People v. Sanchez CA1/1

Opinion

Filed 9/4/26 P. v. Sanchez CA1/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, A174670

v. ANTONIO ELISEA SANCHEZ, (San Francisco City & County Super. Ct. No. 192298)

Defendant and Appellant.

Defendant, who uses the name Crystal Sanchez, appeals from a trial court order under Penal Code1 section 1606 extending her commitment to an outpatient conditional release program (CONREP) for people found not guilty by reason of insanity. Her only contention on appeal is that insufficient evidence supports the order. We reject this claim and affirm.

I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL

BACKGROUND

In May 2004, Sanchez was charged with several felonies based on two incidents the previous December.2 The trial court found her not guilty by

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2 The charges were arson of an inhabited structure (§ 451, subd. (b)),

and attempted arson of a structure (§ 455) based on Sanchez’s setting a fire in her apartment, and four counts of battery by gassing on a peace officer (§ 243.9, subd. (a)), one count of aggravated assault (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)), and

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reason of insanity on all counts. On September 24, 2004, she was committed to the state hospital with a maximum commitment term of 14 years and four months.

Sanchez was discharged from the state hospital to CONREP in 2007 but returned to inpatient status in 2013 after violating the program’s terms and conditions. On September 28, 2021, Sanchez was again discharged to CONREP. Her outpatient commitment was renewed each of the next three years.3 In late August 2025, CONREP submitted a report recommending that Sanchez’s outpatient commitment be extended for another year under section 1606. The report reflected that Sanchez was diagnosed with bipolar I disorder, “[o]ther specified personality disorder with borderline traits,” and various substance use disorders. She had made advances over the past year, including obtaining a college certificate in substance use counseling. But she “lack[ed] adequate awareness of her personality disorder and its associated traits,” had “a variety of stressors in different life domains,” and posed a risk for violent behavior that would “significantly increase” without continued supervision and treatment. Her treatment team agreed that she represented a danger to the community if unsupervised but did not represent a danger if she continued in CONREP. Sanchez opposed remaining an outpatient on the ground that she did not “need further treatment” and requested a hearing.

At the October 6, 2025 hearing, the licensed clinical social worker who prepared the report and was Sanchez’s “primary clinician . . . at CONREP”

one count of battery against a peace officer (§ 243, subd. (c)(2)), based on her attacking multiple sheriff’s deputies while in jail for the arson offenses.

3 A defendant’s time on outpatient status does not count against the

maximum commitment term. (§ 1026.5, subd. (b)(8); People v. Crosswhite (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 494, 502 (Crosswhite).)

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testified for the People. In addition to reiterating information from the report, the social worker explained her “concerns” should Sanchez no longer receive treatment: “Those primarily reside in Ms. Sanchez’s established pattern of relapse . . . when released from court-ordered treatment . . . , not adhering to medication,” and “resuming some behaviors that aren’t in support of . . . her mental health.” The social worker testified that “court- ordered supervision seems to provide . . . a significant protective factor for Ms. Sanchez,” and treatment had been “measurably necessary for [her] to achieve the great things that she is achieving.”

Sanchez also testified at the hearing. She provided information about her mental health conditions and coping strategies, and she acknowledged the importance of taking her medications to support her mental health and sobriety.

At the hearing’s conclusion, the trial court extended Sanchez’s outpatient status for another year, to September 28, 2026. The court congratulated Sanchez for her progress and strong support system, telling her it thought she was “on the threshold” of no longer needing supervision.

II.

DISCUSSION

Sanchez claims there was insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s order renewing her outpatient status. We are not persuaded.

A defendant found not guilty by reason of insanity and committed to the state hospital may be placed in outpatient treatment if the trial court approves “the recommendation of the state hospital director and the community program director” for outpatient status. (People v. Cross (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 63, 72; §§ 1026.1, subd. (c), 1600, 1604, subd. (d).) Before ordering outpatient status, the court must consider whether the evidence shows “that the defendant would no longer be a danger to the health and

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safety of others, or to themselves, while under supervision and treatment in the community, and would benefit from such outpatient status,” and whether “an appropriate program of supervision and treatment” has been identified. (§ 1602, subd. (a)(1)–(2).)

“ ‘Outpatient status is not a privilege given the [defendant] to finish out [the] sentence in a less restricted setting; rather it is a discretionary form of treatment to be ordered by the committing court only if the medical experts who plan and provide treatment conclude that such treatment would benefit the [defendant] and cause no undue hazard to the community.” (People v. Sword (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 614, 620 (Sword).) Since time as an outpatient does not count against the maximum term of commitment, a defendant “may remain an outpatient as long as [the defendant] will not be a danger to others and will benefit from an outpatient program.” (People v. Superior Court (Henry) (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1312 (Henry).)

A trial court approves outpatient status for no more than one year at a time. (§ 1606.) “At the end of the [approved] period of outpatient status,” the court must, after notice and a hearing, “either discharge the person from commitment under appropriate provisions of the law, order the person confined to a treatment facility, or renew its approval of outpatient status.” (Ibid.) “[T]he purpose of section 1606 is to protect society by assuring that no [covered offender] is released from supervision and treatment or continued on outpatient status without a court order determining that is appropriate.” (People v. Harner (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 1400, 1407.)

There is a dearth of authority on the standard of review of an order extending outpatient status under section 1606. The statute requires CONREP to “furnish a report and recommendation” before the hearing, but it does not address the standard of proof or burden of proof at the hearing.

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(§ 1606; see Sword, supra, 29 Cal.App.4th at p. 621.) Sanchez urges us “to determine whether substantial evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion beyond a reasonable doubt,” the same standard that governs review of an order extending a commitment under section 1026.5, subdivision (b), after the maximum term has expired. (See Crosswhite, supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at pp. 507–508.)

We are not convinced that the class of people who face extension of their maximum term under section 1026.5 are, as Sanchez claims, “all but identical” to the class of people who face a return to inpatient status or continued outpatient status under section 1606. Whereas section 1026.5, subdivision (b)(7), provides that those facing extended maximum terms are “entitled to the rights guaranteed under the federal and State Constitutions for criminal proceedings,” section 1606 confers no such rights. (See § 1606; Henry, supra, 12 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1312–1313.) And as the Attorney General points out, the defendant bears the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence at the initial hearing granting outpatient status. (Sword, supra, 29 Cal.App.4th at p. 621.) It is far from clear why the People would bear a greater burden merely to maintain the status quo at a subsequent hearing.

Ultimately, however, we need not decide which standard of review applies, because the claim fails even under the one Sanchez advocates. Reviewing the record in the light most favorable to the challenged order, we conclude there was substantial evidence from which the trial court could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that continued outpatient status would protect the community from danger and benefit Sanchez—namely, the CONREP report and the social worker’s testimony to that effect. (See

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Crosswhite, supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at pp. 507–508; Henry, supra, 12 Cal.App.4th at p. 1312.)

Sanchez does not challenge the reliability of this evidence, and she acknowledges that “a single [expert] opinion can constitute substantial evidence to support an extension of outpatient status.” (See People v. Zapisek (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 1151, 1154, 1165 [single psychiatric opinion is substantial evidence supporting commitment extension under section 1026.5].) Nonetheless, she urges us to conclude there was insufficient evidence “in light of the entire record” to continue her outpatient status. Although we join the trial court in recognizing Sanchez’s significant progress in CONREP, she fails to identify any valid basis for disturbing the court’s determination that another year as an outpatient was warranted.

III.

DISPOSITION

The October 6, 2025 order extending Sanchez’s outpatient commitment is affirmed.

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_________________________

Humes, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

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Banke, J.

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Smiley, J.

People v. Sanchez A174670