People v. Parker

Opinion

People v Parker

2026 NY Slip Op 04213

July 1, 2026

Appellate Division, Second Department

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

This decision is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.

The People of the State of New York, respondent,

v

Kason G. Parker, appellant.

Supreme Court of the State of New York, Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department

Decided on July 1, 2026

2023-05523, (Ind. No. 70618/21)

Mark C. Dillon, J.P.

Lillian Wan

Lourdes M. Ventura

Susan Quirk, JJ.

Laurette D. Mulry, Riverhead, NY (Genevieve M. Cahill of counsel), for appellant, and appellant pro se.

Raymond A. Tierney, District Attorney, Riverhead, NY (Jamie H. Greenwood and Marion Tang of counsel), for respondent.

[*1]

DECISION & ORDER

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Suffolk County (Timothy P. Mazzei, J.), rendered May 31, 2023, convicting him of murder in the second degree, upon his plea of guilty, and imposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial, after a hearing, of those branches of the defendant's omnibus motion which were to suppress identification evidence, physical evidence, and his statements to law enforcement officials.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.

Contrary to the defendant's contention, the County Court correctly determined that an eyewitness was sufficiently familiar with the defendant prior to the stabbing incident, such that she was impervious to suggestiveness and, therefore, her pretrial identification of the defendant as the perpetrator was merely confirmatory (see People v Rodriguez, 79 NY2d 445; People v Williams, 211 AD3d 1055, 1057).

As the People correctly contend, the evidence presented at the suppression hearing established that the defendant abandoned his vehicle when he parked the vehicle at a farm, left the door unlocked and the keys in the vehicle, and attempted to flee New York State on a bus, thereby undermining any claim he may have had to an expectation of privacy in the vehicle or its contents (see People v Shabazz, 231 AD3d 968, 968; People v Ethridge, 175 AD3d 552, 553). Accordingly, the defendant lacked standing to challenge the impoundment of the vehicle (see People v Shabazz, 231 AD3d at 968).

The County Court properly denied that branch of the defendant's omnibus motion which was to suppress statements that he made to Suffolk County police officers both prior to and after being advised of his Miranda rights. The challenged statements were either in response to questions regarding the defendant's identity, which fell within the exception for pedigree information (see People v Patton, 229 AD3d 808, 809), or uttered spontaneously and voluntarily (see People v Grant, 96 AD3d 779, 780). Contrary to the defendant's contention, his request to make a phone call during his interrogation, after being read his Miranda rights, did not constitute an unequivocal invocation of the right to counsel preventing further interrogation (see People v Sanchez, 124 AD3d [*2]685, 687).

The defendant's right to proceed pro se was not violated, as the defendant abandoned his request by explicitly agreeing to continue with his attorney's representation (see People v Koltun, 163 AD3d 720, 721).

Contrary to the defendant's contention, the fact that the complainant's mother was employed by the Suffolk County District Attorney's office did not warrant disqualification of the prosecutor (see People v Wynn, 248 AD2d 494, 494).

The sentence imposed was not excessive (see People v Suitte, 90 AD2d 80).

The defendant's contentions, raised in his pro se supplemental brief, concerning the People's certificate of compliance and discovery sanctions are unpreserved for appellate review, and we decline to review them in the exercise of our interest of justice jurisdiction. The defendant's contention, also raised in his pro se supplemental brief, that his trial counsel was ineffective by taking a position adverse to the defendant during certain pretrial proceedings is not properly before this Court, since, by pleading guilty, the defendant forfeited appellate review of his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel that did not directly involve the plea bargaining process and sentence (see People v Moshier, 110 AD3d 832, 833). The defendant's remaining contention, also raised in his pro se supplemental brief, is without merit.

DILLON, J.P., WAN, VENTURA and QUIRK, JJ., concur.

ENTER:

Darrell M. Joseph

Clerk of the Court