People v. Norfleet

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: June 29, 2026
• Docket: 1-26-0828
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

2026 IL App (1st) 260828-U FIRST DISTRICT, SIXTH DIVISION June 29, 2026

No. 1-26-0828B

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). _____________________________________________________________________________

IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT _____________________________________________________________________________

) Appeal from the THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Circuit Court of ) Cook County, Illinois. Plaintiff-Appellee, ) v. ) No. 24 CR 0519001 ) MAURICE NORFLEET, ) Honorable ) Patrick Coughlin, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge Presiding. _____________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE GAMRATH delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice C.A. Walker and Justice Pucinski concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: We affirm the circuit court’s order for continued detention and denial of the defendant’s motion for relief.

¶2 On a late morning in April 2024, the victim Destiny Young was driving on a residential

street in Lansing, Illinois, when a stranger, defendant Maurice Norfleet, shot at her vehicle four

times, striking a rear window once. Norfleet was subsequently charged with attempted first-degree

murder, aggravated discharge of a firearm, aggravated unlawful use of a weapon, and unlawful

use or possession of a weapon by a felon. Upon the State’s motion, the trial court ordered Norfleet No. 1-26-0828B

to be detained before trial. Norfleet filed a motion for relief from pretrial detention, which the trial

court denied. We affirm.

¶3 BACKGROUND

¶4 Norfleet was arrested on April 29, 2024, and charged and indicted on three counts of

attempted first-degree murder, two counts of aggravated discharge of a firearm, one count of

aggravated unlawful use of a weapon, and one count of unlawful use or possession of a weapon

by a felon. On April 30, 2024, the State filed a petition for a pretrial detention hearing, alleging

that Norfleet committed the eligible offense of attempted first-degree murder, posed a real and

present threat to the safety of any person or the community, and that no conditions of release could

mitigate that threat. See 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a)(4) (West 2022). A hearing was held the same day.

¶5 According to the State’s proffer, Destiny Young was driving north on Chicago Avenue in

Lansing around 11:20 a.m. on April 29, 2024. After realizing she had forgotten something at a

friend’s house, she turned onto Flanigan Drive to make a three-point turn. As she turned left, she

heard a “loud pop” she first believed was a firework. Facing west, she saw a man, later identified

as Norfleet, standing in front of 2985 Flanigan Drive with both arms extended, pointing a firearm

at her. She described the weapon as a “firearm that had a single handle and was larger than a

standard handgun.” Norfleet fired another shot, which missed. As Destiny reversed and turned

south, he fired a third round, shattering the rear passenger window and lodging in a stool she was

carrying in the back seat. She heard a fourth gunshot as she drove away and returned to her friend’s

home to call police.

¶6 Officers canvassing the area encountered Norfleet outside his home at 2977 Flanigan

Drive, next door to where Destiny saw him standing. Destiny identified him on scene as the

shooter. Police recovered spent 7.62x39mm casings in front of 2977 and 2985 Flanigan. A search

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warrant at Norfleet’s residence uncovered thirteen firearms, including an “AK-47 style pistol”

loaded with 7.62x39mm rounds just inside the front door. A fired round matching the ammunition

was recovered from Destiny’s vehicle. Norfleet had prior felony drug convictions in 2008 and

2006.

¶7 The State argued that Norfleet committed the eligible offense of attempted first-degree

murder and posed a real and present threat because the shooting was “seemingly completely

random” and occurred in broad daylight. The State asserted Norfleet could “walk onto any street

at any point” with a firearm he was prohibited from possessing and “just shoot at people,” as he

did here. The State maintained that GPS or electronic monitoring would not limit his access to

firearms and would leave him with unmonitored movement for at least two days to contact Destiny

or other potential victims.

¶8 Defense counsel argued that the police reports and Destiny’s descriptions contained

“multiple different discrepancies,” and that additional physical evidence, such as gunshot residue

testing results or video from nearby doorbell cameras, was lacking. Counsel asserted the firearms

belonged to Norfleet’s wife, who had a Firearm Owners Identification (FOID) and Concealed

Carry License (CCL). He argued Norfleet was not a danger and that less restrictive conditions

could mitigate any risk he presents because he had lived in Illinois his entire life, had no violent

criminal history, was employed, 48 years old, married with a family, and recently called police

about crime in the neighborhood after being robbed.

¶9 The circuit court denied pretrial release, finding the “proof is evident and the presumption

is great” that Norfleet committed attempted first-degree murder; that he “poses a real and present

threat to the safety of any person or the community based on the specific articulable facts of the

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case”; and no less restrictive conditions of release would suffice to mitigate the threat he posed. In

a written order, the court ordered Norfleet detained pending trial.

¶ 10 Norfleet filed a notice of appeal on May 7, 2024, and an amended notice on May 13, 2024.

On May 23, 2024, we granted his motion to dismiss the appeal as premature.

¶ 11 On June 5, 2024, Norfleet filed a motion for relief under Illinois Supreme Court Rule

604(h), repeating the arguments made at the detention hearing. He also argued that being “charged

with violent felonies alone is insufficient” to establish that no conditions could mitigate the risk.

An amended motion followed on June 11, 2024. Although there is no hearing transcript, the record

demonstrates the court found continued detention necessary on June 5, June 12, July 10, August

9, and September 3, 2024.

¶ 12 On October 4, 2024, Norfleet filed a motion to “Readdress the Necessity of Continued

Detention,” again raising prior arguments and attempting to distinguish his case from other

authority. The court again found continued detention necessary on October 7, November 18, and

December 6, 2024, and on January 13, and February 11, 2025.

¶ 13 On May 20, 2025, defense counsel withdrew, and Norfleet elected to proceed pro se. He

filed a pro se Motion to Dismiss the Indictment on June 11, 2025, and a Motion to Quash Arrest

and Suppress Evidence on July 28, 2025. On October 10, 2025, counsel again represented him.

The court found continued detention necessary on October 10 and November 7, 2025, and on

January 7, February 11, and March 27, 2026.

¶ 14 On March 27, 2026, Norfleet filed another motion for relief, again asserting the State failed

to meet its burden of proof for all three prongs required for detention. On April 24, 2026, Norfleet

filed an amended motion, arguing for the first time that the State “violated the disclosure

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requirements of the Pre-Trial Fairness Act by failing to disclose the substance of statements which

they relied upon” at the initial detention hearing.

¶ 15 At the April 27, 2026 hearing on the amended motion, defense counsel first addressed the

alleged disclosure violation, and then repeated the earlier arguments: that the State failed to

establish by clear and convincing evidence that the proof was evident or the presumption great that

he committed attempted first-degree murder, that Norfleet’s nonviolent criminal history undercut

any finding of dangerousness, and that less restrictive conditions could mitigate any risk.

¶ 16 The State responded that all discovery available at the initial hearing had been tendered

and defense counsel had agreed he was ready to proceed. The State emphasized Destiny’s

identification of Norfleet, the thirteen firearms found in Norfleet’s home, and the matching shell

casings and ammunition recovered from the home. It argued that the random nature of the shooting

showed dangerousness, and that GPS or monitoring would not prevent Norfleet from acquiring or

using firearms to randomly shoot at other people near his home.

¶ 17 The trial court rejected the alleged disclosure violation, noting that “whatever the State had,

they had tendered as far as reports.” The court then found the State met all three detention prongs

and therefore denied Norfleet’s motion for relief. The court relied on Destiny’s identification and

ballistics evidence for the first prong and characterized the shooting as an “unprovoked, random”

attack showing danger to “anybody passing by the residence.” It concluded that home confinement

would not lessen the danger and denied the motion. Norfleet timely appealed.

¶ 18 ANALYSIS

¶ 19 The State charged Norfleet with attempted first-degree murder (720 ILCS 5/8-4(a), 9-

1(a)(1) (West 2024)), which is a detainable offense. 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a)(1.5), (7). Norfleet

argues that the State failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the proof was evident

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or the presumption great that he committed attempted first-degree murder, that he posed a real and

present threat to any person or the community, and that no less restrictive conditions could mitigate

that threat. We disagree.

¶ 20 Under the Pretrial Fairness Act (Act), “[a]ll defendants shall be presumed eligible for

pretrial release.” Pub. Act 104-417, § 1075 (eff. Aug. 15, 2025) (amending 725 ILCS 5/110-

6.1(e)). A court may order detention when the State establishes, by clear and convincing evidence

that: (1) the proof is evident or the presumption great that a defendant has committed a detainable

offense; (2) the defendant’s pretrial release poses a real and present threat to the safety of any

person or persons or the community based on the specific, articulable facts of the case; and (3) no

condition or combination of conditions can mitigate that threat. 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(e). Clear and

convincing proof requires more than a preponderance of the evidence but less than proof beyond

a reasonable doubt. People v. Clay, 361 Ill. App. 3d 310, 322 (2005). Where, as here, the State

proceeds by proffer, our standard of review is de novo. People v. Morgan, 2025 IL 130626, ¶ 54.

¶ 21 As to the first prong, we reject Norfleet’s argument that the alleged inconsistencies in

Destiny’s descriptions made the State’s evidence insufficient. The proffer showed that Destiny

attempted to turn her vehicle around on a residential street in broad daylight when Norfleet, who

did not know her but had apparently been robbed recently, began shooting at her. Before Destiny

could drive away, Norfleet fired four shots, one of which shattered her rear passenger window.

During the shooting, Destiny saw Norfleet standing outside a home next to his own with both arms

extended and a gun in hand. Police later found Norfleet in front of his home, recovered spent shell

casings in front of both homes, recovered a spent round from Destiny’s vehicle, and recovered

thirteen firearms from Norfleet’s home, including an “AK-47 style pistol” loaded with ammunition

matching the casings and round recovered. This evidence was sufficient to show by clear and

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convincing evidence that the proof was evident or the presumption great that Norfleet committed

attempted first-degree murder. The inconsistencies Norfleet cites, such as the clothing Norfleet

may have worn or a car he may have driven, are minor considering Destiny’s same-day in-person

identification and corroborating ballistics evidence.

¶ 22 Norfleet next argues the State failed to establish that he posed a real and present threat to

the safety of the community and that no conditions could mitigate the threat he posed. Norfleet

points to his age, family ties, and lack of prior violent convictions. But as courts have recognized,

“the nature and circumstances of the offense charged is the prime consideration in determining the

conditions of release, if any ([725 ILCS 5/] §110-5(a)(1)), and in denying pretrial release (id. §

110-6.1(a)), including in making the dangerousness determination (id. § 110-6.1(g)(1)).”

(Emphasis in original.) People v. Carpenter, 2024 IL App (1st) 240037, ¶ 14.

¶ 23 Here, Norfleet’s conduct demonstrates a quick temper, a willingness to employ serious

violence based on an unfounded perceived threat, and a disregard for the surrounding community.

The finding of dangerousness was not grounded solely in the charged offense but in the

circumstances surrounding it: Norfleet opened fire on a complete stranger in the middle of the day

on a residential street. See 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(g). The proffered evidence amply supports the

conclusion that he poses a real and present threat to the safety of the community.

¶ 24 The record also supports the conclusion that no alternative measures, including electronic

home monitoring or GPS, could adequately mitigate that danger. The shooting was an intentional

act directed at a stranger who simply turned her vehicle around near his home. The random nature

of the gunfire endangered not only Destiny but anyone nearby. As the circuit court recognized,

confining Norfleet to his home would not meaningfully reduce the danger when he was alleged to

have been standing steps from that same home when he opened fire. Defense counsel’s assertion

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that the thirteen firearms belonged solely to Norfleet’s wife, who had a valid FOID and CCL, only

underscores how easily he could access firearms despite being legally prohibited from possessing

them. And as noted in People v. Thomas, 2024 IL App (4th) 240248, ¶ 26, electronic monitoring

does not eliminate serious concerns about noncompliance, particularly where the potential

consequences are grave.

¶ 25 Finally, we reject Norfleet’s claim that the State violated its disclosure obligation at the

initial detention hearing. Under the Act, the State must tender before the hearing “copies of the

defendant’s criminal history available, any written or recorded statements, and the substance of

any oral statements made by any person, if relied upon by the State in its petition, and any police

reports in the prosecutor’s possession at the time of the hearing.” 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(f)(1).

Norfleet asserts that the State failed to disclose the substance of statements relied upon, but he

identifies neither the statements nor authority supporting his claim beyond citing the statute.

¶ 26 In People v. Ramyyeh, 2024 IL App (1st) 240299, we reaffirmed that the State is required

to tender only the reports and information in its possession and relied upon in filing the petition.

Id. ¶ 13 (citing People v. Chapman, 2024 IL App (1st) 231879-U, ¶ 21; People v. Morales, 2023

IL App (2d) 230334, ¶ 8). There, the State was not obligated to tender video statements not yet in

its possession, and its summaries of those statements sufficed at the detention stage. Id. ¶ 17.

¶ 27 Likewise, nothing indicates the State possessed undisclosed recorded statements. Before

the hearing, defense counsel acknowledge receipt of “the LEADS and criminal history, the petition

for pretrial detention hearing, *** two different felony complaints” and one six-page report from

Lansing police. The State indicated that was the only report it had, and defense counsel confirmed

he was ready to proceed with the hearing. The detention hearing occurred one day after the

shooting, well before full discovery could reasonably be complete. The Act recognizes this reality,

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stating: “The pre-trial detention hearing is not to be used for purposes of discovery, and the post

arraignment rules of discovery do not apply.” 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(f)(4). The record shows the

State complied with its disclosure obligations here.

¶ 28 Based on our review of the record, we find the circuit court correctly denied Norfleet’s

motion for relief and therefore affirm the order denying him pretrial release.

¶ 29 CONCLUSION

¶ 30 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of the circuit court of Cook County.

¶ 31 Affirmed.

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