People v. Randazzo

459 N.E.2d 161, 60 N.Y.2d 952, 471 N.Y.S.2d 52, 1983 N.Y. LEXIS 3581
CourtNew York Court of Appeals
DecidedNovember 29, 1983
StatusPublished
Cited by11 cases

This text of 459 N.E.2d 161 (People v. Randazzo) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
People v. Randazzo, 459 N.E.2d 161, 60 N.Y.2d 952, 471 N.Y.S.2d 52, 1983 N.Y. LEXIS 3581 (N.Y. 1983).

Opinions

OPINION OF THE COURT

Memorandum.

The order of the Appellate Term should be reversed, and the case remitted to that court for a determination of the facts. (CPL 470.25, subd 2, par [d]; 470.40, subd 2, par [b].)

This appeal concerns a traffic ordinance enacted by the Village of Scarsdale, declaring Walworth Avenue a one-way northbound street for a 50-foot segment beginning at the Scarsdale border. Neither the beginning nor the end of the one-way segment is at an intersection. The restriction applies during the hours of 4:00 p.m. to 6:00 p.m. on weekdays, and it does not apply to Westchester County buses. Respondent, a newspaper reporter, was ticketed after traveling in the wrong direction during the prohibited hours and was convicted of violating the ordinance, the validity of which he questions. The Village Court upheld the ordinance, but the Appellate Term reversed, finding it an unreasonable traffic regulation.

Although the State is responsible for regulating the streets, it has delegated much of this power to municipalities. A village is empowered to designate “any highway or any separate roadway thereof for one-way traffic” (Vehicle and Traffic Law, § 1640, subd [a], par 4), and it may enact such additional reasonable traffic laws as local conditions may require. (Vehicle and Traffic Law, § 1640, subd [a], par 16.) A traffic ordinance established by a municipality will be upheld so long as it is reasonable and nondiscriminatory. (7 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations [3d rev ed], § 24.618.)

Where an ordinance limits through traffic, factors to be weighed in determining its validity include the availabil[954]*954ity of convenient alternate routes, any discriminatory effect, and the necessity for the regulation in relation to traffic conditions. (People v Grant, 306 NY 258; Jones Beach Blvd. Estate v Moses, 268 NY 362; Mobil Oil Corp. v Village of Roslyn Harbor, 69 Misc 2d 79 [Meyer, J.].) For example, in Grant, upon which defendant relies heavily, we sustained a challenge to an ordinance of the Town of North Hempstead which prohibited through traffic in a 10-block area and was designed to reserve the use of the streets to local residents. The ordinance in Grant banned all travel through the area, in whatever direction, and wherever destined. (306 NY, at p 264.) The Scarsdale ordinance, by contrast, does not impose a blanket prohibition. It forecloses only southbound traffic on one street for two hours each weekday.

On the present record, the Appellate Term was not justified in striking down the regulation. Defendant’s challenge consisted of little more than citing People v Grant. No motion was made to dismiss the information on grounds of invalidity. (CPL 170.30, subd 1, par [a]; 170.35, subd 1, par [c].) Defendant did not show that alternate routes were unavailable or that these routes, if available, were inadequate. No mention was made of undue inconvenience imposed on southbound travelers on Walworth Avenue. Nor did defendant allege, much less prove, that the ordinance was designed to favor residents rather than to eliminate a dangerous traffic condition. He established no discriminatory effect.

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Bluebook (online)
459 N.E.2d 161, 60 N.Y.2d 952, 471 N.Y.S.2d 52, 1983 N.Y. LEXIS 3581, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/people-v-randazzo-ny-1983.