People v. Pritchard

2020 IL App (2d) 170354-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: January 13, 2020
• Docket: 2-17-0354
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

2020 IL App (2d) 170354-U No. 2-17-0354 Order filed January 13, 2020

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

SECOND DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE ) Appeal from the Circuit Court OF ILLINOIS, ) of Du Page County. ) Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) v. ) No. 16-CM-288 ) DONALD L. PRITCHARD, ) Honorable ) Alexander F. McGimpsey III, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE HUDSON delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Schostok and Bridges concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: The State proved defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of disorderly conduct, as the jury was entitled to find that defendant unreasonably threatened the victim, alarming and disturbing the victim and breaching the peace.

¶2 Defendant, Donald L. Pritchard, appeals from his conviction of disorderly conduct (720

ILCS 5/26-1(a)(1) (West 2016)), arguing that the evidence was insufficient to prove him guilty

beyond a reasonable doubt. We affirm.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 On January 28, 2016, defendant was charged with disorderly conduct (id.) in that he: 2020 IL App (2d) 170354-U

“Knowingly became enraged over the price of a tent, an item offered for sale [at] the

Goodwill Industries *** and confronted Matthew Norton (Asst. Store Manager), within

inches of his face and told him, ‘I am going to come at you just like you have been coming

at me’, in such an unreasonable manner as to alarm and disturb Matthew Norton, and

provoke a breach of the peace.”

¶5 The matter proceeded to a jury trial, at which the following relevant testimony was

presented. Norton testified that, on January 23, 2016, he was the assistant store manager at the

Goodwill store in Naperville. At about 11:30 a.m., several individuals, including defendant, were

congregating in a certain area of the store, waiting for new items to be brought onto the sales floor.

Norton asked those individuals to move from the area and continue shopping. Defendant became

“incredibly agitated” and “loud,” and he called Norton a “racist,” saying that Norton was “targeting

him.” Norton asked defendant to continue shopping. Defendant remained in the store for about

three more hours.

¶6 Norton testified that, at about 2:30 p.m., he saw one of his associates at a register attempting

to decipher a problem. Defendant had brought the associate a tent that did not have a price tag

attached. Another employee, Rosa Wash, did a price check and told defendant that the price of

the tent was $9.99. Defendant claimed that that was not the price that he had seen on the tent.

Defendant “got rather loud.” Norton asked defendant if he wanted to step off to the side to continue

the conversation, because a crowd was starting to form. According to Norton, there were about

50 to 60 people in the store, and “people were collecting around [defendant] because of the

commotion that he was causing.”

¶7 Norton testified that he and defendant moved to an adjacent aisle. Defendant was upset,

claiming that the original tag on the tent was not marked $9.99. Norton asked if the price tag might

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have fallen off in defendant’s cart. Defendant and Norton searched the cart for the missing tag.

According to Norton, defendant was “getting more and more angry.” When they could not find

the tag in the cart, defendant “started waving the tent around and it kind of made [Norton] nervous

because [defendant] was getting so upset over the difference of $5.00.” At that time, defendant

was about two feet away from Norton. Norton “was trying to stay as calm and professional as

possible because [he] was getting rather nervous about how upset [defendant] was becoming.”

Norton did not yell or raise his voice at defendant. Ultimately, defendant produced an orange price

tag, but Norton knew that the tag did not belong to the tent. According to Norton, the store rotated

colors of price tags every week; orange tags would have been from the previous week. In addition,

the item code on the orange price tag indicated that it had been placed on a pair of shoes. According

to Norton, the tent would have had a pink price tag, because the tent had gone out on the sales

floor that Saturday.

¶8 Norton testified that he told defendant that the orange price tag could not have come from

the tent. When asked how defendant responded, Norton testified:

“He got angrier. He said that you’re targeting me. He said that I’m going to be

coming at you like you were coming at me. And then he got within mere inches of my

face, and I had to step back because I was very afraid at that point in time.”

According to Norton, defendant stepped toward him when he made that statement. When asked

how he felt, Norton testified: “I felt afraid for my well-being.” Wash was standing between Norton

and defendant, because “she was afraid something was going to happen.” A crowd had formed

and a lot of people were staring and stopping what they were doing. Norton told defendant that

“that type of language cannot be used against [his] associates” and he asked defendant to leave.

Defendant refused to leave. Norton could not recall what defendant said at that point but defendant

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“was speaking in a loud and aggressive tone.” Norton left to call the police. Norton testified that

he had had price disputes with customers before but that “this was not like any price dispute that

[he had] ever had with anyone in the seven years [he had] spent with Goodwill.” He stated: “I

have never had a price dispute where I felt like it could come to physical harm. At that point in

time, I had a six-month-old child at home, and I live within close proximity to the store. I don’t

know what intentions could be brought past this.”

¶9 Norton testified that a video surveillance system was operating at the store on the day of

the incident. He identified People’s exhibit No. 1 as the video recording that depicted the incident.

The video was played for the jury. Norton identified himself, defendant, and Wash in the video.

He testified that, at the 6 minute and 55 second mark, defendant approached him and got within

inches of his face. He pointed out the people gathering around them. At 7 minutes and 20 seconds,

he and defendant were looking in the cart for the missing price tag. At 7 minutes and 35 seconds,

Norton told defendant that the price was $9.99. At 8 minutes and 26 seconds, defendant

approached Norton and stated “that he’d be coming at [Norton] just like [Norton had] been coming

at him.” Norton testified: “And I did feel afraid.” At about the 9-minute mark, Norton exited the

area to call the police.

¶ 10 On cross-examination, Norton was asked about the video recording. He testified that, at 8

minutes and 6 seconds, he told defendant “that if he’s going to use that type of language he has to

leave the store,” and he pointed toward the exit. They continued to argue and Norton can be seen

in the video stepping toward defendant. Defendant then can be seen gathering his belongings and

putting them in the cart.

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¶ 11 On redirect examination, Norton testified that, when defendant told Norton that he would

be coming at Norton like Norton had been coming at him, Norton feared for his safety and felt

alarmed and disturbed.

¶ 12 Wash testified that she was a retail supervisor at the store. At about 2:15 p.m. on the day

of the incident, she was called to a cash register for a price check. A cashier handed her a tent that

was shaped liked a race car. She took it to “production” and asked whether the tent was placed on

the sales floor that day. The store manager, “Eucienia,” told her that it had been and, further, that

it had been priced at $9.99. Eucienia was running production that day and was responsible for

pricing the items. At that time, Wash did not know which customer she was doing the price check

for. Wash returned the tent to the cashier, telling the cashier that the tent was $9.99.

¶ 13 Wash testified that she was subsequently paged and asked to return to the registers. The

cashier told her that a customer believed that one of his items was priced too high. The cashier

directed Wash to defendant. Defendant told Wash that “he felt as if he was being robbed because

[the tent] was originally priced as 4.99.” Wash asked defendant what happened to the original

price tag and defendant told her that it must have fallen off. Norton and defendant looked through

defendant’s cart to see if they could find the missing price tag. Defendant found a $4.99 price

sticker in his cart. Wash testified that, based on the color of the sticker and the code on the sticker,

she knew that the sticker could not have come from the tent. Wash heard defendant say to Norton,

“ ‘I’m going to come at you like you come at me.’ ” Defendant took a step toward Norton when

he made the statement. Wash also testified that defendant “kind of lifted the tent.” She thought

that he might hit Norton with the tent. She stood between the men, because she thought that

defendant would not hit a woman. Wash believed that defendant was so upset over the additional

five dollars that he was going to hit Norton. Norton responded to defendant’s comment by stating:

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“ ‘There’s no need for that, if you’re going to threaten me, I’m going to have to ask you to leave

the store.’ ” Defendant then stated: “ ‘I will be back and I can assure you that I will be back.’ ”

Wash thought he meant that he would come back and harm someone. Defendant also told Norton

that he was a “fucking racist.” At that point, an assistant manager went to get Eucienia. A lot of

customers had crowded around and Eucienia stated to defendant: “ ‘Sir, you’re causing a scene

and yelling at my managers, I’m going to have to ask you to leave the store.’ ” Defendant told

Eucienia, who was Mexican, that “she was racist against blacks and Mexicans.” Defendant

repeatedly called Eucienia a bitch.

¶ 14 On cross-examination, Wash viewed the surveillance video. She testified that, at about

8:06 on the video, defendant told Norton that he was going to come at Norton like Norton had

come at defendant. At 8:08, Norton can be seen pointing at the door. At 8:11, Norton took a step

toward defendant while pointing at the door. Wash testified that, during the incident, defendant

stated that he was going to sue Goodwill.

¶ 15 On redirect examination, Wash testified that Norton took a step toward defendant, pointing

at the door and asking him to leave, after defendant had threatened him and called him a racist.

When defendant stated that he would be back, Wash felt threatened.

¶ 16 At the close of the State’s evidence, defendant moved for a directed verdict, which the trial

court denied. Defendant rested.

¶ 17 The jury found defendant guilty of disorderly conduct (id.) and the trial court sentenced

him to 28 days in jail with credit for time served. Following the denial of his amended motion for

a new trial or judgment notwithstanding the verdict, defendant timely appealed.

¶ 18 II. ANALYSIS

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¶ 19 Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove him guilty beyond a

reasonable doubt of disorderly conduct. When we review a challenge to the sufficiency of the

evidence, “ ‘the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable

to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime

beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (Emphasis in original.) People v. Collins, 106 Ill. 2d 237, 261

(1985) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). The trier of fact is responsible

for resolving conflicts in the testimony, weighing the evidence, and determining what inferences

to draw, and a reviewing court ordinarily will not substitute its judgment on these matters for that

of the trier of fact. People v. Cooper, 194 Ill. 2d 419, 431 (2000). A reviewing court will not set

aside a criminal conviction unless the evidence is so improbable or unsatisfactory that it creates a

reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt. Collins, 106 Ill. 2d at 261.

¶ 20 To prove defendant guilty of disorderly conduct, the State had to prove that he knowingly

did any act in such an unreasonable manner as to alarm or disturb another and to provoke a breach

of the peace. 720 ILCS 5/26-1(a)(1) (West 2016); People v. Steger, 2018 IL App (2d) 151197,

¶ 29. “Therefore, the State had to prove that defendant knowingly engaged in conduct that (1) was

unreasonable, (2) alarmed or disturbed another, and (3) provoked a breach of the peace.” People

v. McLennon, 2011 IL App (2d) 091299, ¶ 29. “Disorderly conduct is loosely defined. The main

purpose of the statute is to guard against an invasion of the right of others not to be molested or

harassed, either mentally or physically, without justification. [Citation.]” (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Steger, 2018 IL App (2d) 151197, ¶ 30.

¶ 21 Defendant argues that he acted reasonably when he was told the price of the tent.

According to defendant, no reasonable person would have interpreted his remark as threatening,

as it was instead “a declaration of his intent to treat Norton with parity.” He also argues that

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Norton’s claim that he was alarmed and disturbed by defendant’s conduct was refuted by the video

evidence. And he argues that his actions did not breach the peace but, rather, merely “seemed to

draw the attention of a few curious bystanders.” We disagree.

¶ 22 The evidence established that, during the discussion about the price, defendant approached

Norton and got within inches of Norton’s face. Defendant spoke in a loud and aggressive tone and

was becoming increasingly angry. While looking for the price tag, defendant waved the tent

around, which made Norton “nervous.” After being told that the tag that defendant claimed was

on the tent could not have come from the tent, defendant stated to Norton: “I’m going to be coming

at you like you were coming at me.” Both Norton and Wash testified that they took defendant’s

statement as a threat. Indeed, given defendant’s agitated state and his increasingly angry and

aggressive tone, his statement was threatening. Although defendant claims that his only threat

“was to take legal action against the store,” Wash testified that she believed that defendant was

going to return to the store to harm someone, and Norton testified that he “felt afraid for [his] well-

being.” Defendant refused to leave after being told to do so and Norton called the police. Although

defendant claims that his actions were reasonable, Norton testified that he had had price disputes

with customers before but had never had one that he thought would result in physical harm.

¶ 23 Defendant challenges Norton’s testimony that he was alarmed and disturbed by pointing

to the surveillance video. Defendant argues that the video shows that he moved slowly toward

Norton as he made his comment and that, contrary to Norton’s testimony, Norton did not step back

but instead stepped toward defendant and pointed toward the door. To be sure, the video shows

that, at one point, Norton stepped toward defendant as he pointed to the door. However, that does

not negate Norton’s testimony that defendant’s conduct alarmed and disturbed him. Norton made

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clear that he feared for his safety and, indeed, after attempting to get defendant to leave, he went

to call the police.

¶ 24 Defendant attempts to liken the situation to People v. Bradshaw, 116 Ill. App. 3d 421

(1983). However, Bradshaw is readily distinguishable. There, the defendant left a bar and stood

outside calling the manager a variety of obscene names over the course of about 10 to 15 minutes.

Id. at 422. No patrons left the bar. Id. The reviewing court reversed the conviction of disorderly

conduct, finding that the defendant’s conduct was “nothing more than annoying” given that no

patrons left the bar as a result. Id. Here, however, unlike in Bradshaw, defendant did not simply

yell obscenities at Norton. Instead, he became increasingly angry over a price dispute, got within

inches of Norton’s face, and ultimately made a threatening statement, which caused both Norton

and Wash to fear for their safety.

¶ 25 Defendant also argues that his conduct did not breach the peace, because it did not draw a

crowd. According to defendant, his conduct had no “effect on bystanders except to rouse their

curiosity.” “ ‘Generally, to breach the peace, a defendant’s conduct must threaten another or have

an effect on the surrounding crowd.’ [Citation.] ‘However, a breach of the peace can occur

without overt threats or profane and abusive language.’ [Citation.] In addition, it ‘need not occur

in public. [Citation.]” People v. Pence, 2018 IL App (2d) 151102, ¶ 17. Here, regardless of the

effect that defendant’s conduct had on the other Goodwill shoppers, the evidence made clear that

defendant’s conduct threatened Norton and invaded his right not to be harassed. See Steger, 2018

IL App (2d) 151197, ¶ 33 (the defendant’s act of standing quietly outside victim’s home, which

“freaked out” the victim, was sufficient to constitute disorderly conduct, as it invaded the victim’s

right not to be harassed); Pence, 2018 IL App (2d) 151102, ¶ 18 (the defendant’s message to the

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victim on social media was sufficient to constitute disorderly conduct where the defendant’s

conduct invaded the victim’s right not to be harassed).

¶ 26 Accordingly, we find that, viewed in the light most favorable to the State, the evidence was

sufficient to prove defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of disorderly conduct.

¶ 27 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 28 For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County.

¶ 29 Affirmed.

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