People v. Perez

Opinion

2026 IL App (1st) 231771-U No. 1-23-1771 Order filed June 2, 2026 Second Division

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________ IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________ THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County. ) v. ) No. 79 CR 1730 ) ANTHONY PEREZ, ) Honorable ) Carol M. Howard, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.

PRESIDING JUSTICE VAN TINE delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Ellis and D.B. Walker concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: We affirm the circuit court’s dismissal of defendant’s successive postconviction petition because (1) as an adult offender, defendant cannot raise an eighth amendment challenge to his life sentence under Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012); (2) defendant cannot demonstrate the cause prong of the cause and prejudice test with respect to his claim under the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution; and (3) postconviction counsel did not render unreasonable assistance.

¶2 Defendant Anthony Perez appeals the second-stage dismissal of his successive petition

under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (the Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2018)). No. 1-23-1771

Defendant was 18 years old when he committed first-degree murder. The trial court sentenced him

to natural life imprisonment. On appeal, defendant contends (1) the circuit court erred in

dismissing his sentencing challenge under the eighth amendment to the United States Constitution

(U.S. Const., amend VIII), Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), and related authority; (2) he

demonstrated cause and prejudice with respect to his claim under proportionate penalties clause of

the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11); and (3) postconviction counsel rendered

unreasonable assistance. For the following reasons, we affirm. 1

¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 A. Jury Trial

¶5 The State charged defendant with first degree murder (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, ¶¶ 9-

1(a)(1), 9-1(a)(2)) arising out of the fatal shooting of Victor Figueroa in Chicago on February 21,

1979. In January 1981, the case proceeded to a jury trial. The evidence established that police

found Figueroa’s body in a gangway on February 23, 1979. He had been shot three times in the

chest, and his penis had been cut off and forced into his mouth. Police arrested defendant, who

confessed that he and an accomplice murdered Figueroa in retaliation for testifying against a

member of the Latin Kings in a 1976 criminal case. Defendant admitted shooting Figueroa but

denied that he mutilated Figueroa’s body. The jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder.

According to the Illinois Department of Corrections website, defendant’s date of birth is November

29, 1960, meaning that he was 18 years old when he murdered Figueroa. See People v. Goods,

1 The parties completed briefing of this appeal in May 2025. However, the original authoring justice’s illness delayed the resolution of this appeal. To accelerate resolution of this matter, the court recently reassigned the case to this panel.

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2016 IL App (1st) 140511, ¶ 56 (“A court may take judicial notice of information that the Illinois

Department of Corrections provides on its website.”).

¶6 B. Sentencing

¶7 The case proceeded to a sentencing hearing on February 10, 1981. The trial court stated

that it had reviewed the presentence investigation report (PSI), which is included in the record on

appeal. The PSI stated that defendant’s mother abandoned him in 1968 and thereafter, he moved

“from place to place,” including a home in Tennessee where he suffered physical abuse. Defendant

had a “history of truancy, runaway, and delinquency dating back to 1970,” including “18 station

adjustments and eight juvenile court referrals.” Defendant returned to Illinois in the early 1970s

and became a ward of the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) in 1973. He

attended less than one semester of high school. The PSI also stated that, according to childhood

psychological records, defendant was “borderline mental defective.” His intelligence quotient (IQ)

was 69. Defendant suffered from “classic oedipal struggle” involving “competition with male

members as head of family.” Defendant claimed “he was in a mental hospital for six months in

1973 but d[id] not remember which hospital it was.” Defendant began abusing drugs and alcohol

at age 13. The trial court also reviewed defendant’s juvenile records, which are in the record on

appeal. Between 1973 and 1977, the State filed at least eight petitions alleging that defendant

committed juvenile offenses including sexual assault, aggravated battery, aggravated assault,

unlawful use of a weapon, battery, robbery, theft, resisting a peace officer, and criminal damage

to property.

¶8 Defendant requested a continuance to subpoena DCFS records that may have included

records of psychiatric treatment at Ridgeway Hospital and medical professionals’ opinions

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regarding defendant’s “troubled” childhood development. The court denied defendant’s request,

finding that it had “sufficient information to work on.”

¶9 In aggravation, the State argued there was no dispute defendant murdered Figueroa in

retaliation for testifying against other members of the Latin Kings. The State highlighted the

mutilation of Figueroa’s body and characterized this murder as “one of the worst crimes

imaginable.” The State requested that the court sentence defendant “severely and harshly.”

¶ 10 In mitigation, trial counsel focused on defendant’s childhood, arguing that the PSI and

juvenile records told “a sad story” of a “borderline mental defective” young man who “was thrown

into a cauldron” of poverty, drugs, and violence. Counsel argued that “some of the blame *** for

this particular crime should be shared by” DCFS and defendant’s mother due to their lack of care

for defendant as a child. Counsel requested a sentence “that would give [defendant] a chance to be

released, so that when rehabilitation does occur, he will have a chance to, in fact, become a

productive member of society.”

¶ 11 In allocution, defendant stated:

“So far, you people think it was me—think of me as nothing, just because I have

been brung up in the neighborhood. You don’t know what I live in. You don’t know what

we go through. I don’t know. You call yourself people of justice. Ain’t no justice here. It

is Puerto Rican’s crime; not a white man’s flap. It is a Puerto Rican’s crime; white man’s

flap.

You say I killed somebody, somebody supposed to have been a friend of mine. You

blame me for killing him. You put the mark on my back as a murderer, man.”

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¶ 12 The court sentenced defendant to natural life in prison. The court explained that even if

DCFS was “totally negligent in taking care of [defendant]” as a child, that “would not absolve him

of his crime,” which the court described as “repulsive.” The court highlighted that defendant

committed “society’s most serious crime” and that Figueroa was “savagely mutilated.” The court

found that Figueroa’s murder and mutilation qualified as “acts that [we]re heinous and indicative

of guilt,” thereby warranting a life sentence.

¶ 13 C. Direct Appeal

¶ 14 On direct appeal, defendant raised nine claims of error, four of which challenged his life

sentence. People v. Perez, 113 Ill. App. 3d 143, 145 (1983). Defendant argued that (1) the trial

court imposed a life sentence despite indicating prior to trial that the maximum sentence would be

80 years; (2) trial counsel did not timely receive the PSI; (3) the trial court abused its discretion in

imposing a life sentence because the evidence did not prove that defendant mutilated Figueroa;

and (4) the trial court’s ability to sentence defendant to life was unconstitutional. Id. at 145. This

court affirmed defendant’s conviction and sentence. Id. at 149-51.

¶ 15 D. Initial Postconviction Petition

¶ 16 On October 20, 2000, defendant filed a pro se postconviction petition challenging his

sentence pursuant to Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). The circuit court summarily

dismissed the petition and this court affirmed. People v. Perez, No. 1-00-4224 (2002) (unpublished

summary order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23(c)).

¶ 17 E. Successive Postconviction Petition

¶ 18 On October 3, 2019, defendant filed a pro se motion for leave to file a successive

postconviction petition.

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¶ 19 Defendant’s successive petition first raised a “facial” challenge to life sentences imposed

on young adults generally. Defendant argued that “scientific studies establish that young adults

under the age of 21 have an underdeveloped sense of responsibility and engage in impetuous and

ill-considered decision making”; therefore, federal and state courts had reached a “consensus” that

courts should not impose life sentences upon offenders under age 21. Defendant attached (1) a

2009 Stanford Technology Law Review article regarding the use of brain imaging studies in court;

(2) the United Nations’ 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights; and (3) articles from the

mid-2010s describing how developing neuroscience affected criminal cases involving young adult

defendants. In addition, defendant submitted the opinion of psychologist Dr. James Garbarino,

which argued that Miller protections should extend to defendants between ages 18 and 25. Dr.

Garbarino’s cover letter to defendant stated that he “look[ed] forward to helping on [defendant’s]

case,” but Dr. Garbarino’s opinion was not specific to defendant.

¶ 20 Defendant’s successive petition also argued that his natural life sentence violated the eighth

amendment under Miller and the proportionate penalties clause “as applied” to him. Defendant

contended that he was 18 years old when he murdered Figueroa, yet the trial court imposed a life

sentence without considering defendant’s youthful characteristics or his potential for

rehabilitation. Defendant highlighted his difficult childhood as reflected in the PSI and the juvenile

records the trial court reviewed prior to sentencing.

¶ 21 Defendant sought leave to file his successive petition under the cause and prejudice test,

which requires a petitioner to show (1) a reason he could not have raised his claim earlier and (2)

a violation of his right to due process. See 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f) (West 2018). As to cause,

defendant argued that Miller, related case law, and the scientific research that informed those cases

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did not exist at the time of his sentencing, direct appeal, or initial postconviction petition. As to

prejudice, defendant contended that he was harmed by serving an unconstitutional life sentence.

¶ 22 The circuit court advanced defendant’s petition to the second stage and appointed the

Office of the Public Defender to represent him. Postconviction counsel did not amend defendant’s

pro se petition. Rather, he filed a certificate pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 651(c) (eff. July 1,

2017), attesting that he had consulted with defendant, reviewed the record, investigated potential

witnesses, researched potential legal arguments, and found no need to amend the successive

petition.

¶ 23 The State moved to dismiss defendant’s successive petition. The State argued that

defendant could not raise an eighth amendment Miller claim because he was an adult when he

murdered Figueroa, and only juvenile offenders may raise eighth amendment Miller claims. In

addition, the State argued that developments in case law stemming from Miller did not provide

cause for defendant to raise his proportionate penalties clause claim in a successive petition, citing

People v. Dorsey, 2021 IL 123010, ¶ 73 (“Miller’s announcement of a new substantive rule under

the eighth amendment does not provide cause for a defendant to raise a claim under the

proportionate penalties clause.”). Finally, the State argued that defendant did not comply with the

Act’s pleading requirements because he did not (1) verify his petition by affidavit or (2) submit

evidence that his sentence specifically was unconstitutional; rather, he relied on articles claiming

that young adult offenders in general are similar to juvenile offenders. Postconviction counsel did

not file a response to the State’s motion to dismiss. However, he filed defendant’s handwritten

affidavit, which narrated his difficult childhood. The court advanced defendant’s proportionate

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penalties clause claim to the third stage, explaining that defendant should have “an opportunity to

subpoena the DCFS records so a complete record can be made.”

¶ 24 On June 26, 2023, the State filed a motion to reconsider based on People v. Moore, 2023

IL 126461, which our supreme court decided on May 18, 2023. In Moore, the supreme court held

that because Miller did not change the law applicable to discretionary life sentences imposed on

young adult defendants, it does not provide cause for filing a successive postconviction petition

challenging such a sentence under the eighth amendment or the proportionate penalties clause. Id.

¶¶ 38-42. The State argued that, pursuant to Moore, defendant could not establish the cause prong

of the cause and prejudice test with respect to his proportionate penalties clause claim.

Postconviction counsel did not file a response.

¶ 25 The court granted the State’s motion to reconsider and dismissed defendant’s proportionate

penalties clause claim pursuant to Moore.

¶ 26 Defendant timely appealed.

¶ 27 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 28 Defendant contends the circuit court erred in dismissing his successive postconviction

petition because (1) the State never sought dismissal of his eighth amendment Miller claim based

on his failure to demonstrate cause and (2) he demonstrated cause to raise his proportionate

penalties claim based on new scientific studies regarding young adult brain development. In the

alternative, defendant contends that appointed postconviction counsel rendered unreasonable

assistance.

¶ 29 A. The Post-Conviction Hearing Act

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¶ 30 The Act allows a defendant to raise a claim that his sentence violates his constitutional

rights. People v. Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶ 38. Generally, a defendant may file only one

postconviction petition. Id. ¶ 39. To obtain leave to file a successive postconviction petition, a

defendant must fulfill the cause and prejudice test set out in section 122-1(f):

“Leave of court [for filing a successive postconviction petition] may be granted

only if a petitioner demonstrates cause for his or her failure to bring the claim in his or her

initial post-conviction proceedings and prejudice results from that failure. For purposes of

this subsection (f): (1) a prisoner shows cause by identifying an objective factor that

impeded his or her ability to raise a specific claim during his or her initial post-conviction

proceedings; and (2) a prisoner shows prejudice by demonstrating that the claim not raised

during his or her initial post-conviction proceedings so infected the trial that the resulting

conviction or sentence violated due process.” 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f) (West 2018).

The court conducts the cause and prejudice analysis based on the pleadings and determines whether

the defendant has alleged facts setting out a prima facie case of cause and prejudice. Clark, 2023

IL 127273, ¶ 47. A defendant must establish both elements to obtain leave to file a successive

postconviction petition. Id.

¶ 31 If a court grants leave to file a successive postconviction petition, the petition advances to

the second stage. People v. Robinson, 2020 IL 123849, ¶ 43. At the second stage, the defendant

may request counsel, and the State may file responsive pleadings. 725 ILCS 5/122-4, 122-5 (West

2018). The court must determine whether the petition makes a substantial showing of a

constitutional violation. People v. Sanders, 2016 IL 118123, ¶ 37. If the petition does not make

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such a showing, the court must dismiss it. People v. Dupree, 2018 IL 122307, ¶ 28. If the petition

makes such a showing, it advances to the third stage for an evidentiary hearing. Id. ¶¶ 28-29.

¶ 32 Defendant’s successive petition alleges that his life sentence violates both the eighth

amendment and the proportionate penalties clause because he was 18 years old when he murdered

Figueroa, yet the trial court did not consider his youth or potential for rehabilitation before

imposing a life sentence. Miller and related cases hold that a life sentence imposed on a juvenile

offender violates the eighth amendment unless the sentencing court considers in mitigation his

youth, immaturity, and potential for rehabilitation. Miller, 567 U.S. at 471-80; People v. Buffer,

2019 IL 122327, ¶¶ 25-27. A defendant who was 18 or older at the time of the offense, like

defendant in this case, is not a juvenile and cannot raise an eighth amendment Miller claim. See

People v. Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶¶ 58-61. However, any defendant, including a defendant who

was between 18 and 21 at the time of the offense, can challenge his sentence under the

proportionate penalties clause. Id. ¶ 48; People v. Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, ¶¶ 43-44.

¶ 33 Defendant’s successive petition focuses on his age, but it also mentions “intellectual

disabilities” and “mental deficiency.” We presume this refers to defendant’s IQ of 69 and

childhood psychiatric issues. Our supreme court has rejected equating youth with intellectual

disability because the characteristics of youth fade over time whereas intellectual disability tends

to be lifelong. People v. Coty, 2020 IL 123972, ¶¶ 39-40. Accordingly, we construe defendant’s

successive postconviction petition as premised on his age, not mental disability or mental illness.

¶ 34 B. Eighth Amendment Miller Claim

¶ 35 Defendant contends the State never argued that he failed to demonstrate cause for raising

his eighth amendment Miller claim in his successive petition. Rather, the State argued that

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defendant could not raise an eighth amendment Miller claim as a matter of law because he was 18

years old when he murdered Figueroa. Therefore, defendant concludes, the circuit court could not

dismiss that claim based on failure to demonstrate cause.

¶ 36 It is true that the State’s motion to dismiss argued that because defendant was 18 years old

when he murdered Figueroa, as a matter of law, he could not raise an eighth amendment Miller

claim. While the State did not frame this argument in terms of cause or prejudice, the State was

correct. Eighth amendment Miller claims are not available to “emerging adults” who were 18 or

older at the time of the offenses. People v. Spencer, 2025 IL 130015, ¶ 32. There is no dispute that

defendant was 18 years old when he murdered Figueroa. So, as a matter of law, he cannot raise an

eighth amendment Miller claim. See id.

¶ 37 The circuit court properly dismissed this claim. In ruling on the State’s motion to dismiss,

the circuit court advanced only defendant’s proportionate penalties clause claim to the third stage,

which implies that the court dismissed the eighth amendment Miller claim. Although the court did

not explain its reasoning for dismissing the eighth amendment Miller claim, we can affirm its

ruling on any basis in the record. See People v. Snow, 2012 IL App (4th) 110415, ¶ 17. We affirm

the dismissal of defendant’s eighth amendment Miller claim because he cannot raise it as an adult

offender.

¶ 38 Defendant acknowledges that, as an adult offender, he cannot raise an eighth amendment

Miller claim. Nevertheless, he suggests that additional scientific evidence may justify extending

Miller to young adult offenders. We disagree. Our supreme court holds that only juvenile offenders

may raise eighth amendment claims under Miller. Spencer, 2025 IL 130015, ¶ 32. To the extent

defendant asks us to change the law by extending Miller protections to offenders between 18 and

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21, we decline that invitation. Any such extension of Miller “should be made by our legislature or

our highest court.” People v. Rivera, 2020 IL App (1st) 171430, ¶ 27.

¶ 39 We also reject defendant’s argument that the circuit court violated his right to due process

in dismissing his eighth amendment Miller claim. Defendant had the opportunity to respond to

both of the State’s motions but chose not to. Even if the circuit court did not follow proper

procedures in dismissing defendant’s eighth amendment Miller claim, that error was harmless

because defendant cannot raise that claim as a matter of law. See People v. Pingleton, 2022 IL

127680, ¶¶ 51-64 (procedural due process errors in the circuit court’s dismissal of a postconviction

petition are harmless where the petition’s claims lack merit). Accordingly, we affirm the dismissal

of defendant’s eighth amendment Miller claim.

¶ 40 C. Proportionate Penalties Clause Claim

¶ 41 Because defendant was 18 years old when he murdered Figueroa, he may be able to raise

a proportionate penalties challenge to his life sentence. See Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶ 48. The

proportionate penalties clause provides that “[a]ll penalties shall be determined both according to

the seriousness of the offense and with the objective of restoring the offender to useful citizenship.”

Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11. But to raise that claim in his successive postconviction petition, he

must demonstrate both cause and prejudice. See 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f) (West 2018).

¶ 42 It appears the trial court advanced defendant’s successive postconviction petition to the

second stage without conducting the cause and prejudice test, which was error. See People v.

Thames, 2021 IL App (1st) 180071, ¶ 85. However, that error does not hinder our review. The

State can seek dismissal based on the defendant’s failure to establish cause at any stage in

postconviction proceedings, so we can review cause on appeal from a second-stage dismissal.

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People v. Johnson, 2019 IL App (1st) 153204, ¶ 37 (“even though the trial court advanced the

petition to the second stage and made no cause and prejudice findings, we will review whether

defendant established cause and prejudice”). Moreover, our review is de novo regardless of

whether the circuit court denied defendant leave to file the successive petition due to his failure to

show cause (see People v. Bailey, 2017 IL 121450, ¶ 13) or dismissed the petition at the second

stage due to defendant’s failure to make a substantial showing of a constitutional violation (see

Sanders, 2016 IL 118123, ¶ 31). De novo review means that we perform the same analysis as the

circuit court (People v. Van Dyke, 2020 IL App (1st) 191384, ¶ 41), which includes the cause and

prejudice analysis.

¶ 43 To establish cause, a defendant must identify an objective factor that prevented him from

raising his constitutional claim in his initial postconviction petition. People v. Wrice, 2012 IL

111860, ¶ 48; 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f) (West 2018). That is, the defendant must articulate why he

could not have discovered the claim earlier by exercising due diligence. People v. Vidaurri, 2023

IL App (1st) 200857, ¶ 73.

¶ 44 We hold that defendant cannot make such a showing. Defendant could have raised a

proportionate penalties clause challenge to his life sentence on direct appeal or in his initial

postconviction petition. “Illinois cases have long held the proportionate penalties clause require[s]

the circuit court to take into account the defendant’s youth and mentality in fashioning an

appropriate sentence.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶ 92 (collecting

cases dating to 1972). Even prior to Miller and the case law it produced, defendant “had the tools

to construct a claim that his sentence violated the proportionate penalties clause because the

sentencing judge did not take into account (1) his youth and (2) how his particular neurobiological

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development affected his maturity and decision-making.” See People v. Leach, 2024 IL App (4th)

230298, ¶ 83. Because proportionate penalties clause challenges to sentences have been available

in Illinois for decades, our supreme court has held that Miller and the case law it produced do not

provide cause to raise a proportionate penalties claim in a successive postconviction petition.

Spencer, 2025 IL 130015, ¶ 31; Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶ 67; Moore, 2023 IL 126461, ¶ 40;

Dorsey, 2021 IL 123010, ¶ 73. Therefore, defendant cannot establish cause based on the

development of case law following Miller.

¶ 45 Defendant concedes that developments in case law do not establish cause to raise a

proportionate penalties clause claim in a successive petition. Nevertheless, he insists that his cause

for raising this claim is factual, not legal. But defendant’s successive petition presents no new facts

about his “youthful characteristics” at the time of the offense. On the contrary, defendant’s

successive petition recounts his troubled childhood, which was before the trial court at the 1981

sentencing hearing. Information that was available to the defendant and the court at sentencing

does not constitute cause to raise a proportionate penalties challenge in a successive postconviction

petition. See Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶ 63.

¶ 46 The only new information defendant’s successive petition presents is scientific research on

young adult brain development that did not exist at the time of his sentencing, direct appeal, or

initial postconviction petition. Defendant argues that these studies provide a “factual basis” for

cause.

¶ 47 Defendant characterizes these studies as “newly available evidence,” which is confusing

for two reasons. First, newly discovered evidence usually arises in successive postconviction

petitions alleging actual innocence. See, e.g., People v. Griffin, 2024 IL 128587, ¶ 58. A successive

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postconviction petition based on actual innocence is different from a successive petition based on

cause and prejudice. People v. Hauad, 2016 IL App (1st) 150583, ¶ 50. Here, defendant proceeds

under the cause and prejudice approach, yet he uses terms more applicable to actual innocence

claims.

¶ 48 Furthermore, newly discovered evidence typically consists of case-specific evidence that

could have been introduced at trial and likely would have changed the outcome. See, e.g., Griffin,

2024 IL 128587, ¶¶ 55-63 (witness affidavits were newly discovered evidence because they

suggested the State’s witnesses falsely identified the defendant as the shooter). General scientific

studies with no connection to this defendant do not fit that description. See People v. Green, 2022

IL App (1st) 200749, ¶ 50 (“While he cites to studies on the brain of young adults, defendant did

not provide any details connecting those studies to his own brain beyond his alleged intellectual

disabilities.”). More importantly, such studies do not provide cause to raise a proportionate

penalties claim in a successive postconviction petition. See, e.g., People v. Brewer, 2025 IL App

(1st) 240088, ¶¶ 37-46 (defendant who committed first-degree murder when he was 18 years old

did not demonstrate cause for raising a proportionate penalties challenge to his 80-year sentence

by submitting studies indicating that 18 year-olds are mentally more like juveniles than adults);

People v. Haines, 2021 IL App (4th) 190612, ¶ 51 (new neuroscientific research can be “helpful

support” for a proportionate penalties claim but is not cause to raise that claim in a successive

postconviction petition). Therefore, defendant has not demonstrated cause for raising his

proportionate penalties clause claim in his successive petition.

¶ 49 Defendant argues that, in the circuit court, the State did not contest his factual basis of

cause for raising his proportionate penalties clause claim; rather, the State relied only on Moore’s

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holding that developments in case law do not provide cause. Therefore, defendant concludes, the

State has forfeited any argument that studies on young adult brain development do not constitute

cause. But we review defendant’s successive petition de novo (see Bailey, 2017 IL 121450, ¶ 13)

and may affirm its dismissal on any basis apparent from the record (see Snow, 2012 IL App (4th)

110415, ¶ 17). As explained above, the record shows that defendant has not presented any new

facts suggesting that his mental functioning was equivalent to a juvenile’s when he murdered

Figueroa.

¶ 50 Because we find that defendant has not established cause to raise his proportionate

penalties claim in his successive postconviction petition, we need not address prejudice. See

People v. Morrow, 2019 IL App (1st) 161208, ¶ 57 (“we may uphold the denial of leave to file the

claim if defendant has failed to establish either prong” of the cause and prejudice test). We affirm

the dismissal of defendant’s proportionate penalties clause claim.

¶ 51 D. Unreasonable Assistance of Postconviction Counsel

¶ 52 As an alternative to his cause and prejudice argument, defendant contends that

postconviction counsel rendered unreasonable assistance by not (1) submitting additional

affidavits or (2) attempting to overcome Moore’s holding that the development of case law

stemming from Miller does not constitute cause to raise a proportionate penalties claim in a

successive postconviction petition.

¶ 53 A postconviction petitioner does not have a constitutional right to assistance of

counsel. People v. Cotto, 2016 IL 119006, ¶ 29. Nevertheless, postconviction counsel must

provide reasonable assistance. People v. Agee, 2023 IL 128413, ¶ 41. Reasonable assistance is a

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significantly lower standard than the constitutional right to effective assistance. People v. Custer,

2019 IL 123339, ¶¶ 30-31.

¶ 54 Supreme Court Rule 651(c) imposes certain duties on postconviction counsel to ensure

reasonable assistance. People v. Addison, 2023 IL 127119, ¶ 20. Rule 651(c) requires

postconviction counsel to submit a certificate or make a showing in the record that counsel has (1)

consulted with the petitioner by phone, mail, electronic means, or in person to ascertain his or her

contentions of deprivation of constitutional rights; (2) examined the record of the trial proceedings;

and (3) made any amendments to the petitions filed pro se that are necessary for an adequate

presentation of the petitioner’s contentions. Ill. S. Ct. R. 651(c) (eff. July 1, 2017). The Rule

ensures that postconviction counsel shapes a petitioner’s claims into proper legal form and

attempts to overcome any procedural bars that would result in the petition’s dismissal if not

rebutted. People v. Perkins, 229 Ill. 2d 34, 43-44 (2007). That said, counsel need not advance

meritless claims. People v. Pendleton, 223 Ill. 2d 458, 472 (2006).

¶ 55 In this case, postconviction counsel filed a Rule 651(c) certificate, which created a

rebuttable presumption that postconviction counsel provided reasonable assistance. See Addison,

2023 IL 127119, ¶ 21. Defendant must overcome that presumption by showing that counsel did

not substantially comply with Rule 651(c). See id. We review de novo whether postconviction

counsel provided reasonable assistance. People v. Williams, 2025 IL 129718, ¶ 41.

¶ 56 1. Affidavits

¶ 57 Defendant argues that postconviction counsel did not submit an affidavit “verifying [the]

pro se petition or providing any factual support from [defendant] beyond what existed in the

underlying record.”

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¶ 58 A postconviction petition must be “verified by affidavit.” 725 ILCS 5/122-1(b) (West

2018). Here, defendant and a notary signed the pro se successive petition’s prayer for relief. This

approach may not have complied with section 122-1(b), but there is no indication the circuit court

dismissed the successive petition based on noncompliance with section 122-1(b). On the contrary,

the court advanced defendant’s petition to the second stage and then dismissed it on the merits.

So, to the extent defendant complains that postconviction counsel did not ensure compliance with

section 122-1(b), that did not affect defendant. See People v. Buchanan, 2024 IL App (1st) 221579-

U, ¶ 52 (the circuit court “had an independent and sufficient basis to dismiss the petition’s claims,”

so “postconviction counsel’s failure to remedy the lack of a notarized verification affidavit was

inconsequential.”). 2

¶ 59 Defendant also complains that postconviction counsel did not submit an affidavit from Dr.

Garbarino. Defendant’s briefs do not explain what information such an affidavit would have

provided. Therefore, defendant has forfeited this argument. See People v. Crowley, 2025 IL App

(1st) 241072-U, ¶ 31 (undeveloped arguments do not comply with Supreme Court Rule 341(h)

(eff. Oct. 1, 2020) and are forfeited on appeal).

¶ 60 2. Cause

¶ 61 Finally, defendant contends that postconviction counsel rendered unreasonable assistance

because he made no effort to overcome Moore’s holding. Moore holds that case law developments

stemming from Miller do not provide cause for young adult offenders to raise proportionate

penalties clause claims in successive postconviction petitions. See Moore, 2023 IL 126461, ¶ 40.

2 We cite unpublished orders issued after January 1, 2021, as persuasive authority. Ill. S. Ct. R. 23(e)(1) (eff. June 3, 2025).

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¶ 62 We reject this theory of unreasonable assistance. Postconviction counsel has no obligation

to advance legally meritless claims. Pendleton, 223 Ill. 2d at 472. Defendant concedes that Moore

barred him from establishing cause for his proportionate penalties claim based on developments

in case law stemming from Miller. Defendant cannot rebut the presumption that postconviction

counsel rendered reasonable assistance by insisting that counsel should have argued against

binding supreme court authority. And, since the litigation that gave rise to this appeal, our supreme

court has confirmed Moore’s holding. Spencer, 2025 IL 130015, ¶¶ 31-32. That confirms

postconviction counsel could not have overcome Moore’s bar on defendant establishing cause.

¶ 63 Defendant contends that postconviction counsel should have argued that he sought to

establish cause based not on developments in case law but based on scientific studies regarding

young adult brain development. This argument would have failed for the reasons we set forth

above, so postconviction counsel did not render unreasonable assistance by not raising it.

Defendant has not rebutted the presumption that postconviction counsel rendered reasonable

assistance. Accordingly, we affirm the dismissal of defendant’s successive postconviction petition.

¶ 64 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 65 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County.

¶ 66 Affirmed.

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