People v. Philpot

296 N.W.2d 229, 98 Mich. App. 257, 1980 Mich. App. LEXIS 2742

• Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
• Decided: June 16, 1980
• Docket: Docket 44334
• Status: Published

Opinions

Bronson, J.

The pertinent facts are well stated in Judge Riley’s separate opinion, and we are in agreement with the majority of what is said there. We are also in agreement with the position that the verdicts in this case are inexplicably inconsistent. We differ, however, with the apparent conclusion that there is no appropriate remedy for this situation.

The concurring/dissenting opinion seems to assume that the only way in which the inconsistency could be remedied would be to vacate the "but mentally ill” portion of defendant’s felony-firearm conviction. This option is declined, because it is perceived that no benefit would result to the defendant from the premature termination of the treatment mandated by the guilty but mentally ill statute. We believe that the defendant could benefit from an extension of the treatment to cover the entire period of his incarceration, and hold that the proper remedy in this case is to add on the "but mentally ill” language to his assault conviction.

Although this requires interference with the jury’s verdict, such "interference” takes place in every case involving inconsistent verdicts. The problem is that the jury has returned verdicts containing a legal inconsistency, so that some interference is necessary to set matters straight. The extent of the interference is governed in most cases by well-established precepts of criminal law so that, for example, where the inconsistency is between verdicts of guilty and not guilty, the reviewing court must side with the jury’s acquittal, and cannot impose a conviction where the jury failed to do so. See People v McCurtis, 84 Mich App 460; 269 NW2d 641 (1975).

Clearly there are differences between the verdicts of guilty and guilty but mentally ill.¹ In the latter, evaluation and treatment are mandated while this is not true in the former. MCL 768.36; MSA 28.1059. Furthermore, the purpose of the guilty but mentally ill verdict should require the reviewing court to side with the jury’s finding of mental illness. The guilty but mentally ill statute evinces a legislative intent to provide help to those who have committed a criminal offense while suffering from mental illness even when that mental illness cannot be said to have totally relieved the defendant from all criminal responsibility. In this manner, the statute furthers the announced constitutional and legislative concern for fostering care for the mentally handicapped. See Const 1963, art 8, § 8, MCL 330.1116; MSA 14.800(116).

The jury found the defendant was mentally ill on one offense, but made no similar finding as to the other offense when there was no rational basis for such an inconsistency. Accordingly, we remand to the trial court for entry of a verdict of guilty but mentally ill on the assault charge, with leave to the prosecution, should it be persuaded that justice would be better served and on notification to the trial court before resentencing, to seek a new trial on the assault charge.² The verdict of guilty but mentally ill on the felony-firearm charge is affirmed._

Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded.

M. J. Kelly, P.J., concurred.

1 It is interesting to note that in this case the prosecution is arguing that there are no differences between these verdicts. This contention is more often raised by defendants who claim the verdict holds out the mere illusion of meaningful evaluation and treatment. See People v Ramsey, 89 Mich App 468, 472-473; 280 NW2d 565 (1979), lv den 407 Mich 861 (1979), People v McLeod, 77 Mich App 327; 258 NW2d 214 (1977), aff’d 407 Mich 632 (1980).

2 We disagree with Judge Riley’s position that this holding amounts to a substitution of our judgment of what is best for the defendant for the judgment of the jury. The jury found defendant guilty but mentally ill on one charge but inexplicably omitted the finding of mental illness on the other. Faced with such an inconsistency, we must side with one or the other of the jury’s apparent findings, and we believe that sound policy dictates siding with the finding of mental illness. Accordingly, rather than substituting our judgment for that of the jury, we are merely giving the judgment of the jury its proper scope.