Cavanagh, J.
The defendant has been convicted of second-degree murder1 and sentenced to a term of from 100 to 200 years in prison. He argues that the sentence is unlawful. We agree, and we therefore remand this case to the trial court for resentencing.
i
In February of 1985, the defendant killed a woman with whom he had been romantically involved. The defendant was prosecuted for first-degree murder2 and for possession of a firearm during the commission of this felony.3
Three witnesses testified at the defendant’s trial. With minor variations, they testified as follows. The victim and her current flaneé were home when the defendant and the defendant’s sister arrived.4 The defendant sought to speak with the victim. After a time, the defendant produced a pistol from a briefcase and took the victim to another room, out of the witnesses’ sight. The victim was heard pleading not to be killed and then one or two shots were heard. The victim’s fiancé went to get help, and the defendant’s sister fled. On his return, the victim’s fiancé found her "laying [sic] in the kitchen [with] quite a few stab wounds to the chest.” The defense introduced no proofs.
The jury found the defendant guilty of second-degree murder and felony-firearm. As noted by the [314]*314sentencing judge, the presentence report in this case indicated that the defendant had a history of assaultive crime and that the defendant had been harassing the victim, and perhaps planning to harm her, for some time. The defendant did not challenge the accuracy of the presentence report.
The sentencing judge imposed a term of from 100 to 200 years in prison for second-degree murder.5 In doing so, he clearly stated that the purpose of the 100- to 200-year sentence was to foreclose parole:
Because the appellate courts of our state have said that in point of fact a life sentence for this sort of crime allows him to be reviewed in ten years, I intend to utilize numbers with the belief that the law requires that the numbers be served before you become eligible for review.[6]
II
The Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions and sentence.7 The Court said that the defendant’s 100- to 200-year sentence was not cruel or unusual punishment8 and that the sentencing judge had not abused his discretion:
A sentence does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment when it is within statutory limits and does not shock the judicial conscience. People [315]*315v Curry, 142 Mich App 724, 733; 371 NW2d 854 (1985); People v Knoll, 137 Mich App 701, 704; 358 NW2d 926 (1984).
Here, the sentence was within the "life or any term of years” sentence authorized by statute, MCL 750.317; MSA 28.549. Moreover, we believe that, contrary to defendant’s argument, the fact that parole will not be available prior to defendant’s life span does not make the sentence erroneously harsher than a life sentence. People v Rodgers, 30 Mich App 582, 584-585; 186 NW2d 840 [1971]; People v Charles Williams, 19 Mich App 544, 546; 172 NW2d 897 (1971), lv den 386 Mich 783 (1972).
This case is similar to People v Martinez, 147 Mich App 94; 382 NW2d 741 (1985), lv den 425 Mich 873 (1986), cited by plaintiff. In Martinez, defendant was convicted of manslaughter and habitual offender, fourth offense, and was sentenced to a prison term of 100 to 150 years. Defendant claimed, inter alia, that the sentence was an abuse of discretion because it was longer than his life expectancy and designed to prevent him from qualifying for parole. This Court rejected these arguments, concluding:
"First, it was evident that the sentence imposed was fashioned to insure that Mr. Martinez would never be a free man again. The trial judge quite pointedly stated that he intended 'to design a sentence that will mean that Mr. Martinez will not be released from prison.’ Under the statute, MCL 769.12; MSA 28.1084, the trial court had the authority to sentence Mr. Martinez for life or for any lesser term. The trial judge obviously selected the long term of years instead of life in hopes that the 'lifer law,’ MCL 791.234(4); MSA 28.2304(4), would not apply so as to make Mr. Martinez eligible for parole consideration after serving ten calendar years. See People v Johnson, 421 Mich 494; 364 NW2d 654 (1984). We are persuaded that the trial court did not err in imposing a lengthy term of years where such a sentence is expressly authorized by statute and warranted by a dispas[316]*316sionate consideration of legitimate sentencing criteria and objectives.
"The second aspect of Mr. Martinez’s argument is that, in effect, the trial court imposed a sentence which will exceed his life expectancy. Obviously, that was the trial court’s intent and there is no showing that such a sentence was not justified. In fact, there is no claim that this sentence should shock this Court’s conscience nor could there be. Mr. Martinez’s extensive prior record fully supported the imposition of the sentence in this case.” 147 Mich App at 95-96.
Similarly, the trial court here specified that it wanted to impose a sentence that would keep defendant in prison for the rest of his life, while preventing the possibility that defendant would be paroled in 10 years under the "lifer law.” The trial court also considered the "heinous and shocking” nature of the crime, defendant’s prior criminal record, deterrence and the needs to protect society and'to punish defendant. These factors were all legitimate and, considering these factors, the sentence does not shock the conscience of this Court. The mere fact that the sentence exceed’s [sic] defendant’s life expectancy does not change this result. People v Martinez, supra; People v Coles, 417 Mich 523; 339 NW2d 440 (1983). See also People v Crawford, 144 Mich App 86 [88]-90; 372 NW2d 688 (1985). Cf. People v Hurst, [155] Mich App [573; 400 NW2d 685 (1986)].
We granted leave to appeal to consider several aspects of the sentence imposed in this case.9 People v Timothy Moore, 429 Mich 858 (1987).
[317]*317III
A. THE PENALTY FOR SECOND-DEGREE MURDER
Employing language used in connection with a number of other offenses,10 the Legislature has established that second-degree murder "shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for life, or any term of years, in the discretion of the court trying the same.”
On its face, the stated penalty for second-degree murder ("life, or any term of years”) indicates that a term of years is a lesser penalty than life.11 This is well explained in People v Oscar Moore, 164 Mich App 378, 389-391; 417 NW2d 508 (1987).12 In that case, the defendant had been given a 100- to 300-year term of imprisonment following a conviction of armed robbery. The Court of Appeals built upon the majority opinion in People v Johnson, 421 Mich 494; 364 NW2d 654 (1984), to reach the conclusion that "any term of years” must mean a period shorter than life.
We believe that [certain earlier decisions] mis[318]*318construe the phrase "any term of years.” In People v Blythe, 417 Mich 430; 339 NW2d 399 (1983), the Supreme Court considered whether the phrase "for any term of years” in the armed robbery statute required imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence. In determining that it did not, the Supreme Court concluded that the phrase referred to the maximum sentence to be imposed. 417 Mich at 434. In Johnson, supra at 497-498, the Supreme Court wrote:
"The difference between a life sentence and an indeterminate sentence having a minimum and maximum term has been recognized by this Court since our decision in People v Vitali, 156 Mich 370; 120 NW 1003 (1909). We observed in Vitali that if a life sentence is imposed there can be no minimum term.
"Accordingly, when a statute authorizes the imposition of a sentence of 'life or any term of years’ it allows the imposition of a fixed sentence—life— or an indeterminate sentence—any number of years. We observed in People v Blythe, 417 Mich 430, 434-435; 339 NW2d 399 (1983), that the Legislature viewed the phrase 'life or any term of years’ as descriptive of the maximum sentence only. The sentence concepts 'life’ and 'any term of years’ are mutually exclusive and a sentencing judge may (in the appropriate case) opt for either but not both.”
If "life” and "any term of years” are mutually exclusive concepts, the Court’s statement that the latter allows imposition of "any number of years” must mean "any number of years less than life.”
By definition, a person cannot serve a prison sentence lasting longer than that person’s life. A life term is, as a matter of law, a greater penalty than a term of years. People v McNeal, 156 Mich App 379, 381; 401 NW2d 650 (1986); People v Lindsey, 139 Mich App 412, 415; 362 NW2d 304 (1984). Therefore, it is meaningless for a person to receive a sentence longer than life. The phrase "any term of years” also cannot mean a time equal to life, as it would then be surplusage for the Legislature to have also provided for life sentences in the same statute.
[319]*319All that remains, then, is a term of years less than life. [Oscar Moore, 164 Mich App 389-391. Emphasis in original.]
Thus there are two types of sentences that a judge may impose upon a person convicted of second-degree murder—a sentence of life in prison, or a sentence of a term of years less than life.13
B. THE INDETERMINATE SENTENCING ACT
If the judge chooses to impose a term of years less than life, the sentence must be an indeterminate sentence, as stated in the indeterminate sentencing act:
In all cases where the maximum sentence in the discretion of the court may be imprisonment for life or any number or term of years, the court may impose a sentence for life or may impose a sentence for any term of years. If the sentence imposed by the court is for any term of years, the court shall fix both the minimum and the maximum of that sentence in terms of years or fraction thereof, and sentences so imposed shall be considered indeterminate sentences. The court shall not [320]*320impose a sentence in which the maximum penalty is life imprisonment with a minimum for a term of years included in the same sentence. [MCL 769.9(2); MSA 28.1081(2).]
In People v Tanner, 387 Mich 683, 689-690; 199 NW2d 202 (1972), this Court found that a sentence is "not indeterminate” if there is not a significant interval between the minimum and the maximum sentence. Tanner had pled guilty of manslaughter and had been sentenced to a term of from 179 to 180 months in prison. This Court found such a sentence not to be lawful, explaining:
Though the question comes to us couched in terms of abuse of discretion, it clearly involves, and we address ourselves to, the purely legal proposition of whether defendant’s sentence is in fact "indeterminate” as contemplated by the provisions of MCL 769.8 and 769.9; MSA 28.1080 and 28.1081.
Having before us a plethora of cases involving sentences with a period of but 30 days between minimum and maximum, we are constrained to observe that though technically providing some period, though brief, within which the correction authorities may exercise the discretion vested in them by the Legislature, such sentences fail to comply with the clear intent and purpose of the indeterminate sentence act.
Thus, turning to the precise proposition involved, we are convinced that 30 days is not a sufficient interval of time to guarantee that the corrections authorities will be able to exercise their jurisdiction or judgment with any practicality. The net effect of such severe judicial limitation on indeterminate sentencing is to frustrate the intended effect of indeterminate sentencing.
Convinced as we are, that a sentence with too [321]*321short an interval between minimum and maximum is not indeterminate, we hold that any sentence which provides for a minimum exceeding two-thirds of the maximum is improper as failing to comply with the indeterminate sentence act. [Id. at 688, 689-690.]
In the present case, the entire interval between the defendant’s minimum sentence and his maximum sentence is certain to occur after his death. Even more clearly than Tanner, we therefore have before us a sentence that is not indeterminate.14 The Legislature has authorized only that a person convicted of second-degree murder be sentenced to life in prison or to an indeterminate term of years. The Legislature has not authorized that such a person be, in effect, sentenced to a flat term of years.
C. ELIGIBILITY FOR PAROLE
As we have noted, the sentencing judge in this case clearly stated that the purpose of the 100- to 200-year sentence imposed upon this defendant was to foreclose the possibility of parole. The judge’s concern was that, if he were to sentence the defendant to a life term, the defendant would be eligible for parole after ten years. This eligibility is stated in the so-called lifer law, MCL 791.234(4); MSA 28.2304(4).15 The sentencing judge [322]*322instead sought to rely upon Proposal b16 and the accompanying legislation,17 which provide that a person convicted of an enumerated offense may not be paroled until the person has served the minimum term of imprisonment, less available disciplinary credits.18
The Legislature has established a Parole Board19 and has established procedures and eligibility criteria for granting paroles.20 With the exception of a person convicted of a major controlled substance offense, any person sentenced to a term of years falls eventually within the jurisdiction of the Parole Board after ten years and may be released on parole in accordance with the statute:
A prisoner under sentence for life or for a term of years, other than prisoners sentenced for life for murder in the first degree and prisoners sentenced for life or for a minimum term of imprisonment for a major controlled substance offense, who has served 10 calendar years of the sentence is subject to the jurisdiction of the parole board and may be released on parole by the parole board, subject to the following conditions:
(b) A parole shall not be granted a prisoner so sentenced until after a public hearing held in the manner prescribed for pardons and commutations .... Notice of the public hearing shall be given to the sentencing judge or the judge’s successor in [323]*323office, and parole shall not be granted if the sentencing judge, or the judge’s successor in office, files written objections to the granting of the parole within 30 days of receipt of the notice of hearing. The written objections shall be made part of the prisoner’s file.
(d) A parole shall not be granted under this subsection in the case of a prisoner who is otherwise prohibited by law from parole consideration. In such cases, the interview procedures [for pardons and commutations] shall be followed. [MCL 791.234(4); MSA 28.2304(4).]
The Legislature has stated that persons convicted of second-degree murder are to be given either a sentence of life in prison or a term of years. For the reasons explained above, a term of years is an indeterminate sentence less than life. The Legislature has provided that persons sentenced to life or to a term of years are eligible for parole consideration in ten years. The people of this state, in enacting Proposal b effectively modified the lifer law to provide that a person sentenced to a term of years for an offense listed in Proposal b would not become eligible for parole until the minimum term was served. Neither the Legislature nor the people, however, have authorized the imposition of a nonparolable term of years. There is no indication that either the Legislature or the people intended such a drastic change in sentencing law.
The Court of Appeals has well stated the law in Oscar Moore, supra at 386-387:
The Legislature has mandated life sentences for first-degree murder, MCL ,750.316; MSA 28.548, and certain major controlled substance offenses, MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(i) and 333.7403(2)(a)(i); MSA 14.15(7401)(2)(a)(i) and 14.15(7403)(2)(a)(i). The so-[324]*324called "lifer law” excludes persons serving the mandatory life sentences for these crimes from the jurisdiction of the parole board. MCL 791.234(4); MSA 28.2304(4). See also MCL 333.7401(3); MSA 14.15(7401X3).
We are unable to locate any similar statutory authorization for a sentence of life without parole for an armed robbery conviction, however. While such may be a desirable public policy, it is up to the Legislature to authorize such a sentence. The Legislature is the source of a court’s sentencing power. People v [Roosevelt] Moore, 51 Mich App 48, 54; 214 NW2d 548 (1974). As we are unable to discern any legislative authorization for the result of defendant’s sentence, we must conclude that the sentence given was not valid.
In considering the effect of the lifer law, we believe that the sentencing court has failed to appreciate fully MCL 791.234(4)(b); MSA 28.2304(4)(b), which gives the judge, or the judge’s successor in office, a veto over parole. There is a great difference between a prisoner coming under the jurisdiction of the Parole Board, and a prisoner actually receiving a parole. See People v Hurst (After Remand), 169 Mich App 160; 425 NW2d 752 (1988). The extreme measure employed in this case (an attempt to impose a nonparolable determinate sentence of a term of years) was simply unnecessary. The sentencing judge (and the judge’s successor) have the lawful authority to preclude parole for a person sentenced to life in prison.
D. SENTENCING DISCRETION
In People v Coles, 417 Mich 523, 550; 339 NW2d 440 (1983), we held that an appellate court may "review a trial court’s exercise of discretion in sentencing.” We went on to say that relief would [325]*325be afforded only where "the trial court, in imposing the sentence, abused its discretion to the extent that it shocks the conscience of the appellate court.”
In the present case, the defendant argues that the appellate conscience should be shocked by the length of the defendant’s sentence. We are not shocked, and we do not find the effective length of this sentence (life imprisonment) to be an abuse of the trial court’s sentencing discretion.21
We nevertheless believe that the sentencing judge abused his discretion in this case. Sentencing is an event of critical importance. A judge must enter, after careful consideration, a just order. Even when emotions understandably and properly are running high, the judge must discharge faithfully the difficult task of exercising sentencing discretion. The judge must give a sentence that fits the offense and the offender.
In this case, the sentencing judge has abdicated his discretion by entering an order that is impossible to obey. The defendant has committed a terrible crime and must serve a lawful sentence. Whether sentenced to serve life in prison or a term of years in prison, the defendant is obliged to obey the order of the sentencing judge and the subsequent dictates of the Parole Board. This defendant cannot serve a minimum sentence of 100 years in prison because he will die first. Neither can he serve a maximum sentence of 200 years in prison.
This defendant has been sentenced to serve 200 years in prison. It is impossible for him to obey this order. It is as if he had been ordered to jump off the ground and not come back down. Such a sentence serves only to subject an already much [326]*326maligned system to further ridicule. The judge’s outrage is understandable, but the awesome judicial power to enter judgments and orders must be employed with discretion. A judgment or order is not an appropriate case for an emotional or editorial statement. It is not an opportunity for a judge to display for the benefit of the press and the public how "tough on crime” the court might be. On remand, the trial court must enter an order that is possible to obey.
The sentence in this case is an abuse of sentencing discretion in one other regard. The lifer law clearly provides that parole for a person sentenced to life imprisonment is dependent, inter alia, upon the approval of the sentencing judge or the judge’s successor. By entering a sentence of from 100 to 200 years in prison, the sentencing judge in this case has effectively sentenced the defendant to life imprisonment. However, the form of this life sentence forecloses not only this judge’s own future exercise of discretion, but has foreclosed his successor in office from exercising the discretion that the Legislature clearly has provided in cases where a person convicted of second-degree murder is sentenced to life imprisonment.
As recognized by the Legislature, it is appropriate at any time for the sentencing judge (or the judge’s successor) to take the position that the court knows more about the person who has been sentenced to life imprisonment than does the Parole Board, and accordingly to exercise the power of veto over parole. It is an abuse of discretion, however, to enter an order on the day of sentencing that effectively forecloses all future exercise of such Legislatively provided discretion by either the Parole Board or the judge’s successor. No one can see the future with such clarity.
[327]*327E. SEPARATION OF POWERS
Const 1963, art 3, § 2 provides that the powers of one branch of government are not to be exercised by another:
The powers of government are divided into three branches; legislative, executive and judicial. No person exercising powers of one branch shall exercise powers properly belonging to another branch except as expressly provided in this constitution.
The head of the Executive Branch of government is the Governor,22 who has the exclusive power to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons.23 The Department of Corrections lies within the Executive Branch,24 and the Parole Board is placed within the department.25
This Court has made it clear that a defendant cannot come to the courts for a parole when the Parole Board is unwilling to act. People v Fox, 312 Mich 577; 20 NW2d 732; 168 ALR 703 (1945). The defendant argues that the same principle should obtain where the interests of the parties are reversed—that a trial court should not be able to enter an anticipatory order precluding the parole process.
We find it unnecessary to resolve this constitutional issue. There being no legislative authority for the trial court to impose a nonparolable determinate sentence of a term of years, it is unnecessary for us to determine whether the sentencing judge’s order in this case violates the constitution.
[328]*328F. CRUEL OR UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT
The defendant argues that the sentence in this case amounts to cruel or unusual punishment, in violation of Const 1963, art 1, § 16. Again, our resolution of the other issues renders it unnecessary to reach that constitutional question.
iv
Having determined that the trial court has imposed a sentence that does not accord with the sentencing practices established by the Legislature, we must remand this case to the trial court for the imposition of a new sentence. To guide the trial court on remand, we offer additional direction regarding the nature of a lawful sentence in this case.
The defendant informs us that he was thirty-four when he committed this offense and when he was sentenced. He reports that the life expectancy of a person of his age, gender, and race is 34.5 years from the date of sentencing, and that he thus might expect to live until about the year 2020.26 He would like these facts considered in the imposition of the sentence.
In Oscar Moore, supra at 392, the Court of Appeals held that an indeterminate sentence must "be fashioned with consideration of a defendant’s life expectancy at the time of sentencing as determined by the trial judge.” The dissent, however, warned that if a term of years "cannot equal or exceed a particular defendant’s life expectancy, every judge will be an actuary, every attorney will be a physician, and every defendant will be at death’s door on sentencing day.” Id. at 395.
[329]*329For the reasons stated earlier in this opinion, we hold that a "term of years” must be an indeterminate sentence less than life. It must be something that is reasonably possible for a defendant actually to serve.27
We decline, however, to adopt either a rigid cap on indeterminate sentences or a rule that a trial court must make a factual determination of a particular defendant’s actual life expectancy. Otherwise, the trial court would not only find itself evaluating a defendant’s actual state of health, but would find itself reviewing the life expectancies of demographic subgroups, family health histories, and behavioral risks of acquiring certain illnesses, such as cancer and heart disease.
Instead, we simply direct the trial court to fashion a sentence that a defendant in his mid- to late-thirties has a reasonable prospect of actually serving. The effect of the defendant’s first sentence being life in prison, the trial court may, on remand, impose a life sentence or an indeterminate term of years.
The defendant requests that we order a resentencing before a different judge. We see no reason to enter such an order in this case.
The defendant’s conviction is affirmed. His sentence is vacated, and this case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
Levin, Brickley, and Archer, JJ., concurred with Cavanagh, J.