People v. Mikolaitis

2024 IL App (3d) 230791

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: April 11, 2024
• Docket: 3-23-0791
• Status: Published

Opinion

2024 IL App (3d) 230791

Opinion filed April 11, 2024 ____________________________________________________________________________

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

THIRD DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ILLINOIS, ) of the 12th Judicial Circuit, ) Will County, Illinois. Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) Appeal No. 3-23-0791 v. ) Circuit No. 23-CF-2213 ) CHRISTIAN P. MIKOLAITIS, ) The Honorable ) Margaret M. O’Connell, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding. ____________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Justice Brennan specially concurred in the judgment, with opinion. Presiding Justice McDade dissented, with opinion.

OPINION

¶1 The defendant, Christian P. Mikolaitis, appeals from the circuit court of Will County’s

order denying pretrial release, arguing the State failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence

that no condition or combination of conditions could mitigate any threat he posed.

¶2 I. BACKGROUND

On December 12, 2023, the defendant was charged with attempted first degree murder

(Class X) (720 ILCS 5/8-4(a), 9-1(a)(2) (West 2022)) and aggravated battery (id. § 12-3.05(f)(1),

(h)). The State filed a verified petition to deny pretrial release, alleging defendant was charged with a forcible felony, and his release posed a real and present threat to the safety of any person,

persons, or the community under section 110-6.1(a)(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963

(725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a)(1) (West 2022)).

¶3 The factual basis provided that on December 10, 2023, at 8:30 p.m. officers responded to

Challenge Fitness for a victim, Alec Geibel, who had been stabbed multiple times. Geibel was

taken to Silver Cross Hospital and was subsequently transported to Chicago as a trauma transport.

He gave a brief statement while at Silver Cross, stating that the defendant stabbed him and was

driving a gray Hyundai Elantra with red trim. At 10:49 p.m. the defendant’s mother called 911 and

stated that the defendant told her he had stabbed Geibel and provided a description of the car. At

12:39 a.m. the defendant’s girlfriend called 911 and stated that she had met the defendant at a gas

station, and he told her he had stabbed someone and provided details on how he did it. She further

stated that the defendant had picked up Geibel, who was going to buy Percocet from the defendant.

The defendant parked the car, pretended to look for his phone in the back seat, opened the

passenger door, and stabbed Geibel multiple times. He then left Geibel and drove away. The

defendant also told his girlfriend that he hated Geibel. The defendant was apprehended at 1:31

a.m. in the vehicle described by Geibel and the defendant’s mother. The front passenger seat had

knife punctures.

¶4 A pretrial risk assessment was completed, but because the defendant declined to

participate, it included limited information. The criminal history indicated that the defendant had

a pending case for failing to notify of a damaged or unattended vehicle.

¶5 A hearing was held on the petition on December 18, 2023. The State discussed some of the

factors that applied to the case, including (1) it was a violent offense, (2) Geibel was a specific

person to whom the defendant posed a threat, (3) the defendant told people what happened, and

2 (4) the defendant had access to and possessed a weapon, being a knife. The State argued that if the

defendant was released, Geibel’s safety would be at risk. Defense counsel asked for the defendant

to be placed on electronic monitoring, noting that he was 19 years old and had received mental

health treatment for depression, anxiety, and bipolar disorder. The circuit court asked whether the

defendant was currently taking his antipsychotic medicine, to which he said no. Defense counsel

indicated that the last time the defendant took his medication was in September when he “had an

admission for mental health.”

¶6 The court granted the State’s petition, finding that the proof was evident that the defendant

committed a detainable offense and that he posed a real and present threat to the safety of Geibel.

The court also found that there were no conditions that could mitigate the threat the defendant

posed, stating,

“I understand the concept of mental illness, but it does not appear as if the defendant was

taking his medicine which was previously prescribed to him in order to combat his

antipsychotic behavior along with his bipolar, so that is a greater concern to me and it

certainly poses a question as to whether or not he would be in a position where he could

abide by the conditions of pretrial release.”

¶7 II. ANALYSIS

¶8 On appeal, the defendant argues that the State failed to show by clear and convincing

evidence that no condition or combination of conditions could mitigate any threat he posed. We

review a circuit court’s factual findings in pretrial release cases under the manifest weight of the

evidence standard, but the court’s ultimate decision to grant or deny the State’s petition to detain

is considered for an abuse of discretion. People v. Trottier, 2023 IL App (2d) 230317, ¶ 13. Under

either standard, we consider whether the court’s determination is arbitrary or unreasonable. Id.;

3 see also People v. Horne, 2023 IL App (2d) 230382, ¶ 19. We review issues of statutory

construction de novo. People v. Taylor, 2023 IL 128316, ¶ 45.

¶9 Every person charged with an offense is eligible for pretrial release, which may only be

denied in certain situations. 725 ILCS 5/110-2(a), 110-6.1 (West 2022). The State must file a

verified petition requesting the denial of pretrial release. Id. § 110-6.1(a). The State then has the

burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that (1) the proof is evident or presumption

great that the defendant committed a detainable offense, (2) the defendant poses a real and present

threat to any person, persons, or the community, or has a high likelihood of willful flight to avoid

prosecution, and (3) no conditions could mitigate either the defendant’s dangerousness or risk of

flight. Id. § 110-6.1(a), (e). 1 When determining a defendant’s dangerousness and the conditions of

release, the statute includes a nonexhaustive list of factors the court can consider. Id. §§ 110-6.1(g),

110-5. Section 110-10 provides a nonexclusive list of conditions that can be applied to individuals

placed on pretrial release. Id. § 110-10.

¶ 19 Section 110-6.1(g) indicates that the court, when determining dangerousness, should

consider evidence the State presented that applies to a certain set of factors. Id. § 110-6.1(g).

Likewise, section 110-5(a) states that the court shall consider a set of factors when determining

which conditions of pretrial release, if any, would ensure his appearance or mitigate his

dangerousness. Id. § 110-5(a). The section specifically states that the court shall consider these

factors based on the available information, thus indicating that the State shall present evidence

supporting these factors. Id.

1 While the dissent says we “misstate the law” of section 110-6.1(e)(2), this statement of law is a clear summary of the State’s requirements under the entirety of section 110-6.1, considering both subsections (a) and (e). It is thus the dissent who misconstrues this paragraph. 4 ¶ 10 The dissent’s reading of the statute would require the State to present argument as to each

one of the potential conditions and why it should not apply to the defendant. However, the factors

set forth in section 110-5 provide the evidentiary corollary to the potential conditions of release.

For example, the State’s presentation of evidence that the defendant was on probation, parole, or

pretrial release at the time of the offense (id. § 110-5(a)(3)(B)) provides the evidentiary support

for the court’s finding that the defendant could not comply with the conditions that he abide by the

law and the orders of the court (id. § 110-10(a)(2), (4)). It is unclear what evidence the dissent

would require the State to present to meet its burden as to the conditions of release.

¶ 11 Here, the State provided argument and evidence regarding the factors set forth in section

110-5. Id. § 110-5. Moreover, defense counsel indicated to the court that the defendant had mental

health issues and had been prescribed medication. When the court inquired into the medication,

the defendant indicated that he was not taking his prescribed medication and counsel stated that he

had not been taking it since he was admitted to a mental health facility in September. The court

did not err in finding that the defendant’s failure to abide by his doctor’s directives indicated that

he would not follow the conditions placed on him by the court. Therefore, the court did not abuse

its discretion in granting the petition.

¶ 12 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 13 The judgment of the circuit court of Will County is affirmed.

¶ 14 Affirmed.

¶ 15 JUSTICE BRENNAN, specially concurring:

¶ 16 I write to emphasize my disagreement with the dissent’s suggestion that the Code obligates

the State to argue or prove why each condition or combination of conditions set forth in section

110-10(b) cannot mitigate the threat a defendant poses to a particular victim. Indeed, the

5 unworkability of such a requirement is laid bare when one considers that the section 110-10(b)

conditions are not even an exhaustive list of possible conditions. 725 ILCS 5/110-10(b)(9) (West

2022) (allowing court to also require “such other reasonable conditions as the court may

impose[.]”).

¶ 17 Section 110-6.1(d)(1) prescribes the contents of the State’s petition, requiring that “[t]he

petition shall be verified by the State and shall state the grounds upon which it contends the

defendant should be denied pretrial release, including the real and present threat to the safety of

any person or persons or the community, based on the specific and articulable facts or flight risk,

as appropriate.” Id. § 6.1(d)(1). Conspicuously absent from the required content of the petition is

any requirement that the State specifically address a non-exhaustive list of conditions that might

arguably be imposed to mitigate a defendant’s real and present threat.

¶ 18 Where a defendant’s danger is proven by clear and convincing evidence, the Code does, of

course, likewise require the State to prove by clear and convincing evidence that no condition or

combination of conditions can mitigate the threat. Id. § 6.1(e)(3). This burden, however, can be

satisfied in a variety of ways: from the presentation of evidence to be sure, but also by common

sense consideration of the factors listed in section 110-5(a)(1)-(7), including the nature of the

offense, the strength of the case, the defendant’s mental condition, the defendant’s criminal history,

the defendant’s compliance with MSR or probation, and several others. The State’s burden does

not obligate it to specifically address the efficacy of every conceivable condition or combination

of conditions. Rather, it is the trial court that must ultimately consider all it has heard and, if

ordering detention, make written findings explaining “why less restrictive conditions would not

avoid a real and present threat to the safety or any person or persons or the community.” Id. §

6.1(h).

6 ¶ 19 In the instant case, defendant blindsided the victim with a horrific knife attack because, in

the defendant’s own words, he “hated” the victim. Defendant refused to cooperate with his pretrial

risk assessment. To the extent defendant’s mental health issues may have played some role in the

attack, this in no way supports that some condition or conditions short of detention would mitigate

the threat he poses to the victim. To the contrary, defendant’s non-compliance with his

psychotropic medication regimen supports the opposite inference. Simply put, the trial court’s

detention decision was based upon a sufficient quantum of information and was anything but

fanciful.

¶ 20 PRESIDING JUSTICE McDADE, dissenting:

¶ 21 By affirming the circuit court’s detention decision in this case, the majority has excused

the State from having to meet its legislatively mandated burden of proving by clear and convincing

evidence that

“no condition or combination of conditions set forth in subsection (b) of Section 110-10 of

this Article can mitigate (i) the real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons

or the community, based on the specific articulable facts of the case, for offenses listed in

paragraphs (1) through (7) of subsection (a), or (ii) the defendant's willful flight for offenses

listed in paragraph (8) of subsection (a).” 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(e)(3) (West Supp. 2023).

Accordingly, I dissent from the majority’s decision to affirm the circuit court’s detention order.

¶ 22 Initially, I note that the majority has misstated the law contained in section 110-6.1(e). The

majority maintains that under section 110-6.1(e)(2), the State must prove that “the defendant poses

a real and present threat to any person, persons, or the community or had a high likelihood of

willful flight to avoid prosecution.” Supra ¶ 9. However, “willful flight to avoid prosecution” is

not a phrase that appears in section 110-6.1(e)(2). 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(e)(2) (West Supp. 2023).

7 That section only applies when the State has sought detention for offenses listed in section 110-

6.1(a)(1) through (7), i.e., only when the accused allegedly poses a safety risk. Id. In addition, the

majority inaccurately summarizes the State’s burden on the conditions element from section 110-

6.1(e)(3). Supra ¶ 18. I have quoted that section above and do not need to repeat it here.

¶ 23 Turning to the merits, it is important in this case to differentiate between sections 110-5

and 110-10 of the Code. Section 110-5 provides guidance for the court when considering whether

conditions exist that would, in part, “reasonably ensure the appearance of a defendant as required

or the safety of any other person or the community.” 725 ILCS 5/110-5(a) (West Supp. 2023).

That section provides a nonexhaustive list of factors that are relevant to the court’s decision,

including “the nature and circumstances of the offense charged” (id. § 110-5(a)(1)) and “the history

and characteristics of the defendant” (id. § 110-5(a)(3)). Section 110-5 also directs the court to

take specific actions in certain circumstances. See, e.g., id. § 110-5(c) (directing the court, if a

defendant is to be admitted to pretrial release, to impose any conditions mandated by section 110-

10 of the Code).

¶ 24 In contrast to section 110-5, section 110-10 addresses the actual conditions that can be

imposed on pretrial release. Id. § 110-10. For example, section 110-10(a) addresses conditions that

must be imposed if a defendant is admitted to pretrial release. Id. § 110-10(a). Section 110-10(b)

includes a nonexhaustive list of conditions that can be imposed, such as requiring a defendant to

obtain leave of court before departing the State (id. § 110-10(b)(0.05)) and prohibiting a defendant

from possessing firearms or other dangerous weapons and from going to certain geographic areas

or premises (id. §§ 110-10(b)(2), (4)).

¶ 25 The distinction between sections 110-5 and 110-10 is important because the State’s explicit

burden under section 110-6.1(e)(3) of the Code is that it must establish by clear and convincing

8 evidence, in relevant part, that “no condition or combination of conditions set forth in subsection

(b) of section 110-10 can mitigate” either the safety risk the defendant poses or the risk of his or

her “willful flight,” depending on the basis for the State’s detention request. Id. It would seem

elementary, then, that for the State to meet its legislatively mandated burden under section 110-

6.1(e)(3), it would address at a very minimum the conditions explicitly listed in section 110-10(b).

See, e.g., People v. Stock, 2023 IL App (1st) 231753, ¶¶ 15-19. Of course, not every conceivable

condition needs to be addressed by the State to meet its burden under section 110-6.1(e)(3). But

the language of that section shows that the legislature contemplated what conditions would

arguably be applicable and mandated that the State present evidence and argument on them. The

plain language of section 110-6.1(e)(3) makes it clear that the State cannot meet its burden under

section 110-6.1(e)(3) by merely presenting evidence relevant to the factors the court is required to

consider under section 110-5 when reaching its ultimate pretrial release decision. Id.

¶ 26 Whether the procedure mandated by section 110-6.1(e) is considered by the special

concurrence to be unworkable is irrelevant. It is also a curious position because the procedure is

essentially analogous to what transpires every day in criminal court—that is, a criminal defendant

is presumed innocent; the State has a mandated burden so it presents evidence to satisfy that

burden; if it fails to do so, the presumption prevails. In a pretrial release case such as this one, if

the State satisfies its burden, the court can assess all factors available to it; it can fashion a novel

or unique condition outside of the nonexhaustive list and still release the defendant on specific

terms or it can deny release altogether. But it can only do so if the State first meets its burden of

proof. This hardly seems unworkable—unless one just wants to ignore the statute and write his or

her own law.

9 ¶ 27 In this case, the State presented no evidence regarding any condition or combination of

conditions that could mitigate the safety threat posed by Mikolaitis. Even though it may have

presented evidence relevant to the factors the court is required to consider under section 110-5, the

State could not meet its burden under section 110-6.1(e)(3) by presenting nothing more than that

evidence. Because the State failed to present any evidence related to its burden under section 110-

6.1(e)(3), it has failed to meet its burden and has essentially conceded that there are adequate

conditions. Mikolaitis’s argument on appeal is meritorious. The statutory presumption favoring

pretrial release has not been rebutted and Mikolaitis cannot be detained, despite the horrific nature

of the offense and the statutorily defined threat he poses. Accordingly, I would reverse the circuit

court’s decision and order the defendant’s release.