People v. Navarro

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: April 17, 2026
• Docket: 1-21-1543
• Status: Published

Opinion

2026 IL App (1st) 211543-B No. 1-21-1543 Opinion filed April 17, 2026 Sixth Division

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIRST DISTRICT

) THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) ) Appeal from the Circuit Court Plaintiff-Appellee, ) of Cook County. ) v. ) No. 04 CR 10345 ) ANGEL NAVARRO, ) The Honorable ) Stanley J. Sacks, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.

JUSTICE HYMAN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Presiding Justice C.A. Walker and Justice Oden Johnson concurred in the judgment and opinion. OPINION

¶1 Actual innocence claims are an indispensable mechanism against wrongful convictions,

one of the gravest injustices known in law. When faced with an actual innocence claim, courts

bear a solemn responsibility to ensure that justice emerges clad in the robes of rectitude.

¶2 Angel Navarro argues that his successive petition asserted newly discovered evidence that

bore on actual innocence. We agree. Navarro has raised the sliver of doubt necessary to establish

a “colorable claim” and advance to second-stage postconviction proceedings. His pleading

contains newly discovered evidence unavailable at the time of trial in the form of the investigating 1-21-1543-B

officer’s prior record of police misconduct, which is material to his guilt or innocence, is non-

cumulative in nature, and could potentially undermine the verdict.

¶3 In remanding for second-stage proceedings, we reassigned the case to a different circuit

court judge. The State sought leave to appeal in the Illinois Supreme Court. While leave was

denied, the Court directed us to reconsider our directive in light of People v. Class, 2025 IL

129695. Class addressed when an appellate court may sua sponte order the reassignment on I remand. After reconsidering under Class, we find this record inadequate to support a sua sponte

reassignment on remand.

¶4 We reverse the denial of the motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition

and remand for a second-stage hearing.

¶5 Background

¶6 In April 2004, Josue Guerra was killed after being shot in the back. A short time later,

police arrested Navarro on a nearby parkway. Witnesses Artemio Magdaleno, Heber Garcia, and

Carlos Colon testified that Navarro shot at Guerra three times.

¶7 According to Magdaleno, on that night, he, Guerra, and some friends were walking to a

store on Fullerton Avenue, when they encountered Navarro with a group of about five or six men.

Navarro asked them, “[W]hat [sic] you looking at?” According to Magdaleno, one of his friends

replied, “[W]e ain’t [sic] looking at you.” After that, Magdaleno, Guerra, and the others continued

to the store. After they left, the group went through an alley to Leclaire Avenue and then proceeded

on Leclaire Avenue towards Montana Street. As they did, Magdaleno heard a gunshot and bent

down. Looking across Montana Street, Magdaleno saw Navarro’s face. Magdaleno ran home but

later returned as Guerra was placed into an ambulance.

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¶8 On cross-examination, Magdaleno maintained that, although it was dark outside during the

shooting, he could see Navarro’s face lit from the gun firing. Magdaleno said some of his friends

stood between him and the shooter and ran towards him during the shooting but did not block his

view of Navarro.

¶9 Garcia and Colon were at home when they heard gunshots.

¶ 10 Garcia was unloading bicycles from his truck parked along Leclaire Avenue. He heard a

gunshot coming from around the intersection of Leclaire Avenue and Montana Street. He turned

and saw Navarro, standing alone on Leclaire Avenue, pointing a gun. Garcia and wife dashed

inside their apartment building. Garcia heard two more gunshots and saw Navarro walking along

the opposite side of Leclaire Avenue. He could “completely” see Navarro’s face. Navarro had on

a white or light-colored short-sleeved shirt and white pants. Garcia saw Navarro put a gun

“somewhere in [his] clothes.” Police officers arrived and yelled to Navarro, who ran with the

officers in pursuit.

¶ 11 On cross-examination, Garcia conceded that he saw the shooter fire only the first shot and

could not see the shooter for about 10 seconds, during which he and his wife went inside. Garcia

estimated Navarro was about 30 feet away.

¶ 12 Colon was on the second floor of his apartment building, about 35 feet from Navarro. Just

before the shooting, Colon was looking through his window to check on his car parked on the

street. Colon heard a gunshot and saw the side and front of the face of someone holding a gun,

whom he later identified as Navarro. He had an unobstructed view of the shooter; at least two

streetlights lit the area. The shooter wore a white or light-colored shirt and cream-colored

sweatpants. Colon saw the shooter put the gun in his waist after the shooting. Police officers soon

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arrived, and the shooter ran into an alley, at which point Colon lost sight of him. On cross-

examination, Colon testified that it was dark outside.

¶ 13 Chicago police officer John Meer testified that he and his partner, Kevin Murphy, had been

on routine patrol in a marked police squad car in the area of the shooting. Around 8:00 p.m., Meer

heard gunshots, and they responded. On reaching Leclaire Avenue, Meer saw Navarro running

north, away from Montana Street. During the State’s questioning, defense counsel stipulated that

Meer saw Navarro.

¶ 14 Meer stated that Navarro had on a white short-sleeved shirt and white or beige sweatpants.

Meer made eye contact with Navarro, who stopped. But when Meer gestured to Navarro to come

to the police car, Navarro ran through an alley. Meer went after him on foot. Meer estimated that

he was 15-20 feet behind Navarro. Meer saw Navarro pull a handgun from the waistband of his

pants and hold it while running through the alley and then through a gangway. Meer dashed

through a parallel gangway to Montana Street and spotted Navarro standing on the curb, wearing

a black hooded sweatshirt. Navarro took off again until Meer caught him in front of 5019 Montana

Street.

¶ 15 Meer searched Navarro but denied that he recovered a cell phone. Navarro was sweating

profusely and rubbing his hands on his clothes and on the seat of the police car. Meer drove

Navarro to the intersection of Leclaire Avenue and Montana Street for identification by

Magdaleno, Garcia, and Colon. Navarro stood outside the police car, illuminated by either police

flood lights or flashlights. He was wearing handcuffs and a black sweatshirt. All three identified

Navarro.

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¶ 16 On cross-examination, Meer testified that at no time did he see Navarro in possession of a

black sweatshirt. Meer did not see Navarro put on the black sweatshirt and did not see where

Navarro might have acquired it.

¶ 17 Chicago police officer Peter Larcher, a forensic investigator, arrived about 65 minutes after

the shooting. Larcher swabbed Navarro’s hands for gunshot residue and tested Navarro’s black

long-sleeved hoodie sweatshirt, white short-sleeved T-shirt, and sweatpants. Larcher testified that

both Navarro’s hands were “negative” for gunshot residue. Larcher stated, “If the person was in

the vicinity of a gun that was fired or held a gun that had been fired, the test would come back

positive.” The squad car was never tested for gunshot residue.

¶ 18 Illinois State Police forensic scientist Robert Berk testified to why the gunshot residue tests

could be negative. He said gunshot residue on a hand will transfer to everything an individual

touches. Negative results indicated that Navarro did not discharge a firearm or that the gunshot

residue particles were removed by some activity, not deposited, or not detected by the testing

instrument.

¶ 19 Chicago police officer Roberto Serrano arrived to assist Meer and Murphy. Serrano

searched the area with a flashlight because it was dark. After “five to seven” minutes, Serrano

found a gun in the front yard of 5022 Montana Street and three spent 9-millimeter cartridges at the

corner of Leclaire Avenue and Montana Street.

¶ 20 Forensic testing determined that the recovered handgun fired the cartridges and neither the

handgun nor the cartridges contained fingerprints. The parties stipulated that DNA testing on the

recovered handgun was inconclusive.

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¶ 21 Defense Witnesses

¶ 22 Sonia Lugardo testified that she lived with Navarro in the neighborhood where the shooting

took place. Around 8 p.m., Lugardo was leaving work when she received a cell phone call from

Navarro, who had been at home with her children. According to Lugardo, she talked to Navarro

for a few minutes and went home, arriving at about 8:15 p.m. Police were present throughout the

neighborhood, and the streets were cordoned off.

¶ 23 Chicago Police Detective Demosthenes Balodimas testified that he interviewed Colon

regarding his view of the shooting. Colon did not tell Balodimas that he was looking out his

window at the time of the first gunshot but said he looked outside after he heard a gunshot.

¶ 24 Detective Dino Amato testified that he interviewed Navarro at the police station and could

not recall if Navarro had a cell phone.

¶ 25 The jury convicted Navarro. The trial court sentenced him to 60 years’ imprisonment for

first degree murder, which included a sentencing enhancement of 20 years for personally

discharging a firearm. 720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1) (West 2004).

¶ 26 Posttrial Proceedings

¶ 27 Navarro appealed, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel stipulated

that “responding police officers saw defendant running on a street near the scene of the underlying

fatal shooting shortly after that shooting.” People v. Navarro, 378 Ill. App. 3d 1123 (2008) (table)

(unpublished order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23) (Navarro I). Navarro also argued

improper rebuttal argument by the State and improper sentencing. The appellate court affirmed the

conviction and sentence and corrected the mittimus. Id. The Illinois Supreme Court denied

Navarro’s petition for leave to appeal.

¶ 28 In December 2008, Navarro filed his first postconviction petition.

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¶ 29 Navarro claimed that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to quash

identification evidence because the show-up was overly suggestive, taking place near the scene

with witnesses who saw him get out of the back of a police car. Navarro contended that the police

should have conducted a line-up or photo array instead. Navarro also claimed that trial counsel

was ineffective for failing to present mitigating circumstances during sentencing. As to appellate

counsel, Navarro claimed that his counsel’s decision to ignore those issues constituted

incompetence.

¶ 30 The postconviction court summarily dismissed the petition on January 6, 2009, finding that

the issues presented were “frivolous and patently without merit.” Navarro appealed, and this court

affirmed. People v. Navarro, 405 Ill. App. 3d 1201 (2011) (table) (unpublished order under Illinois

Supreme Court Rule 23) (Navarro II). The Navarro II court held that in dismissing the petition,

“the [postconviction judge] found that trial counsel did not err in deciding not to file a

motion to suppress the identification evidence because defendant failed to demonstrate that

the show-up conducted by Officer Meer was overly suggestive. The [postconviction judge]

further held that even if counsel had filed a successful motion to suppress, the outcome at

trial would have been the same because defendant could not escape the fact that the State

presented three eyewitnesses who unequivocally identified him as the shooter.” Navarro

II, slip order at 4.

¶ 31 In 2013, Navarro moved for additional ballistics testing, which was denied. Navarro

appealed, and in March 2016, this court affirmed because “IBIS testing of the bullet shells would

not materially advance Navarro’s claim of actual innocence.” People v. Navarro, 2015 IL App

(1st) 131550, ¶ 16 (Navarro III) (ballistics testing immaterial where several eyewitnesses

identified Navarro as shooter).

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¶ 32 In the meantime, Navarro filed a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request with the

Chicago Police Department, seeking “records, reports, and statements pertaining to his case.” See

5 ILCS 140/1 et seq. (West 2014). The Chicago Police Department did not produce the sought-

after records until August 2017.

¶ 33 In November 2019, Navarro moved pro se for leave to file a successive postconviction

petition. He alleged as cause that the FOIA request he filed in 2015 and the documents produced

in 2017 created a reason that the claims he would raise could not be asserted in his initial petition.

He alleged prejudice in that, had these documents been produced before trial and used, he would

not have been convicted.

¶ 34 In the proposed petition filed with the motion, Navarro raised several claims based on the

14 documents he received: (a) a Brady claim that the documents contained favorable evidence

improperly withheld (see Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)), (b) a claim that the State

knowingly used perjured testimony to obtain his conviction, relying on the documents which he

alleged contradicted the State’s trial evidence, and (c) ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim,

asserting that if the documents had been tendered, they were not shared with him nor were the

contradictions with the State’s trial evidence contained in them exploited by counsel. He also

asserted actual innocence.

¶ 35 The postconviction court summarized the exhibits attached to the petition as a “laundry list

of claimed errors *** none of which adds anything of consequence to his allegations.” The court

denied leave to file the petition, finding that most of the documents were repetitious of matters

raised at trial and, thus, could have been asserted on direct appeal and barred by forfeiture. The

court also found Navarro failed to meet the cause-and-prejudice standard required to initiate a

successive petition. Regarding the actual innocence claim, the court stated:

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“Navarro claims that he is ‘actually innocent’ based on alleged inconsistencies in

written statements, (perjured testimony); that the weapon that he used in the murder was

used in another crime and that he was not identified in that murder; that the arresting officer

in his case supposedly lied in an unrelated case; that he was belatedly provided with the

Freedom of Information Act materials. Navarro comes woefully short of establishing

‘actual innocence.’[citing] People v. Coleman (2013), IL 113307 (2013).”

¶ 36 Standard of Review

¶ 37 We review the sufficiency of a postconviction petition de novo because it poses a legal

question. People v. Robinson, 2020 IL 123849, ¶ 39.

¶ 38 Analysis

¶ 39 Each claim in a successive postconviction petition “must meet the applicable standard in

order to advance to second-stage postconviction proceedings.” People v. Griffin, 2024 IL 128587,

¶ 2; see 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f) (West 2018) (Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act)). An actual

innocence claim, as here, “does not depend on—and is separate from—a challenge to the

sufficiency of the evidence or an allegation of error in the court below.” People v. Reed, 2020 IL

124940, ¶ 29.

¶ 40 Griffin recognized that the bar to successive postconviction petitions may be relaxed in two

situations: (i) “if a petitioner can establish cause and prejudice for not raising the claim in an initial

postconviction petition” (Griffin, 2024 IL 128587, ¶ 32 (citing People v. Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill. 2d

444, 459 (2002))) and (ii) when the petitioner shows “actual innocence,” an exception not codified

in the Act, but “well established under Illinois law” (id. ¶ 33 (citing Robinson, 2020 IL 123849,

¶ 42)). The pivotal inquiry is whether the evidence supporting the postconviction petition casts

“the trial evidence in a different light and undermines the court’s confidence in the judgment of

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guilt.” Robinson, 2020 IL 123849, ¶ 48 (citing People v. Coleman, 2013 IL 113307, ¶ 97).

Critically, the new evidence does not have to be “entirely dispositive to be likely to alter the result

on retrial.” Id. “Probability, rather than certainty, is the key in considering whether the fact finder

would reach a different result after considering the prior evidence along with the new evidence.”

Id. The new evidence raised need not totally “vindicat[e]” or “exonerat[e]” the petitioner. Id. ¶ 55.

¶ 41 Navarro first argues that the court mistakenly applied the cause-and-prejudice test instead

of the colorable claim test and that the proposed successive petition asserted newly discovered

evidence that bore on actual innocence. Because our review is de novo, we undertake the same

analysis as the postconviction court without deferring to its reasoning.

¶ 42 The State asserts that even if cognizable as a freestanding claim of actual innocence,

Navarro still failed to make a colorable showing of actual innocence. The State also complains that

“[Navarro] did not include a claim of actual innocence in his proposed successive postconviction

petition but instead included a section ‘addressing’ actual innocence in his motion for leave to

file.” Navarro counters that additional documentation attached to the proposed successive petition,

particularly the record of professional complaints against officers Meer and Amato, sufficed to

warrant the initiation of successive postconviction proceedings.

¶ 43 We find the motion for leave to file and accompanying petition with documentation

compelling. See People v. Edwards, 2012 IL 111711, ¶ 24 (“[L]eave of court should be denied

only where it is clear, from a review of the successive petition and the documentation provided by

the petitioner[,] that, as a matter of law, the petitioner cannot set forth a colorable claim of actual

innocence.”).

¶ 44 Courts must not elevate form above substance in reviewing a pro se petitioner’s inartful

presentation. At this stage, our supreme court has established a low threshold for the survival of

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pro se petitions, like here, drafted by an individual without legal knowledge or training. See People

v. Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d 1, 9, 11-12 (2009) (“pro se petition seeking postconviction relief under the

Act for a denial of constitutional rights may be summarily dismissed as frivolous or patently

without merit only if the petition has no arguable basis either in law or in fact”). “Petitions filed

pro se must be given a liberal construction and are to be viewed with a lenient eye, allowing

borderline cases to proceed.” People v. Thomas, 2014 IL App (2d) 121001, ¶ 48.

¶ 45 This court’s opinion in People v. Plummer, 344 Ill. App. 3d 1016 (2003), provides guidance

in evaluating the State’s argument. See id. at 1020 (factual disputes raised by pleadings cannot be

resolved by motion to dismiss at either first or second stage of postconviction proceedings—they

only can be determined by evidentiary hearing). A pro se petitioner is not required to allege facts

supporting all elements of a constitutional claim. People v. Mars, 2012 IL App (2d) 110695, ¶ 32.

In Hodges—albeit an appeal from a summary dismissal of a first postconviction petition—the court

relied on the standard established in Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967), that “legal

points arguable on their merits” are “not frivolous.” Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d at 11; see People v.

Boclair, 202 Ill. 2d 89, 101 (2002) (defining “ ‘[f]rivolous’ ” as “ ‘of little weight or importance:

having no basis in law or fact’ ”; defining “ ‘[p]atently’ ” as “ ‘clearly, obviously, plainly’ ”; and

defining “ ‘[m]erit’ ” as “ ‘legal significance, standing, or importance’ ” (quoting Webster’s Third

New International Dictionary 913, 1654, 1414 (1993); Black’s Law Dictionary 677, 1147, 1003

(7th ed. 1999))).

¶ 46 We agree with Navarro that we must decide whether, as a matter of pleading, he has set

forth enough to warrant an opportunity to present his claims with the assistance of counsel.

¶ 47 The weakness of the State’s case involves (i) the arresting officer’s testimony that he

chased a man in a white T-shirt but arrested a man in a black sweatshirt and (ii) the inherently

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suggestive and unreliable show-up procedure substituted for a line-up or photo array. The police

brought Navarro before the witnesses (two of them simultaneously) while handcuffed, illuminating

him with flashlights and possibly a spotlight and asking if this was the shooter. Navarro maintains

that recently acquired evidence of misconduct by Meer raised a colorable claim of actual

innocence.

¶ 48 The State next contends that even if as newly discovered evidence of a pattern of

misconduct, the petitioner’s claim fails because that evidence is immaterial and cumulative. We

reject the State’s argument as contrary to the law. “Evidence is material if it is relevant and

probative of the petitioner’s innocence.” Robinson, 2020 IL 123849, ¶ 47. Moreover, evidence is

noncumulative when it “adds to the information that the fact finder heard at trial.” Id.

¶ 49 The issue of Meer’s credibility is material. Meer claimed to have seen Navarro pull a gun

out during a foot chase, but he could not explain how Navarro emerged from the alleyway wearing

a black sweatshirt just 10-15 seconds after Meer lost sight of him. Meer did not see a black

sweatshirt before the abrupt change of clothing, during which Navarro was running. And evidence

of Meer’s background was noncumulative—the jury had no basis to know about or evaluate his

credibility in light of the Office of Professional Standards files.

¶ 50 As in People v. Tyler, 2015 IL App (1st) 123470, ¶ 186, where evidence of police

misconduct was newly discovered and had the potential to alter the outcome, “[e]ven one incident

of similar misconduct by the same detectives can be sufficient to show intent, plan, motive, and

could impeach the officers’ credibility.” We find that Navarro’s motion for leave to file a

successive postconviction petition should have been allowed and the petition advanced to the

second stage.

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¶ 51 On Remand

¶ 52 In our original opinion, we sua sponte remanded for reassignment to a new circuit judge

under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 366(a)(5) (eff. Feb. 1, 1994). After issuing People v. Class,

2025 IL 129695, the Illinois Supreme Court directed us to reconsider the reassignment in light of

Class. In Class, the court held that, in postconviction proceedings, an appellate court cannot sua I sponte “order reassignment to a new circuit judge for reasons other than bias, potential bias, or

prejudice on the part of the prior circuit court judge.” Id. ¶ 1; People v. Anderson, 2026 IL App

(1st) 200462-C, ¶ 244 (“ ‘Allegedly erroneous findings and rulings by the trial court are

insufficient reasons to believe that the court has a personal bias for or against a litigant.’ ” (quoting

Eychaner v. Gross, 202 Ill. 2d 228, 280 (2002))).

¶ 53 Having considered the criteria in Class for sua sponte reassignment, we conclude that the

record does not warrant reassignment.

¶ 54 Reversed and remanded for second stage proceedings.

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People v. Navarro, 2026 IL App (1st) 211543-B

Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 04-CR- 10345; the Hon. Stanley J. Sacks, Judge, presiding.

Attorneys James E. Chadd, Douglas R. Hoff, and Robert Hirschhorn, of for State Appellate Defender’s Office, of Chicago, for appellant. Appellant:

Attorneys Kimberly M. Foxx, State’s Attorney, of Chicago (Enrique for Abraham, Brian A. Levitsky, and Sara McGann, Assistant Appellee: State’s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.

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