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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF GUAM I· l' 5 2 ) PEOPLE OF GUAM, ) 3 ) 4 vs. ) ) DECISION AND ORDER 5 MARIA ANTOINETTE BLAS SANTOS, ) (Motion to Suppress) Defendant. 6
8 This matter came on for hearing on March 15,2012 before the HONORABLE JUDGE 9 ELIZABETH BARRETT-ANDERSON, on Defendant's Motion to Suppress. Defendant is 10 represented by Assistant Public Defender Suresh Sampath. The People are represented by II Assistant Attorney General James C. Collins. The Court cancelled oral arguments pursuant to 12 CVR 7.1(e)(3), and based on the Court's ruling heretofore on the legal issues presented by 13 Defendant's motion, hereby DENIES the motion on the following grounds. 14 FACTUAL BACKGROUND 15 On July 11,2011, at approximately 3:45 p.m., Officers of the Guam Police Department 16 (hereinafter "Officers") responded to an auto accident in Agat which the Defendant (hereinafter 17 "Santos") was involved in. The Officers found a Toyota Tercel registered to Hellicia Perez close 18 to the reported accident. Ms. Perez told Officers that she had let Santos borrow the car earlier 19 that day and that the damage was new. Officers observed Santos to have a strong alcohol smell, 20 bloodshot watery eyes, slurred speech, and difficulty maintaining balance. When asked about 21 the accident, Santos stated that she left the scene of the crime because the other driver, whom 22 she crashed into, asked her to fight. She also admitted to drinking at a party and was drunk. 23 Santos was arrested shortly before 4:05 a.m. and refused a blood or breath test. There is no 24 dispute as to these facts. On July 11,2012, Santos was charged with 1) Driving While Under the 25 Influence of Alcohol, as a misdemeanor; and 2) Leaving the Scene of a Crime, as a petty 26 misdemeanor. 27 DISCUSSION 28
Page I of 4 Santos moves to suppress "any and all evidence" obtained by the Officers as a result of 2 an unlawful detention of his person in violation of 8 Guam Code Annotated § 30.l0-30.60, 3 Guam's "Stop and Frisk" statute. Guam law provides that "[n]o person shall be detained under 4 the provisions of § 30.10 longer than is reasonable necessary to effect the purposes of that 5 section, and in no event longer than fifteen (15) minutes .... " 8 GCA § 30.30. Santos argues that 6 he was detained more than the permitted fifteen (15) minutes, and therefore, the remedy for 7 violation should be suppression of any and all evidence seized. Santos cites the Court to an 8 earlier decision of this Court in People v. Santos, CM 805-09 (Super. Ct. Guam July 2, 2010), 9 wherein this Court concluded the police officers had detained the defendant longer than 10 lawfully permitted under the facts of the case. For the following reason, the Court is abandoning II its ruling in Santos based on the following analysis. 12 The purpose for Guam's "Stop and Frisk Act" is for 'investigatory stops' where the 13 police officer has reasonable suspicion that a person has, is, or is about to commit a criminal 14 offense. 8 G.C.A. §30.20. A police officer then has fifteen (15) minutes to ascertain the identity 15 of individual and determine the circumstances surrounding his presence. See §30.30. Ifprobable 16 cause arises during the 'investigatory stop' the police officer is permitted to arrest the 17 individual. See §30.40 The time limitation for the statute's 'brief detention' under section 30.10 18 no longer governs once probable cause has been formed. 19 At 3:45 a.m. on July 11, 2011, Officers responded to an auto accident in Agat. At the 20 scene of the crime, Santos admitted to being drunk and leaving the scene of the time. She was 21 arrested about 4:00 a.m. During this investigatory stop, the Officers had probable cause to arrest 22 Santos shortly before 4:05 a.m. based on her admission to having drunk alcohol. Once probable 23 cause is formed during the "investigatory stop", the fifteen (15) minute time limit for purposes 24 of section 30.10 no longer governed. The "investigatory stop", then becomes a detention and 25 need only pass constitutional muster against unreasonable searches and seizures guaranteed by 26 the Fourth Amendment. 27 The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected the application of a bright-line 28 time limit for Fourth Amendment detentions. See United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685
Page 2 of4 (1985). Although having a 'bright-line' rule would be helpful in evaluating whether an 2 investigative detention is umeasonable, a police officer's common sense and judgment must 3 ultimately govern their conduct. In United States v. Place, the Court reasoned that "[s]uch a 4 limit would undermine the equally important need to allow authorities to graduate their 5 responses to the demands of any particular situation." Place, 462 U.S. 696, 709, n.10 (1983). 6 The Guam legislature has provided clear framework for 'stops' for the purposes of section 7 30.30 and the facts in this case do not trigger its application. 8 Accordingly, this Court does not agree with Defendant's assertion that "all and any" 9 evidence from a detention should be suppressed under §30.60. Although the Court in Santos did 10 not address the suppression issue, the Court will do so now. Guam law provides that "[n]othing 11 seized by a peace officer in the search authorized by §30.50 [Weapons Search Permitted] shall 12 be admissible against any person in any court of this Territory unless both the detention and the 13 search which disclosed its existence was authorized by and conducted in compliance with the 14 provisions of this Chapter" 8 G.C.A. §30.60. In the present case, there is no evidence to 15 suppress from a search of the Defendant based on the following analysis. 16 A "detention" for purposes of section 30.30 is limited to ascertaining the identity of the 17 person and the circumstances surrounding his presence. See §30.20. A request for identification 18 and investigation does not generally constitute a seizure under Terry, and more importantly, 19 does not implicate the Fourth Amendment. Under Terry, a 'detention' occurs when a "police 20 officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 21 1, 16 (1968); see also People v. Santos, 2003 Guam 1, ~ 52 (Sup. Ct. Guam 2003) The Court of 22 Appeals in Michigan found the determining factor in assessing whether a "detention is too long 23 in duration to be justified as an investigatory stop is whether the police were diligently pursuing 24 a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions" People v. 25 Chambers, 489 N.W.2d 168, 125, (1992). 26
Page 3 of 4 Defendant urges the Court to rely on its ruling in People v. Santo, CM 0332-11, Superior l 2 Court of Guam, July 2, 2010. This Court abandons its ruling in Santos wherein it concluded 3 police officers have fifteen (15) minutes to make an arrest after the onslaught of probable cause 4 following an initial investigatory stop. This Court has not previously adhered to such analysis. 5 People v. Pascual CF 370-08, Superior Court of Guam, January 11,2010; People v. Tedtaotao, 6 CF 50-09, Superior Court of Guam, April 20, 2009. 7 Even if Section 30.30 was violated, this Court finds that suppreSSIOn IS not an 8 appropriate remedy. The fifteen (15) minute limitation is a statutory right prescribed by the 9 Guam legislature, not a constitutional right.
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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF GUAM I· l' 5 2 ) PEOPLE OF GUAM, ) 3 ) 4 vs. ) ) DECISION AND ORDER 5 MARIA ANTOINETTE BLAS SANTOS, ) (Motion to Suppress) Defendant. 6
8 This matter came on for hearing on March 15,2012 before the HONORABLE JUDGE 9 ELIZABETH BARRETT-ANDERSON, on Defendant's Motion to Suppress. Defendant is 10 represented by Assistant Public Defender Suresh Sampath. The People are represented by II Assistant Attorney General James C. Collins. The Court cancelled oral arguments pursuant to 12 CVR 7.1(e)(3), and based on the Court's ruling heretofore on the legal issues presented by 13 Defendant's motion, hereby DENIES the motion on the following grounds. 14 FACTUAL BACKGROUND 15 On July 11,2011, at approximately 3:45 p.m., Officers of the Guam Police Department 16 (hereinafter "Officers") responded to an auto accident in Agat which the Defendant (hereinafter 17 "Santos") was involved in. The Officers found a Toyota Tercel registered to Hellicia Perez close 18 to the reported accident. Ms. Perez told Officers that she had let Santos borrow the car earlier 19 that day and that the damage was new. Officers observed Santos to have a strong alcohol smell, 20 bloodshot watery eyes, slurred speech, and difficulty maintaining balance. When asked about 21 the accident, Santos stated that she left the scene of the crime because the other driver, whom 22 she crashed into, asked her to fight. She also admitted to drinking at a party and was drunk. 23 Santos was arrested shortly before 4:05 a.m. and refused a blood or breath test. There is no 24 dispute as to these facts. On July 11,2012, Santos was charged with 1) Driving While Under the 25 Influence of Alcohol, as a misdemeanor; and 2) Leaving the Scene of a Crime, as a petty 26 misdemeanor. 27 DISCUSSION 28
Page I of 4 Santos moves to suppress "any and all evidence" obtained by the Officers as a result of 2 an unlawful detention of his person in violation of 8 Guam Code Annotated § 30.l0-30.60, 3 Guam's "Stop and Frisk" statute. Guam law provides that "[n]o person shall be detained under 4 the provisions of § 30.10 longer than is reasonable necessary to effect the purposes of that 5 section, and in no event longer than fifteen (15) minutes .... " 8 GCA § 30.30. Santos argues that 6 he was detained more than the permitted fifteen (15) minutes, and therefore, the remedy for 7 violation should be suppression of any and all evidence seized. Santos cites the Court to an 8 earlier decision of this Court in People v. Santos, CM 805-09 (Super. Ct. Guam July 2, 2010), 9 wherein this Court concluded the police officers had detained the defendant longer than 10 lawfully permitted under the facts of the case. For the following reason, the Court is abandoning II its ruling in Santos based on the following analysis. 12 The purpose for Guam's "Stop and Frisk Act" is for 'investigatory stops' where the 13 police officer has reasonable suspicion that a person has, is, or is about to commit a criminal 14 offense. 8 G.C.A. §30.20. A police officer then has fifteen (15) minutes to ascertain the identity 15 of individual and determine the circumstances surrounding his presence. See §30.30. Ifprobable 16 cause arises during the 'investigatory stop' the police officer is permitted to arrest the 17 individual. See §30.40 The time limitation for the statute's 'brief detention' under section 30.10 18 no longer governs once probable cause has been formed. 19 At 3:45 a.m. on July 11, 2011, Officers responded to an auto accident in Agat. At the 20 scene of the crime, Santos admitted to being drunk and leaving the scene of the time. She was 21 arrested about 4:00 a.m. During this investigatory stop, the Officers had probable cause to arrest 22 Santos shortly before 4:05 a.m. based on her admission to having drunk alcohol. Once probable 23 cause is formed during the "investigatory stop", the fifteen (15) minute time limit for purposes 24 of section 30.10 no longer governed. The "investigatory stop", then becomes a detention and 25 need only pass constitutional muster against unreasonable searches and seizures guaranteed by 26 the Fourth Amendment. 27 The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected the application of a bright-line 28 time limit for Fourth Amendment detentions. See United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685
Page 2 of4 (1985). Although having a 'bright-line' rule would be helpful in evaluating whether an 2 investigative detention is umeasonable, a police officer's common sense and judgment must 3 ultimately govern their conduct. In United States v. Place, the Court reasoned that "[s]uch a 4 limit would undermine the equally important need to allow authorities to graduate their 5 responses to the demands of any particular situation." Place, 462 U.S. 696, 709, n.10 (1983). 6 The Guam legislature has provided clear framework for 'stops' for the purposes of section 7 30.30 and the facts in this case do not trigger its application. 8 Accordingly, this Court does not agree with Defendant's assertion that "all and any" 9 evidence from a detention should be suppressed under §30.60. Although the Court in Santos did 10 not address the suppression issue, the Court will do so now. Guam law provides that "[n]othing 11 seized by a peace officer in the search authorized by §30.50 [Weapons Search Permitted] shall 12 be admissible against any person in any court of this Territory unless both the detention and the 13 search which disclosed its existence was authorized by and conducted in compliance with the 14 provisions of this Chapter" 8 G.C.A. §30.60. In the present case, there is no evidence to 15 suppress from a search of the Defendant based on the following analysis. 16 A "detention" for purposes of section 30.30 is limited to ascertaining the identity of the 17 person and the circumstances surrounding his presence. See §30.20. A request for identification 18 and investigation does not generally constitute a seizure under Terry, and more importantly, 19 does not implicate the Fourth Amendment. Under Terry, a 'detention' occurs when a "police 20 officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 21 1, 16 (1968); see also People v. Santos, 2003 Guam 1, ~ 52 (Sup. Ct. Guam 2003) The Court of 22 Appeals in Michigan found the determining factor in assessing whether a "detention is too long 23 in duration to be justified as an investigatory stop is whether the police were diligently pursuing 24 a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions" People v. 25 Chambers, 489 N.W.2d 168, 125, (1992). 26
Page 3 of 4 Defendant urges the Court to rely on its ruling in People v. Santo, CM 0332-11, Superior l 2 Court of Guam, July 2, 2010. This Court abandons its ruling in Santos wherein it concluded 3 police officers have fifteen (15) minutes to make an arrest after the onslaught of probable cause 4 following an initial investigatory stop. This Court has not previously adhered to such analysis. 5 People v. Pascual CF 370-08, Superior Court of Guam, January 11,2010; People v. Tedtaotao, 6 CF 50-09, Superior Court of Guam, April 20, 2009. 7 Even if Section 30.30 was violated, this Court finds that suppreSSIOn IS not an 8 appropriate remedy. The fifteen (15) minute limitation is a statutory right prescribed by the 9 Guam legislature, not a constitutional right. The Fourth Amendment protects against 10 unreasonable searches and seizures applies pursuant to § 1421 b(c) of the Organic Act of Guam; 11 however, nothing in the Act incorporates the fifteen (15) minute limitation as a constitutionally- 12 afforded right to the people of Guam. In addition, Section 30.50 only applies to weapons search 13 and is inapplicable to the present case, as no weapons search occurred. Section 30.60 provides 14 the admissibility of seized evidence found in searches authorized by § 30.50 to be limited to 15 weapons searches. Since no weapons search occurred, this Court finds the suppression of 16 evidence not an appropriate remedy. Based on the foregoing analysis the Defendant's Motion to 17 Suppress is DENIED. 18 This matter is set for Criminal Trial Setting on JUNE 4,2012 at 9:30 a.m. 19 SO ORDERED 20
22 Judge, Superior Court of Guam 23
27 I More specifically, this Court abandons its faulty logic in Decision & Order (July 2,2010) on p. 5 ,r 2. "The existence of probable cause does not alter the time and place limitations of 8 G.C.A. §30.20" Instead, the Court finds 28 the existence of probable cause does alter the time and place limitations of Section 30.20. Ifprobable cause is foun during the "investigatory stop", the exclusionary rule is not triggered even after the expiration of the fifteen (15) minute time limitation.
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