People v. Robinson

Procedural entryThis page is a short order in People v. Robinson. Read the opinion of the Court — 299 Ill. App. 3d 426 →

Appellate Court of Illinois·Decided March 5, 1997·No. 4-95-0662·Published

Opinion

NO. 4-95-0662

IN THE APPELLATE COURT

OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of

v. ) Vermilion County

MARQUIS DEAN ROBINSON, ) No. 94CF191

Defendant-Appellant. )

) Honorable

) Thomas J. Fahey,

) Judge Presiding.

_______________________________________________________________

JUSTICE KNECHT delivered the opinion of the court:

Following a jury trial in March 1995, defendant Marquis

Robinson was found guilty of attempt (armed robbery) (720 ILCS

5/8-4, 18-2 (West 1994)); he was acquitted of first degree murder

(720 ILCS 5/9-1 (West 1994)). In July 1995, he was sentenced to

15 years' imprisonment. He now appeals, arguing (1) the trial

court erred in refusing to suppress his confession; (2) he was

not proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; (3) he was denied a

fair trial by the prosecutor's comments in closing argument; and

(4) the trial court erred in considering the death of the victim

at sentencing. We affirm.

The evidence of defendant's guilt at trial consisted

primarily of his confession, which he now contends was coerced.

Specifically, he claims he would not have made the statement but

for the State's offer of leniency toward his girlfriend, Deanetra

Brigham. Brigham was arrested at the same time as defendant, and

the police believed she was either involved in the crime or had

purposefully refused to disclose knowledge of the crime. When

the investigating officer, Officer Keith Garrett of the Danville

city police, informed defendant Brigham was being held and why,

defendant suggested Garrett was just "fucking with her" and pro-

claimed Brigham's lack of knowledge or involvement in the whole

affair. Defendant then indicated to Garrett he would agree to

make a statement if Brigham was released. Garrett left the room

and brought Brigham up from the booking area. She was allowed to

enter the room where defendant was sitting and she was then re-

leased. Defendant then confessed his involvement in the crime.

To be admissible, a confession must be given voluntari-

ly. People v. Oaks, 169 Ill. 2d 409, 446, 662 N.E.2d 1328, 1344

(1996). "The test of voluntariness is whether the statement was

made freely, voluntarily and without compulsion or inducement of

any sort, or whether the defendant's will was overcome at the

time he confessed." People v. Clark, 114 Ill. 2d 450, 457, 501

N.E.2d 123, 126 (1986). The voluntariness of a confession is

judged by the totality of the circumstances surrounding its mak-

ing. People v. Melock, 149 Ill. 2d 423, 447, 599 N.E.2d 941, 951

(1992); People v. McDaniel, 249 Ill. App. 3d 621, 634, 619 N.E.2d

214, 225 (1993), aff'd, 164 Ill. 2d 173, 647 N.E.2d 266 (1995).

Factors affecting the voluntariness of a confession include the

age, education and intelligence of the accused, the duration of

the questioning, and whether he received his constitutional

rights or was subjected to any physical punishment. Oaks, 169

Ill. 2d at 446-47, 662 N.E.2d at 1344; Melock, 149 Ill. 2d at

447, 599 N.E.2d at 951. No one factor is dispositive. Oaks, 169

Ill. 2d at 447, 662 N.E.2d at 1344; Melock, 149 Ill. 2d at 447,

599 N.E.2d at 951.

While offers of leniency are also a factor to be con-

sidered (People v. Ruegger, 32 Ill. App. 3d 765, 769, 336 N.E.2d

50, 53 (1975); People v. Shaw, 180 Ill. App. 3d 1091, 1094, 536

N.E.2d 849, 851 (1989)), a confession is not rendered involuntary

simply because such an offer has been made. See People v. Ander-

son, 225 Ill. App. 3d 636, 641, 587 N.E.2d 1050, 1055 (1992);

People v. Veal, 149 Ill. App. 3d 619, 624, 500 N.E.2d 1014, 1018

(1986); People v. Wright, 127 Ill. App. 3d 747, 751, 469 N.E.2d

351, 354 (1984); People v. Noe, 86 Ill. App. 3d 762, 766, 408

N.E.2d 483, 486 (1980); People v. Baine, 82 Ill. App. 3d 604,

610, 403 N.E.2d 57, 61 (1980).

When it is the defendant himself who begins bartering

for leniency in exchange for a statement, a claim of coercion

becomes far less credible. See Wright, 127 Ill. App. 3d at 751,

469 N.E.2d at 353-54. In Wright, the defendant, charged with

murder, asked a detective whether his codefendant, D.C. Clark,

was in custody. Upon learning he was, the defendant told the

detective he would be willing to give a statement in exchange for

a promise by the State not to seek the death penalty against him.

When the State later agreed not to seek the death penalty, the

defendant confessed to the murder. The trial court, finding

"these so-called inducements were actually conditions originated

and tendered by the defendant in return for which he was willing

to give a truthful statement," concluded the defendant's confes-

sion was entirely voluntary, and the appellate court in Wright

affirmed. Wright, 127 Ill. App. 3d at 752, 469 N.E.2d at 354.

Applying these principles to the present case, the

trial court's finding of voluntariness is not to be against the

manifest weight of the evidence. See Oaks, 169 Ill. 2d at 447,

662 N.E.2d at 1344 (standard of review is whether finding of

voluntariness is contrary to the manifest weight of the evi-

dence).

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