IN THE SUI>ERIOR COURT OF GUAM 2
3 THE PEOPLE OF GUAM, )
) CRIMINAL CASE NO. CM0868-ll 4 VS. )
5 ) DECISION AND ORDER JONES NAKAMURA, )
6 )
Defendant. )
7
8 INTRODUCTION
9 This matter came before the Honorable James L. Canto II on the Defendant's second lO motion to reconsider, filed December 11, 2012. Oral arguments were heard on January 7, 2013.
11 Assistant Attorney General Gabrielle L. Rossi, Esq. appeared on behalf of the Government and 12 Assistant Public Defender Suresh Sampath, Esq. represented the Defendant. Having considered 13 the parties' briefs, oral arguments, and the applicable law, the Court now issues the following 14 Decision and Order.
15 BACKGROUND
16 Defendant is charged with driving under the influence of alcohol and reckless driving 17 based upon the following events. On August 13, 2011 at 9:55p.m., Guam Police Officer ArtS.
18 Calvo observed Defendant's vehicle on the side of the road in what appeared to be a single-car 19 collision with the curb. (Testimony of ArtS. Calvo, Record Log at 3:20, Jan. 7, 2012.) Officer 20 Calvo broadcasted a call on his police radio for backup and stopped his car at the scene in order 21 to direct traffic around the accident. !d. At 9:58 p.m., Officer Calvo approached Defendant 22 who was standing next to the accident. !d. Officer Calvo could smell alcohol on Defendant's 23 breath and Defendant affirmed that he had been drinking beer. !d.
24 After Officer Calvo spoke with Defendant, Guam Police Officer Ramon Q. Sablan 25 arrived at the scene and observed Defendant had bloodshot, watery eyes and smelled of alcohol.
26 (Testimony of Ramon Q. Sablan, Record Log at 3:15, Jan. 7, 2012.) Officer Calvo asked 27 Defendant if he were willing to participate in standardized field sobriety tests, and Defendant 28 replied "yes". (Testimony of Art S. Calvo, Record Log at 3:20, Jan. 7, 2012.) Defendant alleges he was told to take the field tests and that he would have refused to participate if given
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2 the choice. (Declaration of Jones Nakamura, Mar. 13, 2012.) Defendant allegedly failed the 3 standardized field sobriety tests and was arrested at 10: I 5 p.m. (Testimony of Art S. Calvo, 4 Record Log at 3:20, Jan. 7, 2012.) 5 On March 13, 2012, Defendant moved to suppress all evidence obtained from the 6 investigative detention because it lasted longer than fifteen (15) minutes in violation of 8 GCA 7 § 30.30. Defendant asserted that his initial detention was an unreasonable seizure and that all 8 evidence obtained during or as a result of the seizure must be suppressed. The Court denied 9 suppression on the grounds that probable cause to arrest appeared before fifteen minutes of 10 detention elapsed. (Decision and Order, Jun. 13, 2012.) On July 2, 2012, Defendant filed a 11 motion to reconsider because disputed facts were considered as undisputed. On reconsideration, 12 the Court denied suppression because the disputed facts did not change its probable cause l3 analysis. (Decision and Order, Oct. 2, 2012.) The matter was thereafter reassigned to Judge 14 James L. Canto II. 15 On December 11, 2012, Defendant filed a second motion to reconsider on the basis that 16 material facts remain in dispute. The Government agreed that an evidentiary hearing is 17 necessary pursuant to People v. Santos, 1999 Guam 1 ~~ 16-25 and further argued that the 18 Court's prior probable cause analysis must be applied pursuant to the law of the case doctrine. 19 DISCUSSION
20 1. Reconsideration and the Law of the Case
21 The law of the case doctrine generally precludes a court from reconsidering an issue it 22 has already decided unless: 1) the first decision is clearly erroneous; 2) the law, evidence or 23 other circumstances have changed; or 3) manifest injustice would result. People v. Hualde, 24 1999 Guam 3 ~ 13. However, the trial court, "always has the power to reexamine, modify, 25 vacate, correct and reverse its prior rulings and orders," and the, "[l]aw of the case does not ... 26
27 1 Defendant swore to the truth of this written declaration under penalty of perjury at the Jan. 7, 2013 suppressio 28 hearing and the Court shall consider this affidavit as testimony per 6 GCA §§ 4308, 7301 & 7302. See People o preclude the court from reconsidering an earlier ruling if the court feels that the ruling was 2 probably erroneous and more harm would be done by adhering to the earlier rule than from the 3 delay incident to a reconsideration and the possible change in the rule of law to be applied." 4 People v. Gutierrez, 2005 Guam ~ 40 n. 7 (quoting Chun v. Board of Trustees of Employees' 5 Retirement System of State of Hawaii, 992 P.2d 127, 136 (Hawai'i 2000)). Furthermore, "[a] 6 judge may reexamine his earlier ruling (or the ruling of a judge previously assigned to the case 7 ... ) if he has a conviction at once strong and reasonable that the earlier ruling was wrong, and if 8 rescinding it would not cause undue harm to the party that had benefitted from it." Id. (quoting 9 Avitia v. Metro. Club ofChicago, Inc., 49 F.3d 1219, 1227 (7th Cir. 1995)). 10 In this case, the Government asserts that the Court cannot reexamine the suppression II analysis of the previously assigned judge. The Court does not agree. The law of the case 12 doctrine should not be applied here where new testimony is considered for the first time. Based 13 upon the discussion infra, the Court holds a strong and reasonable conviction that the earlier 14 analysis was incorrect. Furthermore, a reexamination of the suppression decision and a 15 rescinded order shall not cause undue harm before trial. Cf Avitia, 49 F.3d at 1227-1228 16 (prejudice may result without notice of jury instruction). For these reasons, the Court shall 17 grant reconsideration and reexamine the issues presented by Defendant's motion to suppress 18 under 8 GCA § 30.30. 19 2. The Stop and Frisk Statutes 20 The Fourth Amendment permits brief investigative detentions that are based upon a 21 reasonable suspicion of illegal conduct. People v. Johnson, 1997 Guam 9 ~ 4 (citing Terry v. 22 Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868 (1968)). This principle is codified in the "Stop and Frisk" 23 statutes at 8 GCA Chapter 30. See People v. Cundiff, 2006 Guam 12 ~ 40. 24 \\ 25
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28 Guam v. Santos, 1999 Guam I ~ 21.
Title 8 GCA § 30.10 states:
2 Whenever a peace officer encounters any person under circumstances which reasonably indicate that such person has committed, is committing or is about to 3 commit a criminal offense, the peace officer may detain such person.
4 Title 8 GCA § 30.20 states:
5 Detention pursuant to § 30.10 shall be for the purpose of ascertaining the 6 identity of the person detained and the circumstances surrounding his presence abroad which lead the officer to believe that he had committed, was committing, 7 or was about to commit a criminal offense, but such person shall not be 8 compelled to answer any inquiry of the peace officer.
9 Title 8 GCA § 30.30 states: 10 No person shall be detained under the provisions of § 30.10 longer than is reasonably necessary to effect the purposes of that section, and in no event ll longer than fifteen (15) minutes. Such detention shall not extend beyond the 12 place where it was first effected or the immediate vicinity thereof.
13 Title 8 GCA § 30.40 states: 14 If at any time after the onset of the detention authorized by § 30.1 0, probable cause for arrest of the person shall appear, the person shall be arrested. If after 15 an inquiry into the circumstances which prompted the detention, no probable 16 cause for the arrest of the person shall appear, he shall be released.
17 Thus under Guam law, a police officer having a reasonable suspicion regarding criminal 18 activity by a particular individual may detain that person to investigate said suspected criminal 19 activity. 8 GCA §§ 30.10 & 30.20. When this investigative detention reveals probable cause 20 for arrest, "the person shall be arrested." 8 GCA § 30.40. However, "in no event [shall a 21 person be detained] longer than fifteen ( 15) minutes," and the person "shall be released," if no 22 probable cause for arrest appears. 8 GCA §§ 30.30 and 30.40.
23 In this case, the parties dispute the application and effect of the 15 minute time limit for 24 investigative detentions. The Government argues that any appearance of probable cause to 25 arrest within 15 minutes removes the need to apply the time limitation. Alternatively, the 26 Government contends that any suppression applies only to evidence obtained after 15 minutes 27 and before arrest. Defendant asserts that if he is not arrested or released within 15 minutes pursuant to the Stop and Frisk statutes, then all evidence from the investigative detention must
2 be suppressed unless it comes from an independent source. 3 3. Violation of the 15-Minute Time Limit 4 a. Meaning of the "Stop and Frisk" Act. 5 Title 8 GCA Chapter 30 and the 15-minute time limit are derived from former Penal 6 Code Sections 735 through 736.4. See 8 GCA § 30.1 0, COMMENT; Guam Pub. L. 10-99 (June 7 19, 1969). Former Sections 735 through 736.4 were enacted as original statutes and without 8 any statement of legislative findings or intent. P.L. 10-99. There is an absence of controlling 9 authority to interpret the 15 minute time limit. 2 Without clear legislative intent or authority to 10 the contrary, the Court shall interpret the Stop and Frisk statutes according to their plain 11 meaning. See Guam Resorts, Inc. v. G.C. Corporation, 2012 Guam 13 ~ 7 ("When the plain 12 reading of a statute is 'clear on its face' and yields to an unambiguous definition, we will not 13 look past that plain reading."); Castino v. G.C. Corp., 2010 Guam 3 ~ 29 ("A plain reading 14 construction is appropriate where the statute lays out specific requirements and indicates exactly 15 what is necessary for compliance without ambiguous terms."); People v. Lau, 2007 Guam 4 ~~
16 11-14. I7 An examination of the plain language of the 15-minute time limit within the context of 8
18 GCA Chapter 30 does not reveal ambiguity or absurd and unworkable consequences. See 19 Sumitomo Canst., Co., Ltd. v. Government of Guam, 2001 Guam 23 ~ 17; People v. Flores, 20 2004 Guam 18 ~ 18. The Stop and Frisk statutes state that a person shall be detained, "in no 21 event longer than fifteen (15) minutes." 8 GCA § 30.30. If probable cause to arrest appears, "at 22
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24 2 For example, Guam law does not explicitly discredit any detention beyond the time limit nor does it converse!
hold that the time limit is merely a guide for law enforcement. Compare Florida v. Royer, 460, U.S. 491, 500, 103 25 S.Ct. 1319, 1325 (1983) ("[A]n investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary t effectuate the purpose of the stop."), and US. v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 1575 (1985) ("I 26 assessing whether a detention is too long in duration to be justified as an investigative stop, we consider i appropriate to examine whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to confirm o 27 dispel their suspicions quickly, during which time it was necessary to detain the defendant."), with US. v. Place, 46 U.S. 696, 709 n.IO, 103 S.Ct. 2637, 2646 (1983) ("We understand the desirability of providing law enforcemen 28 authorities with a clear rule to guide their conduct. Nevertheless, we question the wisdom of a rigid time limitation.
any time after the onset of the detention ... the person shall be arrested." 8 GCA § 30.40. If 2 probable cause does not appear, "he shall be released." !d. This language clearly contemplates 3 that any investigative detention must end by arrest or release within 15 minutes. Even where 4 probable cause to arrest appears within 15 minutes of detention, the plain language of 8 GCA § 5 30.30 does not allow the detention to continue beyond 15 minutes. When a person is detained 6 without arrest for more than 15 minutes, although probable cause to arrest may appear, the Stop 7 and Frisk statutes are violated. 8 To posit that probable cause ansmg before the expiration of 15 minutes somehow 9 negates the statute's time limit is to say that an officer may detain an individual indefinitely 10 without an arrest just because probable cause arose within the first 15 minutes. This would be 11 an illogical reading of the statute that subverts its entire purpose, and one which this Court 12 cannot reasonably adopt. The Guam Legislature has apparently narrowed the ability of any 13 officer to graduate an investigative detention according to the demands of a particular situation, 14 as the U.S. Supreme Court might otherwise afford in the absence of an explicit time limit. See, 15 e.g., US. v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685-87, 105 S.Ct. 1568 (1985). Based upon the plain 16 meaning of the Stop and Frisk statutes, the Court holds that an investigative detention must
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17 cease by arrest or release within 15 minutes of its initiation. 18 The Government argues that a defendant's voluntary consent to undergo a Standardized
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19 Field Sobriety Test vitiates the effect of 8 GCA § 30.30, tolling the 15-minute clock. However, 20 the plain language of the statute is inescapable. It states in pertinent part: "No person shall be 21 detained ... longer than is reasonably necessary to effect the purposes of [Section 30.1 0], and in 22 no event longer than fifteen ( 15) minutes. 8 GCA § 30.30 (emphasis added). This
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24 Such a limit would undermine the equally important need to allow authorities to graduate their responses to th demands of any particular situation.''). 3 25 The Court recognizes this law's possibly impairing effect upon meaningful law enforcement investigatio technique; however, this Court is duty-bound to administer the law as the Legislature intended and may do no more 26 The only alternative is for the Legislature to re-examine whether the statute indeed withstands an effectiv application to real-world circumstances within the reasonable balance between individual liberty interests and th 27 Government's law enforcement interests.
4 See generally, People v. Santos, 1999 Guam 1 ,, 33-37; People v. Chargualaf, 2001 Guam I,, 14-15 unconditional language unequivocally imparts that no circumstance may serve as an exception 2 to the time limit, be it exigency or even an express waiver by the detainee. 3 b. Application to the Facts of this Case. 4 In order to apply this rule to the present case, the Court must further examine the 5 difference between an investigative detention and an arrest. Under Guam law, "a person has 6 been seized under the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all the circumstances surrounding 7 the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave." Cundiff, 8 2006 Guam 12 at '1!21 (quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 9 1877 (1980)). An investigative detention under 8 GCA Chapter 30 is consistent with a Fourth 10 Amendment seizure. See e.g. Cundiff, 2006 Guam 12 at '1!40; Terry, 392 U.S. at 16 ("It must be II recognized that whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to I2 walk away, he has 'seized' that person."). For this reason, an investigative detention occurs 13 when a reasonable person would believe he is not free to leave under the circumstances. I4 Guam law defines an arrest as, "an actual restraint of the person, or. .. submission to the I5 custody ofthe person making the arrest." 8 GCA § 20.10. An officer must announce the arrest I6 pursuant to 8 GCA § 20.25, but the declaration is not an absolute requirement for a lawful arrest I7 based upon probable cause. Cund!IJ, 2006 Guam 12 at '1!'1!35-36 and 25-26 (quoting People v. I8 Maddox, 294 P.2d 6, 9 (Cal. 1956); and Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91, 85 S.Ct. 223, 225 I9 (1964)). Any physical restraint that curtails movement constitutes an arrest. !d. at '1!'1! 19-20
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20 (quoting Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 67, 88 S.Ct. 1889 (1968)). Even without physical 2I restraint, a severely intrusive detention may constitute an arrest. !d. at '1!,1 21-22 (quoting 22 Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 216, 99 S.Ct. 2248 (1979) (custodial interrogation is an
23 arrest and requires probable cause)). 24 In this case, Officer Calvo approached and questioned Defendant at the scene of his 25 accident at 9:58 p.m. If Defendant walked away and left the scene of his accident then he could 26
27 5 Cf People v. Farata, 2007 Guam 8 ,fl 44-45; People v. Santos, 2003 Guam 1 fl 51 (police custody ultimate!
28 determined by use of physical restraint comparable to formal arrest).
have been arrested. See 16 GCA § 3501. Furthermore, a traffic stop is, "unquestionably a 2 seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment." People v. Rasauo, 2011 Guam 1 ~ 26 3 (citing Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 436-439 (1984)). See also People v. Chargualaf, 4 2001 Guam 1 ~ 17. Under these circumstances, Defendant was detained pursuant to 8 GCA 5 Chapter 30 because he could not reasonably believe that he was free to disregard the police and 6 walk away from his traffic accident. See Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554 (no detention if person 7 can disregard and walk away). The investigative detention lasted seventeen (17) minutes before 8 it ended with an arrest at 10:15 p.m. For this reason, the investigative detention violated the 15- 9 minute time limit of the Stop and Frisk statutes. 10 4. The Exclusionary Remedy 11 The Stop and Frisk statutes do not provide an explicit remedy for a person who is 12 detained by law enforcement for more than 15 minutes. See 8 GCA Chapter 30. However, an 13 unreasonable investigative detention implicates the Fourth Amendment under Guam law. See 14 e.g. Cundiff, 2006 Guam 12 at ~ 40; Chargualaf, 2001 Guam 1 at ~ 20 ("[T]he Fourth 15 Amendment is only at issue where the police detain or seize an individual while posing 16 investigative questions.") (citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 1324 17 (1983)). When the Fourth Amendment is violated by an unlawful seizure or investigative 18 detention, evidence obtained during the detention must be suppressed pursuant to the 19 exclusionary rule. See e.g. Cundiff, 2006 Guam 12 at~ 51; Terry, 392 U.S. at 13-15. Evidence 20 that is obtained during or derived from an unlawful detention must be suppressed pursuant to 21 the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine. Cundiff, 2006 Guam 12 at~ 41 (citing Wong Sun v.
United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); People v. Santos, 2003 Guam 1 ~ 64).
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25 6 See also Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431,442-443, 104 S.Ct. 2501, 2508 (1984) ("The core rationale consistent!
advanced by this Court for extending the exclusionary rule to evidence that is the fruit of unlawful police conduc 26 has been that this admittedly drastic and socially costly course is needed to deter police from violations o constitutional and statutory protections. This Court has accepted the argument that the way to ensure sue 27 protections is to exclude evidence seized as a result of such violations notwithstanding the high social cost of Iettin persons obviously guilty go unpunished for their crimes. On this rationale, the prosecution is not to be put in a bette 28 position than it would have been in if no illegality had transpired.").
The Stop and Frisk Act's 15 minute time limit constitutes a greater restriction upon 2 police activity than the Fourth Amendment. See discussion supra and Place, 462 U.S. at 709 3 ("we decline to adopt any outside time limitation for a permissible Terry stop"). For this 4 reason, the Constitution may not protect against a violation of 8 GCA § 30.30, even though it 5 implicates the Fourth Amendment. See Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 128 S.Ct. 1598 (2008) 6 (evidence is not excluded under the Fourth Amendment for the violation of a state law that 7 restricts police intmsion more narrowly than the Constitution). However, the Organic Act of 8 Guam incorporates language identical to the Fourth Amendment and the Court is persuaded by 9 aforementioned federal cases that apply the exclusionary mle in order to remedy unreasonable 10 searches and seizures. Compare 48 U.S.C. § 142lb(c) with U.S. Const. amend. IV (identical II language). See also People v. Roten, 2012 Guam 3 ~ 16; Macris v. Guam Memorial Hasp. 12 Authority, 2008 Guam 6 ~ 25 (federal cases interpreting identical language are persuasive 13 authority). Furthermore, the Guam Legislature clearly considered exclusion to be an 14 appropriate remedy for a violation of the Stop and Frisk Act. See 8 GCA § 30.60 (evidence 15 obtained from a frisk is not admissible when a detention lasts longer than 15 minutes). Cf 16 Moore, 553 U.S. at 167 (Virginia does not require suppression of evidence obtained in violation 17 of state law). 18 On these grounds, the Court shall apply the ordinary exclusionary mle and fmit of the 19 poisonous tree doctrine to the Stop and Frisk statutes and suppress all evidence obtained or 20 derived from an unlawful detention that exceeds the time limit; specifically meaning any and all 21 evidence obtained during the entire detention, and not just that evidence obtained after the 15- 22 minute time limit has elapsed. 23 In order to suppress evidence under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, the Court 24 must detetmine, "whether the challenged evidence was come at by exploitation of the initial 25 illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint." 26 Cundiff, 2006 Guam 12 at~ 41; Santos, 2003 Guam 1 at~ 65 (quoting Segura v. United States, 27 468 U.S. 796, 805-805, 104 S.Ct. 3380, 3385 (1984)). See also Segura, 468 U.S. at 815 28 ("[E]vidence will not be excluded as 'fruit' unless the illegality is at least the 'but for' cause of
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the discovery of the evidence."). The coercive effect of an illegal seizure may attenuate and 2 dissipate with the passage of time. Santos, 2003 Guam 1 at ,!65 (quoting Oregon v. Elstad, 470 3 U.S. 298,311-312, 105 S.Ct 1285, 1294 (1985)). 4 In this case, the unlawful Stop and Frisk detention ended when Defendant was arrested 5 at 10:15 p.m. All evidence obtained during the unlawful detention shall be suppressed pursuant 6 to the exclusionary rule. After the arrest at 10:15 p.m., Defendant was transported to the police
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7 station where he may have made statements and performed a breath test. The short passage of 8 time between the illegal detention and any evidence collected at the police station by itself does 9 not likely dissipate and purge the taint of the illegality. See Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 10 604-605, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 2262 (1975) (statement separated from illegal arrest by less than two 11 hours does not purge the taint of illegal arrest). Furthermore, any implied consent warning or 12 Miranda warning by itself does not purge the taint of the illegal detention. !d. at 601-603. In 13 order to determine whether Defendant's possible statements or breath test are purged of the taint 14 of the illegal detention, the Court should consider the totality of the circumstances, including: 1) 15 the temporal proximity between the illegal detention and the evidence; 2) the presence of 16 intervening circumstances; and 3) particularly, the purpose and flagrance of the illegal conduct. 17 Chargualaf, 2001 Guam 1 at~ 53 (citing Brown, 422 U.S. at 603-604). 18 As discussed above, the close temporal proximity between the illegal detention and the 19 evidence collected at the police station does not purge the taint of illegality. Furthermore, there 20 are no intervening circumstances to purge the taint of the illegal detention. See Johnson v. 21 Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 365, 92 S.Ct. 1620, 1626 (1972) (lineup identification is purged of 22 illegal arrest when conducted with counsel and after magistrate hearing to advise rights and 23 commit under bail). However, it is particularly important here that the illegal detention did not 24 have an illegal purpose or constitute flagrant illegal conduct. During the period of unlavvful 25 detention Officer Calvo observed indicators of Defendant's intoxication, questioned him about 26 intoxication, conducted standardized field sobriety tests, and arrested Defendant when he failed 2 the tests. These actions are reasonably tailored to quickly confirm or dispel the suspicion that 3 Defendant drove under the influence of alcohol. See US. v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686, 105 4 S.Ct. 1568, 1575 (1985). On this basis, the 17 minute detention was not conducted for an illegal 5 purpose nor did it constitute flagrant illegal conduct and any evidence obtained under custody at
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6 the police station is purged of the taint of the illegal detention. 7 For all of these reasons, the police obtained custodial evidence by means sufficiently 8 distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint of the illegal detention, and the evidence shall 9 not be excluded under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine. See Cundiff, 2006 Guam 12 at,! 10 41. II ///
12 ///
13 ///
14 CONCLUSION 15 Based upon the foregoing, Defendant's motion to suppress is hereby GRANTED and all 16 evidence obtained from the onset of the detention until his arrest shall not be admissible against
17 Defendant. 18
19 SO ORDERED this ~ day of March, 2013. 20
21
22 Judge, Superior Court of Guam 23
24 7 At the evidentiary hearing, the Government presented no evidence of the events after the arrest at 10: 15 p.m.
25 However the Complaint charges Defendant with driving a motor vehicle with more than 0.08% by weight of alcohol in his blood on the basis of a breath test performed at the police station. (Complaint, 2, Declaration, Aug. 15, 20 II.) 8 26 One example of an illegal purpose or flagrant illegal conduct under the Stop and Frisk statutes is a detention an investigation that exceeds the scope of the officer's reasonable suspicions, and which reveals evidence of wholl 27 unrelated conduct after more than 15 minutes, only because the detention continued indefinitely. See general!} Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 218-219 (confession inadmissible where defendant was seized without probable cause in th 28 hope that something might tum up).