People v. Petty

2020 IL App (3d) 180011-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: January 8, 2020
• Docket: 3-18-0011
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

2020 IL App (3d) 180011-U

Order filed January 8, 2020 ____________________________________________________________________________

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

THIRD DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ILLINOIS, ) of the 10th Judicial Circuit, ) Stark County, Illinois. Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) Appeal No. 3-18-0011 v. ) Circuit No. 16-CF-5 ) SCOTT A. PETTY, ) The Honorable ) Thomas A. Keith, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding. ____________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE McDADE delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Lytton concurred in the judgment. Justice Schmidt dissented. ____________________________________________________________________________

ORDER

¶1 Held: The State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the presence of amphetamine and benzodiazepine in Defendant’s urine results from the unlawful consumption of methamphetamine.

¶2 The State charged Scott A. Petty with, inter alia, one count of aggravated driving a

vehicle while under the influence of methamphetamine, in violation of 625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(6)

(2015). Following a stipulated bench trial, the trial court found Petty guilty of the offense

charged and sentenced him to nine years in prison. Petty now appeals, arguing: (1) the trial court erred in failing to suppress the State’s evidence; (2) the State’s evidence was insufficient to

sustain his conviction’ and (3) section 5/11-501(a) is unconstitutional. We reverse and vacate

Petty’s conviction.

¶3 FACTS

¶4 On November 9, 2015, Stark County Sheriff's Deputy Dustin Schaill responded to a

reported car crash on Illinois Route 40 at approximately 630 feet north of 800 N. Bradford, Penn

Township. Schaill arrived on site at about 5:13 P.M. He observed a Bradford Rescue unit

removing Petty from his van in the southbound lane facing east. The front of Petty's van was

heavily damaged and seemed to have collided with another car. Petty did not appear to be

coherent. Officer Todd Marquez of the Bradford Police Department also responded to the crash

and assisted with traffic control.

¶5 The other car was in the northbound ditch and had significant damage from what

appeared to be a frontal collision. The Bradford Rescue unit removed the driver, Gina Masters,

from the crash site and air-lifted her to OSF/Saint Francis Medical Center (Saint Francis) in

Peoria. Petty was transported via ambulance to the same location. While Schaill was in transit, he

learned that Masters had died en route to Saint Francis. At the crash site, Officer Marquez

observed drug paraphernalia and a substance he believed to be cannabis inside Petty's van.

Marquez informed Schaill of his observations and collected the items.

¶6 Petty arrived at Saint Francis at about 6:43 P.M. At about 6:50 P.M., Dr. Jennifer E.

Schmidt ordered that a urine sample be drawn from Petty. After Deputy Schaill arrived at Saint

Francis, he placed Petty under arrest for driving under the influence and read him the motorist’s

implied consent warning at about 9:02 P.M., and at about 9:25 P.M. independently signed a

2 separate request for a urine draw. At the time, Petty was semi-conscious, severely injured and

incoherent. A single urine sample was collected from Petty at 4:00 A.M. the following morning.

¶7 The State filed four criminal charges against Petty on March 10, 2016. Count 1 alleged a

Class 2 felony offense in violation of 625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(6) (2015). It stated that Petty, “while

under the influence of methamphetamine as listed in the Methamphetamine Control and

Community Protection Act, drove [his van], causing [it] to strike the vehicle driven by Gina M.

Masters, thereby causing the death of Gina M. Masters, and [Petty’s] driving in violation of

Section 11-501(a)(6) was a proximate cause of the death of Gina M. Masters ***.”

¶8 Petty filled two separate motions to suppress the urine draw and test results. In the first

motion, he alleged that the urine draw was performed without first obtaining his consent.

Specifically, he argued that the urine draw was not part of his medical treatment and was

conducted without probable cause. The trial court denied the motion, ruling that the Illinois

implied consent statute, 625 ILCS 5/11-501.1 (2015), creates an exception to the warrant

requirement of the Fourth Amendment.

¶9 In his second motion, Petty argued that the trial court should suppress all the findings of

the urine analysis obtained from his sample. He contended that, although the test was performed

for medical use only and not for legal purposes, the medical facility turned over the results

without his consent and without a warrant. The trial court denied Petty’s second motion on

September 13, 2017, ruling that the hospital records would come in under the business records

exception to the hearsay rule.

¶ 10 On October 6, 2017, Petty executed a "waiver of jury and a plea of not guilty" form. A

week later, the parties tendered following facts in stipulation: that Schaill and Marquez would

testify to their observations at the crash site and on the date of the accident; that Medical

3 Examiner J. Scott Denton would testify that he performed an examination of Masters on

November 11, 2015 and determined that she died "from multiple blunt injuries due to a motor

vehicle collision ***;" that Dr. Schmidt would testify that she ordered an analysis of Petty's urine

from which amphetamine and benzodiazepines were detected; and that Forensic Scientist Joni C.

Little would testify that she analyzed 0.2 grams of the white powder found in Petty's car and

detected the presence of methamphetamine. Petty and counsel for the parties signed the written

stipulation form.

¶ 11 In the stipulations, Petty reserved the right to raise "evidentiary objections to the

admissibility of [the] test results as previously argued in [his] pretrial motions." He stated that he

would present testimony from Ronald Henson regarding "the weight to be given to the test

results."

¶ 12 The parties then proceeded to a stipulated bench trial. At the bench trial, Petty stipulated

to the facts previously tendered. Counsel for the defense explained that Petty was stipulating

only that the evidence would be as tendered. Ronald Henson never testified, and no additional

testimony was presented.

¶ 13 The trial court ruled as followed:

"I find that there is a factual basis to support a finding of

beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of Count

One as charged for the aggravated driving of a vehicle under the

influence. His stipulation is accepted, and it is ordered and directed

that the defendant is found guilty of Count one of the indictment."

4 ¶ 14 The court subsequently sentenced Petty to nine years in prison. On November 14, 2017,

Petty timely filed a motion for a new trial arguing, inter alia, that the evidence was insufficient

to sustain his conviction. The trial court denied his motion.

¶ 15 This appeal now follows.

¶ 16 ANALYSIS

¶ 17 On appeal, Petty contends that the State failed to show that he consumed

methamphetamine as defined in the Methamphetamine Control and Community Protection Act.

The parties only stipulated to the presence of two substances in his urine: amphetamine and

benzodiazepine. Petty argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the charge because the

State presented no evidence that those compounds resulted from his consumption of

methamphetamine. We agree with Petty and vacate his conviction.

¶ 18 In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, the relevant question is

whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of

fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. People v.

Holliday, 2019 IL App (3d) 160315, ¶ 10. A conviction will be reversed where the evidence is

so unreasonable, improbable, or unsatisfactory that there remains a reasonable doubt of the

defendant's guilt. Id. In reviewing the evidence presented, this Court should "allow all reasonable

inferences from that evidence to be drawn in favor of the [State].” People v. Martin, 2011 IL

109102, ¶ 15. However, this Court "should not make random speculation in favor of the [State].”

People v. Dye, 2015 IL App (4th) 130799, ¶ 12. Where review of the evidence turns on a

"statutory interpretation, our review is de novo." Martin, 2011 IL 109102, ¶ 20.

¶ 19 Petty was charged with the offense of aggravated driving of a vehicle while under the

influence of methamphetamine, in violation of subsection 5/11–501(a)(6) of the Vehicle Code.

5 Subsection (a)(6) provides: "A person shall not drive or be in actual physical control of any

vehicle within this State while *** there is any amount of a drug, substance, or compound in the

person’s breath, blood, or urine resulting from the unlawful use or consumption of ***

methamphetamine as listed in the Methamphetamine Control and Community Protection Act

***." 625 ILCS 5/11-501(a) (6) (2015).

¶ 20 The State first contends that "methamphetamine is an amphetamine, hence the name

'methamphetamine.'" The State thus argues that a reasonable inference could be drawn that the

amphetamine and benzodiazepine found in Petty's blood were salts, optical isomers, salts of an

optical isomer, or analog thereof, from "which the methamphetamine had been metabolized." We

disagree.

¶ 21 In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court "should draw only reasonable

inferences in favor of the [State]; we should not make random speculations in favor of the

prosecution.” Dye, 2015 IL App (4th) 130799, ¶ 12. Whether the metabolization of

methamphetamine into amphetamine, benzodiazepine, or both has occurred entails a level of

chemical knowledge not ordinarily possessed by the average person. Thus, a determination by

the trier-of-fact that the presence of either chemical compound results from the consumption of

methamphetamine requires competent testimony from a person having such specialized

knowledge. To sustain Petty’s conviction absent such testimony would be tantamount to making

a random speculation regarding the metabolization of methamphetamine in favor of the State.

¶ 22 The State's contention also fails because the applicable statute specifically precludes it.

The Methamphetamine Control and Community Protection Act defines methamphetamine as

"the chemical methamphetamine *** or any salt, optical isomer, salt of optical isomer, or analog

thereof, with the exception of *** any other scheduled substance with a separate listing under

6 the Illinois Controlled Substances Act." 625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(6) (2015) (emphasis added).

Amphetamine is listed as a controlled substance under subsection 570/206 (d)(1) of the

Controlled Substances Act, whereas methamphetamine and "its salts, isomers, and salts of its

isomers" are separately listed under subsection 570/206(d)(2) of that act. See 720 ILCS

570/206(d)(1) (2015); 720 ILCS 570/206(d)(2) (2015). So even if one could appropriately infer

without competent testimony that amphetamine is a "salt" or "isomer" of methamphetamine

simply because of its name, the plain language of both the Illinois Controlled Substances Act and

the Methamphetamine Control and Community Protection Act excludes amphetamine as a

predicate for a subsection 11–501(a)(6) violation based on consuming methamphetamine. 625

ILCS 5/11-501(a)(6).

¶ 23 Finally, the State contends that Petty failed to argue in the trial court, that the presence of

amphetamine and benzodiazepine is insufficient to establish consumption of methamphetamine

and has, therefore, "forfeited the argument on appeal.” The State also contends that this Court

can sustain the decision of the trial court on any grounds supported in the record regardless of

whether the trial court relied on the grounds and regardless of whether the trial court's reasoning

was correct. The State seems to conclude from these contentions that the presence of

methamphetamine in a white powder collected from Petty’s van supports an inference that he

unlawfully consumed methamphetamine. We again disagree.

¶ 24 First, this Court has previously found that a "challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence

is not subject to the waiver rule and can be raised by a defendant for the first time on direct

appeal, even if not properly preserved ***." People v. Muhammad, 398 Ill. App. 3d 1013, 1018

(2010). Thus, Petty’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal is not limited to his

theory before the trial court. And second, as previously noted, our duty is to draw reasonable

7 inferences from the evidence, not to “make random speculations in favor of the [State].” Dye,

2015 IL App (4th) 130799, ¶ 12. There is nothing in the stipulated facts showing that Petty

consumed methamphetamine, regardless of whether the evidence showed that Officer Marquez

collected methamphetamine from his car.

¶ 25 CONCLUSION

¶ 26 The judgment of the circuit court of Stark County is vacated and the conviction of Scott

A. Petty’s conviction for aggravated driving while under the influence of methamphetamine is

vacated.

¶ 27 As a result of our ruling, we need not address Petty’s arguments regarding (1) the

constitutionality of section 5/11-501(a), and (2) the suppression of the evidence.

¶ 28 Conviction vacated.

¶ 29 JUSTICE SCHMIDT, dissenting:

¶ 29 I respectfully dissent. In my opinion, the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable

to the State, supports the trial court’s finding that defendant violated subsection 11-501(a)(6) of

the Vehicle Code.

¶ 30 The majority acknowledges that when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we must

ask whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond

a reasonable doubt. Holliday, 2019 IL App (3d) 160315, ¶ 10. The majority continues that the

reviewing court will not reverse unless the evidence is so improbable so as to create a reasonable

doubt of defendant’s guilt. Id. But then the majority does just that.

¶ 31 The trier of fact need not be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt as to each link in the chain

of circumstances but rather be satisfied that all evidence, taken together, establishes defendant’s

guilt. People v. Sutherland, 223 Ill. 2d 187, 242 (2006). Defendant struck a car and killed the

8 driver. When the paramedics removed defendant from his vehicle, he was incoherent. Officers

found drug paraphernalia and a white powdery substance in his car. A forensic scientist identified

this substance as methamphetamine. Defendant’s urinalysis returned a positive result for

benzodiazepines and amphetamine. The subsection under which the State charged defendant

criminalizes operating a motor vehicle when a defendant has any amount of a “drug, substance, or

compound” in his “breath, blood, or urine resulting from the unlawful use or consumption of ***

a controlled substance listed in the Illinois Controlled Substances Act, *** or methamphetamine.”

625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(6) (2014). The State put forth a common sense argument:

methamphetamine is an amphetamine. See Methamphetamine, THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON

DRUG ABUSE (May 2019), https://www.drugabuse.gov/publications/drugfacts/methamphetamine.

The consumption of methamphetamine metabolizes down into amphetamine. See Robert West et

al., Differentiating Medicinal from Illicit Use in Positive Methamphetamine Results in a Pain

Population, 37(2) J. OF ANALYTICAL TOXICOLOGY 83, 85 (2013) (“[Methamphetamine] is

metabolized by hepatic microsomal enzymes to amphetamine.”). Defendant had

methamphetamine in his vehicle and paraphernalia to consume it. He tested positive for

amphetamines. Therefore, one can make a reasonable inference that defendant was under the

influence of methamphetamine at the time of the collision.

¶ 32 The majority also contends the State failed to satisfy the statutory requirements to sustain

a conviction under subsection 11-501(a)(6) of the Vehicle Code. Subsection 501(a)(6) describes

not only consumption of methamphetamine but also any drug listed in the Illinois Controlled

Substances Act. Referring to the Illinois Controlled Substances Act, one can see that both

amphetamine and methamphetamine are included. 720 ILCS 570/206(d)(1), (2) (West 2014).

Therefore, the State proved defendant was in violation of the charging statute.