The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division. Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.
SUMMARY May 7, 2026
2026 COA 36
No. 24CA2021, People v. Medina — Criminal Law — Postconviction Remedies — Punishment for Habitual Criminals
In this postconviction proceeding, a division of the court of
appeals considers, as a matter of first impression in Colorado,
whether the rule announced in Erlinger v. United States, 602 U.S.
821, 835 (2024) — which requires that a jury, rather than a judge,
determine whether a defendant committed prior offenses on
separate occasions for purposes of habitual sentencing — may be
applied retroactively to cases that became final before the rule’s
announcement. Applying the framework established in Teague v.
Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310-11 (1989), the division concludes that, to
the extent that Erlinger announced a new rule of constitutional law,
the rule is neither substantive nor a watershed rule of procedure
and, thus, it does not apply retroactively on collateral review. The division therefore affirms the postconviction court’s denial of the
defendant’s Crim. P. 35(c) motion, which was both untimely and
successive.
The division also rejects the defendant’s claim alleging a
violation of his speedy trial rights under the Uniform Mandatory
Disposition of Detainers Act. Applying the law of the case doctrine,
the division declines to consider this issue, which was previously
rejected by two prior divisions of the court. COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2026 COA 36
Court of Appeals No. 24CA2021 Jefferson County District Court No. 14CR3044 Honorable Chantel Contiguglia, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Delano Marco Medina,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDERS AFFIRMED
Division VII Opinion by JUDGE GOMEZ Pawar and Johnson, JJ., concur
Announced May 7, 2026
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Brock J. Swanson, First Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Delano Marco Medina, Pro Se ¶1 The United States Supreme Court held in Erlinger v. United
States that for purposes of sentencing a defendant under the federal
Armed Career Criminal Act — which increases prison terms for
defendants who previously committed three violent felonies or
serious drug offenses on separate occasions — the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments require a jury, rather than a judge, to decide whether
the defendant’s prior offenses were committed on separate
occasions. 602 U.S. 821, 835 (2024). The Colorado Supreme Court
has held that this rule applies to Colorado’s habitual criminal
sentencing statute, such that a jury, rather than a judge, must
decide whether a defendant’s prior felony convictions arose out of
separate and distinct criminal episodes. People v. Gregg, 2025 CO
57, ¶ 24; see § 18-1.3-801(1)(b)(I), (1.5), (2)(a)(I), C.R.S. 2025.1
¶2 In this appeal, defendant, Delano Marco Medina, asks us to
consider, as a matter of first impression in Colorado, whether this
rule may be applied retroactively to cases that became final before
the rule was announced. We hold that it cannot. Therefore, we
1 After the announcement of Erlinger v. United States, 602 U.S. 821
(2024), the General Assembly amended the habitual criminal sentencing statute to require a jury to make such decisions. See Ch. 344, sec. 1, § 18-1.3-803(1), 2025 Colo. Sess. Laws 1866.
1 conclude that the postconviction court properly denied Medina’s
untimely and successive postconviction motion raising the issue.
¶3 Medina also challenges the postconviction court’s order
denying his motion to dismiss all the charges against him based on
an alleged violation of his right to a speedy trial under the Uniform
Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Act (UMDDA), §§ 16-14-101 to
-108, C.R.S. 2025. We decline to consider his challenge, which two
prior divisions of this court have already rejected.
¶4 Accordingly, we affirm both orders.
I. Background
¶5 Following an incident in which Medina pursued and fired a
gun toward someone he claimed had threatened his girlfriend,
Medina was charged with attempted first degree assault, two counts
of felony menacing, possession of a weapon by a previous offender,
and seven habitual counts. Not long after the initial charges were
filed, Medina was arrested and held in another county of the state
on charges and warrants issued in other cases.
¶6 In December 2014, Medina submitted a request under the
UMDDA, which allows a person in the custody of the Department of
Corrections (DOC) to request the final disposition of any untried
2 charges pending against them in the state. See § 16-14-102(1),
C.R.S. 2025. But the district attorney in this case initially didn’t
receive the request, and while Medina sent a copy of the request to
the DOC, he wasn’t in DOC custody at the time. He entered DOC
custody in mid-March 2015, and the DOC forwarded his request to
the district attorney in late April. The district attorney received it in
early May. Medina’s trial was set for mid-August of that year.
¶7 A few weeks before trial, Medina filed a motion to dismiss the
charges, asserting that the court had lost jurisdiction over the case
because it hadn’t gone to trial within the statutory deadline of 182
days after he submitted his UMDDA request. See § 16-14-104(1),
C.R.S. 2025. The trial court denied the motion.
¶8 The trial proceeded, and a jury convicted Medina on all the
substantive charges. The trial court then found Medina guilty of all
the habitual charges, adjudicated him a habitual criminal, and
sentenced him to forty-four years in the custody of the DOC.
¶9 Medina appealed, arguing, as relevant here, that his right to a
speedy trial under the UMDDA had been violated. A division of this
court rejected his argument and affirmed the judgment. See People
v. Medina, slip op. at ¶ 22 (Colo. App. No. 15CA1681, May 23, 2019)
3 (not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(e)), as modified on denial of
reh’g (Aug. 22, 2019) (Medina I). The division concluded that
because Medina had only substantially (not strictly) complied with
the UMDDA’s procedural requirements, he had to establish that the
prosecution had actual notice of his UMDDA request. Id. at ¶¶ 17-
19; see People v. McKimmy, 2014 CO 76, ¶ 24. And because the
prosecution didn’t have actual notice until May 2015 and the trial
was held less than 182 days later, the trial was timely. Medina I,
slip op. at ¶ 20; see § 16-14-104(1). The division also concluded
that, to the extent that the DOC had failed to timely submit
Medina’s UMDDA request to the prosecution, Medina hadn’t
suffered any prejudice because the trial occurred within 182 days of
when the court and the prosecution would’ve received the request
had the DOC sent it in a timely manner. Medina I, slip op. at ¶¶ 9,
21; see Martin v. People, 738 P.2d 789, 792-93 (Colo. 1987).
¶ 10 Then, in a Crim. P. 35(c) motion, Medina again invoked the
UMDDA, presenting additional evidence that he claimed established
that he was in DOC custody at the time he made his UMDDA
request. The postconviction court denied the motion. Another
division of this court affirmed the denial, concluding that the
4 evidence Medina had presented either wasn’t new or didn’t support
his claim. People v. Medina, slip op. at ¶¶ 17-22 (Colo. App. Nos.
21CA0604 & 21CA0704, Jan. 25, 2024) (not published pursuant to
C.A.R. 35(e)) (Medina II).
¶ 11 Thereafter, Medina filed the two motions now at issue. First,
he filed another motion to dismiss all charges, once again arguing
that his UMDDA rights were violated, but this time raising the issue
under Crim. P. 35(a). The postconviction court summarily denied
the motion. And second, he filed a motion to dismiss the habitual
charges, arguing that, under Erlinger — which was announced after
the Medina II decision — his conviction on the habitual charges was
unconstitutional because a judge, rather than a jury, had made the
determination that his prior convictions arose out of separate and
distinct criminal episodes. The postconviction court denied the
motion, concluding that Erlinger didn’t apply retroactively.
¶ 12 Medina now appeals the postconviction court’s orders denying
his two motions to dismiss.
II. UMDDA Challenge
¶ 13 Medina first contends that his sentence is illegal because the
trial court lacked jurisdiction due to violation of the UMDDA.
5 Applying the law of the case doctrine, we decline to address this
issue, as it has already been resolved by two divisions of this court.2
¶ 14 We review a court’s summary denial of a Crim. P. 35(a) motion
de novo. See People v. Bassford, 2014 COA 15, ¶ 20. We likewise
review de novo the question whether a prior ruling by a court
constitutes the law of the case. People v. Misenhelter, 214 P.3d 497,
500 (Colo. App. 2009), aff’d, 234 P.3d 657 (Colo. 2010).
¶ 15 The law of the case doctrine rests on the principle that “when
an issue is once litigated and decided, that should be the end of the
matter.” Verzuh v. Rouse, 660 P.2d 1301, 1303 (Colo. App. 1982)
(quoting United States v. U.S. Smelting Refin. & Mining Co., 339 U.S.
186, 198 (1950)). This doctrine applies to attempts to relitigate an
appellate court’s holdings and the rulings logically necessary to
those holdings. People v. Roybal, 672 P.2d 1003, 1005 (Colo. 1983).
It also applies to successive postconviction motions brought under
Crim. P. 35(a). People v. Tolbert, 216 P.3d 1, 5-6 (Colo. App. 2007).
2 This issue also is more properly raised under Crim. P. 35(c) than
under Crim. P. 35(a), as it doesn’t challenge Medina’s sentence so much as it challenges the judgment of conviction. See People v. Wenzinger, 155 P.3d 415, 418 (Colo. App. 2006) (comparing these two subsections of Rule 35). As such, it is likely both untimely and successive, just like Medina’s Erlinger challenge.
6 ¶ 16 Although one division of this court is not bound by the
decision of any other division, see People v. Williams, 2025 COA 26,
¶ 14, we generally apply the law of the case doctrine to refuse to
revisit issues resolved by another division in the same case unless
“the previous decision is no longer sound because of changed
conditions or law, or legal or factual error” or applying “the prior
decision would result in manifest injustice,” Cummings v. Arapahoe
Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 2021 COA 122, ¶ 12 (quoting Saint John’s
Church in Wilderness v. Scott, 2012 COA 72, ¶ 9).
¶ 17 Here, while Medina’s UMDDA argument is framed differently
than before, the substance of his argument is virtually the same as
it was in his earlier appeals. Again, he argues that he was in DOC
custody when he made his UMDDA request and that the 182-day
statutory deadline expired before the time of trial. And while he
claims the previous decisions didn’t address some of his specific
arguments, the divisions in those cases nonetheless rejected his
UMDDA claim and fully explained their reasons for doing so.
¶ 18 We decline to reconsider this issue. Medina hasn’t shown that
the previous divisions’ decisions are no longer sound due to
changed conditions, new law, or legal or factual error, nor has he
7 shown that applying those decisions would result in manifest
injustice. See Cummings, ¶ 12. Accordingly, we treat the decisions
as the law of the case and do not revisit them.
III. Erlinger Challenge
¶ 19 Medina also contends that his habitual sentence is illegal
under Erlinger because a judge, rather than a jury, made the
determination that his prior convictions arose out of separate and
distinct criminal episodes. While the rule set forth in Erlinger does
apply to habitual sentences like Medina’s, see Gregg, ¶ 24, in this
case, unlike in Gregg, Medina’s conviction was final before Erlinger
was announced. And we agree with the postconviction court’s
conclusion that Erlinger cannot be applied retroactively on collateral
review. Accordingly, we conclude that Medina’s challenge was
properly denied, as it is both untimely and successive.3
A. Procedural Bars to Review
¶ 20 The People assert that Medina’s postconviction motion based
on Erlinger was untimely under Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(I) and section
16-5-402(1), C.R.S. 2025, because he didn’t file it within three years
3 We reject the People’s argument that Medina failed to properly
include his Erlinger challenge within the scope of his appeal.
8 after his conviction became final and didn’t identify an applicable
exception to the limitation period. However, “[a] reviewing court has
the discretion to address the merits of an untimely motion for
postconviction relief if the motion is premised on newly arising
authority of constitutional magnitude” that applies retroactively to
cases on collateral review. People v. Rainer, 2013 COA 51, ¶ 28,
rev’d on other grounds, 2017 CO 50.
¶ 21 Similarly, the People assert that Medina’s Erlinger challenge is
successive because he could’ve raised it in his direct appeal or his
earlier Crim. P. 35(c) motion. See Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(VII). But again,
we may address “[a]ny claim based on a new rule of constitutional
law that was previously unavailable,” so long as the rule applies
retroactively to cases on collateral review. Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(VII)(c).
¶ 22 Therefore, to determine whether we can address the merits of
Medina’s claim, we must assess whether Erlinger established a new
rule of constitutional law that can be applied retroactively to cases
on collateral review. See Rainer, ¶ 29; Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(VII)(c).
B. The Teague Framework
¶ 23 We apply the test set out in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288,
310-11 (1989), to determine whether a new constitutional rule of
9 criminal procedure applies retroactively to cases on collateral
review. Edwards v. People, 129 P.3d 977, 983 (Colo. 2006). This
analysis presents a question of law that we review de novo. See
People v. Cooper, 2023 COA 113, ¶ 7. Under the Teague test, we
examine (1) whether the defendant’s conviction is final; (2) whether
the rule is in fact new; and (3) whether the rule meets either of the
two exceptions to the general bar precluding retroactive application
of new rules to cases that were final before the rules were
announced. Edwards, 129 P.3d at 983. The two exceptions are
when the new rule is substantive in nature and when it is a
watershed procedural rule. Id. at 986; Cooper, ¶ 8.4
¶ 24 Here, there is no question as to the finality of Medina’s
conviction. The conviction became final when the mandate was
4 The United States Supreme Court has abolished the watershed
exception for purposes of federal collateral review. See Edwards v. Vannoy, 593 U.S. 255, 272 (2021). But the Colorado Supreme Court had already adopted that exception as part of Colorado’s test, see Edwards v. People, 129 P.3d 977, 986 (Colo. 2006), and it hasn’t since then determined whether the exception still applies under Colorado law, see McDonald v. People, 2024 CO 75, ¶ 16 n.3 (avoiding the issue). Therefore, we presume that the exception still applies. See People v. Harmon, 2019 COA 156, ¶ 3 n.1 (“[W]e are bound by holdings of the Colorado Supreme Court and must follow those holdings unless and until they are overruled by that court.”).
10 issued in his direct appeal. See Edwards, 129 P.3d at 983. Thus,
we turn to consideration of the rule announced in Erlinger.
C. Whether Erlinger Announced a New Constitutional Rule
¶ 25 We first conclude that Erlinger announced a new rule of
constitutional law.
¶ 26 “[A] case announces a new rule when it breaks new ground or
imposes a new obligation on the States or the Federal Government.”
Teague, 489 U.S. at 301. Thus, a rule is not new if it “was dictated
by then-existing precedent” and “was apparent to all reasonable
jurists” at the time. Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406, 413 (2004)
(quoting Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 527-28 (1997)).
¶ 27 Under this test, Erlinger announced a new rule because it
broke new ground.
¶ 28 In Almendarez-Torres v. United States, the United States
Supreme Court held that when recidivism is treated as a sentence
enhancer, a judge can find the fact of a prior conviction rather than
submitting the issue to a jury. 523 U.S. 224, 246-47 (1998). Then,
in Apprendi v. New Jersey, the Court held that “[o]ther than the fact
of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime
beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a
11 jury.” 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). And in Blakely v. Washington, the
Court held that “the ‘statutory maximum’ for Apprendi purposes is
the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of
the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant.”
542 U.S. 296, 303 (2004) (emphasis omitted).
¶ 29 In the wake of these and other related decisions, all twelve
federal circuit courts held that judges may make the determination
of whether prior offenses occurred on different occasions. Erlinger,
602 U.S. at 856 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (collecting cases). But
the United States Supreme Court disagreed in Erlinger, concluding
that to comply with the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, juries — not
judges — must make such determinations. 602 U.S. at 835.
¶ 30 Thus, the rule announced in Erlinger was neither dictated by
pre-existing precedent nor apparent to all reasonable jurists. See
Beard, 542 U.S. at 413. Accordingly, it was a new constitutional
rule. See Chaidez v. United States, 568 U.S. 342, 352 (2013) (a
decision announced a new rule when it “answered a question about
the Sixth Amendment’s reach that [the Supreme Court] had left
open, in a way that altered the law of most jurisdictions”).
12 D. Whether Erlinger Meets Either Teague Exception
¶ 31 But while Erlinger did announce a new constitutional rule, we
conclude that the rule doesn’t meet either Teague exception, as it is
neither a substantive rule nor a watershed procedural rule.
¶ 32 As to the first exception, rules are substantive if they “forbid[]
‘criminal punishment of certain primary conduct’” or “prohibit[] ‘a
certain category of punishment for a class of defendants because of
their status or offense.’” Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190,
206 (2016) (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 330 (1989)).
In other words, “[a] rule is substantive rather than procedural if it
alters the range of conduct or the class of persons that the law
punishes.” Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 353 (2004). “In
contrast, rules that regulate only the manner of determining the
defendant’s culpability are procedural.” Id. Procedural rules “alter
‘the range of permissible methods for determining whether a
defendant’s conduct is punishable.’” Welch v. United States, 578
U.S. 120, 129 (2016) (quoting Schriro, 542 U.S. at 353). “Rules that
allocate decisionmaking authority” between a judge and a jury “are
prototypical procedural rules.” Schriro, 542 U.S. at 353.
13 ¶ 33 The rule announced in Erlinger is procedural, not substantive.
It doesn’t alter the range of conduct or the class of persons the law
punishes. See id. Rather, it solely affects the manner of
determining a defendant’s punishment by allocating decision-
making authority between a judge and a jury on an issue affecting
habitual sentencing. See id.; see also People v. Johnson, 142 P.3d
722, 725 (Colo. 2006) (the rule announced in Blakely was
procedural); People v. Bradbury, 68 P.3d 494, 498 (Colo. App. 2002)
(the rule announced in Apprendi was procedural). See generally
United States v. Charles, 813 F. Supp. 3d 200, 203 (D. Mass. 2025)
(“There is no question that Erlinger’s rule is procedural.”).
¶ 34 The second, watershed exception is “extremely narrow,” People
v. Tate, 2015 CO 42, ¶ 56 (quoting Schriro, 542 U.S. at 352), and
applies only when a rule of criminal procedure “implicat[es] the
fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding,”
Johnson, 142 P.3d at 726 (quoting Beard, 542 U.S. at 417). “[I]n
order to be considered watershed, the new rule must be more than
‘fundamental’; it ‘must be one “without which the likelihood of an
accurate conviction is seriously diminished.”’” Edwards, 129 P.3d
at 986-87 (quoting Schriro, 542 U.S. at 352).
14 ¶ 35 As the Colorado Supreme Court has recognized, the watershed
exception doesn’t apply to the rule announced in Ring v. Arizona,
536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002) — which is that only a jury, not a judge,
may find an aggravating circumstance necessary to impose the
death penalty — because “the type of judicial factfinding in question
[does] not create an impermissible risk of injustice.” Edwards, 129
P.3d at 987 (citing Schriro, 542 U.S. at 356). For similar reasons,
and because the issue involved sentencing procedures as opposed
to a determination of innocence or guilt, the Colorado Supreme
Court later determined that Blakely, too, doesn’t fall within the
exception. Johnson, 142 P.3d at 727-28. And a division of this
court also held that Apprendi doesn’t fall within the exception.
Bradbury, 68 P.3d at 499.
¶ 36 Given that all these cases raise similar issues concerning the
allocation of decision-making authority between a judge and a jury,
if Ring, Apprendi, and Blakely don’t qualify as cases announcing
watershed procedural rules, it’s difficult for us to understand how
Erlinger could. And Medina doesn’t offer any arguments that might
support such a distinction. Accordingly, we conclude that the rule
announced in Erlinger isn’t a watershed procedural rule.
15 E. Conclusion
¶ 37 Because neither of the Teague exceptions to the bar on
retroactivity applies, we conclude that the rule announced in
Erlinger does not apply retroactively on collateral review. The
postconviction court thus properly denied Medina’s Erlinger motion,
as the motion was both untimely and successive. See Crim. P.
35(c)(3)(I), (VII); § 16-5-402(1).5 Therefore, we don’t address the
merits of Medina’s claim challenging his habitual sentence.
IV. Disposition
¶ 38 The orders are affirmed.
JUDGE PAWAR and JUDGE JOHNSON concur.
5 Medina argues that there’s no need for the rule announced in
Erlinger to be retroactive because the rule pronounced in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), still applies, and under that rule, he was entitled to have a jury consider his habitual charges. But that doesn’t help his case. Apprendi was announced in 2000, long before Medina’s case became final, so it doesn’t enable him to overcome the procedural bars to his untimely and successive postconviction claim. See Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(I), (VII); § 16-5-402(1), C.R.S. 2025.