Filed 8/27/26 P. v. Norton CA2/8 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
THE PEOPLE, B338198
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. KA131685)
v.
WILLIE NORTON,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. David C. Brougham, Judge. Affirmed.
Debbie Yen, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Jason Tran and Taylor Nguyen, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_______________________________________
INTRODUCTION
A jury convicted defendant Willie Norton of one count of carjacking. On appeal, Norton argues: (1) the People failed to prove the force or fear and intent to deprive elements of carjacking; and (2) the trial court prejudicially erred when it did not instruct the jury on the defense of unconsciousness. We reject Norton’s arguments and affirm.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Early one morning in September 2022, Raul Valdez was driving on the freeway in Los Angeles County when he saw Norton’s car crash into a barrier and flip over. Valdez stopped his car on the side of the freeway and walked toward the flipped car. As he approached Norton’s car, Valdez saw that no one was inside it. Valdez then saw Norton run across the freeway and enter the driver’s side door of Valdez’s car.
As Valdez approached his car, Norton tried to start it by pressing the ignition button. When Valdez opened the driver’s side door, Norton pressed the ignition button again and the car started. After Valdez reached inside the car and turned off the engine, Norton repeatedly said “[t]his is my car.” Norton then pushed Valdez’s shoulder or chest with a “stiff arm,” causing Valdez to step back about a foot away from the car.
Norton started Valdez’s car again. Although Valdez believed that Norton was going to take his car, Valdez did not want to get into a fight on the freeway. Valdez asked Norton if he could retrieve his phone and backpack from his car. Norton handed Valdez his phone and a pocketknife that was in a front cupholder. Norton also threw Valdez’s backpack at Valdez, causing him to step another foot back from the car. Norton then drove off with Valdez’s car.
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Valdez noticed that Norton had a cut on his head. Valdez had no medical training or expertise, but he assumed that Norton may have been dazed or suffering from a concussion “due to his cut on his forehead and what he kept repeating.”
The police recovered Valdez’s car later that morning at Norton’s home in the city of Perris, about 40 miles from the scene of the altercation.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The People charged Norton with one count of carjacking (Pen. Code,1 § 215, subd. (a)). The People alleged that Norton suffered two prior strike convictions. The People also alleged two aggravating sentencing factors.
A jury found Norton guilty of carjacking. After the People dismissed one of the prior strike allegations, Norton admitted the other prior strike allegation and one aggravating sentencing factor. The trial court sentenced Norton to 10 years in prison, consisting of the middle term of five years for carjacking, doubled under the “Three Strikes” law.
Norton appeals.
DISCUSSION
1. Substantial evidence supports Norton’s carjacking conviction Norton argues insufficient evidence supports his carjacking conviction. First, he argues that the People failed to prove that he used sufficient force or fear to take Valdez’s car. Second, Norton argues that there was no evidence that he intended to deprive Valdez of his car. Norton does not challenge any other
1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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element of his conviction. As we explain, substantial evidence supports Norton’s conviction.
1.1. Applicable law and standard of review The crime of carjacking requires proof that: (1) the defendant took a vehicle that belonged to someone else; (2) from the immediate presence of a person who possessed the vehicle or was a passenger in the vehicle; (3) against that person’s will; (4) through the use of force or fear; and (5) with the intent to temporarily or permanently deprive that person of possession of the vehicle. (§ 215, subd. (a); People v. Magallanes (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 529, 534.)
Carjacking requires proof of substantially the same force or fear necessary to prove the crime of robbery. (People v. Hudson (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 831, 835 (Hudson).) Thus, cases discussing that element in the robbery context provide guidance for evaluating whether the People proved a defendant used sufficient force or fear to complete the crime of carjacking. (Ibid.)
The terms “force” and “fear” have no technical meaning in the law. (Hudson, supra, 11 Cal.App.5th at p. 836.) The amount of force used to take the property need not be great. (Id. at p. 835.) All that is required is force exceeding what is necessary to seize the property, such as force sufficient to overcome the victim’s resistance. (People v. Anderson (2011) 51 Cal.4th 989, 995; Hudson, at pp. 835–836.)
Carjacking also requires proof that the defendant acted with the intent to permanently or temporarily deprive the victim of the vehicle. (People v. Gomez (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 609, 618, disapproved of on other grounds in People v. Elizalde (2015) 61 Cal.4th 523, 538, fn. 9.) The intent to deprive “must exist before or during the use of force or fear.” (Gomez, at p. 618.)
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The necessary “intent to deprive the owner of possession of his car may be inferred from all the facts and circumstances of the particular case.” (People v. Green (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 165, 181.)
When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we view the record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable jury could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Wilson (2008) 44 Cal.4th 758, 806.) We make all reasonable inferences in support of the judgment. (Ibid.) We do not reweigh the evidence or reevaluate the credibility of witnesses. (People v. Lindberg (2008) 45 Cal.4th 1, 27.) If the evidence reasonably justifies the jury’s findings, we will not reverse the judgment even if the evidence also supports a contrary finding. (People v. Cravens (2012) 53 Cal.4th 500, 508.) As we explain, substantial evidence supports Norton’s conviction.
1.2. There was substantial evidence of force Here, the evidence supports a finding that Norton used sufficient force to complete the crime of carjacking. After Norton entered Valdez’s car and started its engine, Valdez reached inside the car to shut off the engine. Norton used a “stiff arm” to shove Valdez’s shoulder and push Valdez out of the car, causing Valdez to step about a foot away from the car. Norton then restarted the car, removed Valdez’s belongings from the car, and drove away. Valdez testified that he decided not to try to reenter his car or otherwise regain possession of it after Norton pushed him because he did not want to get into an altercation on the freeway. Norton, therefore, used sufficient force to overcome Valdez’s resistance.
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Norton cites a series of cases affirming robbery and carjacking convictions where the defendants used arguably greater force to accomplish their crimes than what he used in this case. (See, e.g., Hudson, supra, 11 Cal.App.5th at pp. 836–840 [defendant driving off in stolen car while victim tried to prevent the theft by opening car’s door and banging on the car’s trunk was sufficient force for carjacking]; People v. Lopez (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 1230 [defendant driving faster than was necessary to move stolen car while the victim held on to the outside of the car was sufficient force for carjacking]; People v. Gomez (2008) 43 Cal.4th 249, 265 [defendant shooting at the victim was sufficient force for robbery].) Norton argues that because he used less force than the defendants in these cases, the People failed to prove he used sufficient force for carjacking.
Norton’s argument is misguided. None of the cases that he cites holds that the force used by the defendant constitutes a baseline or minimum amount of force necessary to establish robbery or carjacking. The fact that those cases upheld robbery and carjacking convictions where the defendants used arguably greater force than what Norton used in this case does not mean that Norton’s use of force here was insufficient to support a carjacking conviction.
Indeed, other cases have held that a defendant’s use of less force against a victim than what Norton used in this case was sufficient to establish robbery. For instance, our colleagues in Division Seven concluded that the defendant’s “rather polite” tap to move the victim out of the way so that he could reach into a cash register was sufficient force for robbery. (See People v. Garcia (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1246, overruled on other grounds by People v. Mosby (2004) 33 Cal.4th 353, 365, fns. 2 &
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3.) Similarly, our colleagues in the Third District held that the defendant used sufficient force for robbery when he “nudged or shoved” the victim at an ATM. (People v. Mullins (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 594, 604.) As the court explained, the defendant used sufficient force to overcome the victim’s resistance when he “touched [the victim’s arm], cut in front of [the victim], and prevented [the victim] from pushing the button to prevent another transaction [at the ATM] from occurring.” (Id. at p. 604.)
In short, substantial evidence supports a finding that Norton used sufficient force to support his carjacking conviction.2 1.3. There was substantial evidence of an intent to deprive
The evidence also supports a finding that Norton intended to deprive Valdez of his car. That Norton left his car and ran across the freeway before entering Valdez’s car supports an inference that Norton was aware he was in someone else’s car when he took it. Likewise, Norton heard and responded to Valdez’s request that Norton return Valdez’s belongings that were inside the car, further supporting an inference that Norton knew the car did not belong to him. An intent to deprive is also supported by the facts that Norton physically prevented Valdez from regaining possession of the car and soon after fled the scene of the altercation in Valdez’s car before driving it more than 40 miles to his home in a different county.
2 Because there was substantial evidence to support a finding that Norton took Valdez’s car by force, we need not determine whether there also was substantial evidence to support a finding that Norton took the car through fear.
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Norton argues that the evidence more strongly supports a finding that he did not intend to steal Valdez’s car because he was confused, and likely concussed, following the crash and believed that he was trying to drive away in his own car. Norton points to evidence that he suffered an apparent head injury during or after the crash, he claimed that Valdez’s car was his own, and he returned Valdez’s belongings before fleeing the scene. Norton made this same argument to the jury, however, and the jury rejected it. As we just explained, the evidence, including many of the facts that Norton relies on, amply supports the jury’s finding that he intended to steal Valdez’s car. We cannot second guess that finding simply because there also was evidence to support a contrary finding. (See People v. Westerfield (2019) 6 Cal.5th 632, 713.) 2. The trial court was not required to instruct on the defense of unconsciousness Norton next contends that the trial court prejudicially erred when it did not instruct on unconsciousness as a defense to carjacking. Unconsciousness, if not voluntarily induced, is a complete defense to a criminal charge. (People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 887 (Rogers).) “To constitute a defense, unconsciousness need not rise to the level of coma or inability to walk or perform manual movements; it can exist ‘where the subject physically acts but is not, at the time, conscious of acting.’ ” (People v. Halverson (2007) 42 Cal.4th 379, 417 (Halverson).) Unconsciousness can result from “somnambulism, a blow on the head, or similar cause.” (People v. Sedeno (1974) 10 Cal.3d 703, 717, overruled on other grounds by People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 175–178.)
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The trial court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on the defense of unconsciousness if it appears the defendant is relying on that defense, or if there is substantial evidence to support the defense and it is not inconsistent with the defendant’s theory of the case. (Halverson, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 417.) When determining whether a defense instruction is supported by substantial evidence, “the trial court does not determine the credibility of the defense evidence, but only whether ‘there was evidence which, if believed by the jury, was sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt.’ ” (People v. Salas (2006) 37 Cal.4th 967, 982.) “A criminal defendant has the burden of producing evidence that he was unconscious if he wishes to rely upon that defense.” (People v. Froom (1980) 108 Cal.App.3d 820, 830.)
Here, Norton never asked the trial court to instruct on unconsciousness. Although Valdez testified that Norton appeared dazed or concussed, no witnesses testified that Norton was unconscious at any time leading up to or during the carjacking. And while defense counsel argued to the jury that Norton lacked the intent to steal Valdez’s car because he likely was concussed and confused throughout his altercation with Valdez, counsel never argued that Norton was unconscious. Thus, the court was obligated to give an instruction on unconsciousness only if substantial evidence supported it. (Rogers, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 887.) As we explain, there was insufficient evidence to support such an instruction.
Immediately after he crashed his car, Norton was able to engage in the following conduct: (1) exit his car, run across the freeway, and locate Valdez’s car; (2) enter the driver’s seat of Valdez’s car and press the ignition button to start the car’s engine; (3) recognize that Valdez was trying to regain possession
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of the car and push Valdez away from the car after Valdez turned off the car’s engine; (4) restart the car’s engine after pushing Valdez away from the car; (5) respond to Valdez’s request to return Valdez’s personal belongings that were still in the car; and (6) drive the car over 40 miles from the scene of the altercation to his home in a different county. This type of “complicated and purposive” conduct “makes clear that [Norton] did not lack awareness of his actions during the course of the offense[],” such that the record did not support an unconsciousness instruction. (Halverson, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 418; see also People v. Carlson (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 695, 704 [evidence that defendant entered and started car, navigated roads and highways, and later responded to questions demonstrated that unconsciousness instruction was not warranted].)
Norton’s reliance on People v. Gana (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 598 (Gana) is misplaced. One of the victims in that case testified that the defendant’s eyes were wide open and her face lacked emotion when she shot her husband. (Id. at p. 609.) An investigating officer reported that the defendant had “ ‘a thousand mile stare,’ ” and paramedics stated that the defendant remained silent when asked a series of standard questions. (Ibid.) The defendant also presented medical expert testimony. (Id. at pp. 603–604, 609–610.) Before the shooting, the defendant had been prescribed multiple drugs and steroids that could cause psychosis. (Ibid.) A psychiatrist testified that on the day of the shooting, the defendant suffered from a psychotic depression and “was experiencing a delirium, which is a kind of fluctuating level of consciousness.” (Id. at pp. 604, 610.) In addition, a psychologist testified that the defendant was suffering from
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clinical depression when she committed the charged offenses. (Id. at p. 604.)
The reviewing court in Gana concluded that the trial court should have instructed on unconsciousness because the evidence supported such a defense. (Gana, supra, 236 Cal.App.4th at pp. 609–610.) The reviewing court concluded that any error was harmless, however, because the jury was afforded the opportunity to consider how the defendant’s medical condition and prescriptions affected her ability to form the requisite intent and malice, and its verdicts and findings showed that it “clearly ‘rejected defendant’s [mental state] defense.’ ” (Id. at pp. 610– 611.)
Gana is distinguishable from this case. Here, there was scant evidence addressing Norton’s mental condition leading up to and during the carjacking. Norton did not testify that he was unconscious during, or could not otherwise remember the events surrounding, the carjacking. While Norton repeatedly stated that Valdez’s car was his (Norton’s) car, that evidence suggests, at most, that Norton was confused about whose car he was trying to take, not that he was unaware of his actions. Indeed, as we already discussed, Norton was aware of Valdez’s presence and able to respond to Valdez’s requests to return Valdez’s belongings, and Norton engaged in a series of complicated and purposeful conduct throughout his altercation with Valdez. In addition, although Valdez testified that Norton had a cut on his head and appeared to be concussed or dazed, Valdez did not testify that Norton appeared to be unconscious or otherwise unaware of his actions leading up to and during the carjacking. In any event, Valdez later testified that he had no medical training or expertise “with respect to evaluating head injuries”
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and that he simply “made an assumption that [Norton] might have a concussion.” No doctors or other medical experts testified that Norton suffered a head injury before the carjacking or that he otherwise exhibited any signs of being unconscious when he took Valdez’s car.
In short, the evidence did not support an unconsciousness defense. The trial court, therefore, did not err by not instructing on that defense.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
VIRAMONTES, J.
WE CONCUR:
STRATTON, P. J.
WILEY, J.