People v. Mesa

2024 NY Slip Op 50488(U)
CourtThe Criminal Court of the City of New York, Queens
DecidedApril 29, 2024
StatusUnpublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 2024 NY Slip Op 50488(U) (People v. Mesa) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering The Criminal Court of the City of New York, Queens primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
People v. Mesa, 2024 NY Slip Op 50488(U) (N.Y. Super. Ct. 2024).

Opinion

People v Mesa (2024 NY Slip Op 50488(U)) [*1]
People v Mesa
2024 NY Slip Op 50488(U)
Decided on April 29, 2024
Criminal Court Of The City Of New York, Queens County
Licitra, J.
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.


Decided on April 29, 2024
Criminal Court of the City of New York, Queens County


The People of the State of New York

against

Mesa, Defendant.




Docket No. CR-000117-23QN

For the People: Melinda Katz, District Attorney of Queens County (by Harpreet Kaur)

For Mr. Mesa: The Legal Aid Society (by Laura Eraso)
Wanda L. Licitra, J.

Pending before the court is a C.P.L. § 30.30 motion to dismiss. It alleges the People stated ready for trial without first filing a proper certificate of automatic discovery compliance. The motion claims the People filed the certificate without first exercising due diligence to ascertain the existence of impeachment material relating to their police witnesses. Upon review of the papers, the motion is granted.

Criminal Procedure Law § 245.50[1] defines a proper, good-faith certificate of compliance, and it requires the People to certify two assertions. First, that the prosecutor has exercised "due diligence" and made "reasonable inquiries" to "ascertain the existence" of discoverable material. (C.P.L. § 245.50[1]). And second, that "after" doing so, the prosecutor has "made available all known material and information subject to discovery." (Id.).

"Should a defendant bring a CPL 30.30 motion to dismiss on the ground that the People failed to exercise due diligence and therefore improperly filed a [certificate of compliance], the People bear the burden of establishing that they did, in fact, exercise due diligence . . . prior to filing [it]." (People v. Bay, 2023 NY Slip Op. 06407, at *7 [Dec. 14, 2023]). "If the prosecution fails to make such a showing, the [certificate] should be deemed improper, the [prosecutor's] readiness statement stricken as illusory, and—so long as the time chargeable to the People exceeds the applicable CPL 30.30 period—the case dismissed." (Id.).

Under C.P.L. § 245.20[1][k][iv], the People are required to disclose, as part of automatic discovery, "[a]ll evidence and information, including that which is known to police . . . that tends to . . . impeach the credibility of a testifying prosecution witness." Evidence of "a police witness's prior bad act . . . can be proper fodder" for impeaching that witness on the stand and therefore relates to the subject matter of the case. (See People v. Smith, 27 NY3d 652, 661 [2016]). Moreover, under C.P.L. § 245.20[2], "all items and information related to the prosecution of a charge" in the possession of the police "shall be deemed to be in the possession of the prosecution." Police misconduct is "'related to the prosecution of a charge' for the same reason that impeachment evidence relates to 'the subject matter of the case': it directly relates to whether the factfinder should believe the witness's testimony." (People v. Edwards, 74 Misc 3d 433, 441 [Crim. Ct., NY County 2021] [Weiner, J.]). "Consequently, with respect to every listed potential police witness, it [is] the People's obligation to disclose whether or not disciplinary [*2]records exist, and to provide the defense with copies of any existing records." (People v. Hamizane, 80 Misc 3d 7, 10-11 [citing Matter of Jayson C., 200 AD3d 447, 449 [1st Dep't 2021]; People v. Rodriguez, 77 Misc 3d 23, 24 [App. Term, 1st Dep't 2022]]).[FN1]

Here, the People designated four police officers as potential prosecution witnesses: Brandyn Baltusis, Jason Batista, Paul Lenoci, and Michael Fasano. However, the People failed to produce the underlying records for one of Officer Baltusis's IAB matters. The People neither dispute that assertion, nor do they explain why they did not produce these records. They note that they disclosed "underlying IAB documents in [their actual] possession." But they are silent on whether they disclosed underlying IAB records in the police's possession. (See C.P.L. § 245.20[2] [deeming the People to be in constructive possession of discoverable material in the police's possession]). These circumstances raise the inference that the People did not, in fact, act diligently to ascertain the existence of impeachment records in the NYPD's possession. In fact, the People provide zero indication that they did anything at all to ascertain the existence of impeachment material in the NYPD's possession. Thus, they fail to meet their "burden." (See Bay, 2023 NY Slip Op. 06407, at *7).

The problems do not end there, however. The People also admit that they were in possession of unredacted CCRB records regarding their testifying officers but only disclosed copies they had unilaterally redacted. "All [CCRB] documents are received unredacted," they explain, "and all redactions are made by the People for information that is protected under [Article 6 of the] Public Officer [sic] Law's 89 2-b[b] and [c]." (Oddly, the People simultaneously state that they also redacted "one case in which mediation was attempted and no disposition was made," which does not fall under that statute.) While the People disclosed some IAB records, they similarly only disclosed copies that the police redacted.

Aside from some special circumstances not at issue here, (see C.P.L. §§ 245.20[1][c], [d], [g]), the Criminal Procedure Law limits unilateral redactions to "social security numbers and tax numbers," (C.P.L. § 245.20[6]). Should the People seek to condition disclosure on further redactions, the law requires that they seek a protective order from a court. (C.P.L. § 245.70; see also People v. Marte, 82 Misc 3d 528, 539 [Crim. Ct., Queens County 2023] ["As many courts have noted, the People are without authority to make such redactions without at least a pending court-approved protective order."]; People v. Best, 76 Misc 3d 1210[A], at *6 [Crim. Ct., Queens [*3]County 2022] ["[T]he disclosure of . . . records must be automatic, absolute and without redaction, adulteration, or censorship by the People."]).

That the People even opened Article 6 of the Public Officers Law boggles the mind. That is New York's Freedom of Information Law ("FOIL"), which governs FOIL requests by "the public" to access government records. (See generally Pub. Off. Law § 84 ["Legislative declaration"]). Unsurprisingly, FOIL allows the government greater authority to withhold information from public-records requests than what the Criminal Procedure Law authorizes in a criminal proceeding. But FOIL has absolutely nothing to do with criminal procedure, criminal discovery, or any of the rights or rules included in those processes. The criminal discovery statutes are not coextensive, or even tangentially related, to FOIL. Nor do they ever ask the People to go fishing around unrelated statutes for excuses to unilaterally withhold material. To the contrary, Article 245 mandates that the People presume disclosure, (C.P.L. § 245.20[7]), and if the People seek to condition that disclosure, to request a protective order from a court, (C.P.L. § 245.70).

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

People v. Mesa
2024 NY Slip Op 50488(U) (Queens Criminal Court, 2024)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
2024 NY Slip Op 50488(U), Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/people-v-mesa-nycrimctqueens-2024.