COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2017COA77
Court of Appeals No. 14CA1175 Arapahoe County District Court No. 12CR2748 Honorable Gerald J. Rafferty, Judge Honorable Christopher C. Cross, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Rogelia Perez-Rodriguez,
Defendant-Appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division V Opinion by JUDGE BOORAS Román and Fox, JJ., concur
Announced June 1, 2017
Cynthia H. Coffman, Attorney General, Kevin E. McReynolds, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Douglas K. Wilson, Colorado State Public Defender, Jon W. Grevillius, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant ¶1 Rogelia Perez-Rodriguez, defendant, appeals the judgment of
conviction and sentence entered on jury verdicts finding him guilty
on two counts each of aggravated incest, sexual assault on a child
by one in a position of trust as a pattern of conduct, and sexual
assault with the actor ten years older than the victim. We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 Defendant started dating A.S. and soon after moved in with
her. A.S. had several children from a previous marriage and had
three children with defendant during their relationship. J.H-S. was
one of A.S.’s children from a previous marriage and was around
eleven years old when defendant started dating A.S.
¶3 Although defendant and A.S. did not have a wedding ceremony
and were never formally married, they publicly referred to each
other as husband and wife. And while defendant never formally
adopted J.H-S., they publicly referred to each other as father and
daughter.
¶4 In the summer of 2012, when J.H-S. was fifteen years old,
defendant forced her to have sexual intercourse with him on two
separate occasions, one to two weeks apart. Defendant
impregnated J.H-S., and she delivered the baby approximately nine
1 months after the incidents. DNA testing confirmed that defendant
was the baby’s biological father.
¶5 After discovering she was pregnant, J.H-S. told her mother
what had happened, and police started an investigation. During
the investigation, a detective — through an interpreter —
questioned defendant. Defendant initially denied but then admitted
to having had sexual intercourse with J.H-S.
¶6 A jury convicted defendant on all counts, and the trial court
sentenced him to a life sentence with parole eligibility after twelve
years.
II. Issues
¶7 Defendant first contends that the aggravated incest statute is
unconstitutionally vague as applied. He next contends that the
aggravated incest instruction incorrectly instructed the jury that he
did not need to know that J.H-S. was his stepdaughter. Defendant
then alleges that the prosecution misstated the law on common law
marriage during rebuttal closing argument, thereby committing
reversible misconduct. Finally, defendant asserts that his
confession was involuntary because the interrogating officers made
implied promises of leniency and compassion, and therefore the
2 court erred in admitting the taped confession into evidence. We
examine each contention in turn.
III. Aggravated Incest Statute
¶8 Defendant contends that the aggravated incest statute is
unconstitutionally vague as applied to stepchildren of common law
marriages because common law marriage itself turns on a
multitude of factors and is not sufficiently defined by statute.
Defendant asserts, therefore, that when a couple is not formally
married, the statute fails to provide a standard by which the
accused may know whether the victim is his or her stepchild. We
do not agree.
A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
¶9 We review de novo as-applied constitutional challenges to
statutes. People v. Trujillo, 2015 COA 22, ¶ 15. A statute may be
unconstitutional on its face or as applied. People v. Stotz, 2016
COA 16, ¶ 27. A statute is unconstitutional as applied if it does
not, with sufficient clarity, prohibit the conduct against which it is
enforced. Id.; see also Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. ___, ___,
135 S. Ct. 2551, 2556 (2015). A defendant has the burden of
3 showing beyond a reasonable doubt that the statute is
unconstitutional as applied to him or her. Trujillo, ¶ 15.
¶ 10 When determining whether a statute is vague, we apply
common principles of statutory interpretation. Stotz, ¶ 28. First,
we look to the language of the statute itself and interpret statutory
terms in accordance with their commonly accepted meanings. Id.
If the plain language is unclear or ambiguous, we may look beyond
the words of the statute to legislative history or rules of statutory
construction. Id. Otherwise, we apply the statute as written. Id.
¶ 11 Defendant preserved this argument by asserting it at trial.
The trial court ruled that a common law marriage is the same as
any other type of marriage for purposes of the incest statute — the
only difference being how a common law marriage is proved.
B. Analysis
¶ 12 Colorado’s aggravated incest statute says:
(1) A person commits aggravated incest when he or she knowingly:
(a) Marries his or her natural child or inflicts sexual penetration or sexual intrusion on or subjects to sexual contact, as defined in section 18-3-401[, C.R.S. 2016], his or her natural child, stepchild, or child by adoption, but this paragraph (a) shall not apply when the
4 person is legally married to the stepchild or child by adoption. For the purpose of this paragraph (a) only, “child” means a person under twenty-one years of age.
§ 18-6-302, C.R.S. 2016 (emphasis added).
¶ 13 The term “stepchild” is not defined by the statute, but is
typically defined as a child of one’s wife or husband by a former
marriage or relationship. See Webster’s Third New International
Dictionary 2237 (2002). Whether a person is a stepchild depends,
therefore, on whether or not the alleged stepparent and the child’s
biological parent are husband and wife.
¶ 14 “A common law marriage is established by the mutual consent
or agreement of the parties to be husband and wife, followed by a
mutual and open assumption of a marital relationship.” People v.
Lucero, 747 P.2d 660, 663 (Colo. 1987). The Lucero court
recognized that
in many cases express agreements will not exist. The parties’ understanding may be only tacitly expressed, and the difficulty of proof is readily apparent. We have recognized that ‘the agreement need not have been in words,’ and the issue then becomes what sort of evidence is sufficient to prove the agreement. We have stated that if the agreement is denied or cannot be shown, its existence may be inferred from evidence of cohabitation and general
5 repute. In such cases, the conduct of the parties provides the truly reliable evidence of the nature of their understanding or agreement.
Id. at 664 (footnote and citations omitted).
¶ 15 Defendant contends that, because common law marriage relies
on evidence of cohabitation and general repute, the aggravated
incest statute is too vague to provide an accused with a standard by
which he or she could know that a person is his or her stepchild or
any standard by which law enforcement can differentiate illegal
conduct from legal conduct.
¶ 16 But a lack of clearly defined terms is not fatal to a statute’s
constitutionality. See Posters ‘N’ Things, Ltd. v. United States, 511
U.S. 513, 525-26 (1994) (concluding that statute defining drug
paraphernalia by using specified, objective criteria for assessing
whether an item qualifies and containing a scienter requirement
was not unconstitutionally vague); Tiplick v. State, 43 N.E.3d 1259
(Ind. 2015) (holding drug statute constitutional because, despite
having multiple undefined terms, the statute contained a scienter
requirement and numerous factors to help determine the accused’s
intent); State v. Munson, 714 S.W.2d 515, 520 (Mo. 1986)
6 (upholding drug paraphernalia statute even though it relied on
nonexclusive enumerated factors).
¶ 17 Similarly, a statute is not rendered vague when the existence
of a statutory element is determined by balancing factors that are
not included in the statute. See State v. Campbell, 756 N.W.2d 263,
270-72 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008) (upholding breach of fiduciary
obligation where statute was admittedly broad and a factual
determination based on numerous factors was necessary, noting
that “[a]lthough the determination requires a judgment call, it is not
so inherently elusive that it is not reasonably ascertainable or that
it cannot be established beyond a reasonable doubt”). Common law
marriage may be shown through agreement or consent in
combination with a variety of factors, but the two most clearly
recognized are cohabitation and “a general understanding or
reputation among persons in the community in which the couple
lives that the parties hold themselves out as husband and wife.”
Lucero, 747 P.2d at 665. Furthermore,
Specific behavior that may be considered includes maintenance of joint banking and credit accounts; purchase and joint ownership of property; the use of the man’s surname by the woman; the use of the man’s surname by
7 children born to the parties; and the filing of joint tax returns. However, there is no single form that any such evidence must take. Rather, any form of evidence that openly manifests the intention of the parties that their relationship is that of husband and wife will provide the requisite proof from which the existence of their mutual understanding can be inferred.
Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
¶ 18 There is, therefore, sufficient guidance through statute, case
law, and the plain meaning of “stepchild” so that a person in a
common law marriage has sufficient notice as to the prohibited
conduct of aggravated incest.
¶ 19 Defendant cites State v. Johnson, 695 N.W.2d 165, 178-80
(Neb. 2005) (Gerrard, J., dissenting),1 as an example of when an
aggravated incest statute was unconstitutionally vague. Johnson is
not persuasive because — in addition to being a dissenting opinion
— in that case, the term “minor” was defined differently throughout
Nebraska statutes, and there was no clear or definite way for the
defendant to determine what age would be applied to the aggravated
1Although the majority of justices agreed with the dissent, Nebraska rules required more than a majority agreement to declare a statute unconstitutionally vague. State v. Johnson, 695 N.W.2d 165, 173 (Neb. 2005).
8 incest statute. Id. Colorado cases set forth a test to be routinely
applied in determining whether a common law marriage exists.
This eliminates the danger of arbitrary application of inconsistent
definitions as was the case in Johnson.
¶ 20 We therefore conclude that Colorado’s aggravated incest
statute is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to those in a
common law marriage.
IV. Jury Instruction
¶ 21 Defendant next contends that the trial court’s elemental
instruction on aggravated incest failed to properly instruct the jury
on the scope of the mens rea required to sustain a conviction. We
perceive no error.
A. Standard of Review and Preservation
¶ 22 Defendant concedes that he did not raise any objection to the
elemental jury instruction, and he urges that it should be reviewed
for plain error. However, the People contend that because defense
counsel stated, “No, sir” when the trial court asked if there were any
further objections to Instructions 1 through 24, waiver or invited
error should entirely preclude review.
9 ¶ 23 A waiver is “an intentional relinquishment of a known right or
privilege.” Moore v. People, 2014 CO 8, ¶ 9 (quoting People v. Curtis,
681 P.2d 504, 514 (Colo. 1984)). A closely related concept, invited
error, is based on the principle that “a party may not complain on
appeal of an error that he has invited or injected into the case; he
must abide by the consequences of his acts.” People v. Foster, 2013
COA 85, ¶ 25 (quoting Horton v. Suthers, 43 P.3d 611, 618 (Colo.
2002)).
¶ 24 Generally, defense counsel’s failure to make a
contemporaneous objection results in review under the plain error
standard. See People v. Miller, 113 P.3d 743, 749 (Colo. 2005).
Although sometimes referred to as a “waiver,” the complete failure
to object is more precisely a “forfeiture” of rights. See United States
v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733-34 (1993) (“Waiver is different from
forfeiture. Whereas forfeiture is the failure to make the timely
assertion of a right, waiver is the ‘intentional relinquishment or
abandonment of a known right.’” (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304
U.S. 458, 464 (1938))).
¶ 25 In contrast, invited error typically requires more than the
simple failure to object. People v. Gross, 2012 CO 60M, ¶ 9 (where
10 error results from counsel’s oversight, appeal is not precluded by
the invited error doctrine); People v. Garcia, 1 P.3d 214, 219 (Colo.
App. 1999) (merely failing to object to an instruction does not
constitute “invited error”), aff’d, 28 P.3d 340 (Colo. 2001). Invited
error is sometimes referred to as a strategic error. But this does not
mean that the “strategy” must be competent or well planned. It
simply means that the action that results in invited error must be
deliberate rather than inadvertent. See Gross, ¶ 9. Thus, whether
analyzed as waiver or invited error, there must be intentional or
deliberate action in order to preclude plain error review.
¶ 26 In some cases, whether an attorney’s action is deliberate
rather than inadvertent may be adequately reflected by the record.
In other cases, the record may not be clear. See id. at ¶ 11 (invited
error where defense counsel argued affirmatively for an instruction
despite opposition by the prosecution). The question here then is
whether the record reflects a deliberate act or an inadvertent act.
¶ 27 To determine whether the statement “no objection” or even
silence should be characterized as either deliberate or inadvertent,
it is necessary to consider the objection or silence in the context of
its circumstances. See United States v. Anderson, 604 F.3d 997,
11 1001 (7th Cir. 2010) (examining a party’s state of mind to
distinguish forfeiture from waiver). For example, in Stackhouse v.
People, 2015 CO 48, the supreme court viewed counsel’s silence
after the trial court explained its reasoning for closing the
courtroom to the public as a waiver. Id. at ¶ 3. Similarly, in other
cases relied upon by defendant the circumstances established more
than just a response to a general inquiry:
People v. Riley, 2016 COA 76, ¶ 15 (the defendant’s
request for a lesser nonincluded instruction at trial
invited the potential error that he would be convicted of
that offense on insufficient evidence).
People v. Rediger, 2015 COA 26, ¶ 53 (finding waiver
where at conclusion of jury instruction conference,
counsel stated that “[d]efense is satisfied [with the
instructions]”) (cert. granted Feb. 16, 2016).2
Foster, ¶¶ 29, 30 (finding invited error where defense
counsel agreed with the prosecutor’s statement that
2Counsel’s statement is similar to the statement “I am content,” which was construed as an explicit withdrawal of counsel’s previously proffered instruction in United States v. Hansen, 434 F.3d 92, 101 (1st Cir. 2006).
12 defendant’s prior conviction acted as a sentence
enhancer that should be decided by the court, and then
expressly asked the court, rather than the jury, to make
that finding).
People v. Gregor, 26 P.3d 530, 533 (Colo. App. 2000) (the
defendant’s affirmative proposal with respect to one
instruction and acquiescence in two others invited error).
¶ 28 Assuming that the statement “no objection” was the response
to an inquiry about specific language or a specific instruction, the
circumstances might support deliberate conduct. But here, the
court’s inquiry grouped all twenty-four instructions. It is not clear
whether defense counsel’s blanket statement indicating “no
objection” reflected deliberate agreement with all the instructions or
was an inadvertent failure to object to the error defendant now
claims. Thus, under the circumstances of this case, the record
does not establish deliberate conduct sufficient to support invited
error or waiver. Accordingly we apply the plain error standard of
review.
13 B. Analysis
¶ 29 The trial court gave the following instruction regarding
aggravated incest:
The elements of the crime of Aggravated Incest as applied to Counts 1 & 2 are:
1. That Mr. Perez-Rodriguez, 2. in the State of Colorado, at or about the date and place charged, 3. knowingly, 4. subjected [J.H-S.] to sexual penetration or sexual intrusion, and 5. [J.H-S.] was his stepchild, and 6. [J.H-S.] was under twenty one years of age.
¶ 30 Defendant contends that because the court included “and” at
the end of elements four and five, the “knowingly” mens rea applied
only to his act of subjecting J.H-S. to sexual penetration or sexual
intrusion, and not to whether he knew she was his stepchild.
¶ 31 Regardless of whether the instruction was erroneous, the
evidence that defendant knew J.H-S. was his stepdaughter was
overwhelming.
Defendant referred to J.H-S. as his stepdaughter during
his interview with police, even going so far as to
distinguish the fact that he was not her biological father,
but her stepfather.
14 Defendant referred to A.S., J.H-S.’s mother, as his wife
numerous times throughout the interview.
A.S. referred to defendant as her husband, and she
testified that defendant introduced all of her children,
including J.H-S., as his own.
J.H-S. also testified that she and defendant referred to
each other as father and daughter.
¶ 32 Here, the jury found that a marital relationship legally existed,
and there was no evidence that defendant did not understand a
parent-stepchild relationship existed between him and J.H-S.
Failure to properly instruct the jury is not plain error if the subject
of the error is not contested or if evidence of the defendant’s guilt is
overwhelming. Auman v. People, 109 P.3d 647, 665 (Colo. 2005).
¶ 33 We conclude, therefore, that even if the trial court erred in
giving the elemental instruction, such error was not plain error
because the evidence overwhelmingly showed that defendant knew
J.H-S. was his stepdaughter at the time of the incidents.
15 V. Prosecutorial Misconduct
¶ 34 Defendant asserts that the prosecutor committed reversible
misconduct in rebuttal closing by misstating the law on common
law marriage. We do not agree.
¶ 35 Because defendant did not object to the prosecutor’s
statements, we review only for plain error. Domingo-Gomez v.
People, 125 P.3d 1043, 1053 (Colo. 2005).
¶ 36 “Prosecutorial misconduct during closing arguments rarely
constitutes plain error that requires reversal.” People v. Nardine,
2016 COA 85, ¶ 63. “To warrant reversal, the misconduct must be
obvious and substantial and so undermine the fundamental
fairness of the trial as to cast serious doubt on the reliability of the
judgment of conviction.” Id. “Only prosecutorial misconduct which
is ‘flagrantly, glaringly, or tremendously improper’ warrants
reversal.” Id. (quoting Domingo-Gomez, 125 P.3d at 1053).
¶ 37 In reviewing a claim of prosecutorial misconduct we engage in
a two-step analysis. Wend v. People, 235 P.3d 1089, 1096 (Colo.
2010). First we determine whether the prosecutor’s conduct was
improper based on the totality of the circumstances, and second,
16 we determine whether such actions warrant reversal under the
applicable standard, in this case, plain error. Id.
¶ 38 Defendant’s primary defense at trial was that no common law
marriage existed between him and J.H-S.’s mother. The court gave
the following instruction regarding common law marriage:
In order for J.H.-S. to be [defendant’s] step-daughter, you must find beyond a reasonable doubt that a common-law marriage existed between A.S. and [defendant]. A common-law marriage is established by the mutual consent or agreement of the parties to be husband and wife, followed by a mutual and open assumption and acknowledgement of a marital relationship. Behavior that may be considered by you in determining whether there was a common-law marriage, includes but is not limited to: Cohabitation, which is holding forth to the world by the manner of daily life, by conduct, demeanor, and habits, that the man and woman have agreed to take each other in marriage and to stand in the mutual relation of husband and wife; reputation, which means the understanding among the neighbors and acquaintances, with whom the parties associate in their daily life, that they are living together as husband and wife; maintenance of joint banking and credit accounts; purchase and joint ownership of property; the use of the man’s surname by the woman; the use of the man’s surname by children born to the man and woman; and the filing of joint tax returns.
17 ¶ 39 During closing argument, defense counsel discussed several of
the factors listed in the instruction, arguing that there was no
common law marriage because there was no joint banking account,
there was no joint property, A.S. did not use defendant’s surname,
and there was no evidence of joint tax returns.
¶ 40 During rebuttal, the prosecutor stated, regarding the common
law marriage instruction, as follows:
So what do we have here? And these elements, as it says, “including but not limited to,” that means you can find one and find common law marriage, so long as that one is proven beyond a reasonable doubt. You can have more than one, and we do have more than one. You have cohabitation. You have them both saying that they are married; you have her saying she was his husband — he was her husband, and him saying she was his wife.
¶ 41 Defendant contends on appeal that the prosecutor’s statement
misstated the law by implying that one factor alone was sufficient to
prove common law marriage, when the law requires evidence of
both cohabitation and reputation. Lucero, 747 P.2d at 664 (citing
Graham v. Graham, 130 Colo. 225, 227, 274 P.2d 605, 606 (1954)).
¶ 42 Although the prosecutor’s simple reference to “cohabitation,”
viewed in isolation, may have misstated the law, when viewed in
18 context as rebuttal to defendant’s arguments, we perceive no plain
error. The court’s instruction defined cohabitation as including an
agreement to be married, and it correctly stated the requirements of
common law marriage. The rebuttal argument merely emphasized
behavior that may be used to show mutual consent or agreement to
be husband and wife and a mutual and open assumption and
acknowledgment of a marital relationship.
¶ 43 Defendant does not contend that the instruction itself
misstated the law. When the prosecutor’s statement is viewed in
relation to the entirety of closing arguments and the instructions
given, we conclude that even if error occurred, it was not obvious
and substantial and it did not so undermine the fundamental
fairness of the trial as to cast serious doubt on the reliability of the
judgment of conviction.
VI. Confession
¶ 44 Finally, defendant asserts that his confession was involuntary
and that its admission violated his state and federal due process
rights. We do not agree.
19 A. Legal Principles
¶ 45 Defendant preserved his argument by filing a motion to
suppress the confession. The trial court held an evidentiary
hearing and denied the motion.
¶ 46 “A trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress presents a
mixed question of fact and law.” People v. Cisneros, 2014 COA 49,
¶ 56. If the statements sought to be suppressed are recorded, we
independently review them to determine whether they should have
been suppressed. Id. “Because neither party contests the facts
that controlled the trial court’s determination whether to admit the
videotaped confession, we review its admission de novo.” People v.
Wickham, 53 P.3d 691, 694 (Colo. App. 2001).
¶ 47 A defendant’s statement must be voluntary in order to be
admissible. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 376-77 (1964);
Cisneros, ¶ 80. Voluntariness is determined by the totality of the
circumstances. People v. York, 189 Colo. 16, 20, 537 P.2d 294, 296
(1975); Cisneros, ¶ 81. Threats and promises of leniency may be
considered in determining whether a statement was voluntary, but
they are not conclusive. Wickham, 53 P.3d at 695. “For such
threats and promises to render a confession involuntary, they must
20 have caused the defendant to confess, for example, where police
have promised leniency in exchange for a confession or have
threatened harmful consequences unless the defendant confesses.”
Id.
¶ 48 Other factors to consider include the following:
whether the defendant was in custody or was free to leave and was aware of his situation; whether Miranda warnings were given prior to any interrogation and whether the defendant understood and waived his Miranda rights; whether the defendant had the opportunity to confer with counsel or anyone else prior to the interrogation; whether the challenged statement was made during the course of an interrogation or instead was volunteered; whether any overt or implied threat or promise was directed to the defendant; the method and style employed by the interrogator in questioning the defendant and the length and place of the interrogation; and the defendant’s mental and physical condition immediately prior to and during the interrogation, as well as his educational background, employment status, and prior experience with law enforcement and the criminal justice system.
Id. (quoting People v. Gennings, 808 P.2d 839, 844 (Colo. 1991)).
B. Additional Background
¶ 49 When defendant was taken into custody he was questioned for
approximately forty minutes by a detective and a translating officer.
21 The detective advised defendant of his rights pursuant to Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), in English and Spanish, and
defendant indicated that he understood his rights and signed a
waiver form. Defendant initially denied having had any sort of
sexual intercourse with J.H-S., but after approximately fifteen more
minutes, he confessed to it.
¶ 50 During the interrogation, the detective told defendant several
times that he did not believe defendant. The detective also told
defendant
people are going to watch this interview, to include like judges and district attorneys, and they are going to have to make a decision based on whether you are being truthful or not. If you’re truthful sometimes these folks have some sort of level of compassion. But when people lie it’s very bad for you.
The detective made similar remarks several times during the
interview before defendant admitted to the intercourse.
C. Analysis
¶ 51 During the interrogation, the detective never made a specific
threat or promise.3 At times he suggested that judges or
3We may conduct an independent review of the interrogation video. See People v. Martin, 222 P.3d 331, 334 (Colo. 2010).
22 prosecutors may be more lenient on a defendant who they perceive
as being honest and who “took responsibility” for his actions. These
statements, however, do not promise any sort of leniency or
guarantee any special treatment. These facts are distinguishable
from those in cases like People v. Quintana, 198 Colo. 461, 601 P.2d
350 (1979), in which a sheriff promised the defendant that
if the defendant cooperated the sheriff would do what he could to see that the defendant was not unjustly accused of offenses he did not personally commit, although the final decision would be with the District Attorney and the court; if the defendant would talk with the sheriff and the undersheriff he might get probation since he had a clean record, and he might be released from custody that day; if he talked, the sheriff would talk to the defendant’s employer, the manager of the Forbes Trinchera Ranch, about re-hiring him; and, if the defendant waited to talk until Monday, November 27th, he would have to “face the music” with the rest of the defendants.
Id. at 463, 601 P.2d at 351 (footnotes omitted).
¶ 52 Here, the alleged promises were merely conjectures that
prosecutors or judges may show leniency, and that the detective
was giving defendant an opportunity to take responsibility for his
actions. See Gimmy v. People, 645 P.2d 262, 268-69 (Colo. 1982)
23 (upholding trial court’s finding that confession was voluntary where
officer told defendant that he would recommend revoking
defendant’s sentence but ultimately the district attorney would
decide the consequences of defendant’s confession); People v. Joyce,
878 P.2d 48, 49-50 (Colo. App. 1994) (admission was voluntary
where interrogating officer “indicated that the defendant’s level of
cooperation would be reported to the district attorney’s office,
but . . . he made no threats or promises to the defendant”). As for
the detective’s statements that he did not believe defendant, we do
not perceive such statements as threatening or coercive.
¶ 53 Although defendant was detained and could not leave, he had
been advised of his Miranda rights and signed a waiver. As shown
in the videotaped interview, the body language of the detective and
defendant did not suggest any sort of hostility or threat, and the
interrogation was only about forty minutes long. Although
defendant is not highly educated, he did not seem overwhelmed by
his circumstances, and his physical appearance and mannerisms
did not suggest any sort of mistreatment or coercion rendering his
statements involuntary.
24 ¶ 54 Based on the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that
defendant’s admission was voluntary and that the trial court did
not err in admitting it into evidence.
VII. Conclusion
¶ 55 For the forgoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of conviction.
JUDGE ROMÁN and JUDGE FOX concur.