People v. Purdy

Michigan Court of Appeals

People v. Purdy

208 N.W.2d 581, 46 Mich. App. 630, 1973 Mich. App. LEXIS 1242

CourtMichigan Court of Appeals

DecidedApril 25, 1973

DocketDocket 14414-14415

StatusPublished

Cited by5 cases

This text of 208 N.W.2d 581 (People v. Purdy) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Michigan Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

People v. Purdy, 208 N.W.2d 581, 46 Mich. App. 630, 1973 Mich. App. LEXIS 1242 (Mich. Ct. App. 1973).

Pincite

Opinions

Lesinski, C. J.

On March 6, 1972 defendants Purdy and Johnson pleaded guilty to assault with intent to rob being armed in Detroit Recorder’s Court. MCLA 750.89; MSA 28.284. Both defendants now appeal their convictions by right alleging that the trial court did not inform them of their right to confront their accusers. Defendants’ allegations are sound, and therefore we reverse.

An examination of the guilty plea transcript reveals the following exchange between the trial judge and the defendants with regard to their right of confrontation:

"The Court: Do you know that if you had a trial you wouldn’t have to go [to] trial alone. You could go to trial with your lawyer and he could help you in a lot of ways. He could question the witnesses for you and subpoena witnesses in your behalf. Did you know about that, Mr. Purdy?

"Mr. Purdy: Yes.

"The Court: He can make legal arguments for you and argue your case to the jury and give you advice and help you in a lot of ways. Do you understand that, Mr. Johnson?

"Mr. Johnson: Yes.

"The Court: Do you Mr. Purdy?

"Mr. Purdy: Yes.”

This Court has held the above language is not sufficient to inform a defendant of his right to confront his accusers. People v D’Argis, 44 Mich App 186 (1972). Accordingly, we must reverse each defendant’s conviction and remand for a new trial.

[633]*633We also note that the trial judge examined each defendant’s juvenile record at sentencing. In view of our reversal of the convictions we do not consider this assignment of error. See People v McFarlin, 41 Mich App 116 (1972); People v Chappell, 44 Mich App 204 (1972).

The issue is now before the Supreme Court. Leave was granted in McFarlin, supra, August 8, 1972. Thus, on remand, if defendants should again be found guilty, the trial court should abide by the decision of the Supreme Court on the use of juvenile records at sentencing.

Reversed and remanded.

R. B. Burns, J., concurred.

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