IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF GUAl\r{ -, 0 " k ) :J L PEOPLE OF GUAM, ) CRL\t1INAL CASE NO. CM 868-11 3 ) 4 vs. ) ) DECISION AND ORDER 5 JONES NAKAMURA, ) (Motion to Suppress) Defendant. 6
8 Defendant filed a Notice of Motion on March 12, 2012 to have heard his Motion to 9 Suppress before the HONORABLE JUDGE ELIZABETH BARRETT-ANDERSON. 10 Defendant is represented by Assistant Public Defender Suresh Sampath. The People are 11 represented by Assistant Attorney General James C. Collins. The Court having ruled on the 12 legal issues presented by the motion heretofore, now therefore, pursuant to Rule CVR 7.1 (e)( 1), 13 the Court decides this matter without further briefing or oral argument. Having considered the 14 briefs herein the motion is DENIED. 15 FACTUAL BACKGROUND 16 On August 13, 2011, at approximately 9:55 a.m., Officers of the Guam Police 17 Department (hereinafter "Officers") effected a traffic stop of the Defendant (hereinafter 18 "Nakamura") in Tiyan. Nakamura had skidded off the roadway in Tiyan and Officers appeared 19 at the scene to see if assistance was needed. At about 9:58 p.m., Officer requested for 20 Nakamura's driver's license and vehicle registration. Nakamura had a driver's license but 21 couldn't find the registration. The Officers noted a strong odor of intoxicants, and when asked 22 Nakamura admitted to drinking four (4) beers. At approximately 10: 15 a.m. Nakamura was 23 arrested. A test of his blood alcohol content ("BAC") was subsequently administered. There is 24 no dispute as to these facts. On August 13,2011, Nakamura was charged with 1) Driving While 25 Under the Influence of Alcohol, as a misdemeanor (BAC); 2) Driving While Under the 26 Influence of Alcohol, as a misdemeanor; and 3) Reckless Driving, as a petty misdemeanor. 27
lof4 DISCUSSION 2 Nakamura moves to suppress "any and all evidence" obtained by the Officers as a result 3 of an unlawful detention of his person in violation of 8 Guam Code Annotated § 30.10-30.60, 4 Guam's "Stop and Frisk" statute. Guam law provides that "[n]o person shall be detained under 5 the provisions of § 30.10 longer than is reasonable necessary to effect the purposes of that 6 section, and in no event longer than fifteen (15) minutes .... " 8 GCA § 30.30. Nakamura argues 7 that he was detained more than the permitted fifteen (15) minutes, and therefore, the remedy for 8 violation should be suppression of any and all evidence seized. Nakamura cites the Court to an 9 earlier decision of this Court in People v. Santos, CM 805-09 (Super. Ct. Guam July 2, 2010), 10 wherein this Court concluded the police officers had detained the defendant longer than II lawfully permitted under the facts of the case. For the following reason, the Court is abandoning 12 its ruling in Santos based on the following analysis. 13 The purpose for Guam's "Stop and Frisk Act" is for 'investigatory stops' where the 14 police officer has reasonable suspicion that a person has, is, or is about to commit a criminal 15 offense. 8 G.c.A. §30.20. A police officer then has fifteen (15) minutes to ascertain the identity 16 of individual and determine the circumstances surrounding his presence. See §30.30. Ifprobable 17 cause arises during the 'investigatory stop' the police officer is permitted to arrest the 18 individual. See §30AO The time limitation for the statute's 'brief detention' under section 30.10 19 no longer governs once probable cause has been formed. 20 At 9:58 p.m. on August 13, 2011, Officers pulled over the Defendant for an 21 'investigatory stop' because his vehicle skidded off the roadway in Tiyan. At 1:42 a.m. the 22 Officers requested Siren to submit to the SFST based on the reasonable suspicion Defendant 23 was Driving under the Influence of Alcohol. Sometime between 9:58 p.m. and 10:15 a.m. the 24 Officers asked Nakamura if he had consumed alcohol, to which he admitted to having drunk 25 four (4) beers. Nakamura was arrested at 10:15 p.m. During this investigatory stop, the Officers 26 had probable cause to arrest Siren shortly before 10: 15 a.m. based on his admission to having 27 drunk alcohol. Once probable cause is formed during the "investigatory stop", the fifteen (15) 28 minute time limit for purposes of section 30.10 no longer governed. The "investigatory stop",
Page 2 of 4 then becomes a detention and need only pass constitutional muster against unreasonable 2 searches and seizures guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment. 3 The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected the application of a bright-line 4 time limit for Fourth Amendment detentions. See United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685 5 (1985). Although having a 'bright-line' rule would be helpful in evaluating whether an 6 investigative detention is unreasonable, a police officer's common sense and judgment must 7 ultimately govern their conduct. In United States v. Place, the Court reasoned that "[ s]uch a 8 limit would undermine the equally important need to allow authorities to graduate their 9 responses to the demands of any particular situation." Place, 462 U.S. 696, 709, n.10 (1983). 10 The Guam legislature has provided clear framework for 'stops' for the purposes of section 11 30.30 and the facts in this case do not trigger its application. 12 Accordingly, this Court does not agree with Defendant's assertion that "all and any" 13 evidence from a detention should be suppressed under §30.60. Although the Court in Santos did 14 not address the suppression issue, the Court will do so now. Guam law provides that "[n]othing 15 seized by a peace officer in the search authorized by §30.50 [Weapons Search Permitted] shall 16 be admissible against any person in any court ofthis Territory unless both the detention and the 17 search which disclosed its existence was authorized by and conducted in compliance with the 18 provisions of this Chapter" 8 G.C.A. §30.60. In the present case, there is no evidence to 19 suppress from a search of the Defendant based on the following analysis. 20 A "detention" for purposes of section 30.30 is limited to ascertaining the identity of the 21 person and the circumstances surrounding his presence. See §30.20. A request for identification 22 and investigation does not generally constitute a seizure under Terry, and more importantly, 23 does not implicate the Fourth Amendment. Under Terry, a 'detention' occurs when a "police 24 officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 25 1, 16 (1968); see also People v. Santos, 2003 Guam 1, ~ 52 (Sup. Ct. Guam 2003) The Court of 26 Appeals in Michigan found the determining factor in assessing whether a "detention is too long 27 in duration to be justified as an investigatory stop is whether the police were diligently pursuing 28
Page 3 of 4 a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions" People v. 2 Chambers, 489 N.W.2d 168, 125, (1992). 3 Defendant urges the Court to rely on its ruling in People v. Santo, CM 0332-11, Superior 4 Court of Guam, July 2, 2010. This Court abandons its ruling in Santos 1 wherein it concluded 5 police officers have fifteen (15) minutes to make an arrest after the onslaught of probable cause 6 following an initial investigatory stop. This Court has not previously adhered to such analysis. 7 People v. Pascual CF 370-08, Superior Court of Guam, January 11, 2010; People v. Tedtaotao, 8 CF 50-09, Superior Court of Guam, April 20, 2009. 9 Even if Section 30.30 was violated, this Court finds that suppreSSIOn IS not an 10 appropriate remedy.
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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF GUAl\r{ -, 0 " k ) :J L PEOPLE OF GUAM, ) CRL\t1INAL CASE NO. CM 868-11 3 ) 4 vs. ) ) DECISION AND ORDER 5 JONES NAKAMURA, ) (Motion to Suppress) Defendant. 6
8 Defendant filed a Notice of Motion on March 12, 2012 to have heard his Motion to 9 Suppress before the HONORABLE JUDGE ELIZABETH BARRETT-ANDERSON. 10 Defendant is represented by Assistant Public Defender Suresh Sampath. The People are 11 represented by Assistant Attorney General James C. Collins. The Court having ruled on the 12 legal issues presented by the motion heretofore, now therefore, pursuant to Rule CVR 7.1 (e)( 1), 13 the Court decides this matter without further briefing or oral argument. Having considered the 14 briefs herein the motion is DENIED. 15 FACTUAL BACKGROUND 16 On August 13, 2011, at approximately 9:55 a.m., Officers of the Guam Police 17 Department (hereinafter "Officers") effected a traffic stop of the Defendant (hereinafter 18 "Nakamura") in Tiyan. Nakamura had skidded off the roadway in Tiyan and Officers appeared 19 at the scene to see if assistance was needed. At about 9:58 p.m., Officer requested for 20 Nakamura's driver's license and vehicle registration. Nakamura had a driver's license but 21 couldn't find the registration. The Officers noted a strong odor of intoxicants, and when asked 22 Nakamura admitted to drinking four (4) beers. At approximately 10: 15 a.m. Nakamura was 23 arrested. A test of his blood alcohol content ("BAC") was subsequently administered. There is 24 no dispute as to these facts. On August 13,2011, Nakamura was charged with 1) Driving While 25 Under the Influence of Alcohol, as a misdemeanor (BAC); 2) Driving While Under the 26 Influence of Alcohol, as a misdemeanor; and 3) Reckless Driving, as a petty misdemeanor. 27
lof4 DISCUSSION 2 Nakamura moves to suppress "any and all evidence" obtained by the Officers as a result 3 of an unlawful detention of his person in violation of 8 Guam Code Annotated § 30.10-30.60, 4 Guam's "Stop and Frisk" statute. Guam law provides that "[n]o person shall be detained under 5 the provisions of § 30.10 longer than is reasonable necessary to effect the purposes of that 6 section, and in no event longer than fifteen (15) minutes .... " 8 GCA § 30.30. Nakamura argues 7 that he was detained more than the permitted fifteen (15) minutes, and therefore, the remedy for 8 violation should be suppression of any and all evidence seized. Nakamura cites the Court to an 9 earlier decision of this Court in People v. Santos, CM 805-09 (Super. Ct. Guam July 2, 2010), 10 wherein this Court concluded the police officers had detained the defendant longer than II lawfully permitted under the facts of the case. For the following reason, the Court is abandoning 12 its ruling in Santos based on the following analysis. 13 The purpose for Guam's "Stop and Frisk Act" is for 'investigatory stops' where the 14 police officer has reasonable suspicion that a person has, is, or is about to commit a criminal 15 offense. 8 G.c.A. §30.20. A police officer then has fifteen (15) minutes to ascertain the identity 16 of individual and determine the circumstances surrounding his presence. See §30.30. Ifprobable 17 cause arises during the 'investigatory stop' the police officer is permitted to arrest the 18 individual. See §30AO The time limitation for the statute's 'brief detention' under section 30.10 19 no longer governs once probable cause has been formed. 20 At 9:58 p.m. on August 13, 2011, Officers pulled over the Defendant for an 21 'investigatory stop' because his vehicle skidded off the roadway in Tiyan. At 1:42 a.m. the 22 Officers requested Siren to submit to the SFST based on the reasonable suspicion Defendant 23 was Driving under the Influence of Alcohol. Sometime between 9:58 p.m. and 10:15 a.m. the 24 Officers asked Nakamura if he had consumed alcohol, to which he admitted to having drunk 25 four (4) beers. Nakamura was arrested at 10:15 p.m. During this investigatory stop, the Officers 26 had probable cause to arrest Siren shortly before 10: 15 a.m. based on his admission to having 27 drunk alcohol. Once probable cause is formed during the "investigatory stop", the fifteen (15) 28 minute time limit for purposes of section 30.10 no longer governed. The "investigatory stop",
Page 2 of 4 then becomes a detention and need only pass constitutional muster against unreasonable 2 searches and seizures guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment. 3 The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected the application of a bright-line 4 time limit for Fourth Amendment detentions. See United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685 5 (1985). Although having a 'bright-line' rule would be helpful in evaluating whether an 6 investigative detention is unreasonable, a police officer's common sense and judgment must 7 ultimately govern their conduct. In United States v. Place, the Court reasoned that "[ s]uch a 8 limit would undermine the equally important need to allow authorities to graduate their 9 responses to the demands of any particular situation." Place, 462 U.S. 696, 709, n.10 (1983). 10 The Guam legislature has provided clear framework for 'stops' for the purposes of section 11 30.30 and the facts in this case do not trigger its application. 12 Accordingly, this Court does not agree with Defendant's assertion that "all and any" 13 evidence from a detention should be suppressed under §30.60. Although the Court in Santos did 14 not address the suppression issue, the Court will do so now. Guam law provides that "[n]othing 15 seized by a peace officer in the search authorized by §30.50 [Weapons Search Permitted] shall 16 be admissible against any person in any court ofthis Territory unless both the detention and the 17 search which disclosed its existence was authorized by and conducted in compliance with the 18 provisions of this Chapter" 8 G.C.A. §30.60. In the present case, there is no evidence to 19 suppress from a search of the Defendant based on the following analysis. 20 A "detention" for purposes of section 30.30 is limited to ascertaining the identity of the 21 person and the circumstances surrounding his presence. See §30.20. A request for identification 22 and investigation does not generally constitute a seizure under Terry, and more importantly, 23 does not implicate the Fourth Amendment. Under Terry, a 'detention' occurs when a "police 24 officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 25 1, 16 (1968); see also People v. Santos, 2003 Guam 1, ~ 52 (Sup. Ct. Guam 2003) The Court of 26 Appeals in Michigan found the determining factor in assessing whether a "detention is too long 27 in duration to be justified as an investigatory stop is whether the police were diligently pursuing 28
Page 3 of 4 a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions" People v. 2 Chambers, 489 N.W.2d 168, 125, (1992). 3 Defendant urges the Court to rely on its ruling in People v. Santo, CM 0332-11, Superior 4 Court of Guam, July 2, 2010. This Court abandons its ruling in Santos 1 wherein it concluded 5 police officers have fifteen (15) minutes to make an arrest after the onslaught of probable cause 6 following an initial investigatory stop. This Court has not previously adhered to such analysis. 7 People v. Pascual CF 370-08, Superior Court of Guam, January 11, 2010; People v. Tedtaotao, 8 CF 50-09, Superior Court of Guam, April 20, 2009. 9 Even if Section 30.30 was violated, this Court finds that suppreSSIOn IS not an 10 appropriate remedy. The fifteen (15) minute limitation is a statutory right prescribed by the 11 Guam legislature, not a constitutional right. The Fourth Amendment protects against 12 unreasonable searches and seizures applies pursuant to § 1421 b(c) of the Organic Act of Guam; 13 however, nothing in the Act incorporates the fifteen (15) minute limitation as a constitutionally- 14 afforded right to the people of Guam. In addition, Section 30.50 only applies to weapons search 15 and is inapplicable to the present case, as no weapons search occurred. Section 30.60 provides 16 the admissibility of seized evidence found in searches authorized by § 30.50 to be limited to 17 weapons searches. Since no weapons search occurred, this Court finds the suppression of 18 evidence not an appropriate remedy. Based on the foregoing analysis the Defendant's Motion to 19 Suppress is DENIED. 20 This matter is set for Criminal Trial Setting on JUNE 4' 2012 at 9:30 a.m. 21 SO ORDERED 22 13 23
27 I More specifically, this Court abandons its faulty logic in Decision & Order (July 2,2010) on p. 5 'il2. "The existence of probable cause does not alter the time and place limitations of 8 G.c.A. §30.20" Instead, the Court finds 28 the existence of probable cause does alter the time and place limitations of Section 30.20. If probable cause is foun during the "investigatory stop", the exclusionary rule is not triggered even after the expiration ofthe fifteen (15) minute time limitation.
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