People v. Santos

Opinion

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF GUAM 2

3 THE PEOPLE OF GUAM, ) ) CRIMINAL CASE NO. CM1076-12 4 vs. ) 5 ) DECISION AND ORDER RICKY JAMES SANTOS, ) 6 ) Defendant. ) 7

8 INTRODUCTION 9 This matter came before the Honorable James L. Canto II on Defendant's motion to 10 dismiss, filed December 31,2012 and Defendant's motion to suppress, filed February 14, 2013. 11 Oral arguments were heard on January 25 and March 18, 2013. Assistant Attorneys General 12 Matthew S. Heibel, Esq. and Gabrielle L. Rossi, Esq. appeared on behalf of the Government 13 and Assistant Public Defender Suresh Sampath, Esq. represented the Defendant. Having 14 considered the parties' briefs, oral arguments, and the applicable law, the Court now issues the 15 following Decision and Order. 16 BACKGROUND 17 Defendant is charged with underage drinking, driving under the influence of alcohol, 18 and jurisdiction over adults based upon the following allegations. On November 29, 2012 at 19 1:01 a.m., Guam Police Officer John A. Bagaforo parked his police motorcycle in the Fountain 20 Plaza parking lot in Tumon when a young woman almost vomited on him from the passenger 21 window of a parked car. (Testimony of John A. Bagaforo, Record Log at 2:40, Mar. 18, 2013.) 22 The young woman smelled of alcohol and was not responsive as she continued to vomit. !d. 23 Officer Bagaforo found more minor passengers in the vehicle and radioed for backup at 1:02 24 a.m. (Testimony of John A. Bagaforo, Record Log at 2:40; Testimony of J.J. Mendiola, Record 25 Log at 2:55, Mar. 18, 2013.) 26 Between 1:03 a.m. and 1:05 a.m., Officer Bagaforo observed Defendant walk out of the 27 Circle K store towards the parked car. (Testimony of John A. Bagaforo, Record Log at 2:40.) 28 Defendant could see that Officer Bagaforo's motorcycle was parked behind his car. (Testimony

Page 1 of 11 of Ricky J. Santos, Record Log at 3:22, Mar. 18, 2013.) Officer Bagaforo asked Defendant 2 about the car and the intoxicated young woman and observed that Defendant had bloodshot, 3 watery eyes and smelled of alcohol. (Testimony of John A. Bagaforo, Record Log at 2:40.) 4 Defendant affirmed that he was the driver of the vehicle. !d. Officer Bagaforo and Defendant 5 then helped the intoxicated young woman reach a bathroom because she could not walk on her 6 own. !d. 7 At 1:10 a.m., Guam Police Officer J.J. Mendiola arrived and observed that Defendant 8 had bloodshot, watery eyes and smelled of alcohol. (Testimony of J.J. Mendiola, Record Log at 9 2:55.) Defendant participated in Standardized Field Sobriety Tests and was arrested when he 10 failed them at 1:23 a.m. !d. Defendant was thereafter transported to the police station where he II executed a written waiver of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), made 12 statements, and performed a breath test. !d. 13 On December 31,2012, Defendant moved to dismiss the underage drinking charge as de 14 minimis pursuant to 9 GCA §7.67(b). For the purposes of this motion, the parties stipulate that 15 Defendant is alleged to have consumed less than one cup of liquor. (Record log at 2:37 and 16 3:12, Jan. 25, 2013.) 17 On February 14, 2012, Defendant moved to suppress all evidence obtained from the 18 investigative detention because it lasted longer than fifteen (15) minutes in violation of 8 GCA 19 § 30.30. Defendant asserts his initial detention was an unreasonable seizure and that all 20 evidence obtained during or as a result of the seizure must be suppressed. The Government 21 opposes suppression on the bases that: 1) the Defendant consented to an extended detention 22 when he participated in field sobriety tests; 2) probable cause to arrest appeared before 15 23 minutes of alleged detention; and 3) suppression should be limited to evidence obtained after 15 24 minutes of detention and before arrest. 25 DISCUSSION 26 1. De Minimis Conduct 27 Pursuant to 8 GCA § 80.70(c), "[t]he court on its own motion may dismiss a prosecutio 28 pursuant to [9 GCA] § 7.67." 8 GCA § 80.70(c). Title 9 GCA § 7.67(b) provides that,

Page 2 of II The court shall dismiss a prosecution if, having regard to the nature of the conduct charged to constitute an offense and the nature of the attendant circumstances, it 2 finds that the defendant's conduct. .. [d]id not actually cause of threaten the harm 3 or evil sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense or did so only to an extent too trivial to warrant the condemnation of conviction. 4 9 GCA § 7 .67(b). 5 In order to consider dismissal under 9 GCA § 7.67(b) and de minimis grounds, the Comi 6 should assume all factual allegations as true and determine whether the alleged conduct exposes 7 society to a risk of harm sufficient to warrant conviction. People v. Perez, 2004 Guam 4 ~~ 16- 8 21. The risk of harm to society is determined by examining: 1) the attendant circumstances; 2) 9 the existence of contraband; 3) the value of property involved; 4) the use or threat of violence; 10 and 5) the use of weapons. !d. at~ 12 (citing State v. Zarrilli, 523 A.2d 284, 288 (N.J. Super. 11 Ct. Law Div. 1987)). 12 In this case, Defendant stipulates that he drank less than one cup of liquor before he 13 allegedly drove a vehicle. The attendant circumstances ofunderage drinking and driving pose a 14 serious threat of violence to society. See Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 15 451, 110 S.Ct. 2481, 2485, 110 L.Ed.2d 412 (1990) ("No one can seriously dispute the 16 magnitude of the drunken driving problem or the States' interest in eradicating it. Media reports 17 of alcohol-related death and mutilation on the Nation's roads are legion."). The Court does not 18 find that Defendant's conduct before operating a motor vehicle is too trivial to warrant 19 conviction. Cf. Zarrilli, 523 A.2d at 288-289 (underage sip of beer does not endanger others 20 where no vehicles are involved). For this reason, the underage drinking charge shall not be 21 dismissed as de minimis pursuant to 9 GCA § 7.67(b). 22 2. The Stop and Frisk Act 23 The Fourth Amendment permits brief investigative detentions that are based upon a 24 reasonable suspicion of illegal conduct. People v. Johnson, 1997 Guam 9 ~ 4 (citing Teny v. 25 Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868 (1968)). This principle is codified in the entitled Stop and 26 Frisk Act at 8 GCA Chapter 30. See People v. Cundiff, 2006 Guam 12 ~ 40. 27 Ill 28 Ill

Page 3 of 11 Title 8 GCA § 30.10 states: 2 Whenever a peace officer encounters any person under circumstances which reasonably indicate that such person has committed, is committing or is about to 3 commit a criminal offense, the peace officer may detain such person. 4 Title 8 GCA § 30.20 states: 5 Detention pursuant to § 30.10 shall be for the purpose of ascertaining the 6 identity of the person detained and the circumstances surrounding his presence abroad which lead the officer to believe that he had committed, was committing, 7 or was about to commit a criminal offense, but such person shall not be 8 compelled to answer any inquiry of the peace officer.

9 Title 8 GCA § 30.30 states: 10 No person shall be detained under the provisions of § 30.10 longer than is reasonably necessary to effect the purposes of that section, and in no event II longer than fifteen (15) minutes. Such detention shall not extend beyond the 12 place where it was first effected or the immediate vicinity thereof.

13 Title 8 GCA § 30.40 states: 14 If at any time after the onset of the detention authorized by § 30.10, probable cause for arrest of the person shall appear, the person shall be arrested. If after 15 an inquiry into the circumstances which prompted the detention, no probable 16 cause for the arrest of the person shall appear, he shall be released.

17 Thus under Guam law, a police officer having a reasonable suspicion regarding criminal 18 activity by a particular individual may detain that person to investigate said suspected criminal 19 activity. 8 GCA §§ 30.10 & 30.20. When this investigative detention reveals probable cause 20 for arrest, "the person shall be arrested." 8 GCA § 30.40. However, "in no event [shall a 21 person be detained] longer than fifteen (15) minutes," and the person "shall be released," if no 22 probable cause for arrest appears. 8 GCA §§ 30.30 and 30.40. 23 In this case, the parties dispute the application and effect of the 15 minute time limit for 24 investigative detentions. The Government argues that any appearance of probable cause to 25 arrest within 15 minutes removes the need to apply the time limitation. Alternatively, the 26 Government contends that any suppression applies only to evidence obtained after 15 minutes 27 and before arrest. Defendant asserts that if he is not arrested or released within 15 minutes 28

Page 4 of 11 pursuant to the Stop and Frisk statutes, then all evidence from the investigative detention must 2 be suppressed unless it comes from an independent source. 3 3. Violation of the 15-Minute Time Limit 4 a. Meaning of the Stop and Frisk Act. 5 Title 8 GCA Chapter 30 and the 15-minute time limit are derived from former Penal 6 Code Sections 735 through 736.4. See 8 GCA § 30.10, COMMENT; Guam Pub. L. 10-99 (June 7 19, 1969). Former Sections 735 through 736.4 were enacted as original statutes and without 8 any statement of legislative findings or intent. P .L. 10-99. There is an absence of controlling 9 authority to interpret the 15 minute time limit. 1 Without clear legislative intent or authority to 10 the contrary, the Court shall interpret the Stop and Frisk statutes according to their plain II meaning. See Guam Resorts, Inc. v. G.C. Corporation, 2012 Guam 13 ~ 7 ("When the plain 12 reading of a statute is 'clear on its face' and yields to an unambiguous definition, we will not 13 look past that plain reading."); Castino v. G.C. Corp., 2010 Guam 3 ~ 29 ("A plain reading 14 construction is appropriate where the statute lays out specific requirements and indicates exactly 15 what is necessary for compliance without ambiguous terms."); People v. Lau, 2007 Guam 4 ~~ 16 11-14. 17 An examination of the plain language of the 15-minute time limit within the context of 8 18 GCA Chapter 30 does not reveal ambiguity or absurd and unworkable consequences. See 19 Sumitomo Cons!., Co., Ltd. v. Government of Guam, 2001 Guam 23 ~ 17; People v. Flores, 20 2004 Guam 18 ~ 18. The Stop and Frisk Act states that a person shall be detained, "in no event 21 longer than fifteen (15) minutes." 8 GCA § 30.30. If probable cause to arrest appears, "at any 22

23 24 1 For example, Guam law does not explicitly discredit any detention beyond the time limit nor does it converse] hold that the time limit is merely a guide for law enforcement. Compare Florida v. Royer, 460, U.S. 491, 500, 103 25 S.Ct. 1319, 1325 (1983) ("[A]n investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary t effectuate the purpose of the stop."), and US v. Shwpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 1575 (1985) ("I 26 assessing whether a detention is too long in duration to be justified as an investigative stop, we consider i appropriate to examine whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to confirm o 27 dispel their suspicions quickly, during which time it was necessary to detain the defendant."), with US v. Place, 46 U.S. 696, 709 n.lO, 103 S.Ct. 2637, 2646 (1983) ("We understand the desirability of providing law enforcemen 28 authorities with a clear rule to guide their conduct. Nevertheless, we question the wisdom of a rigid time limitation.

Page 5 of 11 time after the onset ofthe detention ... the person shall be arrested." 8 GCA § 30.40. If probable 2 cause does not appear, "he shall be released." Id. This language clearly contemplates that any 3 investigative detention must end by arrest or release within 15 minutes. Even where probable 4 cause to arrest appears within 15 minutes of detention, the plain language of 8 GCA § 30.30 5 does not allow the detention to continue beyond 15 minutes. When a person is detained without 6 arrest for more than 15 minutes, although probable cause to arrest may appear, the Stop and 7 Frisk statutes are violated. 8 To posit that probable cause ansmg before the expiration of 15 minutes somehow 9 negates the statute's time limit is to say that an officer may detain an individual indefinitely 10 without an arrest just because probable cause arose within the first 15 minutes. This would be 11 an illogical reading of the statute that subverts its entire purpose, and one which this Court 12 cannot reasonably adopt. The Guam Legislature has apparently narrowed the ability of any 13 officer to graduate an investigative detention according to the demands of a particular situation, 14 as the U.S. Supreme Court might otherwise afford in the absence of an explicit time limit. See, 15 e.g., US. v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685-87, 105 S.Ct. 1568 (1985). Based upon the plain 16 meaning of the Stop and Frisk statutes, the Court holds that an investigative detention must 2 17 cease by arrest or release within 15 minutes of its initiation. 18 The Government argues that a defendant's voluntary consent to undergo a Standardized 3 19 Field Sobriety Test vitiates the effect of8 GCA § 30.30, tolling the 15-minute clock. However, 20 the plain language of the statute is inescapable. It states in pertinent part: "No person shall be 21 detained ... longer than is reasonably necessary to effect the purposes of [Section 30.1 0], and in 22 no event longer than fifteen (15) minutes. 8 GCA § 30.30 (emphasis added). This 23

24 Such a limit would undermine the equally ~mportant need to allow authorities to graduate their responses to th demands of any particular situation."). 25 2 The Court recognizes this law's possibly impairing effect upon meaningful law enforcement investigatio

technique; however, this Court is duty-bound to administer the law as the Legislature intended and may do no more. 26 The only alternative is for the Legislature to re-examine whether the statute indeed withstands an effectiv application to real-world circumstances within the reasonable balance between individual liberty interests and th 27 Government's law enforcement interests. 3 See generally, People v. Santos, 1999 Guam 1 ,, 33-37; People v. Chargualaf, 2001 Guam 1 ,, 14-15 28

Page 6 of 11 unconditional language unequivocally imparts that no circumstance may serve as an exception 2 to the time limit, be it exigency or even an express waiver by the detainee. 3 b. Application to the Facts ofthis Case. 4 In order to apply this rule to the present case, the Court must further examine the 5 difference between an investigative detention and an arrest. Under Guam law, "a person has 6 been seized under the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all the circumstances surrounding 7 the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave." Cundiff, 8 2006 Guam 12 at 'lf21 (quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 9 1877 (1980)). An investigative detention under 8 GCA Chapter 30 is consistent with a Fourth 10 Amendment seizure. See e.g. Cundiff, 2006 Guam 12 at 'lf40; Terry, 392 U.S. at 16 ("It must be 11 recognized that whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to 12 walk away, he has 'seized' that person."). For this reason, an investigative detention occurs 13 when a reasonable person would believe he is not free to leave under the circumstances. 14 Guam law defines an arrest as, "an actual restraint of the person, or. .. submission to the 15 custody ofthe person making the arrest." 8 GCA § 20.10. An officer must announce the arrest 16 pursuant to 8 GCA § 20.25, but the declaration is not an absolute requirement for a lawful arrest 17 based upon probable cause. Cundiff, 2006 Guam 12 at '1!'1!35-36 and 25-26 (quoting People v. 18 Maddox, 294 P.2d 6, 9 (Cal. 1956); and Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91, 85 S.Ct. 223, 225 19 (1964)). Any physical restraint that curtails movement constitutes an arrest. !d. at '11'11 19-20 4 20 (quoting Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 67, 88 S.Ct. 1889 (1968)). Even without physical 21 restraint, a severely intrusive detention may constitute an arrest. !d. at '11'11 21-22 (quoting 22 Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 216, 99 S.Ct. 2248 (1979) (custodial interrogation is an 23 arrest and requires probable cause)). 24 In this case, Defendant encountered Officer Bagaforo next to his car between 1:03 a.m. 25 and 1:05 a.m. Officer Bagaforo asked Defendant questions about his car and the minors inside, 26

27 4 Cf People v. Farata, 2007 Guam 8 ~~ 44-45; People v. Santos, 2003 Guam 1 ~51 (police custody ultimate] 28 determined by use of physical restraint comparable to formal arrest).

Page 7 of II and Defendant could see that the Officer's motorcycle was parked behind his car. Under these 2 circumstances, Defendant was detained pursuant to 8 GCA Chapter 30 because he could not 3 reasonably believe that he was free to disregard the police and walk or drive away. See 4 ~Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554 (no detention if person can disregard and walk away). Defendant

5 was arrested at 1:23 a.m. and transported to the police station. The investigative detention 6 lasted between eighteen (I 8) and twenty (20) minutes before it ended with an arrest. For this 7 reason, the investigative detention violated the 15-minute time limit ofthe Stop and Frisk Act. 8 4. The Exclusionary Remedy 9 The Stop and Frisk Act does not provide an explicit remedy for a person who is detained 10 by law enforcement for more than 15 minutes. See 8 GCA Chapter 30. However, an 11 unreasonable investigative detention implicates the Fourth Amendment under Guam law. See 12 e.g. Cundiff, 2006 Guam 12 at ~ 40; Chargualaf, 2001 Guam 1 at ~ 20 ("[T]he Fourth 13 Amendment is only at issue where the police detain or seize an individual while posing 14 investigative questions.") (citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 1324 15 (1983)). When the Fourth Amendment is violated by an unlawful seizure or investigative 16 detention, evidence obtained during the detention must be suppressed pursuant to the 17 exclusionary rule. See e.g. Cundiff, 2006 Guam 12 at~ 51; Terry, 392 U.S. at 13-15. Evidence 18 that is obtained during or derived from an unlawful detention must be suppressed pursuant to 19 the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine. Cundiff, 2006 Guam 12 at~ 41 (citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); People v. Santos, 2003 Guam 1 ~ 64). 5 20

21 The Stop and Frisk Act's 15 minute time limit constitutes a greater restriction upon 22 police activity than the Fourth Amendment. See discussion supra and Place, 462 U.S. at 709 23 ("we decline to adopt any outside time limitation for a permissible Terry stop"). For this 24

26 5 See also Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431,442-443, 104 S.Ct. 2501, 2508 (1984) ("The core rationale consistent! advanced by this Court for extending the exclusionary rule to evidence that is the fruit of unlawful police conduc 27 has been that this admittedly drastic and socially costly course is needed to deter police from violations o constitutional and statutory protections. This Court has accepted the argument that the way to ensure sue 28 protections is to exclude evidence seized as a result of such violations notwithstanding the high social cost of lettin

Page 8 of 11 reason, the Constitution may not protect against a violation of 8 GCA § 30.30 although it 2 implicates the Fourth Amendment. See Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 128 S.Ct. 1598 (2008) 3 (evidence is not excluded under the Fourth Amendment for the violation of a state law that 4 restricts police intrusion more narrowly than the Constitution). However, the Organic Act of 5 Guam incorporates language identical to the Fourth Amendment and the Court is persuaded by 6 aforementioned federal cases that apply the exclusionary rule in order to remedy unreasonable 7 searches and seizures. Compare 48 U.S.C. § 142lb(c) with U.S. Const. amend. IV (identical 8 language). See also People v. Roten, 2012 Guam 3 ~ 16; Macris v. Guam Memorial Hosp. 9 Authority, 2008 Guam 6 ~ 25 (federal cases interpreting identical language are persuasive 10 authority). Furthermore, the Guam Legislature clearly considered exclusion to be an II appropriate remedy for a violation of the Stop and Frisk Act. See 8 GCA § 30.60 (evidence 12 obtained from a frisk is not admissible when a detention lasts longer than 15 minutes). Cj. 13 Moore, 553 U.S. at 167 (Virginia does not require suppression of evidence obtained in violation 14 of state law). 15 On these grounds, the Court shall apply the ordinary exclusionary rule and fruit of the 16 poisonous tree doctrine to the Stop and Frisk statutes and suppress all evidence obtained or 17 derived from an unlawful detention that exceeds the time limit; specifically meaning any and all 18 evidence obtained during the entire detention, and not just that evidence obtained after the IS- 19 minute time limit has elapsed. 20 In order to suppress evidence under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, the Court 21 must determine "whether the challenged evidence was come at by exploitation of the initial 22 illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint." 23 Cundiff, 2006 Guam 12 at~ 41; Santos, 2003 Guam 1 at~ 65 (quoting Segura v. United States, 24 468 U.S. 796, 805-805, 104 S.Ct. 3380, 3385 (1984)). See also Segura, 468 U.S. at 815 25 ("[E]vidence will not be excluded as 'fruit' unless the illegality is at least the 'but for' cause of 26

27 persons obviously guilty go unpunished for their crimes. On this rationale, the prosecution is not to be put in a bette 28 position than it would have been in if no illegality had transpired.").

Page 9 of 11 the discovery of the evidence."). The coercive effect of an illegal seizure may attenuate and 2 dissipate with the passage of time. Santos, 2003 Guam 1 at~ 65 (quoting Oregon v. Elstad, 470 3 U.S. 298,311-312, 105 S.Ct 1285, 1294 (1985)). 4 In this case, the unlawful Stop and Frisk Act detention ended when Defendant was 5 arrested at 1:23 a.m. and transported to the police station. Defendant subsequently waived his 6 Miranda rights, made statements to the police and performed a breath test. The short passage of 7 time between the illegal detention and the evidence collected at the police station by itself does 8 not likely dissipate and purge the taint of the illegality. See Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 9 604-605, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 2262 (1975) (statement separated from illegal arrest by less than two 10 hours does not purge the taint of illegal arrest). Furthermore, an implied consent warning and 11 Miranda warning alone do not purge the taint of the illegal detention. !d. at 601-603. In order 12 to determine whether Defendant's statements and breath test are purged of the taint of the illegal 13 detention, the Court should consider the totality of the circumstances, including: 1) the temporal 14 proximity between the illegal detention and the evidence; 2) the presence of intervening 15 circumstances; and 3) particularly, the purpose and flagrance of the illegal conduct. 16 Chargualaf, 2001 Guam 1 at~ 53 (citing Brown, 422 U.S. at 603-604). 17 As discussed above, the close temporal proximity between the illegal detention and the 18 evidence collected at the police station does not purge the taint of illegality. Furthermore, there 19 are no intervening circumstances to purge the taint of the illegal detention. See Johnson v. 20 Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 365, 92 S.Ct. 1620, 1626 (1972) (lineup identification is purged of 21 illegal arrest when conducted with counsel and after magistrate hearing to advise rights and 22 commit under bail). However, it is particularly important here that the illegal detention did not 23 have an illegal purpose or constitute flagrant illegal conduct. During the period of unlawful 24 detention, Officers Bagaforo and Mendiola observed indicators of Defendant's intoxication, 25 questioned Defendant about driving and intoxication, conducted standardized field sobriety 26 tests, and arrested Defendant when he purportedly failed the tests. These actions are reasonably 27 tailored to quickly confirm or dispel the suspicion that Defendant consumed alcohol as a minor 28 and drove under the influence of alcohol. See Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 686. On this basis, the 18-20

Page 10 of II minute detention was not conducted for an illegal purpose, nor did it constitute flagrant illegal 6 2 conduct and the evidence obtained under custody is purged of the taint of the illegal detention. 3 For all of these reasons, the police obtained Defendant's custodial statements and breath 4 test results by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint of the illegal 5 detention, and those particular statements and the test result shall not be excluded under the fruit 6 of the poisonous tree doctrine. See Cundijf, 2006 Guam 12 at ~ 41. 7 Ill 8 Ill 9 Ill 10 CONCLUSION 11 Based upon the foregoing, Defendant's motion to dismiss is hereby DENIED. 12 Furthermore, Defendant's motion to suppress is hereby GRANTED and all evidence obtained 13 from the onset of the detention until his arrest and custodial waivers shall not be admissible

14 against Defendant. 15

16 SO ORDERED this ( 7-ju day of April, 2013. 17

19 HON. JAMES LCAN'fOII-.:::~ Judge, Superior Court of Guam 20

26 6 One example of an illegal purpose or flagrant illegal conduct under the Stop and Frisk statutes is a detention an

investigation that exceeds the scope of the officer's reasonable suspicions, and which reveals evidence of wholl) 27 unrelated conduct after more than 15 minutes, only because the detention continued indefinitely. See general! Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 218-219 (confession inadmissible where defendant was seized without probable cause in th 28 hope that something might turn up).

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