People v. Poulsen

2025 IL App (4th) 250758-U

Opinion

NOTICE 2025 IL App (4th) 250758-U This Order was filed under FILED Supreme Court Rule 23 and is NO. 4-25-0758 October 28, 2025 not precedent except in the Carla Bender th limited circumstances allowed 4 District Appellate IN THE APPELLATE COURT under Rule 23(e)(1). Court, IL OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of v. ) Fulton County THOMAS C. POULSEN, ) No. 25CF79 Defendant-Appellant. ) ) Honorable ) Thomas B. Ewing, ) Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE KNECHT delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Steigmann and Grischow concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: The circuit court did not err in finding no change of circumstances warranted defendant’s release from pretrial detention.

¶2 Defendant, Thomas C. Poulsen, appeals the circuit court’s order denying his

request to be released from pretrial detention under section 110-6.1(i-5) of the Code of Criminal

Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(i-5) (West 2024)). Defendant contends a change

in circumstances shows there were less restrictive means of mitigating the threat he posed to the

community. We affirm.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 On April 9, 2025, defendant was charged with two counts of aggravated battery

(720 ILCS 5/12-3.05(d)(4)(i), (11) (West 2024)). According to the charges, defendant battered

two hospital employees, nurse Jeremiah Larson and security officer Shawn Pratt. ¶5 That same day, the State filed a verified petition to deny defendant pretrial release

under section 110-6.1(a)(1.5) of the Code (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a)(1.5) (West 2024)) under the

dangerousness standard. The State alleged defendant committed a forcible felony and his pretrial

release posed a real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community.

¶6 At the hearing on the State’s petition, the State proffered testimony from an

officer of the Canton Police Department. According to the proffer, officers were dispatched to

Graham Hospital. Upon their arrival to the emergency room, officers found defendant in

handcuffs, and he was being held by hospital employees. Pratt was a security officer at Graham

Hospital. Larson was a registered nurse there. Defendant had been waiting at the hospital for a

drug test. As defendant started to leave, he was stopped. Defendant grabbed a wooden box and

threw it, striking “Scott Brewer” in the elbow. Defendant became more hostile. Brewer and

Larson tried to deescalate the situation by encouraging defendant to leave. Defendant, using his

right fist, struck Larson, causing Larson to bleed from his nose. Defendant attempted to strike

Larson again—“[t]hat was when Scott was struck.” We note the charges in this case allege an

aggravated battery against Pratt. There are no charges identifying “Scott Brewer” as a victim.

¶7 Defense counsel began with a proffer. Counsel stated defendant was at Graham

Hospital seeking assistance during a mental-health crisis. Defense counsel then introduced

defendant’s testimony. Defendant testified he had resided at his current address for one year and

would return to that address if released from custody. Defendant would attend court as required,

remain in touch with defense counsel, meet with the probation officer, and submit to random

drug testing. Defendant testified he had underlying health issues for which he was under a

doctor’s care and had been prescribed medications and, until he was incarcerated, he had been

taking his medications. Defendant averred he had no one who could deliver his medications to

-2- him. He further testified he had monthly appointments with a physician for his medication and

saw a psychiatrist weekly. Defendant was willing to submit to random drug testing to show he

was taking his medication.

¶8 During argument, the State began by stating defendant was released from custody

in mid-February and remained “a significant risk to the community.” The State noted, “We’ve

been through this song and dance now of the defendant’s mental health problems.” The State

argued against allowing defendant’s release for health services “because we’ve tried that.”

¶9 The circuit court considered defendant’s pretrial services investigation report

(PSI). The report showed defendant was uncooperative and refused to be interviewed. According

to the PSI, the author obtained information from a 2022 PSI. At that time, defendant resided with

his spouse. He had two biological children who resided with their mother. Defendant had no

contact with his children. His employment status was unknown. The last grade defendant

completed was seventh grade. Defendant had been diagnosed with “Depression, Anxiety, Bipolar

Disorder I, and Borderline Personality Disorder,” and he took prescribed medication. Defendant

had denied having medical issues but reported having tried all drugs except heroin. The author

further reported, in Fulton County case No. 24-OP-329, a plenary order of protection was entered

against defendant in the favor of Mandy K. Schmidt. The order of protection expires in

December 2026. As of the 2025 report, defendant scored a 7 out of 14 on the Virginia Pretrial

Risk Assessment Instrument-Revised, indicating a moderate-high risk level to reoffend. The

assessor noted, however, the assessment was not properly scored, as defendant refused to be

interviewed.

¶ 10 Defendant’s criminal record, included with the PSI, indicated defendant has a

history of violence. In 2003, defendant was convicted of “Mob Action/Force/2+ Persons,” for

-3- which he was sentenced to 30 months’ probation, which terminated as unsatisfied. In 2011,

defendant was charged with “Domestic Battery/Physical Contact” and convicted of

“Battery/Makes Physical Contact” and “Knowingly Damage Property < $300,” both

misdemeanors. In 2015, defendant was convicted of a 2014 “Aggravated Battery/Great Bodily

Harm,” for which he was sentenced to 33 months in prison. In 2017, defendant was convicted of

“Domestic Battery/Other Prior,” for which he was sentenced to 68 days in jail and 30 months’

probation. In Fulton County case No. 19-CF-10, defendant pled guilty to “Aggravated

Battery/Peace Officer” and was sentenced to 3 years’ imprisonment. As a result of this plea,

multiple 2018 charges were dismissed, including three charges of “Violate Order Protection,”

one charge of “Agg[ravated] Domestic Battery/Strangle,” and one charge of “Inter[fering with

Reporting] Domestic Violence.” The plea also resulted in the dismissal of multiple 2019 charges,

including charges of “Domestic Battery/Other Prior,” disorderly conduct, and “Violate Order of

Protection 2nd+.” In 2022, defendant was convicted of “Battery/Domestic,” and sentenced to

180 days in jail and 2 years of conditional discharge. In February 2025, defendant was convicted

of a June 2024 misdemeanor “Battery/Cause Bodily Harm,” a December 2024 misdemeanor of

“Resist/Peace Officer/Correction Emp[loyee],” and a February 2025 misdemeanor of

“Aggravated Assault/Public Property.” For those last three convictions, defendant was sentenced

to 2 years’ conditional discharge.

¶ 11 The circuit court granted the State’s petition to detain defendant. The court found

by clear and convincing evidence the proof was evident or presumption great defendant

committed a qualifying offense, defendant posed a real and present threat to the safety of any

person or persons or the community, and no condition or combination of conditions could

mitigate the threat. The court expressed the following as findings supporting the conclusion less

-4- restrictive conditions would not avoid defendant’s real and present threat:

“the nature of the allegations and the possible punishments for the

defendant, the allegations relating to injuries to medical personnel,

the Defendant’s prior criminal history as well as prior allegations

of violent offenses, and the Court[’]s knowledge of Defendant’s

mental health and substance abuse issues.”

¶ 12 On May 7, 2025, defendant filed a motion for review of his pretrial detention

under section 110-6.1(i-5) of the Code (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(i-5) (West 2024)). Defendant

alleged changes in circumstance supported pretrial release. Defendant asserted he found

appropriate housing, had medical appointments for physical and mental-health treatment, and

returned to the county jail when he was granted a furlough to seek treatment and attend his

appointments.

¶ 13 At the May 15, 2025, hearing on the motion, defense counsel proffered defendant

was at Graham Hospital at the time of the offenses due to mental-health issues. Defendant had

doctors’ appointments “coming up.” Defendant met with his behavioral psychiatrist and

psychologist weekly, and he saw Dr. Chad Lampe for his medication. When he was going to

Graham Hospital, defendant “was having psychiatric issues,” and he was seeking assistance

when the alleged incident occurred. Approximately two weeks before the hearing, defendant was

given a furlough in this matter to seek mental-health treatment and get some affairs in order from

a Wednesday to a Friday. Defendant returned early, with no issues.

¶ 14 Defendant testified he was looking for work and had filed for disability benefits.

Defendant identified an address where he would reside if released. Defendant asserted he would

abide by house-arrest restrictions. Defendant had “a borderline personality disorder, Bipolar 1

-5- [disorder], severe depression, severe anxiety, [and post-traumatic stress disorder].” He met

weekly with counselors at Graham Medical Unit. He met monthly with Dr. Lampe. Defendant

missed an appointment with his behavioral specialist to attend that hearing, and he was

concerned he would be dropped from counseling if he missed too many appointments. Defendant

was willing to submit to random drug testing and meet with the probation officer.

¶ 15 The circuit court questioned defendant regarding his medications. Defendant

stated he was receiving all of his medications at the jail, as the correctional officer delivered

them daily. The court concluded it did not see “a change in circumstances at this time to warrant

your release.” The court stated it could continue to arrange furloughs to allow defendant to

continue to meet with the behavioral therapist. The court then stated the following:

“You are receiving medications. We were aware that you

had medications. And, it seems like not taking those medications

was a significant component of what happened. And what

happened, allegedly, was not good. It put a medical personnel at

risk. It also put law enforcement when they’re called to deal with it

at risk, and it puts you at risk. I want to see you continue getting

those now.

I’m concerned that the quote ‘house arrest’ may lead to

something that we’re going to regret, and I don’t see the change in

circumstances. The furlough that you had before worked. It was

short, short and sweet. That doesn’t mean a release would have the

same desired effect at this point.

We want you to get better. I’m glad you’re on track, but I

-6- think your close supervision in these circumstances is in your

interest and in the public’s interest.”

¶ 16 On June 4, 2025, the issue of defendant’s detention was revisited. At that hearing,

defense counsel reminded the circuit court defendant, while detained, had been granted four

furloughs to attend counseling and to go to medical appointments. Counsel stated defendant

timely returned from each appointment and had no new charges. Counsel further submitted a

letter from defendant’s counselor, Michelle Locke of Graham Medical Group. According to

Locke, she had met with defendant weekly for mental-health therapy since January 9, 2025.

When defendant was told there was an extensive waiting list to be seen, he went to Locke’s

office and begged the receptionist to be seen earlier, as there “were issues that he could no longer

manage on his own.” Defendant “faithfully attended every counseling appointment,” except

those missed while he was incarcerated. Locke diagnosed defendant with post-traumatic stress

disorder and major depressive disorder. As a child, defendant suffered abuse, causing him to

develop maladaptive coping skills resulting in anger when he felt unsafe. Defendant welcomed

the opportunity jail afforded him to get clean from using various substances. Defendant

acknowledged he alone is responsible for the situation he is in and demonstrated a true desire for

change. The court ordered continued detention.

¶ 17 On June 12, 2025, defendant filed a motion for relief under Illinois Supreme

Court Rule 604(h)(2) (eff. Apr. 15, 2024). In his motion, defendant argued the circuit court erred

in finding continued detention necessary, asserting the record showed a change in circumstances.

Defendant’s argument, which followed a brief procedural history, is as follows:

“That the Defendant respectfully requests this Court

reconsider its findings in the Order for Detention and provide the

-7- Defendant relief by vacating the Order for Detention entered, for

the following reasons:

That at the hearing on June 4, 2025[,] the Defendant

provided information relating to a change in circumstance in that a

letter from the Defendant’s mental health counselor was provided

indicating the extraordinary steps the Defendant has taken to

address his mental health, that the Defendant provided testimony

that he had secured appropriate housing in Fulton County, that he

would wear [an] ankle monitor, have no contact with the alleged

victims, that when he came into custody he was suffering from

mental health issues, that since the time of his incarceration he has

been provided the appropriate medication and has his mental

health issues under control, that the Defendant has been released

numerous times since being detained, on furloughs, to attend his

mental health treatment and that he has returned on time or early

every time so far, that while out on furloughs he has committed no

crimes and abided by all orders of the court, and that he would

abide by any conditions the Court wished to impose upon him, and

because of that the Defendant showed there were less restrictive

means than his continued detention.”

¶ 18 Defendant emphasized he, at the June 4, 2025, hearing, provided a letter from his

mental-health counselor setting forth “the extraordinary steps the Defendant ha[d] taken to

address his mental health,” and he testified he found appropriate housing, would wear an ankle

-8- monitor, and would have no contact with the victims. Defendant asserted he was taking his

medication and his mental-health issues were under control. Defendant emphasized he had “been

released numerous times since being detained, on furloughs, to attend his mental health treatment

and that he [had] returned on time or early every time so far.” After a hearing on the motion, the

circuit court, on June 23, 2025, denied defendant’s motion for relief.

¶ 19 On July 16, 2025, a hearing was held on defendant’s request to be released from

custody. Defense counsel argued defendant, while incarcerated, developed a medical issue “with

his bowels” and sought a four-day furlough for a colonoscopy. Counsel further emphasized

defendant’s compliance with furloughs and defendant’s willingness to comply with conditions,

such as wearing an ankle monitor and staying on house arrest, if the circuit court would release

him. The State did not dispute defendant’s request for a furlough for medical treatment but

objected to defendant’s release. The court allowed the furlough but did not grant defendant

pretrial release.

¶ 20 This appeal followed.

¶ 21 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 22 Defendant did not file a memorandum in support of his appeal but relies on the

argument in his motion for relief. While this action is authorized by Rule 604(h)(7), the rule also

requires “the appellant’s arguments must contain sufficient detail to enable meaningful appellate

review, including the contentions of the appellant and the reasons therefore and citations of the

record and any relevant authorities.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(h)(7) (eff. Apr. 15, 2024). Defendant’s

motion for relief does not comply with Rule 604(h)(7), meaning this court may find his claim

forfeited. See People v. Post, 2025 IL App (4th) 250598, ¶ 22. Because defendant’s motion for

relief contains “some basic facts” and uses statutory language and it preceded our Post decision,

-9- in which this court stressed the importance of compliance with Rule 604(h)(7)’s requirements in

an appeal from a section 110-6.1(i-5) ruling (see id. ¶¶ 1, 23), we will address the merits of his

claim.

¶ 23 After a defendant has been detained under the dangerousness standard of section

110-6.1(a), (e) of the Code (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a), (e) (West 2024)), “[a]t each subsequent

appearance of the defendant before the court, the judge must find that continued detention is

necessary to avoid a real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the

community, based on the specific articulable facts of the case.” Id. § 110-6.1(i-5). Before

changing a detention order under section 110-6.1(i-5), a circuit court must conclude a change in

circumstances occurred. Post, 2025 IL App (4th) 250598, ¶ 26. We review a circuit court’s

decision on the issue of continued detention under section 110-6.1(i-5) for an abuse of discretion

and will find an abuse of discretion only when we find the decision is fanciful, unreasonable, or

arbitrary or we conclude no reasonable person would agree with the circuit court’s position. Id.

¶ 29. We note defendant, in his motion for relief, did not challenge the initial detention order.

¶ 24 The circuit court did not abuse its discretion in finding the continued detention of

defendant was necessary to avoid a real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons

or the community. Defendant presented no new information to demonstrate a change in

circumstances sufficient to justify altering the pretrial-detention order. At the initial detention

hearing, the evidence proffered showed defendant had a history of mental illness and a criminal

history containing many violent offenses, including multiple domestic-violence charges. While

the letter from his counselor shows defendant was making strides in his treatment, the letter also

reveals the depth of defendant’s struggles with mental illness and his maladaptive coping skills

of resorting to anger when he felt unsafe. The letter also shows defendant had begun counseling

- 10 - with Locke approximately three months before the charged offenses occurred. It is reasonable for

the court to conclude in such circumstances defendant’s timely return from furloughs for medical

treatment, his mental-health counseling, and his assurances he would comply with conditions

were not enough to remove the real and substantial threat defendant’s release posed to the

community.

¶ 25 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 26 We affirm the circuit court’s judgment.

¶ 27 Affirmed.

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