People v. Pearson

332 N.W.2d 574, 123 Mich. App. 462

• Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
• Decided: February 24, 1983
• Docket: Docket 56966
• Status: Published

Opinions

Per Curiam.

Defendant was convicted by a jury of burning real property, MCL 750.73; MSA 28.268. He appeals and we affirm.

The prosecution’s case consisted entirely of circumstantial evidence. The prosecutor’s theory of the case was that defendant had set fire to his restaurant in order to get out of debt. Although defendant could not have received any insurance proceeds from the fire, because his indebtedness exceeded his coverage, the prosecution argued that defendant would have benefited by disposing of many of his financial obligations while retaining the real estate and the restaurant’s liquor license.

Defendant claims that the prosecutor committed error by questioning him regarding the value of the liquor license. Specifically, on cross-examination, the prosecutor asked defendant over defense counsel’s objection:

"Are you aware, Mr. Pearson, that currently, in this community, a liquor license — just the license itself — is of a value of approximately 25 to 30 thousand dollars?”

Defendant stated that he believed he paid $5,000 for the "good will” of the business, meaning the liquor license. Following this answer, the defendant acknowledged that defense exhibit "A”, the closing statement from the purchase of the business, reflected that defendant had paid $30,000 for "personal property and good will”.

The prosecution may not attempt to inject unfounded prejudicial innuendo into the proceedings. People v DiPaolo, 366 Mich 394; 115 NW2d 78 (1962); People v Moreno, 112 Mich App 631; 317 NW2d 201 (1981). However, if a prosecutor’s question is based upon prior testimony, it is not an impermissible injection of innuendo. People v Williams #2, 45 Mich App 630; 207 NW2d 180 (1973); People v Morrin, 31 Mich App 301; 187 NW2d 434 (1971).

Because defendant had previously adduced evidence regarding the value of the liquor license, the prosecutor’s cross-examination in the instant case was based on prior evidence and was not improper. Therefore, no error occurred.

Affirmed.