People v. Reed

2025 IL App (1st) 231003-U

Opinion

2025 IL App (1st) 231003-U

No. 1-23-1003

Order filed May 30, 2025

FIFTH DIVISION

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County. ) v. ) No. 17 CR 15201 ) ISHMAEL REED, ) Honorable ) William H. Hooks, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.

JUSTICE MITCHELL delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Mikva and Justice Navarro concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: Defendant’s convictions are affirmed where defendant’s statutory right to a speedy trial was not violated because the Illinois Supreme Court tolled the speedy trial term during the COVID-19 pandemic. Thus, defendant’s trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance by failing to move to dismiss defendant’s charges.

¶2 Defendant Ishmael Reed appeals his convictions for attempt murder (720 ILCS 5/8-4(a)

(West 2016); 720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1) (West 2016)), home invasion (720 ILCS 5/19-6(a)(3)-(5) (West

2016)), aggravated battery (720 ILCS 5/12-3.05(e)(1) (West 2016)), and residential burglary (720

ILCS 5/19-3(a) (West 2016)). The issue on appeal is whether defendant’s trial counsel provided No. 1-23-1003

ineffective assistance by failing to move to dismiss defendant’s charges due to a speedy-trial

violation. For the following reasons, we affirm.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 Defendant Ishmael Reed was arrested on September 23, 2017, following an encounter with

Jonpaol Bosseau in which Bosseau was shot four times. The following day, defendant was charged

by complaint with attempt murder, home invasion, aggravated domestic battery and aggravated

assault in case number 17111806001. Defendant asserted a trial demand, and the case was

continued three times, each continuance attributed to the State. On October 19, 2017, the State

filed a superseding indictment under case number 17CR15201, charging defendant with multiple

counts of attempt murder, home invasion, aggravated battery, residential burglary, aggravated

unlawful use of a weapon, unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon, and aggravated assault.

On October 30, defendant was arraigned and pleaded not guilty.

¶5 The case was continued by agreement of the parties from October 30, 2017, until July 6,

2021. Starting in March 2020, the Illinois Supreme Court issued several emergency administrative

orders due to the COVID-19 pandemic that tolled statutory speedy-trial restrictions and allowed

the Chief Judges of each circuit to issue continuances for trials. See, e.g., Ill. S. Ct., M.R. 30370

(eff. Apr. 7, 2020). A bench trial was set for July 6, 2021. However, the State was not ready for

trial on that date because it needed additional time to locate a witness. The circuit court agreed to

continue the case on the State’s motion until August 5. On that date, the case was continued again

on the State’s motion.

¶6 Between September 21, 2021, and November 3, 2021, the case was continued by agreement

while the parties tried to negotiate a plea agreement. However, the parties could not reach an

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agreement and on November 3, defendant reasserted his trial demand. The case was continued on

the State’s motion until the bench trial began on December 14, 2021. Defendant remained in

custody from the time of his arrest until trial.

¶7 At trial, the State proceeded on four counts of attempt murder, four counts of home

invasion, two counts of residential burglary, and one count of aggravated battery. The circuit court

convicted defendant on all counts. Defendant filed a motion for a new trial that did not include any

claim that defendant’s speedy-trial rights had been violated. The circuit court denied the motion

and sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of 35 years of imprisonment. This timely appeal

followed. Ill. S. Ct. R. 606 (eff. Mar. 12, 2021).

¶8 II. ANALYSIS

¶9 Defendant argues that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance because counsel

failed to move to dismiss defendant’s charges due to a violation of defendant’s statutory right to a

speedy trial. 725 ILCS 5/103-5 (West 2016). The State argues that trial counsel was not ineffective

because defendant’s speedy-trial rights were not violated. An ineffective assistance of counsel

claim is governed by the two-pronged test established in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,

687 (1984). Under this test, defendant must show both that “(1) counsel's performance was

deficient, and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced defendant such that he was deprived of a

fair trial.” People v. Cordell, 223 Ill. 2d 380, 385 (2006). “Counsel's failure to assert a speedy-trial

violation cannot establish either prong of an ineffective assistance claim if no speedy-trial violation

occurred.” People v. Staake, 2017 IL 121755, ¶ 47. Therefore, we must first determine whether

defendant’s statutory right to a speedy trial was violated. Cordell, 223 Ill. 2d at 385.

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¶ 10 Defendant argues that his right to a speedy trial was violated because his trial commenced

after the statutory 120-day limit had expired. “In Illinois, a defendant has both a constitutional and

a statutory right to a speedy trial.” Id. Here, defendant contends only that his statutory right to a

speedy trial was violated.

¶ 11 Under the Code of Criminal Procedure, “[e]very person in custody in this State for an

alleged offense shall be tried by the court having jurisdiction within 120 days from the date he or

she was taken into custody unless delay is occasioned by the defendant ***.” 725 ILCS 5/103-

5(a). Delay is occasioned by the defendant “when he requests a continuance, agrees to a

continuance, or when his actions otherwise cause or contribute to the delay.” (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) People v. Patterson, 392 Ill. App. 3d 461, 467 (2009). Further, “[d]elay shall be

considered to be agreed to by the defendant unless he or she objects to the delay by making a

written demand for trial or an oral demand for trial on the record.” 725 ILCS 5/103-5(a). If a

defendant is not tried within the statutory period, he “shall be discharged from custody” and have

the charges against him dismissed. People v. Mayo, 198 Ill. 2d 530, 536 (2002); 725 ILCS 5/103-

5(d). “Proof of a violation of the statutory right requires only that the defendant has not been tried

within the period set by statute and that defendant has not caused or contributed to the delays.”

People v. Staten, 159 Ill. 2d 419, 426 (1994). Defendant need not show that he was prejudiced by

the delay. Id. at 426-27. Whether defendant’s statutory right to a speedy trial was violated is a

question of law reviewed de novo. People v. Pettis, 2017 IL App (4th) 151006, ¶ 17.

¶ 12 The parties agree that 78 days of delay can be attributed to the State: 37 days from

September 23, 2017, to October 30, 2017, and 41 days from November 3, 2021, to December 14,

2021. The parties dispute whether the 77-day period of delay from July 6, 2021, to September 21,

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2021, was attributable to the State. If so, then the total period of delay would be 155 days, which

would exceed the 120-day statutory speedy-trial period.

¶ 13 On July 6, 2021, the State asked the circuit court to continue the case on the State’s motion

because the State needed additional time to locate a witness:

“Your Honor, at this time, I am asking the Court to continue the matter. The

defendant is going to demand trial today. There is a written demand that’s been filed. That

matter will continue motion State.

Just to perfect the record with issue to motion State or to demands for speedy trial,

although the Supreme Court has tolled speedy trial, this courthouse and this Court itself

has been doing bench trials and hearings for a while now. So if the Court deems it

appropriate to continue the matter motion State and count that against the State, it’s

obviously no problem. I’ve actually calculated that into my term, presuming that the Court

would do that. We have until September 26th for 120 days in custody based on trial demand

today.”

The circuit court agreed to continue the case on the State’s motion until August 5. On that date,

the case was continued again on the State’s motion until September 21.

¶ 14 Ordinarily, this period of delay would be attributable to the State. However, during the

period in question, the Illinois Supreme Court had issued emergency administrative orders due to

the COVID-19 pandemic that tolled the speedy trial term:

“The Chief Judges of each circuit may continue trials until further order of this

Court. The continuances occasioned by this Order serve the ends of justice and outweigh

the best interests of the public and defendants in a speedy trial. Therefore, such

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continuances shall be excluded from speedy trial computations contained in section 103-5

of the Code ***. Statutory time restrictions in section 103-5 of the Code *** shall be tolled

until further order of this Court.” Ill. S. Ct., M.R. 30370 (eff. Apr. 7, 2020).

The April 7 order was an amendment of the Illinois Supreme Court’s prior orders and was meant

to “clarify [the court’s] intent to toll the time restrictions of the speedy-trial statute.” People v.

Mayfield, 2023 IL 128092, ¶ 9.

¶ 15 The court in Mayfield found that because the scheduling of trials is a “matter of court

procedure *** within this court’s constitutional authority over all state courts,” the Illinois

Supreme Court’s orders “that tolled the speedy-trial statute did not violate the separation-of-

powers clause.” Id. ¶ 3. The court held that “[w]hen, as in this case, a statute cannot be reconciled

with a rule of this court adopted pursuant to our constitutional authority, the rule will prevail.” Id.

¶ 31. Thus, the “supreme court had the authority to allow the tolling of the time limits under the

Act for bringing criminal defendants to trial. The court exercised that authority in this case in

response to a pandemic that threatened the health and safety of millions of Illinois residents.”

People v. Mayfield, 2021 IL App (2d) 200603, ¶ 21, aff'd, 2023 IL 128092.

¶ 16 On June 30, 2021, the Illinois Supreme Court ordered that speedy trial time restrictions

would no longer be tolled starting October 1, 2021:

“Beginning October 1, 2021, statutory time restrictions in section 103-5 of the Code

*** shall no longer be tolled. All days on and following October 1, 2021, shall be included

in speedy trial computations as contained in section 103-5 of the Code ***. Days prior to

this Court’s March 20, 2020, order in M.R. 30370 *** shall also be included in speedy trial

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computations as required by the statutory time restrictions in section 103-5 of the Code

***.” Ill. S. Ct., M.R. 30370 (eff. June 30, 2021).

¶ 17 Under these orders, the speedy trial term under the Code was tolled during the period of

time from July 6, 2021, to September 21, 2021, and therefore cannot be attributed to the State.

Since the delay attributable to the State was less than 120 days, defendant’s statutory right to a

speedy trial was not violated. See People v. Cano, 2023 IL App (1st) 211606-U ¶¶ 39-53 (the

defendant’s right to a speedy trial was not violated when his trial was postponed for more than 365

days pursuant to emergency orders issued by the Illinois Supreme Court and the chief judge of the

circuit court of Cook County in response to the COVID-19 pandemic); People v. Araiza, 2022 IL

App (1st) 210993-U ¶¶ 43-50 (the defendant’s statutory right to a speedy trial was not violated

when the Supreme Court issued an order allowing the court to continue the defendant’s trial

without attributing the delay to the State).

¶ 18 Significantly, defendant does not challenge the validity of the Illinois Supreme Court’s

COVID-19 orders, but rather he argues that those orders have no application here because the

State’s delay was caused by its need for additional time to locate a witness. Defendant contends

that the orders do not exclude all continuances from speedy trial computations, only continuances

relating to the COVID-19 pandemic. Defendant points to the orders’ language that “[t]he

continuances occasioned by this Order serve the ends of justice and outweigh the best interests of

the public and defendants in a speedy trial,” and that “[t]herefore, such continuances shall be

excluded from speedy trial computations ***.” (Emphasis added.) Ill. S. Ct., M.R. 30370 (eff. Apr.

7, 2020); Id. (eff. May, 20, 2020). Defendant argues that we should interpret this language to mean

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that only continuances related to the COVID-19 pandemic outweigh defendants’ interests in a

speedy trial and are tolled under the Illinois Supreme Court’s orders.

¶ 19 Defendant argues that this interpretation is bolstered by the fact that the Illinois Supreme

Court later amended its April 7, 2020, order to clarify that “[t]his provision also applies when a

trial is delayed when the court determines proper distancing and facilities limitations prevent the

trial from proceeding safely. The judge in the case must find that such limitations necessitated the

delay and shall make a record thereof.” Ill. S. Ct., M.R. 30370 (eff. May, 20, 2020). Defendant

contends that “[h]ad the speedy trial term been absolutely tolled, there would have been no need

to outline this fact-specific scenario and require judges to make on-the-record findings with regard

to Covid-related delays.”

¶ 20 Despite the language defendant emphasizes, the Illinois Supreme Court clearly stated in its

orders that “[s]tatutory time restrictions in section 103-5 of the Code *** shall be tolled until

further order of this Court.” Ill. S. Ct., M.R. 30370 (eff. May, 20, 2020). This statement was an

absolute tolling of speedy trial time restrictions under the Code. The tolling was not conditioned

on the State seeking a continuance due to complications related to the COVID-19 pandemic.

Instead, the Illinois Supreme Court tolled speedy trial time restrictions unconditionally until

October 1, 2021. Ill. S. Ct., M.R. 30370 (eff. June 30, 2021) (“Beginning October 1, 2021, statutory

time restrictions in section 103-5 of the Code *** shall no longer be tolled.”). Therefore, even

though the State sought a continuance for additional time to locate a witness, the 77-day period of

delay from July 6, 2021, to September 21, 2021, cannot be attributed to the State.

¶ 21 Defendant also argues that the 77-day period of delay should be attributed to the State

because the State suggested that the circuit court do so. At the July 6, 2021, hearing, the State said

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that “although the Supreme Court has tolled speedy trial, this courthouse and this Court itself has

been doing bench trials and hearings for a while now,” and so the State had “no problem” if the

circuit court “deem[ed] it appropriate to continue the matter motion State and count that against

the State.” The circuit court later continued the case “motion State.” However, the Illinois Supreme

Court’s orders tolled statutory speedy trial time restrictions absolutely, and so the circuit court had

no authority to attribute the delay to the State under the Code, even at the State’s invitation. See

Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 16 (“General administrative and supervisory authority over all courts is

vested in the Supreme Court and shall be exercised by the Chief Justice in accordance with its

rules.”). As such, defendant’s statutory right to a speedy trial was not violated, and defendant’s

ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails. Staake, 2017 IL 121755, ¶¶ 47-48.

¶ 22 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 23 The judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed.

¶ 24 Affirmed.

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