NOTICE 2023 IL App (4th) 220691-U This Order was filed under FILED Supreme Court Rule 23 and is August 22, 2023 NO. 4-22-0691 Carla Bender not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed 4th District Appellate under Rule 23(e)(1). IN THE APPELLATE COURT Court, IL
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of v. ) Woodford County AAROM J. MEZO, ) No. 21CF31 Defendant-Appellant. ) ) Honorable ) Charles M. Feeney III, ) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE DOHERTY delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Harris and Lannerd concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing defendant to concurrent terms of four and a half years in prison for two counts of disorderly conduct.
¶2 Defendant Aarom J. Mezo pleaded guilty to two Class 4 felony counts of disorderly
conduct (720 ILCS 5/26-1(a)(4) (West 2020)) for falsely reporting to two Woodford County
sheriff’s officers that he had been the victim of a domestic battery. Defendant was eligible for
extended-term sentencing due to his criminal history, and the trial court sentenced him to two
concurrent terms of four and a half years in prison. On appeal, defendant argues that his prison
sentence is excessive and asks us to reduce his sentence to the extended-term minimum of three
years or to remand for resentencing. Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
sentencing defendant, we affirm. ¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 On October 21, 2020, defendant committed a domestic battery and was detained by
the Woodford County Sheriff’s Office. While detained, defendant told Deputy Thomas McGuire
that he had been hit three times by Sabrina Goetz, a family or household member. Twenty minutes
later, defendant repeated this allegation to Deputy Cody Geick. Defendant later admitted these
reports were fictitious and he had never been the victim of domestic violence by Goetz. Defendant
was charged for the domestic battery in Woodford County case No. 20-CM-115; in January 2021,
he was sentenced to 24 months’ probation on that charge. The State filed a petition to revoke
defendant’s probation in April 2021 and a supplemental petition to revoke in July 2021.
¶5 In February 2021, the State charged defendant in Woodford County case No. 21-
CF-31 with one count of disorderly conduct for falsely reporting a domestic battery to Deputy
Geick. In December 2021, a grand jury indicted defendant for the same offense and an additional
count of disorderly conduct for the false report to Deputy McGuire.
¶6 Defendant admitted the allegations against him in the petitions to revoke his
probation and pleaded guilty to the two counts in the indictment. At sentencing in April 2022, the
trial court sentenced defendant to 350 days in jail on the petitions to revoke and to concurrent terms
of four and a half years in the Illinois Department of Corrections on the felony counts of disorderly
conduct. Defendant appealed only from his sentence on the disorderly conduct counts.
¶7 The trial court’s sentencing determination and the parties’ arguments primarily
revolve around defendant’s conduct between the date of the offenses and the sentencing hearing.
¶8 A. Defendant’s Conduct
¶9 Defendant was arrested in February 2021 and posted bond in March 2021. After he
failed to appear at a subsequent court appearance, the trial court issued a warrant for his arrest.
-2- Defendant’s whereabouts were unknown because he had failed to notify the Woodford County
probation department that his address and phone number had changed.
¶ 10 Defendant was arrested again in May 2021 and charged with obstructing
identification (id. § 31-4.5) and possession of drug paraphernalia (720 ILCS 600/3.5 (West 2020))
in Woodford County case No. 21-CM-45. At defendant’s bond hearing, he claimed he had no way
of showing up to his previous court date because he could not get a ride. The trial court admonished
defendant to appear voluntarily, stating that when a defendant showed up late to court, even as late
as the following day, the court would recall the warrant. After a bond reduction hearing, defendant
posted bond on the disorderly conduct charge and the petition to revoke and was released.
¶ 11 In June 2021, defendant consumed methamphetamine, contacted Goetz in an
abusive or harassing manner, and failed to complete a court-ordered domestic violence evaluation.
Defendant was charged with three traffic infractions in Woodford County case Nos. 21-TR-714,
21-TR-715, and 21-TR-716. Defendant was arrested again and charged in Marshall County case
No. 21-CF-27 for committing two aggravated domestic batteries (720 ILCS 5/12-3.3 (West 2020))
against Goetz. Defendant pleaded guilty to one of the aggravated domestic battery charges in July
2021 and was sentenced to 24 months’ probation. A subsequent revocation of his probation is the
subject of a separate appeal and will be addressed separately in appellate case No. 4-23-0064.
¶ 12 Defendant failed to appear for trial in September 2021, so the trial court revoked
his bond. Defendant was arrested in October 2021; at his bond hearing, the trial court again
admonished him for failing to appear voluntarily after missing court and stated that “a historical
problem with [defendant was] getting [him] to show up.” Defendant’s bond was reduced, but he
failed to post bond and remained in custody.
-3- ¶ 13 In January 2022, defendant appeared before the trial court to plead guilty to the
counts of disorderly conduct and admit the allegations in the petitions to revoke his probation. The
trial court accepted defendant’s open plea and explained it could impose a sentence anywhere
between the minimum and maximum sentence the law would allow. Pursuant to the plea
agreement, case No. 21-CM-45 was dismissed on the State’s motion.
¶ 14 In February 2022, the trial court held a hearing on defendant’s motion to reduce his
bond to personal recognizance so he could participate in a residential substance abuse treatment
program. The court stated:
“[Defendant] has a terrible record. But I think if he completes a period of treatment,
it is—seems pretty clear to me that he has a substance abuse issue. And if he
completes a period of treatment, then that communicates something. If he leaves
treatment against staff advice, if he doesn’t complete his treatment, that also
strongly indicates something else.
And so I really—I hope you appreciate this opportunity and seize it,
[defendant], because it will have a tremendous impact on your sentencing.”
¶ 15 The trial court proceeded to a sentencing hearing in April 2022.
¶ 16 B. The Sentencing Hearing
¶ 17 The trial court first heard testimony from a Woodford County probation officer,
who reported that defendant had successfully completed the residential substance abuse treatment
program, moved to a sober living house for two days, and then left. After defendant left, he gave
his Marshall County probation officer a phone number for “Jeremy,” allegedly the house manager,
who could verify—falsely—that defendant was still staying at the sober living house. Defendant
-4- later admitted that Jeremy was not the house manager but just a friend who lived there. A
laboratory drug test showed defendant had used methamphetamine.
¶ 18 The trial court then heard testimony from defendant. He explained he had been
using methamphetamine off and on for 23 years and relapsed once after he left the sober living
house. Although there were frequent Narcotics Anonymous and Alcoholics Anonymous meetings
nearby, he had only attended one. When asked about his aggravated domestic battery charges,
defendant testified he “did beat [Goetz] up pretty good,” but he did not choke her.
¶ 19 On the disorderly conduct counts, the State sought concurrent terms of four and a
half years, and defendant asked for probation or, if the trial court opted for imprisonment,
concurrent terms of two and a half years. When pronouncing defendant’s sentence, the court
recognized the mitigating factors that defendant’s conduct did not cause or threaten serious
physical harm and defendant would not have contemplated his criminal conduct would cause or
threaten serious physical harm to another. As aggravating factors, the court cited defendant’s prior
history of criminal activity, the fact that he committed a felony while on probation and released on
bond, his dishonesty with the Marshall County probation office, his failure to attend substance
abuse meetings, his failures to appear in court, the need to deter others, and the need to protect the
public. The court sentenced defendant to concurrent terms of four and a half years.
¶ 20 Defendant filed a motion to reconsider his sentence, claiming it violated the Illinois
Constitution and was excessive in light of the evidence presented. The trial court held a hearing
on the motion and concluded its sentence was rational and reasonable and was given “to impress
upon [defendant] the need to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law and also to protect
society from his continued felonious and otherwise criminal behavior.” The court remarked that it
-5- could have imposed consecutive rather than concurrent terms, in which case the total sentence
could have been up to 12 years.
¶ 21 This appeal followed.
¶ 22 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 23 Section 11 of the Illinois Bill of Rights states that all criminal sentences “shall be
determined both according to the seriousness of the offense and with the objective of restoring the
offender to useful citizenship.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11. “The trial court’s sentence must be
based upon the particular circumstances of the case, including (1) the defendant’s history,
character, and rehabilitative potential; (2) the seriousness of the offense; (3) the need to protect
society; and (4) the need for punishment and deterrence.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
People v. Klein, 2022 IL App (4th) 200599, ¶ 34. A sentence that is within the statutory limits
prescribed by the legislature carries with it a presumption of validity and will only be reversed
when the trial court abuses its discretion. People v. Musgrave, 2019 IL App (4th) 170106, ¶ 56.
The trial court abuses its discretion when its sentence is manifestly disproportionate to the nature
of the offense or greatly at variance with the spirit and purpose of the law. People v. Fern, 189 Ill.
2d 48, 54 (1999). When reviewing a sentence for excessiveness, we do not substitute our judgment
for the trial court’s merely because we might have weighed the sentencing factors differently.
Klein, 2022 IL App (4th) 200599, ¶ 37.
¶ 24 Defendant does not challenge the trial court’s conclusion that his criminal history
authorized an extended-term sentence between three and six years for a Class 4 felony. See 730
ILCS 5/5-4.5-45(a) (West 2022). Rather, defendant argues that his mid-range four-and-a-half-year
sentence is manifestly disproportionate for “a pair of harmless lies” and that a prison sentence
above the extended-term minimum of concurrent three-year terms is greatly at variance with the
-6- spirit and purpose of the disorderly conduct statute. Defendant also argues that the trial court
improperly considered the nature and circumstances of his aggravated domestic battery offense, to
which he did not plead guilty, purportedly in violation of People v. Daly, 2014 IL App (4th)
140624, abrogated on other grounds by People v. Lawson, 2018 IL App (4th) 170105, ¶ 25
(disapproving of decisions where this court reduced a sentence of imprisonment to a sentence of
probation).
¶ 25 We address each argument in turn.
¶ 26 A. The Seriousness of the Offenses
¶ 27 We have often pointed out that the seriousness of the offense is the most important
sentencing factor, and the trial court need not give greater weight to rehabilitation or mitigating
factors than to the seriousness of the offense. See, e.g., People v. Aquisto, 2022 IL App (4th)
200081, ¶ 112. In this context, “offense” refers to the particular facts and circumstances of the
defendant’s offense and not the statutory offense in the abstract. Id.
¶ 28 Defendant cites People v. Stacey, 193 Ill. 2d 203, 210 (2000), for the proposition
that a sentence is excessive when it is manifestly disproportionate to the seriousness of the offense.
In Stacey, the supreme court found a sentence of two consecutive 25-year terms was manifestly
disproportionate to the nature of sexual abuse offenses in which the defendant “momentarily
grabbed the breasts of two young girls, who were fully clothed at the time, and *** made lewd
comments and gestures.” Id. However, the court found no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s
decision to impose consecutive terms. Id. at 211. The court reduced the defendant’s sentence to
two consecutive six-year terms, the statutory minimum, which “comport[ed] with the nature of the
offenses while not diminishing the seriousness of [the] defendant’s actions.” Id. at 211-12.
-7- ¶ 29 Defendant does not cite any other cases where a sentence was found manifestly
disproportionate to the seriousness of the offense, and such cases are exceedingly rare. See, e.g.,
People v. Busse, 2016 IL App (1st) 142941, ¶ 29 (finding sentence of 12 years “grossly
disproportionate to the offense of stealing $44 in loose change from a vending machine”); People
v. Allen, 2017 IL App (1st) 151540, ¶ 15 (finding sentence of 10 1/2 years manifestly
disproportionate to the offense of “breaking a truck window and stealing two packs of cigarettes
and a cap” that were promptly returned to their owner). Daly, which defendant does cite, is not a
case where we found a trial court’s sentence manifestly disproportionate to the seriousness of the
offense. Rather, we found a three-and-a-half-year sentence excessive when, along with other
errors, the trial court failed to consider the nature and circumstances of the charged offense at all.
Daly, 2014 IL App (4th) 140624, ¶¶ 30, 34.
¶ 30 In the present case, defendant argues that his mid-range sentence of four and a half
years is manifestly disproportionate to what he describes as a pair of harmless lies. But we have
declined to craft a “petty offense” exception to statutory sentencing ranges. See People v.
Cunningham, 2018 IL App (4th) 150395, ¶¶ 49-54 (rejecting the reasoning of Busse and Allen);
see also People v. McGee, 2020 IL App (2d) 180998, ¶ 16 (same). In Cunningham, the defendant
was sentenced to 20 years in prison for burglary when he entered a garage with the intent to commit
a theft, even though he did not take anything before he was arrested. Cunningham, 2018 IL App
(4th) 150395, ¶¶ 1, 3. This court affirmed, holding that even a minor offense can warrant a severe
sentence within the statutory range when the defendant has a lengthy criminal history and the
potential to recommit similar offenses. Id. ¶ 54. In other words, although the seriousness of the
offense may be the most important factor, it is not the only factor.
-8- ¶ 31 Here, the trial court explicitly considered the seriousness of defendant’s offenses
and concluded they were “not good” but not “so terribly onerous.” Defendant relies heavily on this
characterization, but when reviewing a trial court’s sentence, we consider the record as a whole
and not just a few words or statements. Daly, 2014 IL App (4th) 140624, ¶ 38. The record shows
the trial court did not disregard the seriousness of the offenses, but rather balanced it against the
other relevant factors we have identified: the defendant’s history, character, and rehabilitative
potential; the need to protect society; and the need for punishment and deterrence. Klein, 2022 IL
App (4th) 200599, ¶ 34. By focusing solely on the seriousness of the offenses, defendant is asking
us to assign less weight to this factor. Even if we were inclined to do so, we would not find an
abuse of discretion merely because we might have weighed the factors differently. Id. ¶ 37.
Because the trial court thoroughly considered the relevant factors and selected a sentence within
the statutory range, we do not find the sentence manifestly disproportionate to the seriousness of
the offenses. See id. ¶¶ 34, 45.
¶ 32 B. The Spirit and Purpose of the Statute
¶ 33 Defendant argues that his sentence is greatly at variance with the spirit and purpose
of the disorderly conduct statute, particularly in light of the sparse details in the State’s factual
basis. “[T]he disorderly conduct statute is intended to prevent activities performed in an
unreasonable manner that would tend to disturb, alarm or provoke others.” (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) People v. Fuller, 187 Ill. 2d 1, 14 (1999). The statute “embraces a wide variety of
conduct serving to destroy or menace the public order and tranquility.” In re B.C., 176 Ill. 2d 536,
552 (1997). Furthermore, defendant was charged under a subsection of the statute that specifically
targets dishonest conduct. The legislature defined this offense as a Class 4 felony and provided for
-9- extended-term sentences of three to six years, which can be served consecutively in certain
circumstances. See 730 ILCS 5/5-8-4 (West 2022).
¶ 34 The trial court accurately described this sentencing scheme and imposed a mid-
range sentence of four and a half years in prison. The court explained that the disorderly conduct
offenses were indicative of “the chaos imposed upon society” by defendant and noted that
defendant had been dishonest with his Marshall County probation officer. After weighing the
sentencing factors, the court found four and a half years’ imprisonment was necessary for the
protection of the public and to deter others. This finding is not greatly at variance with the spirit
and purpose of a statute targeting dishonest conduct that menaces the public order, particularly
when the legislature authorized a total sentence of up to 12 years’ imprisonment. Accordingly, the
court did not abuse its discretion on this basis.
¶ 35 C. Daly
¶ 36 Finally, defendant argues that Daly counsels in favor of a reduction in his sentence.
The State claims this aspect of defendant’s argument is forfeited because he failed to raise it before
the trial court in his motion to reconsider. In reply, defendant argues that his broad reference to the
Illinois Constitution was sufficient, but even if it was not, we should consider the argument under
the doctrine of plain error. See People v. Seal, 2015 IL App (4th) 130775, ¶ 26 (noting that the
plain-error doctrine can bypass forfeiture principles). Because we find defendant has not met his
burden of showing any error, we need not determine whether he has met the higher burden of
showing plain error. See People v. Merriweather, 2022 IL App (4th) 210498, ¶ 37 (“Since we have
found no error, we need not address plain error.”).
¶ 37 Defendant claims Daly stands for the proposition that “the trial court cannot base,
or even appear to base, its sentence on an offense to which a defendant did not plead guilty”—
- 10 - here, the aggravated domestic battery against Goetz in June 2021. Defendant’s argument falters at
the outset because he did plead guilty to that offense, albeit in a different case in another county.
His conviction was documented in his presentence investigation report, and as the State points out,
the trial court was allowed to consider defendant’s prior criminal activity as an aggravating factor
when it imposed its sentence. See 730 ILCS 5/5-5-3.2(a)(3) (West 2022). Defendant also claims
the underlying facts of his aggravated domestic violence conviction were not properly before the
trial court, but defendant testified at the sentencing hearing that he “beat [Goetz] up pretty good.”
Even if defendant had not been convicted of aggravated domestic battery, the trial court would still
have been allowed to consider this testimony as evidence of a prior crime of violence. See People
v. Harris, 359 Ill. App. 3d 931, 936 (2005) (stating that a sentencing court may consider other-
crimes evidence that is relevant and reliable).
¶ 38 Setting these problems aside, Daly does not stand for the proposition that a trial
court errs by considering a defendant’s criminal history, as defendant seems to suggest. This
becomes clear when defendant’s cited excerpt is placed in context:
“Our review of the record in this case shows little to indicate the trial court
considered ‘the nature and circumstance of the offense,’ ‘the history, character and
condition of the offender,’ or defendant’s rehabilitative potential in fashioning its
sentence. Instead, the record shows the court considered the nature and
circumstances of an offense to which defendant did not plead guilty.” (Emphasis
added.) Daly, 2014 IL App (4th) 140624, ¶ 30.
In other words, a trial court abuses its discretion when it disregards the offense to which the
defendant pleaded guilty and proceeds as though it is sentencing the defendant for another offense
altogether.
- 11 - ¶ 39 The trial court in Daly erred when it appeared to sentence the defendant for
aggravated driving under the influence (DUI) instead of reckless homicide, the offense to which
she did plead guilty. This court noted several problems with the trial court’s decision. The trial
court assumed the defendant was intoxicated even though the factual basis for her plea did not say
she was intoxicated or imply she drove under the influence of alcohol. Id. ¶ 31. There was also no
evidence the accident was the direct result of alcohol use and nothing in the record demonstrating
defendant had a problem with drugs or alcohol. Id. ¶ 33. The trial court focused heavily on
deterrence, even though deterrence has less significance for a crime involving unintentional
conduct. Id. ¶ 32. Instead of considering the general presumption in favor of probation, the trial
court emphasized the public policy of the aggravated DUI statute, which required a prison sentence
except in extraordinary circumstances. Id. ¶¶ 24, 34, 36. The trial court improperly used the
victim’s death as an aggravating factor, even though the victim’s death was implicit in the offense
of reckless homicide. Id. ¶ 39. In light of these errors, the State conceded that the trial court had
abused its discretion in sentencing the defendant. Id. ¶ 1. This court agreed. Id. ¶ 40.
¶ 40 Here, defendant complains that the trial court erred by focusing heavily on his
addiction history and his criminal history, including the aggravated domestic battery. Unlike in
Daly, however, the trial court here had ample evidence that defendant dealt with substance abuse,
had a history of violent crimes, and committed an aggravated domestic battery while released on
bond. The court was allowed to consider this evidence as part of its sentencing determination, even
though it did not arise from the underlying offenses, and as explained above, the court did not
abuse its discretion when balancing this evidence against the seriousness of the offenses.
¶ 41 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 42 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
- 12 - ¶ 43 Affirmed.
- 13 -