People v. Palmer

342 N.E.2d 353, 62 Ill. 2d 261, 1976 Ill. LEXIS 246

• Court: Illinois Supreme Court
• Decided: January 26, 1976
• Docket: 47159
• Status: Published

Opinions

MR. JUSTICE SCHAEFER

delivered the opinion of the court:

After a bench trial before a judge in the circuit court of Cook County, the defendant was found guilty of unlawful use of weapons and of failure to possess a firearm owner’s identification card. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 38, pars. 24 — 1(a)(4), 83 — 2(a).) The appellate court reversed the convictions (22 Ill. App. 3d 866), and we allowed leave to appeal. The disputed issue in the case concerns the legality of the search of the defendant, J ohn Palmer, which disclosed a loaded .25-caliber revolver in the defendant’s right rear pants pocket.

The arresting officer testified that at approximately 11:10 a.m. on October 12, 1971, he saw the defendant driving a car without any license plates. The defendant parked the car and helped a woman passenger out of it. When the defendant started to drive away, the officer stopped him, asked him how long it had been since he purchased the car, and also asked him to produce his driver’s license. The defendant did not have a driver’s license, but looked through his wallet for a “yellow slip.” The officer then searched him and discovered the weapon described above in the defendant’s pants pocket. The trial judge denied the motion to suppress on the ground that because the car which the defendant was driving had no license plates and the defendant had no driver’s license, the officer was justified in believing that he was dealing with something more than a routine traffic violation.

At the trial, which took place immediately after the hearing on the motion to suppress, the officer testified that the defendant had been cooperative and had given him no undue cause for alarm or any reason to fear for his safety. The gun was found in a tobacco pouch, with the butt of the pistol protruding from the pouch. The pouch was discovered in a “pat down” search by the officer. At the hearing in mitigation and aggravation, the defendant said that he had applied for license plates but they-had not been issued because he had forgotten to put his social security number on the application. It is undisputed that the defendant had no firearm owner’s identification card. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 38, par. 83 — 2(a).

In his attack upon the validity of the search, the defendant characterizes his conduct as “a routine traffic violation,” and argues that the search was unreasonable because the officer did not “point to specific articulable facts from which he could reasonably infer the individual was armed and dangerous. ” But the decisions of this court have consistently held that the absence of license plates suggests a serious violation of the law which justifies a search. (People v. Brown (1967), 38 Ill.2d 353; People v. Watkins (1960), 19 Ill.2d 11; People v. Berry (1959), 17 Ill.2d 247.) In People v. Brown, the court stated:

“It has long been established that the constitutional safeguards contained in section 6 of article II of the Illinois constitution, and the fourth amendment to the United States constitution, do not prohibit all searches made without a warrant, but only those which are unreasonable, and that the determinations of the reasonableness of any given search must depend upon the facts in the particular situation. (United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 94 L. Ed. 653;People v. Watkins, 19 Ill.2d 11.) In Watkins we held that a search incident to an arrest is authorized when it is reasonably necessary to protect the arresting officers from attack, to prevent the prisoner from escaping, or to discover the fruits of a crime. We went on to state that the total absence of license plates on a car could reasonably suggest a serious violation of the law which would justify a search.

In People v. Thomas, 31 Ill.2d 212, we held that if circumstances reasonably indicate that the police may be dealing, not with an ordinary traffic violator, but with a criminal, then a search of the driver and his vehicle is authorized in order to insure the safety of the police officers and to prevent an escape.” 38 Ill.2d 353, 355.

On the authority of these decisions, the motion to suppress was properly denied.

The judgment of the appellate court is reversed, and the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.

Appellate court reversed; circuit court affirmed.

MR. JUSTICE CREES took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.