Ryan, J.
The issue presented for consideration is whether defendant is entitled to sentence credit in this case for time spent incarcerated under sentence for an unrelated offense committed while he was free on bond for the offense for which he now seeks sentence credit. We hold that he is not so entitled.
Defendant was arrested on April 7, 1982, and charged with two counts of delivery of marijuana. The offenses were alleged to have occurred on March 9 and March 22, 1982. Defendant posted bond on April 10, 1982, and was released from custody. On June 20, 1982, he was again arrested, this time for driving with a revoked license. He posted a seventy-five dollar bond and was again released. On July 20, 1982, defendant began serving a ninety-day sentence, following conviction, for the driving violation. On September 9, 1982, while incarcerated under sentence for the driving violation, defendant was charged with a third delivery of marijuana offense. This third delivery was alleged to have occurred on July 8, 1982, when defendant was free on the bonds previously posted for the first two marijuana offenses, and the driving violation. He did not post bond for the latest arrest.
On September 27, 1982, defendant pled guilty, as a second-felony offender, to one of the original delivery charges in exchange for a dismissal of the two other delivery charges. (The charges of March 22 and July 8.)1 On November 22, 1982, defendant was sentenced to serve three to six years imprison[331]*331ment. The trial court granted sentence credit for fifty-eight days served prior to sentencing.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals held, in an unpublished per curiam opinion, that the trial court had miscalculated the amount of sentence credit for time served to which the defendant was entitled pursuant to § 11b of the Code of Criminal Procedure, MCL 769.11b; MSA 28.1083(2). The Court of Appeals held that defendant was entitled to credit for:
— The four days spent in jail between his arrest on the original marijuana delivery charges and his release on bond on April 10, 1982;
— If verified, the eighteen days spent in jail while under sentence for the driving violation, between September 9, 1982, when he was charged with the third marijuana delivery violation, and September 27, 1982, when he pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea bargain, to a single marijuana delivery offense; and
— The fifty-six days between his plea of guilty on September 27, 1982, and the sentencing for that offense on November 22, 1982.
Over Judge Kelly’s dissent, the appellate court declined to award credit for the fifty-one days between July 20, 1982, and September 9, 1982, that defendant spent in jail under sentence for the driving violation, and before he was charged with the third delivery of marijuana offense. The court then ordered the case remanded to the trial court for a recomputation of sentence credit due the defendant.
A chronological history of the foregoing events, divided into the relevant segments, is as follows:
[332]*332
We granted leave to appeal upon the lower court’s certification, pursuant to our Administrative Order No. 1984-2, that its decision was in [333]*333conflict with People v Coyle, 104 Mich App 636; 305 NW2d 275 (1981).2
I
Michigan’s sentence credit statute, MCL 769.11b; MSA 28.1083(2), provides:
Whenever any person is hereafter convicted of any crime within this state and has served any time in jail prior to sentencing because of being denied or unable to furnish bond for the oifense of which he is convicted, the trial court in imposing sentence shall specifically grant credit against the sentence for such time served in jail prior to sentencing.
Before the enactment of the statute, a criminal defendant had no right to sentence credit for the period he was confined before sentence was imposed. See Bowen v Recorder’s Court Judge, 384 Mich 55; 179 NW2d 377 (1970). The enactment of the statute reflects the Legislature’s intention to entitle every defendant in a criminal case to the sentence credit described in the statute, instead of leaving the matter to the discretion of sentencing courts.
The statute has been interpreted many different ways in the Court of Appeals, depending upon the factual permutations that result in presentence confinement in particular cases. The sheer number and the factual uniqueness of the host of cases that have been decided in the Court of Appeals defy discrete categorization, or restatement of simple majority and minority rules._
[334]*334It has been accurately observed, however, Coyle, supra, pp 649-650, that interpretations of the statute in the Court of Appeals have fallen into one of three general categories: the liberal approach that ordinarily affords credit for any presentence confinement served for whatever the reason, and whether related or unrelated to the crime for which the sentence in issue is imposed, People v Chattaway, 18 Mich App 538, 543; 171 NW2d 801 (1969); the middle or intermediate approach that asks the question whether the reason for the presentence confinement bears an "intimate and substantial relationship” to the offense for which the defendant was convicted and is seeking sentence credit, People v Groeneveld, 54 Mich App 424, 427-428; 221 NW2d 254 (1974); and the strict approach which limits credit to presentence confinement that results from the defendant’s financial inability or unwillingness to post bond for the offense for which he has been convicted, People v Finn, 74 Mich App 580; 254 NW2d 585 (1977). Presumably, this last category would include instances in which the accused is denied bail under the provisions of art 1, § 15 of the Michigan Constitution.
The foregoing classifications are necessarily inexact, and some cases will present factual scenarios that do not fit precisely within any of the stated categories.
To repeat, the statute provides:
Whenever any person is hereafter convicted of any crime within this state and has served any time in jail prior to sentencing because of being denied or unable to furnish bond for the offense of which he is convicted, the trial court in imposing sentence shall specifically grant credit against the sentence for such time served in jail prior to sentencing.
[335]*335The Court of Appeals has, at various times, postulated that the sentence credit statute was intended by the Legislature to put an accused who cannot post bond due to his indigency on an equal footing with his more affluent counterpart who can. See, e.g., People v Davis, 87 Mich App 72; 273 NW2d 591 (1978); People v Andrews #1, 52 Mich App 719; 218 NW2d 379 (1974); People v Pruitt, 23 Mich App 510, 513; 179 NW2d 22 (1970). The language of the statute, particularly the expression, "because of being denied or unable to furnish bond for the offense of which he is convicted,” supports that interpretation.
In the early Court of Appeals decision in Chattaway, supra, the Court observed that the statutory language should be read as going much farther than merely equalizing the position of an impecunious defendant with that of his more affluent counterpart. In Chattaway, the defendant was arrested for two distinct and unrelated crimes. He was unable to post bond for the first crime. No bond was set for the second crime, apparently because, since the defendant was required to be confined for failure to post bond for the first crime, even if he had posted bond for the second, he would not be released from jail until he met the bonding requirements for the first. When the defendant pleaded guilty and was sentenced for the first crime, he was given credit in that case for all presentence confinement served. When, six weeks later, following his guilty plea, he was sentenced for the second crime, he was denied credit in that case for the previous time spent in confinement on the ground that full credit had been given in the first case for all time served up to the date of sentencing in that case, and that the time served thereafter was under the sentence for the first conviction. When the defendant appealed, seeking [336]*336credit once again in the second case for the time already credited in the first case, the prosecution argued that the defendant was not entitled to "duplicate” credit. That was the issue before the Court: Whether the defendant was entitled to be twice credited with the time previously spent in jail pending disposition of both charges.
The Chattaway Court stated that if the statute were not construed to entitle defendant to again be credited in the second case with the predisposition confinement time for which he was once already credited in the first case, the result "would chill exercise of the right to trial by an accused person who, like the defendant, faces more than one untried charge.” 18 Mich App 542. Responding to the prosecutor’s argument that the defendant in Chattaway had not served time in jail prior to sentencing for the second crime "because of being denied or unable to furnish bond for the offense of which he is convicted” [the second crime], but because he had not furnished bond on the unrelated first charge, the Chattaway Court stated:
The statute does not make the convicted person’s right to sentence credit dependent on the reason why bond was denied or, if bond is set, the reason why he was unable to furnish bond. The fact that the defendant may have been able to furnish bond in this case because even if he did so he might not have been released because of the pending charge in the other case and still other pending charges and related "holds” or may have been denied bond after he pled guilty because he had been sentenced in the other case does not change (it is merely an explanation of) the fact that the defendant was at first "unable” to furnish bond and later was “denied” bond in this case.
The Court concluded:
We hold that the statute entitles a convicted [337]*337person to sentence credit without regard to the reason why he was denied or unable to furnish bond. [Chattaway, 18 Mich App 542-543.]
There developed therefrom a line of cases espousing what has come to be called the "liberal” view, that a defendant who is unable to gain his freedom by posting bond for any reason, including reasons not related to his financial status and reasons unrelated to the case in which he is seeking credit, is nevertheless entitled to sentence credit in that case and, in a Chattaway situation, all other pending cases as well. People v Parshay, 104 Mich App 411; 304 NW2d 593 (1981); People v Coyle, supra; People v Donkers, 70 Mich App 692; 247 NW2d 330 (1976); People v Parisi, 46 Mich App 322; 208 NW2d 70 (1973), rev’d on other grounds 393 Mich 31; 222 NW2d 757 (1974); People v Potts, 46 Mich App 538; 208 NW2d 583 (1973); People v Cohen, 35 Mich App 706; 192 NW2d 652 (1971). See, eg., People v Nieto, 122 Mich App 695; 333 NW2d 11 (1982); People v Lewis, 42 Mich App 121; 201 NW2d 341 (1972); People v Dorsey, 104 Mich App 528; 305 NW2d 257 (1981); People v Andrews #1, supra, at 726-727; People v Haines, 24 Mich App 240; 180 NW2d 107 (1970); People v Hall, 19 Mich App 95; 172 NW2d 473 (1969); People v Chattaway, supra; People v Thomas, 10 Mich App 693; 160 NW2d 382 (1968).
Included among the foregoing decisions are cases like the one before us in which a defendant is arrested and then released on bond in one case and then, pending disposition of that charge, is subsequently arrested and incarcerated as a result of unrelated charges brought in another case. See Coyle, supra, Potts, supra, and Cohen, supra. As indicated by the certification in this case, the [338]*338Court of Appeals is divided on whether a grant of sentence credit is required in such cases. In many of the cases in which credit has been granted without regard to whether the credited time was served for reasons having anything to do with the “offense of which [the defendant] is convicted,” the Court of Appeals has afforded relief not because the language of the sentence credit statute commands it, but, following Chattaway, to avoid “unnecessary chilling of exercise of the right to trial,” or to avoid losing “the benefit of [Michigan’s] concurrent sentencing [law].” People v Face, 88 Mich App 435, 441; 276 NW2d 916 (1979).
Other panels of the Court of Appeals have denied credit on essentially the same facts, reasoning that the confinement in question was not occasioned by the inability to post bond for the offense “of which [the defendant] is convicted,” but was occasioned by a second arrest made after the defendant had posted bond for the offense "of which the [defendant] is convicted.” See People v Finn, supra; People v Risher, 78 Mich App 431; 260 NW2d 121 (1977). These cases have been characterized by some observers as decisions adopting the “strict” approach to application of the sentence credit statute.
Still other panels of the Court of Appeals have adopted what has been called the middle ground approach in which the time served in confinement for which credit is sought is not, strictly speaking, time served as a result of an inability to post bond for the offense for which the accused is convicted and seeks sentence credit, but is time served for reasons that “ 'bear an intimate and substantial relationship to the crime for which such person is subsequently convicted.’ ” People v Groeneveld, supra. Such a case was People v Tilliard, 98 Mich App 17; 296 NW2d 180 (1980), where the defendant was charged with breaking and entering an [339]*339unoccupied dwelling house and was incarcerated for forty-eight days between the date of his arrest for the crime and the date of the arraignment. He remained in jail for an additional 112 days between the date of arraignment and the date of sentencing. At sentencing, the defendant was credited with the forty-eight days served between arrest and arraignment, but denied credit for the 112 days between arraignment and sentencing. The reason he had not been released at the time of arraignment, although a personal recognizance bond was set, was because a "hold” had been placed upon him by the Michigan Department of Corrections for a possible parole violation, since the offense for which he was arrested was committed while he was on parole. The Tilliard Court said that credit should have been granted to the defendant for the 112-day period because, although the confinement for that time was not directly related to his inability to post bond for the offense for which he was convicted (he was granted personal bond), "the parole violation[] [was] inextricably related” to the offense of which the accused was convicted.
We undertake to resolve the conflicting interpretations of the sentence credit statute by recalling that our role is not to determine whether we prefer to deal with the problem of presentence confinement liberally, conservatively, or in some intermediate fashion, or even to adopt a judicially preferred policy of fairness in the matter. The Legislature has made the policy decision, and our function is to apply it according to the language of the statute as that language enlightens us concerning the Legislature’s intention.
II
We have granted leave in this case not only to [340]*340resolve the dispute raised by the facts before us, but to attempt to resolve the conflicting views in the Court of Appeals concerning the manner in which the sentence credit statute will be applied in the countless cases not yet litigated upon myriad factual scenarios yet to develop. It is equally important that we provide some guidance for the trial bench, the bar, and the other constituencies for whom we write to assure, as nearly as possible, consistently correct application of the statute to cases presenting facts quite beyond our imagination today.
A
We believe the sentence credit statute neither requires nor permits sentence credit in cases, such as the one before us, where a defendant is released on bond following entry of charges arising from one offense and, pending disposition of those charges, is subsequently incarcerated as a result of charges arising out of an unrelated offense or circumstance and then seeks credit in the former case for that latter period of confinement.
The legislative purpose in enacting a statute must be determined, primarily, from the language of the statute itself. Jones v Grand Ledge Public Schools, 349 Mich 1, 9; 84 NW2d 327 (1957).
While remedial statutes should be liberally construed, a "rule of liberal construction will not override other rules where its application would defeat the intention of the legislature or the evident meaning of an act.” 3 Sands, Sutherland Statutory Construction (4th ed), § 60.01. We agree that the primary purpose of the sentence credit statute is to "equalize as far as possible the status of the indigent and less financially well-circumstanced accused with the status of the accused who can afford to furnish bail.” People v Pruitt, 23 Mich App 510, 513; 179 NW2d 22 (1970).
[341]*341The Legislature sought, in enacting the statute, to give a criminal defendant a right to credit for any presentence time served "for the offense of which he is convicted,” and not upon any other conviction. Had the Legislature intended that convicted defendants be given sentence credit for all time served prior to sentencing day, regardless of the purpose for which the presentence confinement was served, it would not have conditioned and limited entitlement to credit to time served "for the offense of which [the defendant] is convicted.”
It may be that for defendants who find themselves incarcerated for multiple unrelated offenses, one of the motivations to plead guilty to some of the charges is the desire to accelerate the imposition of sentence in order to benefit, as much as possible, from Michigan’s concurrent sentencing law. But that ingredient of a given defendant’s motivation derives from the peculiar facts with which the defendant facing multiple charges is confronted and not, we think, from limiting application of the sentence credit statute to those circumstances described by its terms. We think it is clear that the Legislature sought, by the statute, to give a criminal defendant a right to credit for any presentence time served upon "the offense of which he is convicted.” Judicial obedience to the language of the legislation may, incidentally, indeed coincidentally, have the effect of motivating a defendant, who is charged with multiple offenses and who has posted bond for one offense and was released, but who is incarcerated for a second offense, to waive his right to trial and proceed to plead guilty in the first case in order to get the sentencing clock running on that conviction while awaiting final disposition of the offense for which he is denied bond, or final resolution of an unrelated "hold” or "detainer.” However, that motiva[342]*342tion does not change the language of the statute and should not be judicial excuse for applying the statute to situations to which it does not extend.
B
In addition to urging upon us the "liberal” reading of the statute that began with Chattaway, the defendant argues that granting sentence credit in this case for the fifty-one days confinement served under sentence for the driving offense will "effectuate” this state’s concurrent sentencing rule. The argument is that the defendant is denied the benefit of the Michigan concurrent sentence rule and effectively made to serve consecutive sentences for the two convictions involved here unless he is given credit in the case at bar for the fifty-one days confinement under the driving violation. Consecutive sentencing is forbidden in this state, except in circumstances not involved in this case.3 In re Carey, 372 Mich 378; 126 NW2d 727 (1964).
The concurrent sentence rule does not affect whether the sentence credit the defendant seeks is granted or denied. The concurrent sentence rule is simply irrelevant to this case. The rule, as stated in Carey, supra, 372 Mich 380, is that "in the absence of statutory authority, a sentence may not be imposed to commence at the completion or expiration of another sentence.” Applying the rule to that case, the Carey Court declared that sentences imposed for two state convictions while the defendant was serving a federal sentence could not be made to commence at the expiration of the federal sentence, but must commence on the date of imposition of the state sentences.
Plainly, that rule has no application here. Commencement of the sentence in this case was not [343]*343delayed until after the driving violation sentence was concluded. The sentence in this case was not imposed until well after the driving violation sentence was served, and it was made to commence on the date of its imposition, September 27, 1982, with credit given for all time previously served for that offense.
C
In sum, we believe that in enacting the statute in question, the Legislature intended primarily to equalize the status of the defendants who, because of their inadequate financial resources, are "unable to furnish bond for the offense of which [they are] convicted,” and those who are financially capable of posting bond, or are denied bond because they are charged with an offense for which there is no entitlement to bail. Const 1963, art 1, §15.
Ill
In the case before us, the defendant posted bond for the first two marijuana charges and was at liberty when he was arrested for the driving offense. He was again released on bond on that offense and was not again incarcerated until July 20, 1982, when he began to serve the ninety-day sentence for the traffic violation. He now seeks credit, in this case, for fifty-one days of the confinement he served under sentence for the driving offense. The statute grants no entitlement to such credit however, because the defendant did not serve that time because of his inability to post bond for the March 9, 1982, marijuana delivery offense of which he now stands convicted. Indeed, it was because he was free on bond for that offense that he was in a position to commit the driving offense. To attribute to the Legislature the inten[344]*344tion that the defendant be given credit in this case for the fifty-one days served under the traffic sentence offense, committed while he was free on bond in this case, is to attribute to the Legislature an intent to afford a defendant a "free” misdemeanor — one for which no sentence of confinement need be or could be served.
We note that the Court of Appeals granted the defendant credit in this case for eighteen days served under the driving violation sentence between September 19, 1982, the date he was charged with the third marijuana delivery offense, and September 27, 1982, the date he pleaded guilty to the March 9, 1982, delivery charge — all time being served under the traffic conviction sentence and, therefore, unrelated to the offense for which he was convicted in this case. Because the prosecutor has not cross-appealed that portion of the Court of Appeals decision, we take no action with respect to that matter.
To be entitled to sentence credit for presentence time served, a defendant must have been incarcerated "for the offense of which he is convicted.” Since the fifty-one days of incarceration for which the defendant seeks credit is unrelated to the offense before us for which he has been convicted, he is not entitled to sentence credit for that confinement.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
Williams, C.J., and Brickley, Boyle, and Riley, JJ., concurred with Ryan, J.