People v. Eugene

2025 IL App (3d) 240612-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: January 22, 2025
• Docket: 3-24-0612
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE: This order was filed under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

2025 IL App (3d) 240612-U

Order filed January 22, 2025 ____________________________________________________________________________

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

THIRD DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ILLINOIS, ) of the 12th Judicial Circuit, ) Will County, Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) Appeal No. 3-24-0612 v. ) Circuit No. 23-CF-188 ) MARK F. EUGENE, ) Honorable ) Daniel Rippy, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding. ____________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE DAVENPORT delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Brennan and Justice Holdridge concurred in the judgment. ____________________________________________________________________________

ORDER

¶1 Held: The court did not err in denying pretrial release.

¶2 Defendant, Mark F. Eugene, appeals from the denial of his pretrial release, arguing (1) the

court did not find that continued detention was necessary at each subsequent appearance, (2) his

speedy trial rights were violated, (3) the State’s petition to deny pretrial release was untimely,

(4) the State did not present sufficient evidence that defendant was a danger, and (5) there were

conditions to mitigate any threat that he posed. We affirm. ¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 In February 2023, defendant was indicted on two counts of aggravated battery (Class X

and Class 3) (720 ILCS 5/12-3.05(e)(1), (f)(1), (h) (West 2022)) and two counts of unlawful

possession of a weapon by a felon (Class 3) (id. § 24-1.1(a), (e)). He was arrested on March 1,

2023, and his bail was set at $5 million and later reduced to $3 million. In May 2023, defendant’s

counsel submitted an affidavit signed by the victim urging the State to consider dropping the

charges, and averring that many of his statements to police were “exaggerated, and even untrue.”

On August 19, 2024, counsel requested a hearing regarding pretrial release and agreed to continue

the case to August 21, 2024. In response, the State filed a verified petition to deny pretrial release,

alleging defendant was charged with a forcible felony, and his release posed a real and present

threat to the safety of any person, persons, or the community under section 110-6.1(a)(1.5) of the

Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a)(1.5) (West 2022)). Defendant has

remained in custody since his arrest.

¶5 The factual basis provided that on January 30, 2023, officers responded to the scene of a

shooting. Bart Dulleck had sustained a gunshot wound to the back and was transported to the

hospital. He sustained damage to his kidney and intestines. Defendant was dating the daughter of

Dulleck’s girlfriend. Dulleck had attempted to diffuse an incident when defendant approached him

and struck him in the face with a firearm. A fight then ensued between Dulleck and defendant, and

defendant shot Dulleck in the back. At least two other people witnessed the event. After defendant

was arrested and taken to jail, he made numerous phone calls, including some “to tell his girlfriend

to get [Dulleck] to change his story” in an apparent attempt to have the charges dropped.

Defendant’s prior criminal history included three separate instances of aggravated fleeing and

eluding, felony criminal damage to property, and felony possession of a stolen motor vehicle.

2 ¶6 A hearing was held on the State’s petition on August 21, 2024. The State provided the

factual basis and defendant’s criminal history. The State noted Dulleck was interviewed a second

time and “stated that he was basically persuaded” to sign an affidavit stating this was a private

family matter and he did not wish to proceed with the case. The State said,

“the defendant would be a danger to society, or specifically to the victim in this

case, having already reached out over the phone, in the jail phone calls, to influence

that individual from jail, which it looks like he was at least partially successful in

doing. So the State believes there is no other way to mitigate that risk, as if he can

do it from the jail, he surely can do it from outside the jail.”

Defense counsel argued the State’s petition was untimely, Dulleck retracted his statements to

police by way of affidavit, and defendant could live with his elderly father if released. Counsel

asked for defendant to be released on electronic monitoring with a no-contact order as to Dulleck

and an order to refrain from possessing firearms.

¶7 The court granted the State’s petition, finding by clear and convincing evidence that the

proof was evident (1) defendant committed a detainable offense, (2) defendant posed a danger to

the community, and (3) no conditions could mitigate that danger. The court highlighted defendant

was not supposed to possess a firearm yet did not follow that condition. The court further stated,

“The argument that this is a private family matter doesn’t really matter to me

because it still involves somebody being shot with a firearm in their home. ***

That’s a significant violent allegation that the defendant is facing, that mixed with

the fact that there’s at least some allegation that the defendant has been trying to

get the victim in this case to change his story bothers me, and it does make me

3 believe that the defendant is a threat not only to the community, as a whole, but

also to the victim in this matter.”

After the hearing, defense counsel argued a previously filed motion to dismiss. Specifically, the

motion contended that defendant’s speedy trial rights had been violated. The court denied the

motion.

¶8 Defendant filed a motion for relief, arguing the State’s petition was untimely, the State did

not prove that defendant was a danger, his speedy trial rights have been violated, and conditions

existed to mitigate any threat to Dulleck. After a hearing, the court denied the motion.

¶9 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 10 On appeal, defendant contends the court abused its discretion in granting the petition to

detain. Specifically, he argues the court did not find continued detention was necessary at each

subsequent appearance, his speedy trial rights were violated, the State’s petition was untimely, the

State did not present sufficient evidence that defendant was a danger, and there were conditions to

mitigate any threat that he posed.

¶ 11 A. Arguments Not Properly Before Us

¶ 12 Initially, there are a number of contentions that we cannot consider in this appeal.

Defendant states in his memorandum that he “wishes to incorporate all his arguments in all his

filings, as well as his oral arguments presented in the transcripts and [m]otions.” Though it is not

necessary to file a memorandum, “[i]f a memorandum is filed, it must identify which issues from

the motion for relief are being advanced on appeal.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(h)(7) (eff. Apr. 15, 2024).

“We have repeatedly admonished litigants that this court is not a depository into which the parties

may dump the burden of argument and research.” People v. Woods, 2024 IL App (3d) 230592,

¶ 31. “Accordingly, we routinely hold that the failure to develop an argument in support of a bare

4 contention forfeits that contention, and we do not consider it further.” Id. While Rule 604(h)

appeals are subject to a different process, “[w]e do not believe this is a sufficient reason *** to

nullify the long-standing body of law requiring an appealing party to establish error warranting

relief through reasoned argument, supported by references to the record and authority if available.”

Id. ¶ 32. Therefore, we will not consider any contention not specifically raised and argued in the

memorandum. Further, defendant argues the court failed to make a finding that continued detention

was necessary at each subsequent hearing. However, defendant did not raise this issue in his

motion for relief and it is therefore waived. Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(h)(2) (Apr. 15, 2024).

¶ 13 Defendant also contends his speedy trial rights were violated. He had filed and argued a

motion to dismiss based on speedy trial concerns in the trial court. However, this is not a proper

order to appeal from in an appeal under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(h). Under the rule, the

only orders that can be appealed from are those (1) imposing conditions of pretrial release,

(2) revoking pretrial release or denying a petition to revoke pretrial release, (3) denying pretrial

release, and (4) denying a petition to deny pretrial release. Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(h)(1) (eff. Apr. 15,

2024). The failure of the court to dismiss the case based on speedy trial grounds does not fall within

this list and, therefore, may not be raised in this appeal.

¶ 14 Therefore, the only issues properly before us are the timeliness of the State’s petition, the

State’s evidence that defendant was a danger, and any conditions that could be imposed. We will

consider each of these arguments in turn.

¶ 15 B. Untimeliness

¶ 16 Defendant contends that the State’s petition was untimely. We have already considered this

issue in People v. Kurzeja, 2023 IL App (3d) 230434, ¶¶ 14-15. In Kurzeja, we stated that

defendants who were arrested prior to the implementation of bail reform

5 “can either ‘elect to stay in detention until such time as the previously set monetary

security may be paid’ (People v. Rios, 2023 IL App (5th) 230724, ¶ 16), or file a

motion to modify. If defendant chooses the latter option, the State may file a

responding petition. ‘[O]nce a defendant elects “to have their pretrial conditions

reviewed anew” (Rios, 2023 IL App (5th) 230724, ¶ 16), the matter returns to the

proverbial square one, where the defendant may argue for the most lenient pretrial

release conditions, and the State may make competing arguments.’ People v. Jones,

2023 IL App (4th) 230837, ¶ 23. ‘This is analogous to when a change in the

sentencing law occurs after a defendant has committed the offense—the defendant

is given the opportunity to choose to be sentenced under that law that existed at the

time of the offense or the newly enacted law.’ Rios, 2023 IL App (5th) 230724,

¶ 17.” Id. ¶ 14.

Based on this, we found the State was permitted to file a responsive petition if the defendant chose

to file a motion to reopen the conditions of bail. Id. ¶ 15. We adhere to Kurzeja and, under the

same reasoning, find the State’s petition timely.

¶ 17 C. Granting of Petition to Deny Pretrial Release

¶ 18 Lastly, defendant contends the court abused its discretion in granting the State’s petition to

deny pretrial release. Specifically, he argues the State failed to prove he was dangerous and no

conditions existed to mitigate any risk he posed. We consider factual findings for the manifest

weight of the evidence, but the ultimate decision to grant or deny the State’s petition to detain is

considered for an abuse of discretion. People v. Mikolaitis, 2024 IL App (3d) 230791, ¶ 9. “Under

either standard, we consider whether the court’s determination is arbitrary or unreasonable.” Id.

6 ¶ 19 Everyone charged with an offense is eligible for pretrial release, which may only be denied

in certain situations. 725 ILCS 5/110-2(a), 110-6.1 (West 2022). The State must file a verified

petition requesting the denial of pretrial release. Id. § 110-6.1. The State then has the burden of

proving by clear and convincing evidence (1) the proof is evident or presumption great that

defendant committed a detainable offense, (2) defendant poses a real and present threat to any

person, persons, or the community or is a flight risk, and (3) no conditions could mitigate this

threat or risk of flight. Id. § 110-6.1(e). When determining a defendant’s dangerousness and the

conditions of release, the statute includes a nonexhaustive list of factors the court can consider. Id.

§§ 110-6.1(g), 110-5.

¶ 20 We find the court did not err in granting the petition. Defendant showed he was a danger

to Dulleck and the community when he shot Dulleck in the back. While defendant takes issue with

the evidence presented being hearsay, pretrial release hearings are not subject to the traditional

rules of evidence. See id. § 110-6.1(f)(5). Moreover, the State presented evidence that no

conditions existed to mitigate the threat defendant posed. The statute provides factors the court can

consider when determining the conditions of release, and the State presented evidence of such

factors, including the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics

of defendant. Id. § 110-5. Defendant had a criminal history, possessed and used a firearm when it

was unlawful for him to have one in his possession, and called his girlfriend to convince the victim

to “change his story.” Based on the foregoing, the court’s decision to grant the petition was not an

abuse of discretion.

¶ 21 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 22 For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Will County.

¶ 23 Affirmed.