People v. Sanchez

2024 IL App (2d) 230226-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: April 18, 2024
• Docket: 2-23-0226
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

2024 IL App (2d) 230226-U No. 2-23-0226 Order filed April 18, 2024

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23(b) and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

SECOND DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE ) Appeal from the Circuit Court OF ILLINOIS, ) of Kane County. ) Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) v. ) No. 20-CF-1689 ) DARIELN A. MORAN SANCHEZ, ) Honorable ) David P. Kliment, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE SCHOSTOK delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice McLaren and Justice Kennedy concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: We agree with appellate counsel that there is no potentially meritorious basis for appeal. Therefore, we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw, and we affirm the trial court.

¶2 Defendant, Darieln A. Moran Sanchez, appeals from the judgment of the circuit court of

Kane County finding him guilty of drug offenses. The Office of the State Appellate Defender has

moved to withdraw, claiming that defendant has no potentially meritorious basis for appeal. We

grant the appellate defender’s motion to withdraw, and we affirm.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND 2024 IL App (2d) 230226-U

¶4 Following a bench trial, defendant was found guilty of one count of unlawful possession

with intent to deliver 400 grams or more, but less than 900 grams, of a substance containing

methamphetamine (720 ILCS 646/55(a)(2)(E) (West 2020)) and one count of unlawful possession

with intent to deliver 900 grams or more of a substance containing cocaine (720 ILCS

570/401(a)(2)(D) (West 2020)).

¶5 At trial, the State presented evidence that on September 5, 2020, a DEA agent was

conducting surveillance on defendant. He observed defendant, Nancy Navejas, and two children

leave a hotel in Carol Stream and drive off in a white Ford Explorer. The agent followed the

vehicle onto Interstate 90, where other law enforcement officers pulled it over. The vehicle was

searched, and a written lease for residential property was found in the glove compartment. The

lease named Felipe Ocampo as landlord and defendant and Navejas as tenants. The glove

compartment also contained a utility bill in defendant’s and Navejas’s names for the leased

property. A brick-shaped object wrapped in duct tape and a sealed baggie containing what

appeared to be methamphetamine were recovered from under the third-row seat, which had been

folded down to increase the storage capacity of the rear cargo compartment. It was stipulated that

the brick contained 1005 grams of a substance containing cocaine and that the sealed baggie

contained 446.8 grams of a substance containing methamphetamine.

¶6 Roberto Gutierrez testified that on September 5, 2020, he was a sergeant with the Illinois

State Police and was assigned to the interdiction unit. He was raised in a household where both

parents spoke Spanish, and he was fluent in that language, having spoken it his whole life. Over

the past 20 years in law enforcement, he conducted hundreds of Spanish interviews with suspects

and witnesses. Gutierrez testified that he interviewed defendant in Spanish in the presence of other

law enforcement officers. Defendant admitted that he was aware that there was methamphetamine

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and cocaine in the Explorer. Defendant also indicated that he had paid someone for the use of the

Explorer. Defendant said that he had met with Ocampo, who put the drugs in the vehicle.

Defendant planned to take the drugs to his home in Minnesota, where someone would retrieve

them and pay defendant $1500. During the interview, Gutierrez submitted written questions to

defendant in Spanish, and defendant provided written answers in Spanish. Gutierrez translated the

questions and answers, which contained admissions similar to those defendant made during the

interview. Defendant also prepared a brief written statement in Spanish.

¶7 Derek Cowan testified that he was a master sergeant with the Illinois State Police and was

director of the North Central Narcotics Task Force. Cowan joined the task force in 2014. He had

received training in narcotics investigations and had participated in over 1000 such investigations

during his career. Cowan testified that he was familiar with the street value of various drugs. The

trial court qualified Cowan as “an expert in the area of narcotics detection and transactions.”

Cowan testified that, in his opinion, the drugs recovered from the Ford Explorer were packaged

for distribution.

¶8 Based on this evidence, the trial court found defendant guilty of the offenses described

above. The court sentenced defendant to concurrent prison terms of 17 years for possession of

cocaine with intent to deliver and 12 years for possession of methamphetamine with intent to

deliver. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal, and the trial court appointed the appellate

defender to represent him.

¶9 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 10 Per Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and People v. Jones, 38 Ill. 2d 384 (1967),

the appellate defender moves to withdraw as counsel. In her motion, counsel states that she read

the record and found no issue of arguable merit. Counsel further states that she advised defendant

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of her opinion. Counsel supports her motion with a memorandum of law providing a statement of

facts and an argument as to why this appeal presents no issue of arguable merit. We advised

defendant that he had 30 days to respond to the motion. That time has passed, and defendant has

not responded.

¶ 11 Counsel indicates that she considered the following five issues for appeal: (1) whether

defendant validly waived his right to a jury trial, (2) whether the State laid a proper foundation for

Cowan’s testimony as an expert in the field of narcotics detection and transactions, (3) whether

the trial court erred in accepting Gutierrez’s testimony concerning his ability to translate

defendant’s inculpatory statements, (4) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant’s

convictions, and (5) whether the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing defendant to

concurrent prison terms of 12 years for possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver and

17 years for possession of cocaine with intent to deliver. However, counsel concludes that none

of these issues has arguable merit. We agree.

¶ 12 First, we consider whether defendant validly waived his right to a jury trial. The controlling

legal principles are as follows:

“ ‘The right to a trial by jury is a fundamental right guaranteed by our federal and

state constitutions.’ [Citations.] Nevertheless, a defendant can waive his right to a jury

trial, but for a waiver to be valid, it must be knowingly and voluntarily made. [Citations.]

Under section 115-1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963, a jury waiver must be in

writing. [Citation.]

The trial court has a duty to ensure that the defendant waived his right to a jury trial

‘expressly and understandingly.’ [Citation.] ‘However, a trial court need not give any

specific admonition or advice for a defendant to make an effective jury waiver.’ [Citation.]

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‘Whether a jury waiver is valid cannot be determined by application of a precise formula,

but rather turns on the particular facts and circumstances of each case.’ [Citation.] The

statutory requirement for a written jury waiver does not ‘define or give substance to the

constitutional right to choose whether to have a jury trial. Rather, a written jury waiver

merely memorializes the defendant’s decision, allowing a court to review the record to

ascertain whether a defendant’s jury waiver was made understandingly.’ [Citation.]”

People v. Maxey, 2018 IL App (1st) 130698-B, ¶¶ 106-07.

¶ 13 Here, defendant signed a jury waiver written in Spanish. At a hearing at which he had the

assistance of an interpreter, defendant confirmed that he understood the difference between a

bench trial and a jury trial and that he was giving up the right to have a jury determine his guilt or

innocence. He also confirmed that he was not under the effects of drugs or alcohol and that no

threats or promises had been made to induce him to waive his right to a jury. Therefore, we find

no arguably meritorious basis for challenging defendant’s jury waiver.

¶ 14 Second, we consider whether the State laid a proper foundation for Cowan’s testimony as

an expert in narcotics detection and transactions. As we have recently observed:

“Generally, a witness may testify as an expert if he or she possesses ‘experience and

qualifications [that] afford him [or her] knowledge that is not common to laypersons.’

[Citation.] *** There is no ‘predetermined formula’ specifying how an expert acquires

the knowledge that renders him or her an expert. (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

[Citation.] Such knowledge may be acquired through study, practical experience, training,

education, or research. [Citation.] Any weakness in the basis of an expert’s opinion goes

to the weight of the testimony; it should not affect its admissibility if the facts, data, or

opinions are reasonably relied upon by experts in the relevant field. [Citation.] The

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decision to admit expert testimony is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court

and will not be reversed absent an abuse of that discretion. [Citation.] An abuse of

discretion occurs only if no reasonable person could agree with the trial court. [Citation.]”

People v. Harris, 2023 IL App (2d) 210697, ¶ 34.

¶ 15 Cowan’s testimony established that he had extensive training and experience in narcotics

investigations. There is no arguably meritorious basis for challenging the trial court’s decision to

qualify him as an expert witness.

¶ 16 Third, we consider whether the trial court erred in accepting Gutierrez’s testimony

concerning his ability to translate defendant’s inculpatory statements. We note that an individual

is qualified to serve as an interpreter for a defendant at trial if the defendant can understand that

individual and the individual can understand the defendant. 725 ILCS 140/1 (West 2022). We

see no reason why a more stringent standard should apply to a witness’s translation of a defendant’s

out-of-court statements. Gutierrez testified that he was fluent in Spanish, having spoken it his

whole life, and had conducted hundreds of interviews in Spanish. He testified that he had no

trouble understanding defendant. Likewise, defendant’s written answers to Gutierrez’s written

questions suggest that defendant had no difficulty understanding Gutierrez. Accordingly, there is

no potentially meritorious basis for arguing that the trial court erred in accepting Gutierrez’s

testimony about his ability to translate defendant’s statements.

¶ 17 Fourth, we consider whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant’s convictions.

In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal proceeding, “ ‘the relevant

question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any

rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable

doubt.’ ” (Emphasis in original.) People v. Collins, 106 Ill. 2d 237, 261 (1985) (quoting Jackson

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v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). Moreover, “a reviewing court will not substitute its

judgment for that of the trier of fact on issues involving the weight of evidence or the credibility

of witnesses.” People v. Siguenza-Brito, 235 Ill. 2d 213, 224-25 (2009). Here, the State was

required to prove that defendant (1) knowingly possessed (2) with intent to deliver (3) 400 grams

or more, but less than 900 grams, of a substance containing methamphetamine and 900 grams or

more of a substance containing cocaine. See 720 ILCS 646/55(a)(2)(E) (West 2020); 720 ILCS

570/401(a)(2)(D) (West 2020).

¶ 18 It is well established that

“[c]ontrolled substances discovered on premises, or in a vehicle, under the defendant’s

control and in a place where he could have been, or should have been, aware of them give

rise to an inference of knowledge and possession by [the] defendant which may be

sufficient to sustain a conviction for unlawful possession of controlled substances.” People

v. Eiland, 217 Ill. App. 3d 250, 261 (1991).

Here, substances stipulated to be methamphetamine and cocaine were found under defendant’s

control, beneath a seat that had been folded down to enlarge the rear cargo compartment. Based

on the location of the illicit substances, defendant should have been aware of their presence in the

vehicle. In any event, defendant admitted that he knew that Ocampo put the drugs in the vehicle.

Moreover, not only did Cowan testify that the drugs were packaged to distribute, but defendant

admitted that he planned to take the drugs to Minnesota, where someone would retrieve them and

pay him $1500. This was sufficient evidence of intent to deliver. Finally, the quantity of the drugs

was stipulated: the methamphetamine weighed 446.8 grams, and the cocaine weighed 1005 grams.

Thus, there is no arguably meritorious basis for challenging the sufficiency of the evidence.

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¶ 19 Fifth, we consider whether the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing defendant to

concurrent prison terms of 12 years for possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver and

17 years for possession of cocaine with intent to deliver. As we have recently observed:

“We review for an abuse of discretion a trial court’s sentencing decision. [Citation.]

The sentencing court has wide latitude in imposing a sentence, so long as it does not ignore

relevant mitigating factors or consider improper aggravating factors. [Citation.] We

accord ‘great deference to a sentence within the appropriate sentencing range.’ [Citation.]

However, we will find that a court abused its discretion, even if the sentence imposed is

within the statutory range, if the sentence does not reflect adequate consideration of

relevant mitigating factors or the constitutionally mandated objective of rehabilitation, or

if it is highly disproportionate to the offense and greatly diverges from the spirit and

purpose of the law. [Citation.] *** We may not substitute our judgment for that of the

sentencing court simply because we would have weighed the factors differently [Citation.]”

People v. Cavazos, 2023 IL App (2d) 220066, ¶ 73.

¶ 20 Here, the record does not show that the trial court ignored any proper factors or considered

any improper ones. Unlawful possession with intent to deliver 400 grams or more, but less than

900 grams, of methamphetamine is punishable by a prison term of not less than 12 years and not

more than 50 years. 720 ILCS 646/55(a)(2)(E) (West 2020). Defendant received the minimum

sentence. Unlawful possession with intent to deliver 900 grams or more of cocaine is punishable

by a prison term of not less than 15 years and not more than 60 years. 720 ILCS 570/401(a)(2)(D)

(West 2020). Defendant’s sentence of 17 years was only 2 years above the minimum and was 43

years below the maximum. Thus, there is no arguably meritorious basis for claiming that the trial

court abused its discretion in imposing these sentences.

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¶ 21 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 22 After examining the record, the motion to withdraw, and the memorandum of law, we agree

with counsel that this appeal presents no issue of arguable merit. Thus, we grant the motion to

withdraw, and we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Kane County.

¶ 23 Affirmed.

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