Filed 8/28/26 P. v. Pazpadilla CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, E086277
v. (Super.Ct.Nos. BAF2300395 & SWF2001232)
DIONISIO GERARDO PAZPADILLA, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Brian S. McCarville, Judge. Affirmed.
Ariana D’Agostino, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Assistant Attorney General, Christopher P. Beesley and Britton B. Lacy, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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Defendant and appellant Dionisio Gerardo PazPadilla appeals from the judgment entered against him by the Riverside County Superior Court. His sole contention is his admission of a strike prior must be reversed because he did not voluntarily and intelligently waive his right to a trial on that allegation. We will affirm.
BACKGROUND
In January 2022 defendant, who had been charged with three felony counts of domestic violence, pled guilty to a felony charge of attempting to prevent or dissuade a crime victim from reporting the offense to law enforcement, a violation of Penal Code section 136.1, subdivision (b)(1), a strike offense.1 In keeping with the plea agreement, the trial court placed defendant on probation for three years. One condition of defendant’s probation was a prohibition on possessing any firearms or ammunition. A. Defendant Violates His Probation and the Resulting Charges Include Prohibited Possession of Firearms and Ammunition, and a Prior Strike Allegation During a routine probation search of defendant’s home in April 2023, officers discovered a pistol, three rifles (one was loaded), and multiple rounds of various ammunition in the master bedroom. That discovery led to the filing of a complaint in Riverside County Superior Court case No. BAF2300395 (No. BAF2300395) charging defendant with two felony counts of unlawful possession of firearms (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1), counts 1 & 2) with each charge including an allegation that defendant had been
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code and references to rules are to the California Rules of Court.
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convicted in January 2022 for a felony violation of subdivision (b)(1) of section 136.1 and alleging a strike prior (collectively, the January 2022 conviction).
After a preliminary hearing on the complaint, an information was filed that included the two counts alleged in the complaint and added two additional counts of felony possession of firearms (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1), counts 3 & 4) as well as a fifth count of felony possession of ammunition, with each count alleging defendant’s January 2022 felony violation of subdivision (b)(1) of section 136.1 (the prohibited possession allegations). The information also included the January 2022 conviction as an alleged strike prior (§§ 667, subds. (c) & (e)(1), 1170.12, subd. (c)(1)) and alleged an aggravating factor that defendant committed those offenses while on probation (rule 4.421(b)(4)).
A violation of probation allegation as to defendant’s 2022 section 136.1 conviction was trailed under a different Riverside County Superior Court case No. SWF2001232 (No. SWF2001232), the probation violation. B. Defendant Admits the Prior Strike and the Prohibited Possession Allegations On May 13, 2025, when the jury trial was set to begin, the trial court asked defendant’s counsel whether defendant intended to admit or bifurcate his status as a convicted felon “at least on the charges,” counsel stated she again needed to speak with defendant about that subject, noting the case had been sent out for trial really quickly. The court stated, “[w]e have seven minutes” and a recess was taken. There is no record of how long the recess actually lasted.
When the court reconvened, defendant’s counsel stated defendant “will be stipulating to the felony part.” The court advised defendant of his right to a court or jury
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trial on the allegation of his 2022 conviction contained in the five unlawful possession charges, and explained that, if defendant did not admit the prior conviction element, the People had the right to prove up not only the unlawful weapon possession but also defendant’s felony status. Thereafter, defendant admitted that he had been convicted of a violation of section 126 as alleged in counts 1 to 5.
The court then turned to defendant’s strike, noting it was the same 2022 conviction defendant had just admitted with respect to the five unlawful possession charges and, if a court or jury found the strike true, the strike would have the effect of doubling any potential punishment if he was convicted. Defendant waived his right to trial on that issue and admitted the strike. He opted for a bench trial as to the alleged aggravating factor of being on probation at the time he committed the prohibited possession offenses.
The jury found defendant guilty of four counts of being a prohibited person in possession of a firearm and one count of being a prohibited person in possession of ammunition.
The trial court found true beyond a reasonable doubt the aggravating factor that defendant committed each of the five offenses while he was on probation. It also found that defendant had violated his probation as alleged in No. SWF2001232.
The court sentenced defendant to a state prison term of two years (the mid-term)
for each of the five unlawful possession counts, doubled on account of his admitted strike, and a two-year prison sentence for the probation violation. The sentences were ordered to run concurrently. Defendant appealed the judgments.
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DISCUSSION
On appeal, defendant claims his admission of his January 2022 conviction must be reversed because, in view of the trial court’s failure to advise him either of his right to remain silent or his right to confront witnesses against him, he did not voluntarily and intelligently waive his right to trial on that issue. The People agree the court’s advisement was deficient in those respects but argue defendant’s admission was knowing and intelligent because he had previously and repeatedly been advised of his trial rights before admitting the strike prior. We agree with the People. A. The Need for a Knowing and Voluntary Admission If a defendant’s admission of a previous conviction allegation can subject the defendant to an increased punishment, the admission must be made knowingly and voluntarily. (People v. Cross (2015) 61 Cal.4th 164, 170 (Cross).) To that end, the trial court must inform the defendant of three constitutional protections and solicit a personal waiver of each: the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a jury trial, and the right to confront one’s accusers (the Boykin/Tahl admonitions2). (Cross, supra, at p. 170.) The court must also advise the defendant of penalties and other sanctions that could be imposed as a consequence of admitting the prior conviction. (Id., at pp. 170-171.)
If there are deficiencies in the court’s advisements of those protections (often referred to herein as “trial rights”), the error is not reversable per se. (Cross, supra, 61
2 Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238, 243-244; In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122, 130-133.
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Cal.4th at p. 171.) Instead, we review the entire record to determine if it affirmatively shows the defendant’s admission of the prior conviction was intelligent and voluntary in light of the totality of the circumstances. (Ibid.) A defendant’s past experience with the criminal justice system is relevant to establishing their knowledge and sophistication regarding their trial rights (id., at p. 180) so long as it can be reasonably inferred from the record that the defendant was adequately advised of those rights in a prior proceeding (People v. Kinnear (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 1116). B. Defendant’s Admission Was Knowing and Voluntary Here, the record provides ample support for the conclusion that defendant had knowledge of his trial rights and the specific consequences of his plea when he admitted his January 2022 conviction during the unlawful possession proceedings.
When defendant admitted that offense at the time of his conviction in 2022, he was fully advised of his rights and stated both in writing and on the record that he understood them.
When, in May 2023 defendant was arraigned on the initial April 2023 unlawful firearms possession complaint, his counsel waived a formal arraignment and stipulated defendant had been advised of his legal and constitutional rights. Defendant also was present at the August 12, 2024, preliminary hearing when his counsel cross-examined the police officer who conducted the compliance check of defendant’s residence and found the firearms in the master bedroom.
After the preliminary hearing, the People filed an information. In the course of the August 26, 2024, arraignment on the information, the trial court advised defendant of his
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privilege against self-incrimination, and of his rights to a speedy and public trial by judge or jury, to confront and cross-examine witnesses, and to present evidence on his own behalf. The court also advised him of the charges and consequences of his plea and statutory sentencing. Based upon its inquiry and examination of defendant, the court found defendant had the ability to understand, and that he understood his constitutional rights.
And, at the May 2025 hearing, a recess was taken for defendant and his counsel to again discuss the issue of making an admission. While neither that unreported discussion nor defendant’s presence during his counsel’s cross-examination of the witness against him at the preliminary hearing standing alone may be relied upon to establish a knowing and intelligent admission (People v. Christian (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 688, 698), those facts combined with the complete advisements given defendant on three occasions and those given at the time of defendant’s admission of the strike lend support to our conclusion that his admission of the prior conviction was intelligent and voluntary in light of the totality of the circumstances.
Defendant argues reversal is required because (i) according to him, his prior advisement occurred when he pled guilty to the strike offense in 2022, nearly three years before he admitted he had suffered that strike; (ii) when the court accepted defendant’s admission in 2022, it did not discuss those rights with him in open court; (iii) defendant may have been confused when he admitted the prior strike; and (iv) “the trial court’s error [was] compounded by [defendant’s] language barrier.” We are not persuaded.
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1. Defendant’s Stale and Inadequate Advisement Claim Defendant posits his past experience in the criminal justice system cannot be relied upon for establishing that he had knowledge of his trial rights because the only complete advisement of those rights he had ever received was when he entered his guilty plea in the 2022 felony strike case, “nearly three years before [defendant’s] instant case.” Defendant is mistaken. The trial court had fully advised defendant of those rights on August 26, 2024, less than nine months before defendant’s May 13, 2025 admission.
Defendant also argues the advisement given to him at the time he entered his guilty plea in 2022 was deficient because the trial court did not “discuss” his trial rights during the plea colloquy. His claim falls well short of the mark. Defendant, with his counsel, reviewed and completed a two-page or double-sided Riverside County felony plea form that not only set forth the advisement of his trial rights, but also provided a comprehensive list of the consequences of the plea, the terms of the plea, a statement of defendant’s understanding. Defendant signed the form indicating he had read and understood the entire form.
In addition, a translator signed the form stating he had translated it for defendant and defendant understood the form’s contents before he signed it, and defendant’s counsel also executed a statement defendant understood his constitutional rights and was aware a guilty plea waives those rights, and that defendant had an adequate opportunity to discuss the matter with counsel. The trial court was provided with a copy of the completed form and, before taking defendant’s admission, questioned defendant to be certain he had gone over “everything on both sides” of the form, that defendant had
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personally signed the form, that he understood he was pleading guilty to a strike, and confirmed that defendant had no questions about the ramifications of pleading guilty to a strike offense and no questions about anything on the form except “[j]ust the fine.” It is clear from the foregoing that the court did in fact discuss defendant’s rights with him and was assured that defendant knew and understood them.
Defendant argues two cases, People v. Mosby (2004) 33 Cal.4th 353 (Mosby) and People v. Lloyd (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 49 (Lloyd) also support his stale and inadequate advisement claim. We do not agree.
In Lloyd, as here, the trial court did not include the rights to confront witnesses and to remain silent in the Boykin/Tahl admonitions given before the defendant admitted having five prior felony convictions. (Lloyd, supra, 236 Cal.App.4th at p. 52.) There, Division Three of the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District found the admissions were not knowing and voluntary because they were made almost 15 months after Lloyd was advised of his trial rights and because the record did not include information about how the five prior convictions were obtained so no inference of his having received Boykin/Tahl admonitions at that time could be made. (Lloyd, at pp. 52, 59.)
Lloyd is readily distinguishable from this case. Here, as noted ante, there is ample evidence that defendant was fully advised of his trial rights by the trial court when he pled guilty to the strike offense in 2022, he was advised of those rights by counsel in 2023, and the trial court again gave defendant a full advisement in 2024, less than nine months before defendant admitted the strike.
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In Mosby, the California Supreme Court rejected the defendant's claim that his admission of a strike prior was invalid because the trial court did not advise him of his rights to remain silent and to confront witnesses when he admitted a strike prior. (Mosby, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 364-365.) Defendant argues Mosby is distinguishable from this case because “[t]he lynchpin of the analysis in Mosby was that the defendant had ‘just’ exercised his Boykin-Tahl rights in his substantive trial” so he should have known he would have the same rights in a trial on his prior conviction. Defendant’s reading of Mosby is too narrow.
The Mosby court did include the fact that Mosby had undergone a jury trial just before he admitted the strike prior and found he would have understood the right to confront witnesses because he had through his counsel exercised that right at the trial. (Mosby, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 364.) But that certainly was not the Supreme Court’s sole consideration. In reviewing the totality of the circumstances in that case, it also found that (i) unlike a trial on a criminal charge, trial on a prior conviction is simple and straightforward, usually involving presentation by the People of a certified copy of the prior conviction along with the defendant's fingerprints or photograph; (ii) Mosby was represented by counsel; and (iii) he would have been given the Boykin/Tahl admonitions when he pled guilty to the strike offense in May 1993, a plea entered six years before his 1999 arrest resulted in the admission being considered in the Mosby opinion. (Mosby, at pp. 356, 359, 364-365.)
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2. Defendant’s Language Barrier Claim There is simply no basis to believe that defendant’s comprehension of the advisements he was given by the court or counsel was impeded because English is not his primary language. He was provided with an interpreter at every hearing as well as when consulting with his counsel.
3. The Confusion Claim In support of defendant’s assertion that he could have been confused when admitting his prior strike, he posits the prosecutor and the court’s clerk were “confused about what happened” and, therefore, he must also have been confused. The contention lacks merit. After defendant had admitted the 2022 conviction element in the five prohibited possession counts, admitted that the conviction was a strike, and decided to have a court trial instead of a jury determination as to the aggravating factor, the trial court asked the parties if there was “anything else” to address before taking a lunch break. That query resulted a request by the People and the clerk to confirm their understanding of how the case was to proceed:
“MS. ALVARADO [for the People]: And I apologize, your Honor. Just briefly, did he admit the strike prior, or we are utilizing a bench trial in regards to that, if it comes to that?
“THE COURT: No. He just admitted the strike prior.
“MS. ALVARADO: That's what I thought.
“THE COURT: It's a bench trial with a factor in aggravation.
“MS. ALVARADO: Thank you, your Honor.
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“THE COURT: That is your understanding, as well, Ms. Chavez?
“MS. CHAVEZ [defense counsel]: Yes.
“THE CLERK: He waives the trial?
“THE COURT: On the factor in aggravation, he waives his right to a jury trial, and it will be a Court issue only, if he is convicted, and he is admitting the strike prior.”
There is nothing in those exchanges to support the notion defendant or his counsel suffered any confusion about defendant’s admission.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
RAMIREZ
P. J.
We concur:
MILLER J.
CODRINGTON J.