People v. Rea

Michigan Court of Appeals

People v. Rea

195 N.W.2d 809, 38 Mich. App. 141, 1972 Mich. App. LEXIS 1547

CourtMichigan Court of Appeals

DecidedJanuary 24, 1972

DocketDocket 10213

StatusPublished

Cited by14 cases

This text of 195 N.W.2d 809 (People v. Rea) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Michigan Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

People v. Rea, 195 N.W.2d 809, 38 Mich. App. 141, 1972 Mich. App. LEXIS 1547 (Mich. Ct. App. 1972).

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Opinion

Per Curiam.

Defendant was found guilty by a jury of assault with intent to rape, 1 and gross indecency. 2 He was sentenced to 9 to 10 years in prison on the assault count and 4-1/2 to 5 years in prison on the gross indecency count; the sentences to run concurrently. On appeal he asserts that error arose from the admission of hearsay evidence, that the assault with intent to rape verdict was against the weight of the evidence, that the gross indecency statute is unconstitutionally vague and that, in light of contemporary mores, cunnilingus is not grossly indecent behavior.

Hearsay testimony is generally not admissible because the essential right of cross-examination is absent; and, therefore, the jury is not afforded the opportunity to test the credibility of the person making the statement. People v Chambers, 279 Mich 73 (1937); People v Trilck, 374 Mich 118 (1965); People v Logan, 17 Mich App 363 (1969). Any error resulting from the alleged hearsay testimony herein was rendered moot and harmless by the fact that *143 the conversants were called as witnesses and were subject to cross-examination of defense counsel and the scrutiny of the jury.

There was ample evidence adduced at trial to support the verdict of assault with intent to commit rape.

The gross indecency statute is not constitutionally infirm because of vagueness. People v Dexter, 6 Mich App 247 (1967).

This Court will not substitute its opinion as to whether an act is grossly indecent in the eyes of the community as a whole for that of a properly charged jury. The question of community mores is properly addressed to either the trier of fact or to the legislative branch of government. See People v Haggerty, 27 Mich App 594 (1970).

Affirmed.

1

MCLA 750.85; MSA 28.280.

2

MCLA 750.338(b); MSA 28.570(2).

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Per Curiam.

Defendant was found guilty by a jury of assault with intent to rape, 1 and gross indecency. 2 He was sentenced to 9 to 10 years in prison on the assault count and 4-1/2 to 5 years in prison on the gross indecency count; the sentences to run concurrently. On appeal he asserts that error arose from the admission of hearsay evidence, that the assault with intent to rape verdict was against the weight of the evidence, that the gross indecency statute is unconstitutionally vague and that, in light of contemporary mores, cunnilingus is not grossly indecent behavior.

Hearsay testimony is generally not admissible because the essential right of cross-examination is absent; and, therefore, the jury is not afforded the opportunity to test the credibility of the person making the statement. People v Chambers, 279 Mich 73 (1937); People v Trilck, 374 Mich 118 (1965); People v Logan, 17 Mich App 363 (1969). Any error resulting from the alleged hearsay testimony herein was rendered moot and harmless by the fact that *143 the conversants were called as witnesses and were subject to cross-examination of defense counsel and the scrutiny of the jury.

There was ample evidence adduced at trial to support the verdict of assault with intent to commit rape.

The gross indecency statute is not constitutionally infirm because of vagueness. People v Dexter, 6 Mich App 247 (1967).

This Court will not substitute its opinion as to whether an act is grossly indecent in the eyes of the community as a whole for that of a properly charged jury. The question of community mores is properly addressed to either the trier of fact or to the legislative branch of government. See People v Haggerty, 27 Mich App 594 (1970).

Affirmed.

1

MCLA 750.85; MSA 28.280.

2

MCLA 750.338(b); MSA 28.570(2).

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Bluebook (online)

195 N.W.2d 809, 38 Mich. App. 141, 1972 Mich. App. LEXIS 1547, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/people-v-rea-michctapp-1972.

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