2026 IL App (1st) 261051-U No. 1-26-1051B
Fifth Division
August 18, 2026
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County.
)
v. ) No. 2026 CR 0496301 )
LUIS REYNA-GOMEZ, ) Honorable ) Margaret Ogarek,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding.
JUSTICE WILSON delivered the judgment of the court.
Presiding Justice Mitchell and Justice Mikva concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: We reverse the circuit court’s order denying defendant’s pretrial release and remand for the imposition of conditions of pretrial release.
¶2 Defendant Luis Reyna-Gomez appeals from the circuit court’s order denying his pretrial release under article 110 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS 5/110 et seq. (West 2022)), as amended by Public Act 101-652, § 10-255 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023), commonly
2
known as the Pretrial Fairness Act (Act). On appeal, Reyna-Gomez argues that the trial court erred in concluding that the State had proven by clear and convincing evidence that he posed an unmitigable real and present threat to the safety of minor children. For the following reasons, we reverse and remand.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 On August 9, 2026, Reyna-Gomez was charged by felony complaint with two counts of aggravated criminal sexual abuse against A.A. The State filed a petition to deny him pretrial release on April 10, 2026.
¶5 At the hearing on the petition, the State proffered that Reyna-Gomez and A.A. met when Reyna-Gomez, who was 22 years old, liked A.A.’s Instagram post. A.A. was 15 years old at the time, although she told Reyna-Gomez she was 16 years old. Reyna-Gomez and A.A. messaged over Instagram until they met in person on September 26, 2025. On that date, they went out to a movie, and after the movie was finished, went to A.A.’s car where Reyna-Gomez engaged in sexual contact with A.A. by placing his mouth on her vagina.
¶6 The State further proffered that on November 27, 2025, when A.A. was still 15 years old, Reyna-Gomez went to her house and engaged in sexual contact with her by placing his penis in A.A.’s vagina. The State further alleged that at some later point, A.A.’s mother took her phone away and looked at the messages on A.A.’s Instagram account where she observed messages between A.A. and Reyna-Gomez. During that time, Reyna-Gomez sent a video to A.A.’s Instagram account. The video showed a female and male having intercourse in what A.A.’s mother recognized as A.A.’s bedroom. A.A.’s parents contacted the Evergreen Park Police Department, and A.A. participated in a forensic interview on December 26, 2025.
3
¶7 In the interview, A.A. confirmed that the video depicted her and Reyna-Gomez, and that the video was sent to her Instagram account. Police obtained a search warrant for A.A.’s phone which showed Instagram messages sent from Reyna-Gomez to A.A., including the video of them engaging in intercourse, and messages “discussing a series of graphic plans to engage in sexual intercourse.” Police also executed a search warrant for Reyna-Gomez’s phone, which showed he was at A.A.’s house on November 27. Reyna-Gomez had a pending case for driving under the influence (DUI) which occurred on July 14, 2025, and no other criminal background.
¶8 In response to the State’s petition to detain, the defense argued that “this [was] an isolated incident between two people” and “this is one individual,” A.A, “who self-describes the situation between [defendant] and her as a relationship in her own words.” The defense argued that A.A. “indicated she performed oral sex” on Reyna-Gomez and invited him to her home. Defense counsel further argued that Reyna-Gomez did not pose a threat to the safety of A.A. or the community at large and he had “no allegations now or before of violence, threatening behavior in any way, shape or form.” Defense counsel argued for release, urging that there were conditions like global positioning system (GPS) or electronic home monitoring (EM) that could be placed on Reyna- Gomez to prevent him from communicating with A.A., and from going to A.A.’s residence or leaving his home.
¶9 In addition, defense counsel noted that A.A. had filed a petition for a civil no contact order and that Reyna-Gomez turned himself in when he learned of the warrant for his arrest. Defense counsel argued that Reyna-Gomez was the primary provider for his family including his father, who suffered from dementia, mother, and brother and that he would not leave Cook County unless it was for work.
4
¶ 10 The court granted the State’s detention petition, noting that the State had demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that Reyna-Gomez was charged with, and had engaged in, a detainable offense based on “what was found on the phone, what was learned through the forensic interview, the video that was sent by [] defendant allegedly [and] based on review of both the alleged victim’s phone and [defendant’s] phone. The court found that Reyna-Gomez’s behavior was “violent, abusive and dangerous” where he picked out A.A., but it “could have been any young woman. Could be any young woman today, tomorrow, yesterday, all the time.” The court further found that Reyna-Gomez groomed and “sexualize[d] a 15-year old girl,” and questioned what other 15-year-old girls he could be “looking at on the internet.” The court also found that the State had proven that Reyna-Gomez posed a continuing threat and “[p]ose[d] a real and present threat not only to the safety of [the victim] but to young women generally in the community” as he engaged in a sexual relationship with A.A. “knowing he [was] a grown man with grown man responsibilities” and that the behavior was illegal, immoral, and dangerous. Finally, the court stated that there was “no condition or combination of conditions that [could] protect young girls” from Reyna-Gomez and ordered him to be detained. The court also entered a civil no contact order prohibiting Reyna-Gomez from contacting A.A. and two additional minors.
¶ 11 A hearing was held on Reyna-Gomez’s motion for relief on May 29, 2026. The defense argued that there was “no indication that there was any force, or threat of force, or things that could harm [A.A.] who is alleged to be 16 years old at the time of the contact.” Defense counsel also argued that when a search warrant was executed on Reyna-Gomez’s phone, there was “no additional allegation that he was grooming or speaking to anybody else who was underage.” Defense counsel argued that “the facts in this case alone don’t suggest that he has intended to
5
groom other women, that he has even spoken to other women the age of [A.A]” or anyone younger than him. Counsel argued that the facts of the case alone were insufficient to meet the second and third prongs of the detainment petition, particularly where the State did not provide any additional evidence showing how Reyna-Gomez was a danger to others or why a condition or combination of conditions could not be implemented to mitigate any danger that defendant posed to the public. Counsel urged the court that it could order Reyna-Gomez to have no social media or internet access on his phone and asked that he be released on EM, GPS, or both, noting that there was a civil order of protection which protected the victim.
¶ 12 Defense counsel noted that Reyna-Gomez lived with his parents, and helped his mother take care of his father, who has dementia. Counsel stated that Reyna-Gomez worked at a warehouse in Skokie from 7:30 a.m. to 4:30 p.m., Monday through Friday, and his commute was an hour each way. He was also employed as a door-to-door salesman. Counsel noted that Reyna- Gomez had no children, was a high school graduate, and had applied to an online university.
¶ 13 In response, the State clarified that Reyna-Gomez was on pretrial conditions for DUI when he was arrested, but that case was dismissed on April 30, 2026, but that he clearly could not follow court orders. The State provided a proffer that was substantially similar to the previously provided proffer which was that because A.A. was 15 years old, she could not “consent to having sexual intercourse with a 22-year-old.” The State informed the court that Reyna-Gomez told A.A. he was twenty years old.
¶ 14 Regarding Reyna-Gomez’s allegation that he was not grooming anyone else, the State argued that it was unknown what the police looked for pursuant to the search warrant on his phone and that he could have had multiple phones and “people can have multiple ways of grooming.”
6
The State argued that even if Reyna-Gomez was placed on EM, he would have two days where he would not be monitored and “could go out in society, [] could go to a school, [] could go to a park, [] could use someone else’s cell phone,” or could purchase a different cell phone. The State further argued that although the order of protection was in place, it was only “a piece of paper” and might not protect the victim and did not protect other members of society.
¶ 15 The court denied Reyna-Gomez’s motion for relief. The court ruled that the State had presented clear and convincing evidence that the incidents occurred. The court noted that there was an identifiable victim who Reyna-Gomez knew “was a child by statute,” and that he lied about his age, “demonstrating an intent on his end to improperly communicate with [the] minor.” The court observed that although Reyna-Gomez knew A.A. was underage, he engaged in sexual contact with her “after seeking her out” and that his actions of “[f]inding, identifying, [] targeting” and grooming A.A. was “predatory-like behavior” which made him a danger to her. The court stated that Reyna-Gomez’s actions of communicating with the victim and getting her to agree to engage in sexual relations were “rather devious.” The court noted that “[c]ontrary to the [People’s] assertion that a minor cannot consent to have sex,” it didn’t find that A.A. “lacked the capacity to have consent in this case.” The court said there was “a danger to other minors in the community” and that although the search warrant did not produce any evidence of Reyna-Gomez grooming other victims, the police were “limited to the content of the communications between [defendant and A.A.] or evidence of this particular crime” and the police were not able to look through his cell phone for other materials. The court stated there was nothing to stop Reyna-Gomez from accessing social media if he were released and even if he was on EM, “during the off hours [] his movement would not be restricted” so “he would have access to the rest of society, [] which
7
encompasses minors under the age of 18. The court noted that EM and curfew would not prevent Reyna-Gomez from accessing social media and although GPS could keep him away from A.A., it “wouldn’t necessarily work for any other kid under the age of 18.”
¶ 16 The court noted that Reyna-Gomez was on conditions of release when he committed these crimes, which demonstrated his “lack of or willingness to comply with conditions of release.” The court stated that neither EM, GPS, nor curfew would be “sufficient to ensure that [] defendant not have contact with [A.A.].” The court noted that Reyna-Gomez could potentially have interactions with minors at any of his jobs.
¶ 17 On May 29, 2026, Reyna-Gomez filed his notice of appeal pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(h).
¶ 18 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 19 Reyna-Gomez argues that the trial court erred in concluding that the State had proved by clear and convincing evidence that he posed an unmitigable real and present threat to the safety of minor children. Specifically, he argues that he had no prior convictions, had no privileged access to, or authority over children, and the State proffered no evidence of sexual relations or communications with other minors after executing a search warrant. We agree.
¶ 20 Under the Code, it is presumed that all criminal defendants are entitled to pretrial release on personal recognizance, subject to certain conditions. 725 ILCS 5/110-2(a) (West 2022). A defendant’s pretrial release may only be denied in certain situations. 725 ILCS 5/110-2(a), 110- 6.1 (West 2022). When the State files a petition requesting denial of pretrial release, the State has the burden to show by clear and convincing evidence that the proof is evident or the presumption is great that a defendant has committed a qualifying offense, that the defendant’s pretrial release
8
poses a real and present threat to the safety of another person or the community, and that less restrictive conditions would not avoid a real and present threat to the safety of any person or the community and/or prevent the defendant’s willful flight from prosecution. 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(e) (West 2024). People v. Vingara, 2023 IL App (5th) 230698, ¶ 7. The clear-and-convincing standard “requires proof greater than a preponderance but not quite approaching the criminal standard of beyond a reasonable doubt.” In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d 347, 362 (2004). Because there was no live witness testimony offered in this case, and the evidence presented below was solely documentary in nature, we review the trial court’s decision de novo. People v. Morgan, 2025 IL 130626, ¶¶ 21, 54.
¶ 21 Reyna-Gomez does not challenge the first element, that the proof is evident or the presumption great that he committed a qualifying offense. Rather, Reyna-Gomez contends that the State failed to establish that he posed a real and present threat, either to the victim or to the community. He also argues that the State failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that no condition or combination of conditions could mitigate the real and present threat he posed.
¶ 22 In making a determination of dangerousness, the court may consider a variety of factors which may include, but are not limited to, the nature and circumstances of the charged offense, including whether the crime was a crime of violence or a sex offense; the history and characteristics of the defendant; any statements made by or attributed to the defendant, together with the circumstances surrounding his statements; and the age and physical condition of both the defendant and the victim. 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(g)(1), (2), (4), (5), (6) (West 2024). “The nature and circumstances of the offense charged [are] the prime consideration in determining the conditions of release, if any ([725 ILCS 5/] § 110-5(a)(1)), and in denying pretrial release (id. § 110-6.1(a)),
9
including in making the dangerousness determination (id. § 110-6.1(g)(1)).” (Emphasis in original.) People v. Carpenter, 2024 IL App (1st) 240037, ¶ 14.
¶ 23 In this case, the State did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that Reyna-Gomez was a real and present threat to the victim and the community. The State’s proffer showed that Reyna-Gomez, a 22-year-old man, used social media to contact A.A., a 15-year-old child. After he established a rapport with A.A., the two met in person and Reyna-Gomez had sexual contact with her in his car. Reyna-Gomez met up with A.A. again, eventually having sexual intercourse with her in her childhood bedroom, and recording the act.
¶ 24 The State’s proffer establishes only that Reyna-Gomez engaged in an improper sexual relationship with A.A. The allegations arose from a single Instagram‑initiated relationship with one minor victim, with no allegations of force or threats and no identified communications with or grooming of other minors. There was simply nothing in the State’s proffer to suggest that Reyna- Gomez engaged in a pattern of behavior with minors, that he has any sort of privileged access to minors, or that he had additional contact with any minors based on the search warrant returns covering relevant communications. These facts undercut the trial court’s generalized conclusion that Reyna-Gomez poses an unmitigable threat to “any young woman, today, tomorrow, yesterday, all the time,” which rested on speculation rather than specific, articulable facts demonstrating an ongoing, non-mitigable danger to the community.
¶ 25 Reyna-Gomez’s dangerousness is further mitigated by his lack of prior convictions, his cooperation with law enforcement upon learning of the investigation, and stable residence. As for whether Reyna-Gomez is dangerous with respect to his repeated risk to A.A., the “relationship”
10
has been materially disrupted by A.A.’s parental awareness, cooperation with law enforcement, and the no-contact order, which make recurrence with A.A. unlikely.
¶ 26 We also find that the circuit court’s finding that there is no condition or combination of conditions that could mitigate Reyna-Gomez’s threat to any person or the community was against the manifest weight of the evidence. On this record, any residual risk tied to future online contact with A.A. or other minors is amenable to targeted conditions that restrict movement, which the defense proposed.
¶ 27 Because the State did not carry its clear-and-convincing burden to prove an unmitigable, real and present threat on specific articulable facts, and because conditions will practically mitigate any residual risk, we reverse the circuit court’s order detaining Reyna-Gomez and remand for imposition of conditions of pretrial release.
¶ 28 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 29 For the reasons explained above, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court and remand for imposition of conditions of pretrial release.
¶ 30 Reversed and remanded.