in no way infringes upon the power of the State or Federal Government to make possession of other items, such as narcotics, firearms, or stolen goods, a crime. * * * No First Amendment rights are involved in most statutes making mere possession criminal.”
Correspondingly, we find no First Amendment rights involved with possession of marijuana.
Defendant argues that the 33-day delay between the alleged commission of the crime and his subsequent arrest denied him due process of law. People v. Hernandez (1968), 15 Mich App 141, 147, held that undue prejudice which results from a delay in the arrest of a suspect is a denial of procedural due [480]*480process. However, a delay is permissible “(1) when the delay is explainable, (2) when it is not deliberate, (3) where no undue prejudice attaches to the defendant”. We find no such prejudice in the instant case. Defendant was not denied access to critical evidence.
The tardiness of the police in arresting defendant was justified. The two police agents were conducting extensive undercover operations as to other persons in the general area and did not desire to reveal their identities prematurely. People v. Rios (1970), 27 Mich App 54. People v. Albert White (1970), 27 Mich App 432.
Furthermore, as stated in Hoffa v. United States (1966), 385 US 293, 310 (87 S Ct 408, 417, 17 L Ed 2d 374, 386):
“There is no constitutional right to be arrested. The police are not required to guess at their peril the precise moment at which they have probable cause to arrest a suspect. * * # Law enforcement officers are under no constitutional duty to call a halt to a criminal investigation the moment they have the minimum evidence to establish probable cause, a quantum of evidence which may fall far short of the amount necessary to support a criminal conviction.”
Assuming, without deciding, that the trial court properly dismissed the charge of illegal sale on the grounds of entrapment, we hold that it was not error to admit the two marijuana cigarettes into evidence. Defendant does not contend that the possession of the drug was unlawfully induced, but argues that the evidence should be suppressed as the fruit of illegal police activity.
There can be no entrapment when the criminal activity pre-exists the unlawful inducement. United States v. Stephan (ED Mich, 1943), 50 F Supp 445; [481]*481People v. Smith (1941), 296 Mich 176. We adopt the persuasive reasoning of State v. Hochman (1957), 2 Wis 2d 410, 419, 420 (86 NW2d 446, 451, 452), where the Supreme Court of Wisconsin noted:
“The defense of entrapment is to be determined upon the trial, — it pertains to the merits of the cause — it is not to be raised in a preliminary or collateral manner — it affects the substance of the charge and is not a ground for excluding evidence. Evidence illegally obtained will be suppressed or excluded in a criminal case only upon a showing that it was obtained in violation of a constitutional right. * * *
“With respect to the defense of entrapment, the court is not called upon to deal with constitutional considerations as it is in the case of the validity of a search warrant or of a search made without a warrant. A challenge to an unlawful search is a collateral matter. The defense of entrapment is not in such category.”1
We do not agree that the 9-1/2 to 10-year sentence imposed by the trial court is cruel or unusual within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment to the Federal Constitution or art 1, § 16 of the Michigan Constitution. The statute under which defendant was convicted provides a maximum penalty of ten years for the first offense. The sentence imposed was within the statutory maximum. Such sentences are not regarded as cruel or unusual punishments. People v. Collins (1969), 16 Mich App 667; People v. Girard (1969), 18 Mich App 593. Sentences within the statutory maximum for violation of the anti-marijuana statutes do not differ from those imposed for conviction of crime generally and are not violative of the constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments. People v. Nelson White [482]*482(1970), 26 Mich App 35; People v. Albert White, supra. The current uncertain state of scientific knowledge of marijuana does not justify striking down anti-marijuana laws on cruel and unusual punishment grounds. United States v. Ward (CA7, 1967), 387 F2d 843, 848. Appellate courts do not have supervisory control over sentences which are within the statutory maximum. People v. Doran (1967), 6 Mich App 86; People v. Pate (1965), 2 Mich App 66.
Defendant’s contention that the prosecution failed to carry its burden of proof of establishing that the substance defendant gave the police agents was, in fact, marijuana is without merit. A police chemist, with experience in analyzing marijuana, testified that the substance was cannabis sativa. That conclusion was substantiated by microscopic and chemical tests conducted on the drug. Defendant offered no rebuttal testimony. The evidence fully warranted the jury’s verdict.
Defendant also assigns as error the trial court’s ruling that if the defendant took the stand to testify in his own behalf, the prosecution could use two prior marijuana convictions to impeach his credibility and to show a common plan or scheme. See MCLA § 768.27 (Stat Ann 1954 Rev § 28.1050). While the prior convictions were too remote in time to be used to show a common plan or scheme, we find the trial court correctly ruled that these prior convictions would be available to the prosecution to impeach defendant’s credibility if he testified. MCLA § 600.2158 (Stat Ann 1962 Rev § 27A.2158), provides :
“No person shall be excluded from giving evidence on any matter, civil or criminal, by reason of crime or for any interest of such person in the matter, suit, or proceeding in question, or in the event of such [483]*483matter, suit or proceeding, in which such testimony may be offered, or by reason of marital or other relationship to any party thereto; but such interest, relationship, or conviction of crime, may be shown for the purpose of drawing in question the credibility of such witness, except as is hereinafter provided.”
In People v. Payne (1970), 27 Mich App 133, 134, the following is found:
“In this state, whenever a defendant takes the stand in his own behalf, he may be cross-examined about prior convictions of any crime for purposes of testing his credibility. People v. Diaolo (1962), 366 Mich 394; People v. Roney (1967), 7 Mich App 678; People v. Cybulski (1968), 11 Mich App 244; People v. Koontz (1970), 24 Mich App 336.”
Defendant chose not to testify as a matter of trial strategy. We find no error.
Defendant challenges the constitutional validity of obtaining the names of prospective jurors for duty in Detroit’s Recorder’s Court from a complete list of registered electors residing in that city. Defendant maintains that this system, authorized by MOLA § 725.115 (Stat Ann 1962 Rev § 27.3985), unnecessarily excludes 30% of the adult citizenry as jurors, particularly the poor and those who decline to participate in elections.
The right to an impartially-selected jury as secured by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution does not entitle one accused of a crime to a jury tailored to the circumstance of his particular case. Hoyt v. Florida (1961), 368 US 57 (82 S Ct 159, 7 L Ed 2d 118). The use of voter registration rolls to obtain candidates for jury duty presents the most exhaustive means available to secure as wide and as varied a random sample of the community as possible. The states are free, to choose the [484]*484source of jury lists so long as the source reasonably reflects a cross-section of the population suitable in character and intelligence for that civic duty. Brown v. Allen (1953), 344 US 443, 474 (73 S Ct 397, 416; 97 L Ed 469, 498); Carter v. Jury Commission of Greene County (1970), 396 US 320, 332, 333 (90 S Ct 518, 525; 24 L Ed 2d 549, 559). Exclusive reliance on voter registration lists as the basis for selection of jurors is permissible unless it appears that there is systematic and intentional exclusion from those lists of a particular economic, social, racial or political group. Gorin v. United States (CA1, 1963), 313 F2d 641, 644. Defendant has failed to show any such exclusion.
Affirmed.
Engel, J., concurred.