NOTICE 2023 IL App (5th) 200367-U NOTICE Decision filed 11/20/23. The This order was filed under text of this decision may be NO. 5-20-0367 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is changed or corrected prior to not precedent except in the the filing of a Petition for Rehearing or the disposition of IN THE limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). the same. APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIFTH DISTRICT ________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Bond County. ) v. ) No. 17-CF-101 ) LOUIS REED, ) Honorable ) Ronald R. Slemer, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding. ________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE WELCH delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Cates and Vaughan concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The order of the circuit court of Bond County denying the defendant’s motion to withdraw his admission to his probation violation is reversed because the court failed to conduct a Krankel hearing regarding the defendant’s pro se claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.
¶2 The defendant, Louis Reed, appeals the denial of his motion to withdraw his
admission in his probation revocation. He argues that the trial court erred in failing to
conduct a Krankel hearing (see People v. Krankel, 102 Ill. 2d 181 (1984)) to address his
pro se claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. For the following reasons, we reverse
and remand the cause for a Krankel hearing.
1 ¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 On September 13, 2018, the defendant pled guilty to one count of methamphetamine
possession (count I) and one count of unlawful possession of a controlled substance (count
II) in Bond County. He was sentenced to a 30-month period of probation. His probation
was subsequently transferred to Madison County.
¶5 On January 14, 2019, the State filed a petition to revoke the defendant’s probation
for failing to report as directed to the Madison County Probation Office on three occasions,
for testing positive for methamphetamine, and for failing to provide proof of obtaining an
alcohol and substance abuse evaluation. An arrest warrant was issued, and the defendant
appeared before the trial court on January 25, 2019.
¶6 On February 20, 2019, a hearing was held, and the defendant admitted to violating
his probation where he tested positive for methamphetamine and for failing to appear but
denied the third allegation as he had obtained a drug/alcohol screening. On May 10, 2019,
a sentencing hearing was held. Judy Steele represented the defendant during the sentencing
hearing. Barbara Wheat, an officer with the Sorento Police Department, testified that she
was personally familiar with the defendant and had a lot of dealings with him in the past.
She had made contact with him at numerous “drug houses” in Sorento. She had also seen
him with known addicts. She noted that she thought the defendant “had potential” but that
he “chose the wrong routes” and that he “destroyed a lot of lives.”
¶7 Wheat recalled doing a probation check on another individual who denied having
anyone at her residence, but when Wheat went inside, she found the defendant. Both the
defendant and this individual had probation conditions to have no contact with other 2 convicted felons. Wheat testified that the defendant was sitting on a futon next to torches,
an alcohol bag, and a scale that tested positive for methamphetamine. This incident
occurred a couple of days before the original date of the defendant’s sentencing. Wheat
also had interactions with the defendant in the months leading up to his sentencing. Based
on her investigation, the defendant was bringing “very dangerous people” to Sorento.
Following argument, a victim impact statement, and the defendant’s allocution, the
defendant was sentenced to 84 months’ imprisonment on count I and 72 months’
imprisonment on count II to be served concurrently.
¶8 On May 13, 2019, the trial court received correspondence from the defendant that
the court took as a pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The defendant asked in his
motion that new counsel be appointed to him as his current counsel was ineffective. Judy
Steele was removed as counsel, and John Abell was appointed. The defendant also filed a
pro se motion for reduction of sentence, a pro se motion to withdraw guilty plea, a pro se
motion for change of venue, and a pro se motion for postconviction relief. The court denied
the motion for postconviction relief as untimely and denied the motion for reduction of
sentence. As of November 15, 2019, the motion to withdraw his guilty plea was
outstanding.
¶9 On February 19, 2020, attorney Abell was allowed to withdraw as counsel, and
Joshua Reeves was appointed as counsel for the defendant. On August 19, 2020, a hearing
was held, and the trial court took the matter under advisement.
¶ 10 On October 7, 2020, the trial court entered a written order denying the defendant’s
motion to withdraw his admission to the violation of probation. The court noted that, at 3 the February 20, 2019, admission by the defendant to the probation violation, he did so
knowingly and voluntarily. During his admission, the defendant was advised of his rights,
he exercised his right to allocution at the sentencing, and he did not protest that he did not
know what was going on. The court therefore denied the motion. The defendant appeals.
¶ 11 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 12 The defendant raises three issues on appeal. First, the defendant argues that the trial
court erred in summarily dismissing his postconviction petition at the first stage where the
petition was timely and made unrebutted, arguable claims that his counsel provided
ineffective assistance. Second, that the court erred in dismissing his motion to reconsider
his sentence. Lastly, that the court failed to conduct a preliminary Krankel hearing on his
pro se claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. At the outset, we note that the parties
agree that this court lacks jurisdiction over the first two issues raised in the appellant’s brief
as the appeal was filed more than 30 days after the dismissal of his postconviction petition.
Therefore, we will only address the appellant’s third argument regarding whether the court
failed to conduct a preliminary Krankel hearing, and further, if its failure was harmless
error.
¶ 13 We review de novo whether a trial court properly conducted a preliminary Krankel
inquiry. People v. Roddis, 2020 IL 124352, ¶ 33. Generally, a Krankel inquiry occurs in
two stages. People v. Reed, 2018 IL App (1st) 160609, ¶ 49. First, the trial court examines
the factual basis of defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. Next, if
defendant’s claim shows possible neglect on behalf of trial counsel, new counsel is
4 appointed to represent defendant in an adversarial hearing on the ineffective assistance
claim. Id.
¶ 14 In People v. Moore, 207 Ill. 2d 68, 78 (2003), our supreme court stated that “[t]he
operative concern for the reviewing court is whether the trial court conducted an adequate
inquiry into the defendant’s pro se allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel.” The
court iterated that, in so evaluating defendant’s claim, the court can question trial counsel,
have a discussion with the defendant, or “base its evaluation of the defendant’s pro se
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NOTICE 2023 IL App (5th) 200367-U NOTICE Decision filed 11/20/23. The This order was filed under text of this decision may be NO. 5-20-0367 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is changed or corrected prior to not precedent except in the the filing of a Petition for Rehearing or the disposition of IN THE limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). the same. APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIFTH DISTRICT ________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Bond County. ) v. ) No. 17-CF-101 ) LOUIS REED, ) Honorable ) Ronald R. Slemer, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding. ________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE WELCH delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Cates and Vaughan concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The order of the circuit court of Bond County denying the defendant’s motion to withdraw his admission to his probation violation is reversed because the court failed to conduct a Krankel hearing regarding the defendant’s pro se claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.
¶2 The defendant, Louis Reed, appeals the denial of his motion to withdraw his
admission in his probation revocation. He argues that the trial court erred in failing to
conduct a Krankel hearing (see People v. Krankel, 102 Ill. 2d 181 (1984)) to address his
pro se claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. For the following reasons, we reverse
and remand the cause for a Krankel hearing.
1 ¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 On September 13, 2018, the defendant pled guilty to one count of methamphetamine
possession (count I) and one count of unlawful possession of a controlled substance (count
II) in Bond County. He was sentenced to a 30-month period of probation. His probation
was subsequently transferred to Madison County.
¶5 On January 14, 2019, the State filed a petition to revoke the defendant’s probation
for failing to report as directed to the Madison County Probation Office on three occasions,
for testing positive for methamphetamine, and for failing to provide proof of obtaining an
alcohol and substance abuse evaluation. An arrest warrant was issued, and the defendant
appeared before the trial court on January 25, 2019.
¶6 On February 20, 2019, a hearing was held, and the defendant admitted to violating
his probation where he tested positive for methamphetamine and for failing to appear but
denied the third allegation as he had obtained a drug/alcohol screening. On May 10, 2019,
a sentencing hearing was held. Judy Steele represented the defendant during the sentencing
hearing. Barbara Wheat, an officer with the Sorento Police Department, testified that she
was personally familiar with the defendant and had a lot of dealings with him in the past.
She had made contact with him at numerous “drug houses” in Sorento. She had also seen
him with known addicts. She noted that she thought the defendant “had potential” but that
he “chose the wrong routes” and that he “destroyed a lot of lives.”
¶7 Wheat recalled doing a probation check on another individual who denied having
anyone at her residence, but when Wheat went inside, she found the defendant. Both the
defendant and this individual had probation conditions to have no contact with other 2 convicted felons. Wheat testified that the defendant was sitting on a futon next to torches,
an alcohol bag, and a scale that tested positive for methamphetamine. This incident
occurred a couple of days before the original date of the defendant’s sentencing. Wheat
also had interactions with the defendant in the months leading up to his sentencing. Based
on her investigation, the defendant was bringing “very dangerous people” to Sorento.
Following argument, a victim impact statement, and the defendant’s allocution, the
defendant was sentenced to 84 months’ imprisonment on count I and 72 months’
imprisonment on count II to be served concurrently.
¶8 On May 13, 2019, the trial court received correspondence from the defendant that
the court took as a pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The defendant asked in his
motion that new counsel be appointed to him as his current counsel was ineffective. Judy
Steele was removed as counsel, and John Abell was appointed. The defendant also filed a
pro se motion for reduction of sentence, a pro se motion to withdraw guilty plea, a pro se
motion for change of venue, and a pro se motion for postconviction relief. The court denied
the motion for postconviction relief as untimely and denied the motion for reduction of
sentence. As of November 15, 2019, the motion to withdraw his guilty plea was
outstanding.
¶9 On February 19, 2020, attorney Abell was allowed to withdraw as counsel, and
Joshua Reeves was appointed as counsel for the defendant. On August 19, 2020, a hearing
was held, and the trial court took the matter under advisement.
¶ 10 On October 7, 2020, the trial court entered a written order denying the defendant’s
motion to withdraw his admission to the violation of probation. The court noted that, at 3 the February 20, 2019, admission by the defendant to the probation violation, he did so
knowingly and voluntarily. During his admission, the defendant was advised of his rights,
he exercised his right to allocution at the sentencing, and he did not protest that he did not
know what was going on. The court therefore denied the motion. The defendant appeals.
¶ 11 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 12 The defendant raises three issues on appeal. First, the defendant argues that the trial
court erred in summarily dismissing his postconviction petition at the first stage where the
petition was timely and made unrebutted, arguable claims that his counsel provided
ineffective assistance. Second, that the court erred in dismissing his motion to reconsider
his sentence. Lastly, that the court failed to conduct a preliminary Krankel hearing on his
pro se claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. At the outset, we note that the parties
agree that this court lacks jurisdiction over the first two issues raised in the appellant’s brief
as the appeal was filed more than 30 days after the dismissal of his postconviction petition.
Therefore, we will only address the appellant’s third argument regarding whether the court
failed to conduct a preliminary Krankel hearing, and further, if its failure was harmless
error.
¶ 13 We review de novo whether a trial court properly conducted a preliminary Krankel
inquiry. People v. Roddis, 2020 IL 124352, ¶ 33. Generally, a Krankel inquiry occurs in
two stages. People v. Reed, 2018 IL App (1st) 160609, ¶ 49. First, the trial court examines
the factual basis of defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. Next, if
defendant’s claim shows possible neglect on behalf of trial counsel, new counsel is
4 appointed to represent defendant in an adversarial hearing on the ineffective assistance
claim. Id.
¶ 14 In People v. Moore, 207 Ill. 2d 68, 78 (2003), our supreme court stated that “[t]he
operative concern for the reviewing court is whether the trial court conducted an adequate
inquiry into the defendant’s pro se allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel.” The
court iterated that, in so evaluating defendant’s claim, the court can question trial counsel,
have a discussion with the defendant, or “base its evaluation of the defendant’s pro se
allegations of ineffective assistance on its knowledge of defense counsel’s performance at
trial and the insufficiency of the defendant’s allegations on their face.” Id. at 78-79.
¶ 15 Here, the State claims that the trial court conducted a sufficient Krankel inquiry or,
in the alternative, because new counsel was appointed to the defendant, any error by the
trial court in not conducting a Krankel hearing into the defendant’s pro se ineffective
assistance claim was harmless. However, we disagree with these assertions.
¶ 16 There is no indication in the record that the trial court addressed the defendant’s
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel as required by Krankel. The court noted that it
received the defendant’s correspondence; however, there is no indication that the court
inquired into the ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The court did not question
previous counsel or the defendant regarding the claim. The State asserts that the third
means listed in Moore indicates that the court relied on its own knowledge of the
proceedings; however, this is not indicated in the record. The court failed to ever reference
or comment on the defendant’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.
5 ¶ 17 Therefore, we reverse the trial court’s dismissal of the defendant’s motion to
withdraw his guilty plea and remand for a Krankel hearing on the defendant’s claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel.
¶ 18 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 19 The order of Bond County is hereby reversed and remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this order.
¶ 20 Reversed and remanded.