People v Sanders

Opinion

Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan

Chief Justice: Justices: Megan K. Cavanagh Brian K. Zahra Richard H. Bernstein Elizabeth M. Welch Kyra H. Bolden Kimberly A. Thomas Noah P. Hood

This syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been Reporter of Decisions: prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. Kimberly K. Muschong

PEOPLE v SANDERS

Docket No. 167899. Argued on application for leave to appeal March 12, 2026. Decided July 30, 2026.

In 2013, John H. Sanders was convicted following a jury trial in the Ingham Circuit Court of felony murder and first-degree child abuse. Earlier that year, defendant took his three-month- old daughter to the hospital after she stopped breathing. The examining physician suspected that the child’s injuries were the result of inflicted abuse. While the child remained in the hospital in critical condition, defendant agreed to participate in an interview with detectives from the Lansing Police Department. Defendant repeatedly denied responsibility when the officers either implicitly or directly accused him of harming his daughter. The officers arrested defendant without a warrant and kept him in custody, and the child died that evening. The next day, while defendant remained in detention, a doctor performed an autopsy and concluded that the cause of death was a traumatic brain injury and the manner of death was homicide.

Two days later, defendant waived his Miranda 1 rights and agreed to speak with a detective. Defendant initially denied harming his daughter but later gave varying explanations for the cause of her injuries, including that he shook her when she would not stop crying. At the time defendant made these statements, he had been detained for at least 64 hours without a judicial determination of probable cause. A magistrate later that day authorized a criminal complaint against defendant upon a finding of probable cause.

In 2019, defendant filed in the trial court a motion for relief from judgment. The court, Rosemarie E. Aquilina, J., granted the motion on the basis that defendant’s trial attorney had been ineffective for failing to seek the assistance of a medical expert regarding the child’s cause of death. During proceedings before the second trial, an evidentiary hearing was held on the prosecution’s motion to admit the statements that defendant had made to the detective; the detective testified that, in 2013, it was his understanding, and the practice of the Lansing Police Department, that a suspect arrested without a warrant had to be brought before a magistrate within 72 hours. The court granted the prosecution’s motion, concluding that although defendant was detained in violation of the Fourth Amendment under Riverside Co v McLaughlin, 500 US 44

1 Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436 (1966). (1991)—which held that an unconstitutional seizure occurs when the police detain an individual for more than 48 hours following a warrantless arrest without a neutral magistrate’s determination that probable cause exists, unless the prosecution proves the existence of a bona fide emergency or other extraordinary circumstance—the statements were voluntary under the factors outlined in People v Cipriano, 431 Mich 315 (1988), and therefore admissible. Defendant sought interlocutory leave to appeal in the Court of Appeals, which denied the application. Defendant sought leave to appeal in the Supreme Court, which ordered and heard oral argument on the application. ___ Mich ___; 18 NW3d 511 (2025).

In an opinion by Justice BOLDEN, joined by Chief Justice CAVANAGH and Justices BERNSTEIN, WELCH, THOMAS, and HOOD, the Supreme Court, in lieu of granting leave to appeal, held:

1. Statements made by a detained arrestee while seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment’s requirement of a prompt judicial determination of probable cause must be excluded from evidence unless the prosecution establishes that the statements were sufficiently attenuated from the taint of the unconstitutional conduct. Application of the exclusionary rule is appropriate under these circumstances because it would appreciably deter police misconduct. In determining whether suppression is required, a reviewing court should consider whether Miranda rights were read, the temporal proximity between the constitutional violation and the challenged statements, the presence of intervening circumstances, and the purpose and flagrancy of the police misconduct. The voluntariness of the statements is a separate threshold inquiry guided by the totality of the circumstances and the factors discussed in Cipriano and People v Stewart, 512 Mich 472 (2023). While the Cipriano factors incorporate the length of detention and the delay in bringing a defendant before a magistrate, they do so only through the lens of determining whether a confession was freely and voluntarily made in the context of the Fifth Amendment, not in the context of the Fourth Amendment. People v Manning, 243 Mich App 615 (2000), was overruled to the extent it concluded that Cipriano’s totality-of-the-circumstances voluntariness inquiry sufficiently accounts for the Fourth Amendment interests at play when a defendant arrested without a warrant is detained for more than 48 hours without a probable-cause determination.

2. Because the trial court in this case did not consider whether the statements made by defendant were sufficiently attenuated from the taint of the McLaughlin violation, the trial court’s order granting the prosecution’s motion to admit the statements was vacated and the case was remanded for the trial court to apply the appropriate standards. It was uncontested that defendant’s right to be free from unreasonable seizure was violated under McLaughlin because he was detained for more than 48 hours following a warrantless arrest without receiving a judicial determination of probable cause, and the delay was unjustified. The detective’s belief that officers had 72 hours to bring a suspect arrested without a warrant before a judge for a probable-cause determination was contrary to McLaughlin’s clear rule, and such a plain legal error is not an extraordinary circumstance justifying delay. An attenuation analysis was appropriate to determine whether the statements made while defendant was wrongfully detained were traceable to the Fourth Amendment violation under McLaughlin, or instead whether the taint of illegality had been purged.

Trial court order vacated; case remanded for further proceedings. Justice ZAHRA, dissenting, disagreed with the majority’s conclusion that the exclusionary- rule analysis was required because of the Fourth Amendment McLaughlin violation. Instead, the voluntariness inquiry established in Cipriano would adequately protect the integrity of the process and the statements obtained during the interrogation. The exclusionary rule is a judicial fiction, created to prospectively protect Fourth Amendment rights by deterring future police misconduct, and the United States Supreme Court has refused to apply this judicially created prophylactic rule whenever the costs of exclusion outweigh its deterrent benefits. Far more suitable remedies were available to defendant than suppression of evidence for the violation of his Fourth Amendment right. These alternative remedies—such as threat of civil liability for violating a suspect’s Fourth Amendment rights—would deter wrongful police conduct without imposing the high cost on our criminal justice system of excluding evidence critical to the truth-seeking process of a criminal trial. Justice ZAHRA would not have overruled Manning and would have affirmed the trial court’s order to admit defendant’s inculpatory statements under the voluntariness test supplied by Cipriano. Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan

OPINION Chief Justice: Justices: Megan K. Cavanagh Brian K. Zahra Richard H. Bernstein Elizabeth M. Welch Kyra H. Bolden Kimberly A. Thomas Noah P. Hood

FILED July 30, 2026

STATE OF MICHIGAN

SUPREME COURT

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v No. 167899

JOHN HAROLD SANDERS,

Defendant-Appellant.

BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH

BOLDEN, J. This appeal concerns the Fourth Amendment’s requirement of a judicial probable-

cause determination as a prerequisite to the continued detention of a suspect who is arrested

without a warrant. Under the Supreme Court’s ruling in Riverside Co v McLaughlin, 500

US 44, 56-57; 111 S Ct 1661; 114 L Ed 2d 49 (1991), an unconstitutional seizure occurs

when the police detain an individual for more than 48 hours following such an arrest

without a neutral magistrate concluding that probable cause exists, unless the prosecution proves the existence of a bona fide emergency or other extraordinary circumstance. In this

case, everyone agrees that defendant, John Sanders, made statements to police while he

was detained in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights under McLaughlin. The

questions are whether these statements should be suppressed and what standard applies to

resolve that determination.

We hold that statements made by a detained arrestee while seized in violation of the

Fourth Amendment’s requirement of a prompt judicial determination of probable cause

must be excluded from evidence unless the prosecution establishes that the statements were

sufficiently attenuated from the taint of the unconstitutional conduct. In making this

judgment, a reviewing court should consider whether Miranda 1 rights were read, the

temporal proximity between the constitutional violation and the challenged statements, the

presence of intervening circumstances, and the purpose and flagrancy of the police

misconduct. The voluntariness of the statements is a separate threshold inquiry guided by

the totality of the circumstances and the factors discussed in People v Cipriano, 431 Mich

315, 334; 429 NW2d 781 (1988), and People v Stewart, 512 Mich 472, 481-482, 495-496;

999 NW2d 717 (2023). Because the trial court did not consider whether the statements

made by Sanders were sufficiently attenuated from the taint of the McLaughlin violation,

we vacate the trial court’s order granting the prosecution’s motion to admit the statements

at issue and remand to that court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

1 Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436; 86 S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966).

2 I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This case arises out of the death of Sanders’s three-month-old daughter on Friday,

January 4, 2013. Sanders brought the child to the hospital that morning after she stopped

breathing. There, the examining physician identified brain injuries that he suspected were

indicative of inflicted abuse. While the child remained in the hospital in critical condition,

Sanders agreed to participate in an interview with detectives from the Lansing Police

Department. During separate questioning by two detectives at the police station, Sanders

repeatedly denied responsibility when the officers either implicitly or directly accused him

of harming his daughter. Concluding there was probable cause to believe that Sanders had

engaged in criminal conduct, officers formally arrested him without a warrant at the end of

the interviews and kept him in custody. The child died around the same time as Sanders’s

arrest on Friday evening. The next day, while Sanders remained in detention, a doctor

performed an autopsy on the child. The doctor concluded that the cause of death was a

traumatic brain injury and the manner of death was homicide.

On Monday morning, January 7, Detective Mark Lewandowsky was asked by the

lead investigators to speak with Sanders because he had not yet been interviewed after

the autopsy was completed. Sanders waived his Miranda rights and agreed to talk with

Detective Lewandowsky. During the first hour or so of the interrogation, Sanders

consistently maintained that he did not harm his daughter. Then, after Detective

Lewandowsky confronted Sanders with the autopsy results and insisted there was more

to the story, Sanders gave varying explanations for the cause of his daughter’s injuries.

These included statements that the child hit her head on the ceiling after he tossed her in

3 the air; that the child fell onto the bed; and that he shook the child when she would not

stop crying.

At the time Sanders made these statements, he had been detained for at least 64

hours and had yet to receive a judicial determination of probable cause. Only later that day

did a magistrate authorize a criminal complaint against Sanders upon a finding of probable

cause. Detective Lewandowsky would eventually testify that in 2013, it was his

understanding, and the practice of the Lansing Police Department, that a suspect arrested

without a warrant had to be brought before a magistrate within 72 hours.

At trial in December 2013, a jury convicted Sanders of felony murder and first-

degree child abuse. The Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, and this Court denied

leave to appeal. People v Sanders, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals,

issued April 21, 2015 (Docket No. 320247); People v Sanders, 498 Mich 907 (2015).

Sanders moved for relief from judgment in 2019, and the trial court granted a new trial on

the basis that his trial attorney was ineffective for failing to seek the assistance of a medical

expert. The trial court reached this decision following an evidentiary hearing at which two

doctors testified that the child’s death was likely caused by a severe infection rather than

inflicted abuse.

Pretrial proceedings resumed after the prosecution elected to retry Sanders on the

charges of open murder and first-degree child abuse. The prosecution moved to admit the

statements that Sanders made to Detective Lewandowsky, and Sanders opposed the

motion. An evidentiary hearing was held at which Detective Lewandowsky testified and

4 the interrogation video was played. 2 After the hearing, the trial court issued a lengthy

opinion granting the prosecution’s motion, concluding that the statements were voluntary

under the factors outlined in Cipriano. 3 The court found that a few Cipriano factors—

prolonged questioning, length of detention, and the unnecessary delay in bringing Sanders

before a magistrate—weighed in favor of exclusion, but it concluded that the totality of the

circumstances otherwise supported a finding of voluntariness. While the court found that

Sanders was detained in violation of McLaughlin when he made the challenged statements,

it noted that the delay was merely one factor in the voluntariness inquiry.

Trial court proceedings were stayed while Sanders pursued an appeal of the decision

to admit these statements. The Court of Appeals denied his application for leave to appeal.

People v Sanders, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered November 20, 2024

(Docket No. 371677). Sanders then sought leave to appeal in this Court; we ordered oral

argument on the application and directed the parties to address:

(1) the proper analysis for determining whether statements made while detained in violation of the Fourth Amendment under Riverside Co v McLaughlin, 500 US 44 (1991), should be suppressed; (2) whether People v Manning, 243 Mich App 615[; 624 NW2d 746] (2000), was correctly decided; and (3) whether the trial court clearly erred in concluding that the defendant’s statements were voluntary. See People v Cipriano, 431

2 Commonly known in Michigan as a Walker hearing, this proceeding allows a trial court to receive evidence to determine the voluntariness of incriminating statements made by a defendant. People v Walker (On Rehearing), 374 Mich 331, 338; 132 NW2d 87 (1965). 3 These statements were excluded at the first trial by a since-retired judge, but the successor judge determined that she could reconsider the prior judge’s ruling. Sanders does not challenge this authority, so we do not address it.

5 Mich 315 (1988). [People v Sanders, ___ Mich ___, ___; 18 NW3d 511, 512 (2025).]

II. LEGAL BACKGROUND

The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, as applied to the states

through the Fourteenth Amendment, protects against “unreasonable searches and

seizures.” US Const, Am IV; People v Cartwright, 454 Mich 550, 557-558 & n 7; 563

NW2d 208 (1997); see also Const 1963, art 1, § 11. An arrest is a seizure but one that is

generally reasonable if justified by probable cause. People v Hammerlund, 504 Mich 442,

451; 939 NW2d 129 (2019). Sometimes a lawful arrest requires a warrant. See, e.g.,

Payton v New York, 445 US 573, 576; 100 S Ct 1371; 63 L Ed 2d 639 (1980) (holding that

a warrant is required to make a routine felony arrest inside the home). An arrest warrant

is issued when a magistrate is presented with a sworn complaint alleging the commission

of an offense and determines that there is “reasonable cause to believe that the individual

accused in the complaint committed that offense.” MCL 764.1a(1). Other times, like in a

public place, the Fourth Amendment permits a warrantless arrest so long as a police officer

possesses probable cause. Hammerlund, 504 Mich at 452-453.

For persons arrested without a warrant, the Supreme Court has long held that the

Fourth Amendment requires a judicial determination of probable cause “promptly after

arrest” as a prerequisite to prolonged detention. Gerstein v Pugh, 420 US 103, 114, 125;

95 S Ct 854; 43 L Ed 2d 54 (1975). While a police officer’s “on-the-scene assessment of

probable cause” may justify the initial arrest, it cannot provide the legal basis for sustained

pretrial detention. Id. at 113-114. Gerstein’s holding therefore ensures that a warrantless

arrest receives the same Fourth Amendment scrutiny that would otherwise precede the

6 issuance of an arrest warrant—that is, judicial review for probable cause. Id. Requiring a

neutral magistrate to independently examine the evidence protects the presumptively

innocent against “unfounded interference with liberty” and recognizes that “[t]he

consequences of prolonged detention may be more serious than the interference occasioned

by arrest.” Id. at 114.

Over time, conflicts arose as to what Gerstein meant by a “prompt” probable-cause

determination, so the Supreme Court offered guidance in McLaughlin. McLaughlin, 500

US at 50. That case arose from a class action challenging a California county’s policy for

providing probable-cause determinations to individuals arrested without a warrant. Id. at

47. The Court held that a judicial determination of probable cause made within 48 hours

of arrest will generally satisfy Gerstein’s promptness requirement. Id. at 56. But even a

delay of less than 48 hours will not be insulated from constitutional protection if the

arrestee can show that the delay was unreasonable. Id. “Examples of unreasonable delay

are delays for the purpose of gathering additional evidence to justify the arrest, a delay

motivated by ill will against the arrested individual, or delay for delay’s sake.” Id. After

48 hours without a probable-cause determination, “the burden shifts to the government to

demonstrate the existence of a bona fide emergency or other extraordinary circumstance,”

and intervening weekends do not qualify as the latter. Id. at 57. In other words, a delay of

more than 48 hours presumptively violates the Fourth Amendment. Powell v Nevada, 511

US 79, 83-84; 114 S Ct 1280; 128 L Ed 2d 1 (1994).

After Gerstein but before McLaughlin, this Court addressed a related but distinct

state-law question in Cipriano. By statute, Michigan requires that an arrestee be brought

before a magistrate for arraignment “without unnecessary delay.” MCL 764.26. Cipriano

7 addressed whether a violation of this statute required suppression of a confession obtained

during an unnecessary prearraignment delay. Cipriano, 431 Mich at 319. 4 The Court held

that unnecessary delay does not mandate exclusion. Id. at 335. Instead, delay is one factor,

considered among the totality of the circumstances, for evaluating the voluntariness of a

confession. Id. at 333-334. While prolonged prearraignment delay “should be a signal to

the trial court that the voluntariness of a confession obtained during this period may have

been impaired,” an otherwise voluntary confession should not be excluded solely due to

this delay. Id. at 335. Cipriano enumerated a nonexhaustive list of factors that a trial court

should consider in a voluntariness inquiry:

4 Sanders asserts that Cipriano’s statement that “the prompt-arraignment requirement was never elevated by the United States Supreme Court to the level of a constitutional right,” Cipriano, 431 Mich at 332, is contrary to Gerstein. It’s clear, however, that Cipriano was drawing a distinction between an arraignment and a probable-cause determination. See id. at 324 n 9 (“The statutory right to prompt arraignment without unnecessary delay should not be confused with the Fourth Amendment requirement of a judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to extended restraint of liberty following arrest without a warrant.”), citing Gerstein, 420 US at 114. While jurisdictions may “combine probable cause determinations with arraignments,” McLaughlin, 500 US at 58—a common practice in Michigan—they are not synonymous proceedings. See MCR 6.104(D) (“If an accused is arrested without a warrant, a complaint . . . must be filed at or before the time of arraignment. On receiving the complaint and on finding probable cause, the court must either issue a warrant or endorse the complaint as provided in MCL 764.1c. Arraignment of the accused may then proceed . . . .”). See also Riney v State, 935 P2d 828, 833 (Alas App, 1997) (“It is important to understand that the hearing required under the Fourth Amendment by Gerstein and McLaughlin is not the same thing as an ‘arraignment’ or an ‘initial appearance’.”). The purpose of a probable-cause determination is to provide a neutral judgment that legal justification exists for an arrest, Gerstein, 420 US at 114, while the purpose of an arraignment is to provide defendants with notice of the charges brought against them and to allow them to enter a plea, People v Nix, 301 Mich App 195, 208; 836 NW2d 224 (2013). Cipriano’s pronouncement is therefore not inconsistent with Gerstein.

8 [T]he age of the accused; his lack of education or his intelligence level; the extent of his previous experience with the police; the repeated and prolonged nature of the questioning; the length of the detention of the accused before he gave the statement in question; the lack of any advice to the accused of his constitutional rights; whether there was an unnecessary delay in bringing him before a magistrate before he gave the confession; whether the accused was injured, intoxicated or drugged, or in ill health when he gave the statement; whether the accused was deprived of food, sleep, or medical attention; whether the accused was physically abused; and whether the suspect was threatened with abuse. [Id. at 334.][5]

As noted, Cipriano preceded the decision in McLaughlin. In Manning, 243 Mich

App at 626-627, the Court of Appeals considered the interplay between the two cases.

Manning observed that Michigan courts had yet to address the legal impact of a Fourth

Amendment violation under McLaughlin on statements made during the unreasonable

delay. Id. at 638. The McLaughlin decision, Manning opined, “does not supplant”

Cipriano; rather, the two opinions “dovetail.” Id. at 617. The Manning Court held that a

McLaughlin violation does not automatically require suppression of a confession obtained

during the delay. Id. at 642. Such a rule, Manning reasoned, “would not further the primary

purpose of the exclusionary rule.” Id. Instead, the McLaughlin violation—and hence, the

unreasonable delay—is one factor in evaluating the voluntariness of the statement under

5 We have also since identified “any other factual circumstances, psychological effects, and coercive tactics employed by the officers” during interrogation as relevant to a determination of voluntariness. People v Stewart, 512 Mich 472, 495; 999 NW2d 717 (2023). Such additional factors include promises of leniency and other interrogation strategies that “tend to undermine a defendant’s free will . . . .” Id. at 495-496.

9 Cipriano. And, of course, “[t]he longer the delay, the greater the probability that the

confession will be held involuntary.” Id. at 643. 6

III. ANALYSIS

Sanders contends that the statements he made during the January 7 interrogation

must be suppressed because they were the product of an unconstitutional detention. When

a defendant seeks to suppress evidence arising out of an allegedly unconstitutional search

or seizure, two separate questions generally must be asked: Did the police conduct violate

the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights, and if so, is the remedy of the exclusionary rule

appropriate? Illinois v Gates, 462 US 213, 223; 103 S Ct 2317; 76 L Ed 2d 527 (1983).

We review the answer to these questions de novo, People v Custer, 465 Mich 319, 326;

630 NW2d 870 (2001), meaning independently and without deference to the lower courts,

People v Beck, 504 Mich 605, 618; 939 NW2d 213 (2019).

A. FOURTH AMENDMENT VIOLATION

The first answer is uncontested here. Sanders’s right to be free from unreasonable

seizure was violated, as held in McLaughlin. He was detained for more than 48 hours

following a warrantless arrest without receiving a judicial determination of probable cause,

and the prosecution conceded in the trial court that this delay was unjustified. Indeed,

Detective Lewandowsky admitted that he thought police officers had 72 hours to bring a

suspect arrested without a warrant before a judge for a probable-cause determination. That

6 Manning also hinted that, under a different set of facts, “the length of the delay alone may be a sufficient ground to suppress a defendant’s statement, particularly where the delay is so inexplicably long that it raises an inference of police misconduct.” Id. at 645.

10 belief was contrary to McLaughlin’s clear rule, and such a plain legal error is not an

extraordinary circumstance justifying delay.

B. REMEDY

Having established a Fourth Amendment violation, the disputed issue is whether the

exclusionary rule—which bars evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment

from admission as substantive evidence in criminal proceedings, People v Lucynski, 514

Mich 888, 889 (2024)—applies to the statements made by Sanders while he was unlawfully

detained. When applicable, the exclusionary rule covers evidence discovered directly from

an illegal search or seizure, as well as so-called “fruit of the poisonous tree” evidence that

is derivative of the unlawful conduct. Utah v Strieff, 579 US 232, 237; 136 S Ct 2056; 195

L Ed 2d 400 (2016). But “[t]he exclusionary rule does not automatically apply once a court

finds a Fourth Amendment violation.” Lucynski, 514 Mich at 889. Instead, as a judicially

created remedy, “application of the exclusionary rule properly has been restricted to those

situations in which its remedial purpose is effectively advanced.” Illinois v Krull, 480 US

340, 347; 107 S Ct 1160; 94 L Ed 2d 364 (1987). Because the fundamental purpose of the

exclusionary rule is to appreciably deter future Fourth Amendment violations, the Supreme

Court has held that the rule only applies when the benefits of deterrence outweigh the costs

of exclusion on the justice system. Herring v United States, 555 US 135, 141; 129 S Ct

695; 172 L Ed 2d 496 (2009).

The Supreme Court has previously declined to resolve whether the exclusionary rule

applies in the context of a McLaughlin violation. Powell, 511 US at 85 n *. Lower federal

and state courts have reached differing answers. Some have concluded—like the Court of

11 Appeals in Manning and like the prosecution advocates here—that statements made during

a McLaughlin violation must be excluded only if they are involuntarily made, with the

delay in presenting a defendant to a magistrate considered as one factor in that

determination. See, e.g., People v Willis, 215 Ill 2d 517, 533-535; 831 NE2d 531 (2005);

State v Nissen, 252 Neb 51, 68; 560 NW2d 157 (1997); State v Tucker, 137 NJ 259, 270;

645 A2d 111 (1994). Others, however, have rejected the voluntariness-only approach and

held that the remedy for a McLaughlin violation is exclusion when the evidence is causally

linked to the Fourth Amendment illegality. See, e.g., Anderson v Calderon, 232 F3d 1053,

1071 (CA 9, 2000), overruled on other grounds by Bittaker v Woodford, 331 F3d 715 (CA

9, 2003); Powell v State, 113 Nev 41, 46; 930 P2d 1123 (1997); State v Huddleston, 924

SW2d 666, 673-675 (Tenn, 1996).

Sanders argues for the latter approach, insisting that statements must be suppressed

if no intervening events broke the causal connection between the unconstitutional detention

and the interrogation. To support his position, Sanders discusses the Supreme Court’s

application of the exclusionary rule to confessions made following an illegal arrest—that

is, an arrest lacking probable cause at its outset. In that context, the Court has long held

that verbal evidence must be excluded if it is the “fruit” of an unlawful arrest. Wong Sun

v United States, 371 US 471, 485; 83 S Ct 407; 9 L Ed 2d 441 (1963). This inquiry asks

whether the statement was obtained by “exploitation” of the Fourth Amendment violation

or, instead, whether it was “sufficiently attenuated” from the taint of the illegal arrest to be

admissible. Brown v Illinois, 422 US 590, 592, 600; 95 S Ct 2254; 45 L Ed 2d 416 (1975).

Described by the Supreme Court as an exception to the exclusionary rule, “[t]he attenuation

doctrine evaluates the causal link between the government’s unlawful act and the discovery

12 of evidence[.]” Strieff, 579 US at 238. When this link is broken, the statements are

admissible because they are unaffected by the Fourth Amendment-violative conduct.

Brown, 422 US at 603. But “[w]hen there is a close causal connection between the illegal

seizure and the confession,” exclusion of the evidence is warranted because that remedy is

“more likely to deter similar police misconduct in the future . . . .” Dunaway v New York,

442 US 200, 218; 99 S Ct 2248; 60 L Ed 2d 824 (1979). See also People v Frederick, 500

Mich 228, 242-243; 895 NW2d 541 (2017) (“The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that

evidence obtained through an illegal search or seizure is tainted by that initial illegality

unless sufficiently attenuated from it.”).

To determine whether inculpatory statements have been purged of the taint of a

Fourth Amendment violation, Brown identified several relevant factors, none of which are

dispositive: (1) the reading of Miranda warnings, (2) the temporal proximity of the arrest

and confession, (3) the presence of intervening circumstances, and (4) the purpose and

flagrancy of the misconduct. Brown, 422 US at 603-604. See also Dunaway, 442 US at

217-219 (applying the Brown factors to a confession made following an illegal arrest);

Taylor v Alabama, 457 US 687, 690-694; 102 S Ct 2664; 73 L Ed 2d 314 (1982) (same).

Under this framework, the prosecution has the burden of establishing the admissibility of

the statements. Brown, 422 US at 604.

Although this case does not involve an illegal arrest, 7 it involves an unconstitutional

seizure of a different form—a prolonged detention following a warrantless arrest without

a judicial determination of probable cause. We hold that the exclusionary rule applies to

7 Sanders does not challenge the legality of the arrest.

13 statements made during a McLaughlin violation, but suppression is not required if the

prosecution demonstrates that those statements are sufficiently attenuated from the taint of

the Fourth Amendment infringement.

Application of the exclusionary rule is appropriate under these circumstances

because it would appreciably deter police misconduct. The rule from McLaughlin is clear,

simple, and easy to apply. At most, compliance requires minimal exercise of discretion by

law enforcement officials. Violations can be avoided without difficulty because promptly

presenting an arrestee to a magistrate is generally within the control of the detaining

agency. And to the extent that the ability to meet this obligation is hindered by factors

outside the police’s purview, McLaughlin allows the government to show that a “bona fide

emergency or other extraordinary circumstance” explained the delay. McLaughlin, 500

US at 57. All told, where the Fourth Amendment violation stems from an officer’s own

deliberate error, exclusion is likely to deter future misconduct. Cf. United States v Leon,

468 US 897, 921; 104 S Ct 3405; 82 L Ed 2d 677 (1984) (“Penalizing the officer for the

magistrate’s error, rather than his own, cannot logically contribute to the deterrence of

Fourth Amendment violations.”). Contrast a McLaughlin violation with other Fourth

Amendment violations where the Supreme Court has concluded that suppression is

unwarranted because there is little to no police misconduct to deter. See, e.g., id. at 921-

922 (officer reasonably relied on a later-invalidated search warrant issued by a neutral

magistrate); Krull, 480 US at 342, 349-350 (officer reasonably relied on a later-invalidated

statute authorizing warrantless administrative searches); Arizona v Evans, 514 US 1, 15-

16; 115 S Ct 1185; 131 L Ed 2d 34 (1995) (officer reasonably relied on erroneous

information about an outstanding arrest warrant that resulted from an error by a court

14 employee); Herring, 555 US at 136-137 (officer reasonably relied on erroneous

information about an outstanding arrest warrant that resulted from a negligent police

bookkeeping error). By comparison, applying the exclusionary rule to statements made

during a McLaughlin violation is likely to significantly deter unlawful conduct by police

officers who arrest and detain an individual without a warrant.

The Supreme Court’s decision in New York v Harris, 495 US 14; 110 S Ct 1640;

109 L Ed 2d 13 (1990), does not compel a different result. There, police officers violated

the Payton rule—that the Fourth Amendment “prohibits the police from making a

warrantless and nonconsensual entry into a suspect’s home in order to make a routine

felony arrest.” Payton, 445 US at 576; Harris, 495 US at 20-21 (applying Payton). At

issue in Harris was whether statements made by the defendant at the police station

following this unlawful within-the-home arrest should be suppressed. Id. at 17. The Court

held that the exclusionary rule did not apply to such outside-the-home statements, so long

as probable cause existed to support the arrest. Id.

We believe Harris is distinguishable from this case in several respects. To start,

Harris explained that a warrantless arrest of a person in the home but with probable cause

does not “somehow render[] unlawful continued custody of the suspect once he is removed

from the house.” Id. at 18. Rather, “[b]ecause the officers had probable cause to arrest

Harris for a crime, Harris was not unlawfully in custody when he was removed to the

station house, given Miranda warnings, and allowed to talk.” Id. Similarly, Harris

explained that the attenuation analysis from Brown is appropriate only where “ ‘the

challenged evidence is in some sense the product of illegal government activity.’ ” Id. at

19, quoting United States v Crews, 445 US 463, 471; 100 S Ct 1244; 63 L Ed 2d 537

15 (1980). Because the outside-the-home statement “was not the product of being in unlawful

custody,” it was not necessary to consider whether the statement was sufficiently attenuated

from the taint of the illegal entry into the home. Harris, 495 US at 19.

Here, by contrast, continued detention of Sanders, without a timely probable-cause

determination from a magistrate, was unlawful. As the Supreme Court has put it, this

finding of probable cause is a “condition” or “prerequisite” for prolonged pretrial detention

following a warrantless arrest, Gerstein, 420 US at 114, 125; see also McLaughlin, 500 US

at 47, and so without that finding, the detention becomes unlawful with the passage of time.

See also Manuel v Joliet, 580 US 357, 365; 137 S Ct 911; 197 L Ed 2d 312 (2017)

(describing Gerstein as holding that “pretrial restraint on liberty is unlawful unless a

judge . . . first makes a reliable finding of probable cause”); Huddleston, 924 SW2d at 675

(“[I]t is not the arrest that is unlawful in a McLaughlin violation, but the detention itself.”). 8

An eventual judicial determination that probable cause exists does not retroactively cure

the Fourth Amendment violation. Accordingly, when Sanders made the remarks at issue,

he was unlawfully detained, and so “the challenged evidence [was] in some sense the

product of illegal governmental activity.” Crews, 445 US at 471. Unlike in Harris,

therefore, an attenuation analysis is appropriate here to determine whether statements made

while wrongfully detained are traceable to the Fourth Amendment violation under

McLaughlin, or instead whether the taint of illegality has been purged.

8 The prosecution concedes as much, stating that with a McLaughlin violation, an arrestee’s detention “becomes unlawful with the passage of time[.]”

16 Further, Harris emphasized that suppressing an outside-the-home statement would

not serve the purposes of the Payton rule—to “protect the physical integrity of the home[.]”

Harris, 495 US at 17, 20. Exclusion would also have minimal incremental deterrent value

as “the principal incentive to obey Payton still obtains: the police know that a warrantless

entry will lead to the suppression of any evidence found, or statements taken, inside the

home.” Id. at 20. See also Vale v Louisiana, 399 US 30, 34-35; 90 S Ct 1969; 26 L Ed 2d

409 (1970) (ordering suppression of the physical fruits of a search of a home that was

unlawfully conducted without a warrant, regardless of whether probable cause existed to

justify the search). For a McLaughlin violation, however, exclusion of causally connected

statements would have a far greater deterrent value. Without that remedy, the principal

incentive to obey McLaughlin would be markedly diminished; so long as the statements

were voluntary, the Fourth Amendment violation would go undeterred. But where there is

an unreasonable delay in presenting a defendant to a judge for a probable-cause

determination and that unlawful seizure taints a statement, exclusion would further the

purposes of Gerstein and McLaughlin—to meaningfully protect against unwarranted

pretrial detention. Gerstein, 420 US at 114. In sum, verbal evidence obtained during a

McLaughlin violation must be suppressed, unless the prosecution can show that the

statements are sufficiently attenuated from the unconstitutional police conduct. This

framework sufficiently deters future Fourth Amendment violations while at the same time

ensuring that statements causally unrelated to the violation will not be suppressed.

The prosecution counters that the exclusionary rule is a poor fit for a McLaughlin

violation. Instead, the prosecution contends that, as held in Manning, the proper analysis

for this Court to apply is the totality-of-the-circumstances voluntariness inquiry under

17 Cipriano. In the prosecution’s view, the nature of the violation here—a “timing

violation”—necessitates a balancing test consistent with Cipriano’s voluntariness factors,

not application of the exclusionary rule. 9 We are not persuaded.

While the Cipriano factors incorporate the length of detention and the delay in

bringing a defendant before a magistrate, they do so only through the lens of determining

whether a confession was freely and voluntarily made. But excluding a confession because

it is involuntary protects a defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights. The Fourth Amendment’s

exclusionary rule, however, “serves interests and policies that are distinct from those it

serves under the Fifth.” Brown, 422 US at 601. The Fifth Amendment safeguards the right

against self-incrimination and protects the accused from “inherently compelling pressures

which work to undermine the individual’s will to resist and to compel him to speak where

he would not otherwise do so freely.” Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436, 467; 86 S Ct 1602;

16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966). Despite “lingering confusion,” the Fifth Amendment’s

voluntariness inquiry speaks nothing about the causal connection between an unreasonable

seizure and a confession. Dunaway, 442 US at 219. Rather, “[s]atisfying the Fifth

Amendment is only the ‘threshold’ condition of the Fourth Amendment analysis required

by Brown.” Id. Just as Miranda warnings “cannot assure in every case that the Fourth

Amendment violation has not been unduly exploited,” neither can a finding of

voluntariness. Brown, 422 US at 603.

9 Describing the right at issue as a mere “timing violation” gives short shrift to the Fourth Amendment as interpreted in Gerstein and McLaughlin. This case is no more about a “timing violation” than the failure to obtain a warrant when required is a paperwork error.

18 Thus, while we agree with Manning, 243 Mich App at 642, that a McLaughlin

violation does not always result in suppression of a statement made during the unlawful

detention, Manning erred in concluding that a voluntariness inquiry under Cipriano

sufficiently accounts for the Fourth Amendment interests at play, id. at 643. In so holding,

Manning committed the same error identified in Brown and its progeny. We therefore

overrule Manning to the extent it is inconsistent with our decision today.

C. GUIDANCE ON REMAND

To assist with the proceedings on remand, we provide some additional direction to

lower courts applying the Brown attenuation factors in the context of statements obtained

during a McLaughlin violation. See Huddleston, 924 SW2d at 675 (acknowledging that

“some modification of the precise application of the factors is necessary to accommodate

the differences between an illegal arrest and an illegal detention”).

The first factor—which applies only to an attenuation analysis involving verbal

evidence—is the presence of Miranda warnings. While the reading of Miranda rights will

generally favor a finding of attenuation, Miranda warnings alone cannot break the causal

connection between Fourth Amendment illegality and incriminating statements. See

Brown, 422 US at 603. That’s because Miranda warnings do not inform an individual of

their Fourth Amendment rights, including the “right to be released from unlawful custody

following an arrest made without a warrant or without probable cause.” Id. at 601 n 6. If

Miranda warnings were themselves sufficient to attenuate the taint of an unconstitutional

seizure, “the effect of the exclusionary rule would be substantially diluted.” Id. at 602.

See also Dunaway, 442 US at 217; Taylor, 457 US at 690.

19 Next is the temporal proximity between the occurrence of the McLaughlin violation

and the inculpatory statements. Analysis of this factor differs from its treatment in the

context of an illegal arrest. In the latter situation, the passage of time between an arrest

and a subsequent statement weakens the causal link. See Brown, 422 US at 604; Taylor,

457 US at 691. But with an unreasonable delay under McLaughlin, the Fourth Amendment

violation is ongoing and does not cease until the arrestee is brought before a magistrate for

a probable-cause determination. Therefore, as the length of unlawful detention increases,

the more likely it is that the statements will not be attenuated from the constitutional

violation. See Huddleston, 924 SW2d at 675 (“[W]hen the detention becomes unlawful

under McLaughlin, the passage of time actually makes the violation worse” and “the

pressure to confess likely increases with each moment of continuing illegal detention.”). 10

As for intervening circumstances, we do not purport to define the complete set of

situations that might contribute to purging the taint of a McLaughlin violation on an

inculpatory statement made by a detained arrestee. Some examples, however, could

include an arrestee’s consultation with an attorney or other close adviser before making

a statement, Huddleston, 924 SW2d at 675; an arrestee’s self-initiated or volunteered

communication with police, Anderson, 232 F3d at 1073-1075; Chavez v State, 832 So 2d

10 It should also go without saying that statements made before a McLaughlin violation cannot be the product of later illegality. See Crews, 445 US at 471 (explaining that evidence is suppressible as the fruit of unlawful conduct when acquired “after some initial Fourth Amendment violation”); Huddleston, 924 SW2d at 675 (“Obviously, if the statement was given prior to the time the detention ripened into a constitutional violation, it is not the product of the illegality and should not be suppressed.”).

20 730, 757 (Fla, 2002); or the discovery by police of an outstanding arrest warrant that

justifies detention of the arrestee on other charges, see Strieff, 579 US at 240-241.

The last factor, one which is “particularly” relevant, is “the purpose and flagrancy

of the official misconduct . . . .” Brown, 422 US at 604. This consideration reflects the

deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule “by favoring exclusion only when the police

misconduct is most in need of deterrence—that is, when it is purposeful or flagrant.”

Strieff, 579 US at 241. While an “isolated instance of negligence” does not rise to this

level, “systemic or recurrent police misconduct” would evince otherwise. Id. at 242.

After all, “the exclusionary rule serves to deter deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent

conduct,” as well as “recurring or systemic negligence,” Herring, 555 US at 144, so

evidence of a consistent practice of constitutional contravention would support

suppression.

On a final note, we reiterate the distinction between a voluntary statement and a

statement that is obtained by exploitation of an illegal search or seizure. “Where a Fourth

Amendment violation ‘taints’ the confession, a finding of voluntariness for the purposes of

the Fifth Amendment is merely a threshold requirement in determining whether the

confession may be admitted in evidence.” Oregon v Elstad, 470 US 298, 306; 105 S Ct

1285; 84 L Ed 2d 222 (1985). Applied to this context, a finding of involuntariness under

Cipriano and Stewart is an independent basis to suppress a defendant’s statements made

while detained in violation of McLaughlin, but it is not the only one.

21 IV. CONCLUSION

We hold that the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule applies to an arrestee’s

statements made while detained in violation of McLaughlin, but suppression is not

warranted if the prosecution establishes that the statements are sufficiently attenuated from

the taint of the unlawful conduct. The trial court did not consider this suppression remedy,

so we vacate the court’s order granting the prosecution’s motion and remand for it to

determine the admissibility of the challenged statements under this standard. Because

voluntariness is a threshold inquiry for admissibility, we express no opinion on whether

the trial court clearly erred in its factual findings as to the Cipriano and Stewart factors.

We do not retain jurisdiction. Kyra H. Bolden Megan K. Cavanagh Richard H. Bernstein Elizabeth M. Welch Kimberly A. Thomas Noah P. Hood

22 STATE OF MICHIGAN

SUPREME COURT

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v No. 167899

JOHN HAROLD SANDERS,

Defendant-Appellant.

ZAHRA, J. (dissenting). This case presents an interesting question involving the intersection of rights

protected under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the United States Constitution.

Defendant was arrested without a warrant and held in custody pending a hearing before a

judge to determine the existence of probable cause. Pursuant to Riverside Co v

McLaughlin, 1 defendant was entitled to a probable-cause determination no later than 48

hours after his arrest. 2 Defendant’s probable-cause hearing, however, was delayed past

this 48-hour mark, resulting in a violation of his Fourth Amendment right to be free from

unreasonable seizures. Approximately 64 hours after his arrest, defendant was interrogated

by police. Before the interrogation, defendant waived his Fifth Amendment right against

1 Riverside Co v McLaughlin, 500 US 44, 56-57; 111 S Ct 1661; 114 L Ed 2d 49 (1991). 2 “Where an arrested individual does not receive a probable cause determination within 48 hours, the calculus changes. In such a case, the arrested individual does not bear the burden of proving an unreasonable delay. Rather, the burden shifts to the government to demonstrate the existence of a bona fide emergency or other extraordinary circumstance.” Id. at 57. The prosecution does not assert that the delay was justified. self-incrimination guarded by Miranda v Arizona 3 and then confessed to killing his infant

daughter.

The issue before the Court is what protection should be afforded for a defendant

who waives his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination while detained in

violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. As observed in the majority opinion, the

Supreme Court of the United States has declined to address whether an inculpatory

statement obtained during an unconstitutional detention must be suppressed, 4 and “[l]ower

federal and state courts have reached differing answers.” 5 The majority overrules People

v Manning, 6 and for all intents and purposes cabins People v Cipriano, 7 and holds that the

exclusionary-rule analysis is required due to the Fourth Amendment violation present in

this case. The majority remands the case to the trial court to conduct an attenuation hearing

to, in essence, “ ‘evaluate[] the causal link between the government’s unlawful act and the

discovery of evidence[.]’ ” 8

3 Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436; 86 S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966). 4 Powell v Nevada, 511 US 79, 84-85; 114 S Ct 1280; 128 L Ed 2d 1 (1994). 5 Comparing People v Willis, 215 Ill 2d 517, 533-535; 831 NE2d 531 (2005), State v Nissen, 252 Neb 51, 68; 560 NW2d 157 (1997), and State v Tucker, 137 NJ 259, 270; 645 A2d 111 (1994) (all holding the critical inquiry is whether the incriminating statements were voluntary), with Anderson v Calderon, 232 F3d 1053, 1071 (CA 9, 2000), overruled on other grounds by Bittaker v Woodford, 331 F3d 715 (CA 9, 2003), Powell v State, 113 Nev 41, 46; 930 P2d 1123 (1997), and State v Huddleston, 924 SW2d 666, 673-675 (Tenn, 1996) (all rejecting the voluntariness-only approach and factoring traditional remedies associated with Fourth Amendment violations, including the exclusionary rule). 6 People v Manning, 243 Mich App 615, 643; 624 NW2d 746 (2000). 7 People v Cipriano, 431 Mich 315, 334; 429 NW2d 781 (1988). 8 Quoting Utah v Strieff, 579 US 232, 238; 136 S Ct 2056; 195 L Ed 2d 400 (2016).

2 Contrary to the action of the majority, I would not require analysis under the

exclusionary rule in this case. The voluntariness inquiry established by this Court in

Cipriano adequately protects the integrity of the process and the statements obtained during

the interrogation. The Fourth Amendment violation arises from the illegal detention of

defendant, not from the introduction of evidence obtained during that detention. There are

far more suitable remedies available to defendant than suppression of evidence for the

violation of his Fourth Amendment right. These alternative remedies will deter wrongful

police conduct without imposing the high cost on our criminal justice system of excluding

evidence critical to the truth-seeking process of a criminal trial. I would not overrule

Manning and would instead declare that Cipriano applies with equal force subsequent to

McLaughlin. Accordingly, I dissent.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On Friday, January 4, 2013, defendant, John Sanders, brought his three-month-old

daughter to the hospital after he claimed she suddenly stopped breathing while the two

were left alone. Disturbingly, physicians noted severe brain hemorrhaging, retinal

hemorrhaging, and bruising across the infant’s scalp. With doctors believing that these

injuries were consistent with physical abuse, detectives from the Lansing Police

Department questioned defendant, who at that time was not in custody and agreed to

participate in an interview with police about what happened to his daughter. Defendant

denied responsibility for his daughter’s injuries. Nonetheless, believing that they had

probable cause, police arrested defendant without a warrant. That same Friday evening,

defendant’s daughter tragically succumbed to her injuries. The next day, an autopsy was

3 performed on the child, and it was determined that the cause of death was traumatic brain

injury, and the manner of death was homicide.

On the following Monday, about 64 hours after defendant’s arrest, Detective Mark

Lewandowsky conducted another interview with defendant, who proclaimed that he

understood his Miranda rights and knowingly and freely waived those rights. Detective

Lewandowsky confronted him with the autopsy results. At first, defendant claimed that

his daughter may have been injured after being tossed into the air and bumping her head

on the ceiling, or by falling onto the bed. Ultimately, defendant admitted to shaking his

daughter when she would not stop crying. Later that day, a magistrate made a formal

finding of probable cause and authorized a criminal complaint against defendant for the

death of his daughter. 9

In December 2013, a jury convicted defendant of felony murder and first-degree

child abuse. The Court of Appeals affirmed these convictions, and this Court denied leave

to appeal. 10 Defendant successfully moved for relief from judgment in 2019 and was

granted a new trial on the basis of ineffective counsel due to his trial attorney’s failure to

seek the assistance of a medical expert. The prosecution is now retrying defendant on

charges of open murder and first-degree child abuse. The prosecution moved to admit

defendant’s inculpatory statements. Following a Walker 11 hearing, the trial judge admitted

9 Detective Lewandowsky testified that it was his understanding that a suspect arrested on probable cause without a warrant had to be brought before a magistrate within 72 hours. 10 People v Sanders, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued April 21, 2015 (Docket No. 320247); People v Sanders, 498 Mich 907 (2015). 11 People v Walker (On Rehearing), 374 Mich 331, 338; 132 NW2d 87 (1965).

4 the statements after applying current Michigan law pursuant to Cipriano, 12 which requires

the trial court to consider the totality of the circumstances to ascertain whether the

statements were made voluntarily. 13 After thoughtfully considering a myriad of factors,

including some factors that weighed in favor of finding the statements involuntary, such as

the length of defendant’s detention and the unnecessary delay in bringing him before a

magistrate, the trial judge found that the totality of the circumstances weighed in favor of

finding the statements voluntary and admissible.

Defendant appealed the order to admit these statements, with trial proceedings

stayed for the duration of this appeal. The Court of Appeals denied defendant’s application

for leave to appeal. 14 Defendant sought leave to appeal in this Court, and we ordered oral

argument, directing the parties to address:

(1) the proper analysis for determining whether statements made while detained in violation of the Fourth Amendment under Riverside Co v McLaughlin, 500 US 44 (1991), should be suppressed; (2) whether People v Manning, 243 Mich App 615 (2000), was correctly decided; and (3) whether the trial court clearly erred in concluding that the defendant’s statements were voluntary. See People v Cipriano, 431 Mich 315 (1988). [People v Sanders, ___ Mich ___, ___; 18 NW3d 511, 512 (2025).]

12 Cipriano, 431 Mich at 334. 13 Id. 14 People v Sanders, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered November 20, 2024 (Docket No. 371677).

5 II. LEGAL ANALYSIS

A. EXCLUSIONARY RULE

The Fourth Amendment provides that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their

persons . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no

[w]arrants shall issue, but upon probable cause . . . .” 15 The Fourth Amendment is applied

to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. 16 “The Fourth Amendment contains no

provision expressly precluding the use of evidence obtained in violation of its

commands[.]” 17 The Supreme Court of the United States has, however, established “an

exclusionary rule that, when applicable, forbids the use of improperly obtained evidence at

trial.” 18 The exclusionary rule exists not as a constitutional right inherent in the Fourth

Amendment but rather as a “judicially created remedy” that “has been restricted to those

areas where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served.” 19 These

remedial objectives principally concern “deterring lawless conduct by . . . [law

enforcement] officers[.]” 20

15 US Const, Am IV. 16 Mapp v Ohio, 367 US 643, 655; 81 S Ct 1684; 6 L Ed 2d 1081 (1961). 17 United States v Leon, 468 US 897, 906; 104 S Ct 3405; 82 L Ed 2d 677 (1984). 18 Herring v United States, 555 US 135, 139; 129 S Ct 695; 172 L Ed 2d 496 (2009). 19 United States v Calandra, 414 US 338, 348; 94 S Ct 613; 38 L Ed 2d 561 (1974). 20 Wong Sun v United States, 371 US 471, 486; 83 S Ct 407; 9 L Ed 2d 441 (1963); see also United States v Janis, 428 US 433, 454; 96 S Ct 3021; 49 L Ed 2d 1046 (1976) (“If . . . the exclusionary rule does not result in appreciable deterrence, then, clearly, its use in the instant situation is unwarranted.”) (emphasis added).

6 The Supreme Court has cautioned that “[s]uppression of evidence . . . has always

been our last resort, not our first impulse.” 21 It is worth repeating that the exclusionary rule

is found nowhere in the Constitution. It is a judicial fiction, created to prospectively protect

Fourth Amendment rights by deterring future police misconduct. 22 Since its inception, the

Supreme Court of the United States has consistently limited its application with the creation

of a wide variety of requirements and exceptions to the general rule to ensure that when

the exclusion of evidence results, the remedial objectives of the rule are best served. For

example, the Supreme Court has refused to exclude evidence acquired after a Fourth

Amendment violation unless that violation “is at least the ‘but for’ cause of the discovery

of the evidence.” 23 But “exclusion may not be premised on the mere fact that a

constitutional violation was a ‘but-for’ cause of obtaining evidence.” 24 Rather, “but-for

causality is only a necessary, not a sufficient, condition for suppression.” 25

Even when a Fourth Amendment violation functions as a but-for cause of the

discovery of a piece of evidence, the exclusionary rule does not apply unless the evidence

was obtained by exploiting the illegality. 26 In other words, the discovery of evidence can

21 Hudson v Michigan, 547 US 586, 591; 126 S Ct 2159; 165 L Ed 2d 56 (2006). 22 Calandra, 414 US at 348. 23 Segura v United States, 468 US 796, 815; 104 S Ct 3380; 82 L Ed 2d 599 (1984). 24 Hudson, 547 US at 592. 25 Id.; see also Wong Sun, 371 US at 487-488 (declining to hold that “all evidence is ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ simply because it would not have come to light but for the illegal actions of the police”). 26 See Brown v Illinois, 422 US 590, 600, 603; 95 S Ct 2254; 45 L Ed 2d 416 (1975).

7 become sufficiently causally attenuated from the Fourth Amendment violation so as to

render the exclusionary rule inapplicable. 27 This causal attenuation analysis is analogous

to a proximate-cause analysis. 28 Attenuation is present when either “the causal connection

is remote” or when the “interest protected by the constitutional guarantee . . . would not be

served by suppression of the evidence obtained.” 29

Attenuation is one of the exceptions to the exclusionary rule that allows for the

admission of illegally obtained evidence. For example, the independent-source doctrine

applies in the illegal-search context when evidence seized is later discovered through a

legal “independent source,” 30 such as a valid search warrant that was not itself secured on

the basis of illegally obtained evidence. The inevitable-discovery doctrine “allows for the

admission of evidence that would have been discovered even without the unconstitutional

source.” 31 And the good-faith exception applies when officers seize evidence in

reasonable, good-faith reliance on a search warrant that is later proved defective. 32

In addition to these causal prerequisites and limits on the exclusionary rule, the

Supreme Court has refused to apply this judicially created prophylactic rule whenever “the

27 Strieff, 579 US at 235. 28 See Taylor v Alabama, 457 US 687, 701; 102 S Ct 2664; 73 L Ed 2d 314 (1982) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 29 Hudson, 547 US at 593. 30 Strieff, 579 US at 238. 31 Id. 32 Leon, 468 US at 905, 913.

8 costs of exclusion outweigh its deterrent benefits.” 33 These costs of exclusion include the

dangers posed to society by “setting the guilty free and the dangerous at large” 34 as a result

of excluding probative evidence against them, as well as undermining “ ‘the truth-finding

functions of judge and jury.’ ” 35 The Supreme Court has also scrutinized whether less

costly deterrents exist, such as civil remedies. 36 Finally, given the deterrent nature of the

exclusionary rule, the police misconduct deterred by it must generally be “deliberate,

reckless, or grossly negligent conduct.” 37

B. A SPLIT OF AUTHORITY

Many jurisdictions, including Michigan up to the present, apply a voluntariness test

to weigh the totality of the circumstances in determining whether a statement obtained

during an illegal detention is voluntarily made. 38 This test allows a trial court to consider,

among other things, the following factors: “the age of the accused; his lack of education or

his intelligence level; the extent of his previous experience with the police; the repeated

and prolonged nature of the questioning; the length of the detention of the accused before

he gave the statement in question; the lack of any advice to the accused of his constitutional

33 Strieff, 579 US at 235. 34 Hudson, 547 US at 591. 35 Leon, 468 US at 907, quoting United States v Payner, 447 US 727, 734; 100 S Ct 2439; 65 L Ed 2d 468 (1980). 36 Hudson, 547 US at 598. 37 Herring, 555 US at 144. 38 See Willis, 215 Ill 2d at 536; Bush v State, 695 So 2d 70, 124 (Ala Crim App, 1995); Peterson v State, 674 NE2d 528, 538-539 (Ind, 1996); Nissen, 252 Neb at 68; Tucker, 137 NJ at 270; Cipriano, 431 Mich at 334.

9 rights; whether there was an unnecessary delay in bringing him before a magistrate before

he gave the confession; whether the accused was injured, intoxicated or drugged, or in ill

health when he gave the statement; whether the accused was deprived of food, sleep, or

medical attention; whether the accused was physically abused; and whether the suspect

was threatened with abuse.” 39 When a trial judge finds that these nonexhaustive factors

weigh in favor of finding a statement involuntary, exclusion is the appropriate remedy. 40

Notably, this test does not require exclusion on the mere basis of an unnecessary delay in

having a probable-cause hearing, but rather only treats this as one factor among others in

assessing the voluntariness of a statement. 41

The Court of Appeals in Manning held that this test was consistent with

McLaughlin, which was decided after Cipriano. 42 In doing so, the Manning panel held that

Cipriano, a case interpreting Michigan’s prompt-arraignment statute’s “without

unnecessary delay” 43 language, did not contravene the Supreme Court’s Fourth

Amendment holding in McLaughlin. 44 This part of the Manning analysis is undoubtedly

correct, as the majority acknowledges in its opinion. McLaughlin never addressed the issue

of remedy and left it unresolved for other courts to take up. Manning took on the issue and

39 Cipriano, 431 Mich at 334. 40 See id. at 334-335. 41 Id. 42 Manning, 243 Mich App at 643. 43 MCL 764.13. 44 Id. at 638.

10 held that the exclusionary rule does not automatically apply to statements made during

McLaughlin violations, reasoning that the deterrent effects of the rule would not

outweigh its costs. 45 Manning also appropriately stressed that a lengthy illegal

detention on its own can render a subsequent statement involuntary, thus deterring

police departments that would be tempted to detain suspects for as long as it takes to

secure a confession. 46

In contrast to jurisdictions that joined Michigan in employing the voluntariness test,

some jurisdictions, and the majority in this case, favor application of the exclusionary rule

that requires exclusion of statements made during a McLaughlin violation unless they are

sufficiently attenuated from that violation. 47 Factors important in assessing causal

attenuation include: (1) the giving of Miranda warnings, (2) the temporal proximity

between the arrest and the statement, (3) the presence of intervening circumstances, and

(4) the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct in illegally detaining a suspect. 48

But, as the majority points out, the temporal-proximity factor must be inverted such that

where Brown v Illinois treats a longer duration between an illegal arrest and a statement as

tending to weigh in favor of attenuation, McLaughlin violations require treating a longer

45 Id. at 642. 46 Id. at 643 (“The longer the delay, the greater the probability that the confession will be held involuntary.”). 47 Anderson, 232 F3d at 1071 (CA 9, 2000). 48 Id. at 1072, citing Brown, 422 US at 603-604.

11 illegal detention as weighing against attenuation. 49 This pertinent distinction demonstrates

that application of the attenuation doctrine is ill-suited for a McLaughlin violation.

III. MY DIVERGENCE WITH THE MAJORITY HOLDING

The majority opinion concludes that the exclusionary rule should apply to

statements made during McLaughlin violations. In so holding, this Court overrules

Manning and renders impotent our voluntariness test developed in Cipriano. As noted by

the majority, there is no dispute that defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights under

McLaughlin were violated. Defendant was detained without a judicial determination of

probable cause for over 48 hours and without a bona fide emergency or other extraordinary

circumstances to justify this delay.

Nonetheless, I disagree with the majority opinion in concluding that the

exclusionary rule must apply absent a well-established exception to it, like attenuation. I

dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the deterrent effects of the exclusionary rule

outweigh its costs to law enforcement and public safety in cases involving McLaughlin

violations. In particular, the Cipriano voluntariness test already allows trial courts to weigh

McLaughlin violations, thus providing ample deterrence without the need to use the “last

resort” of suppression under the exclusionary rule. Moreover, as the Supreme Court of the

United States has repeatedly emphasized, the exclusionary rule “exacts an enormous price

49 Cf. Dunaway v New York, 442 US 200, 220; 99 S Ct 2248; 60 L Ed 2d 824 (1979) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“If there are no relevant intervening circumstances, a prolonged detention may well be a more serious exploitation of an illegal arrest than a short one.”).

12 from society and our system of justice[.]” 50 This Court also recognizes the “heavy toll”

that exclusion places on the state’s justice system. 51 Accordingly, exclusion is a “heavily

handicapped” remedy for a Fourth Amendment violation. 52 With these considerations in

mind, the Manning Court correctly held that “[t]he harm caused by excluding a voluntary

confession solely on the basis of the delay would outweigh the benefit of this exclusion in

deterring unreasonable delays.” 53 This holding should not be overruled.

Given that the exclusionary rule exists to deter official misconduct, determining the

incentives for officers to violate the Fourth Amendment is an important step in discerning

whether deterrence is needed at all. In cases involving McLaughlin violations, there are

few incentives for officers to detain a suspect without a timely probable-cause hearing.

Indeed, when officers arrest a suspect with probable cause, such as they did to defendant

in this case, they have virtually no incentive to delay a probable-cause hearing, the purpose

of which is to formally confirm the existence of probable cause. This situation is analogous

to the events in New York v Harris. 54 There, the police had probable cause to arrest the

defendant but proceeded to do so illegally by entering his home to make the arrest without

50 Segura, 468 US at 816; see also Leon, 468 US at 907 (describing the exclusionary rule as generating “substantial social costs”). 51 Cipriano, 431 Mich at 332. 52 Nardone v United States, 308 US 338, 340; 60 S Ct 266; 84 L Ed 307 (1939). 53 Manning, 243 Mich App at 638. 54 New York v Harris, 495 US 14; 110 S Ct 1640; 109 L Ed 2d 13 (1990).

13 a warrant. 55 The defendant then later made an inculpatory statement at the police station. 56

The Supreme Court of the United States declined to impose the exclusionary rule on such

cases, reasoning that officers have no incentive to make warrantless invasions of homes to

effectuate arrests with the hopes of later securing jailhouse confessions from those

arrested. 57 Similarly, police possess little incentive to delay a probable-cause hearing with

the hopes of securing a confession from a suspect when they already have probable cause.

When police have little incentive to violate the Fourth Amendment, deterrence has far less

utility and is more easily outweighed by the costs of exclusion.

There are also other deterrents that make the “last resort” exclusion remedy

unnecessary. For example, the threat of civil liability for violating a suspect’s Fourth

Amendment rights provides a powerful deterrent that the Supreme Court has recognized as

sufficient to deter without resorting to the exclusionary rule. 58 This Court has expressly

held that civil remedies are available against the state for constitutional violations. 59 Thus,

civil rights suits are available to persons subjected to unreasonably long delays. 60 Thanks

to developments in the law since the advent of the exclusionary rule that allow successful

plaintiffs to recover attorney fees in addition to damages for constitutional-rights

55 Id. at 15. 56 Id. at 16. 57 Id. at 20-21 (explaining that “the police know that a warrantless entry will lead to the suppression of any evidence found, or statements taken, inside the home”). 58 Hudson, 547 US at 596-598. 59 Bauserman v Unemployment Ins Agency, 509 Mich 673, 687; 983 NW2d 855 (2022). 60 Willis, 215 Ill 2d at 532, citing 42 USC 1983 (2000) and Manning, 243 Mich App at 638.

14 violations, civil liability offers an effective deterrent to violations of McLaughlin. 61

Moreover, an even greater alternative deterrent exists in the voluntariness test under

Cipriano. Whenever a detention is prolonged to a coercive point, an inculpatory statement

can be suppressed as involuntary. 62 As the Manning Court correctly noted, “[a] sufficiently

long delay in itself will be enough to make a confession involuntary under Cipriano.” 63

Hence, police departments across the state are already deterred from detaining suspects for

as long as it takes to elicit inculpatory statements from them, without the need to resort to

the exclusionary rule. Another point deserving of attention is that the exclusionary rule’s

heyday occurred during a pre-Miranda and pre-Brown time. 64 Given that these decisions

have created protections for criminal defendants during their time in police custody, the

“last resort” exclusionary remedy is not appropriate to extend to new situations like

McLaughlin violations.

Given that there are few incentives for police to violate McLaughlin, and that there

are effective alternative deterrents, the costs of excluding evidence outweigh any deterrent

benefit suppression may have. As mentioned earlier, some of these costs include the

dangers posed to society by releasing dangerous individuals after excluding otherwise

61 See 42 USC 1988. 62 Cipriano, 431 Mich at 334-335. 63 Manning, 243 Mich App at 638. 64 Brown, 422 US at 597, 602-604 (applying the attenuation doctrine of the exclusionary rule—which considers, among other factors, whether Miranda warnings were given—to inculpatory statements made in police custody following illegal arrests).

15 probative and voluntary statements they make. 65 Other costs include undermining the

“ ‘truth-finding functions of judges and juries’ ” in criminal trials. 66 Excessive application

of the exclusionary rule allows some guilty defendants to go free, 67 which may generate

disrespect for the law and the administration of justice. Finally, another practical cost is

the curtailing of judicial discretion in deciding whether to admit any given inculpatory

statement. As Justice Felix Frankfurter put it, the “conduct of criminal trials cannot be

confined within mechanical rules.” 68 Rather, “[i]t necessarily demands . . . a well-

established range of judicial discretion . . . in ruling upon preliminary questions of fact.” 69

One such “preliminary question of fact” concerns the voluntariness of any given

inculpatory statement. Cipriano allows a trial judge to determine whether a statement is

voluntary, with that judge able to consider the effect on voluntariness of the length of

detention and unnecessary delays in bringing the accused before a magistrate. 70 This test

appropriately relies on “the learning, good sense, fairness and courage of . . . trial judges,”

and the test should not be discarded for “mechanical rules” 71 like a 48-hour time limit after

which statements are excluded regardless of voluntariness.

65 Hudson, 547 US at 591. 66 Leon, 468 US at 907, quoting Payner, 447 US at 734. 67 Leon, 468 US at 907. 68 Nardone, 308 US at 342. 69 Id. 70 Cipriano, 431 Mich at 334. 71 Nardone, 308 US at 342.

16 IV. CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, I dissent. I would apply the Court of Appeals’ decision in

Manning and would affirm the trial court’s order to admit defendant’s inculpatory

statements under the voluntariness test supplied by Cipriano.

Brian K. Zahra