2025 IL App (2d) 240287-U No. 2-24-0287 Order filed July 21, 2025
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23(b) and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
SECOND DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE ) Appeal from the Circuit Court OF ILLINOIS, ) of Kendall County. ) Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) v. ) No. 22-CF-210 ) QUINTON J. McKEE, ) Honorable ) Robert P. Pilmer, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE McLAREN delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Kennedy and Justice Jorgensen concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: (1) The trial court’s denial of defendant’s self-defense instruction was, at most, harmless error; (2) defendant was not denied effective assistance of counsel; (3) the evidence was sufficient to prove defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; and (4) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing defendant.
¶2 Following a jury trial, defendant, Quinton McKee, was convicted of five felonies and
sentenced to 30 years’ imprisonment for attempted first-degree murder, 10 years’ imprisonment
for aggravated discharge of a firearm, 8 years’ imprisonment for unauthorized possession of a
firearm by a felon, and 5 years’ imprisonment for aggravated unlawful use of a weapon, all to be
served concurrently. On appeal, defendant claims (1) the trial court abused its discretion in 2025 IL App (2d) 240287-U
denying his requested jury instruction on self-defense, (2) his counsel was ineffective for failing
to request additional jury instructions, (3) the State failed to prove the charge of aggravated
discharge of a firearm beyond a reasonable doubt, and (4) the trial court abused its discretion in
denying defendant’s request to be sentenced as a Class 1 felony instead of a Class X felony for
attempt (first degree murder). For the following reasons, we affirm.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 On June 1, 2022, the State charged defendant by information with two counts of attempted
first-degree murder (720 ILCS 5/8-4(a), 9-1(a) (West 2022)), two counts of aggravated discharge
of a firearm (720 ILCS 5/24-1.2(a)(2) (West 2022)), one count of unlawful possession of a firearm
by a felon (720 ILCS 5/24-1.1(a) (West 2022)), and one count of aggravated unlawful use of a
weapon (720 ILCS 5/24-1.6(a)(1), 24-1.6(a)(3)(A-5), 24-1.6(a)(3)(C) (West 2022)). On July 1,
2022, a grand jury indicted defendant on 11 charges, including the violations charged above and
separating additional charges relating to his unlawful use of a firearm as a felon, without a current
FOID card, and without a valid license under the Firearm Concealed Carry Act (430 ILCS 66/1
et seq. (West 2022)). The charges arose from an incident on May 31, 2022, in which defendant
allegedly fired a handgun at his ex-girlfriend, Dazhia Mapp, and her father, Denarviz Mapp.
¶5 A. Trial Testimony
¶6 At trial, Dazhia Mapp testified that she dated defendant for a few months in late 2021. In
October of that year, defendant allegedly struck Dazhia across her face multiple times and
threatened her with a handgun that had a unique American-flag print on it. Dazhia recorded two
videos during the incident. One showed defendant’s face. The second, longer video included a
statement from defendant admitting he had struck Dazhia.
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¶7 Dazhia testified she was no longer in a romantic relationship with defendant at the time of
the May 31, 2022, incident. She had stopped to fuel her Chevy Cruze at a gas station in
Montgomery when defendant pulled behind her in a blue Jeep Cherokee. Dazhia testified that
defendant began yelling at her about money he claimed she owed him. When she attempted to
leave the gas station, defendant allegedly showed the gun with the American-flag print and
threatened to kill her. Dazhia testified that defendant threated to “turn my car into Swiss cheese”
and moved his Jeep to block her from leaving the gas station. Surveillance video from the gas
station showed the Jeep moving forward in the way of the Chevy Cruze, but any alleged gun inside
the Jeep was not visible because of the camera angle.
¶8 Dazhia testified she left the gas station and drove East on Route 30. Defendant followed
her. Dazhia increased her speed and defendant matched it. Dazhia testified that she tried to outrun
defendant, increased her speed to 109 MPH, drove through gravel, and ran a redlight. She lost
sight of his vehicle briefly, but defendant caught up with Dazhia as she made a U-turn on Route
30. Dazhia had turned to drive to the Montgomery police department as defendant pulled up
parallel to her vehicle. She testified defendant’s passenger window was rolled down and she could
hear him yelling at her.
¶9 Dazhia testified she heard a single gunshot as their cars were parallel. She was facing
forward and not looking at defendant. She testified that after she heard the gunshot, she turned to
look at defendant and saw him shake his head, say “yeah” and demand that she pull over. Dazhia
testified that she did not see the gun in defendant’s hand after she heard the gunshot.
¶ 10 Dazhia called her father and told him that she believed defendant had shot at her.
Defendant pulled behind her as she turned from Orchard Road to Mayfield Drive. It was at this
intersection that she saw her father, Denarviz Mapp, in his pickup truck. Dazhia testified that
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Denarviz drove between her vehicle and defendant’s vehicle. Dazhia drove to her home, called
911, and testified she discovered a new, triangular-shaped dent above the driver’s side window of
her car.
¶ 11 Dazhia testified that she had purchased the 2013 Chevy Cruze as a used vehicle in July
2021. She stated that the car was in good repair when she bought it and did not have any dents or
marks in the bodywork. A mechanical issue arose that prevented her from lowering the driver’s
side window on the day of the incident, but the vehicle did not have the triangular-shaped dent
before that day.
¶ 12 On cross-examination, Dazhia agreed she had not seen defendant with a gun when she
heard the shot. She described the sound of the gunshot as a “pop” and stated she heard the
projectile hit her vehicle. When asked about her written statement to the police, Dazhia explained
that she was “trying to give the basic details” of the incident and did not include seeing defendant
with a gun or his threat to turn her car into “Swiss cheese.”
¶ 13 Denarviz Mapp testified he was Dazhia’s father, and she lived with him in Montgomery.
Shortly before noon on May 31, 2022, he asked Dazhia to drive to pick up food for his lunch before
he left for work. Denarviz testified his daughter called him 10-15 minutes later and informed him
that defendant was chasing her in a blue SUV and had allegedly shot at her. Denarviz left home
in his Dodge Ram pickup truck and saw his daughter’s car after pulling onto Mayfield Drive.
Denarviz testified he cut in front of defendant’s Jeep and defendant turned onto a back road behind
Walgreens. Mr. Mapp followed defendant onto the back road to verify that defendant was no
longer following his daughter.
¶ 14 Denarviz testified he pulled behind defendant’s vehicle as defendant waited to turn back
onto Orchard Road. When defendant suddenly ducked down after seeing the pickup behind him,
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Denarviz testified he was afraid defendant was reaching for the gun he had used to fire at his
daughter’s car. Denarviz testified that he “didn’t know if he was grabbing a gun, so I immediately
jammed on the gas to push him out into the road so I can get away because I didn’t know if he was
going to shoot me next.” He continued pushing the Jeep with his pickup until Defendant’s vehicle
was across the lane and onto the median.
¶ 15 Once the Jeep was out of the turning lane, Denarviz testified he turned onto Orchard Road
to get away from defendant and return home. He testified he saw a gun in defendant’s hand as he
passed the Jeep and heard three gunshots. When he returned home, Denarviz found a bullet hole
in the driver’s side door and a second bullet hole near the center of the truck. A bullet was found
in the front seat interior. He also testified there was minimal damage to his front bumper, notably
a slightly bent license plate.
¶ 16 Denarviz testified he had a FOID card and kept a handgun in a locked box in his closet.
He did not take the gun with him when he responded to his daughter’s call. Denarviz kept a black,
rolling backpack in his truck for work. The bag was in the truck when the police searched the
vehicle after the incident, Denarviz testified.
¶ 17 Kara Fontana testified she was near Orchard Road during the incident. She heard a loud
noise and saw a pickup truck aggressively pushing an SUV onto the road. A part of the SUV fell
off onto the roadway. Once the pushing stopped, she heard three gunshots. Fontana testified she
later walked past Walgreens and saw that one of its windows had a bullet hole. She did not know
defendant or the Mapps.
¶ 18 Gregory Mayyou of the Montgomery Police Department testified that he heard a radio call
of shots fired near Orchard and Mayfield. During his investigation, he found a reflector casing
from a vehicle on Orchard Road. He found a spent cartridge casing on the road and recovered a
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spent bullet from inside the Walgreens. Mayyou examined Dazhia’s vehicle and noted a dent
above the driver’s door which he described as a hole, ricochet, or deflection. On cross-
examination, he testified he did not recall hearing radio reports of shots fired elsewhere during the
incident. He had looked inside Denarviz’ truck but did not recall seeing a black backpack.
¶ 19 The State next called Jason Friedrich, a detective for the Montgomery Police Department.
Friedrich testified that he had reported to Orchard and Mayfield after hearing the radio call for
shots fired in that area. He spoke to both Dazhia and Denarviz. Based upon this information,
Friedrich put out a “be on the lookout” alert for defendant. Friedrich testified he was notified by
the Bolingbrook Police Department that an officer had identified defendant that evening but was
unable to apprehend him. Defendant was arrested on June 6, 2022.
¶ 20 The parties stipulated that Nicholas Higens, an officer with the Bolingbrook Police
Department, would testify that he found defendant in a blue Jeep Cherokee in the evening of May
31, 2022. Higens identified himself as a police officer and asked him about the incident in
Montgomery. Defendant refused to get out of the vehicle and drove away. The parties also
stipulated that Zachary Schmitt of the U.S. Marshals Service would testify that defendant was
driving a white Chevrolet Malibu when he arrested him on June 6, 2022. The parties further
stipulated that defendant did not possess a FOID card or a concealed carry license.
¶ 21 The State called Bradley Jasutis of the Montgomery Police Department. Jasutis testified
he processed the white Malibu and found an empty 9mm magazine, a wallet containing defendant’s
driver’s license and social security card, and the defendant’s vehicle registration in the glove
compartment. Jasutis also testified he recovered two cellphones from the vehicle, an Android
phone and an iPhone.
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¶ 22 Steve Bruening, a sergeant with the Kane County Sheriff’s Office with training in the
extraction of data from cellphones testified he had received the Android phone and iPhone and
was asked to extract data from both. He testified he used the tools at his disposal to extract data
from the Android phone, a TCL model, but was unsuccessful. He was initially unsuccessful with
the iPhone, but a software update to the Graykey product allowed him to successfully extract data
from the device. He used a product from Cellebrite to analyze the data and generate a UFED
report. Bruening explained that the UFED format allows reading of the data but is a format that
cannot be altered by the user. On cross-examination, Bruening admitted that the Cellebrite tool
allows users to see photos stored on a phone, but the meta data associated with the photo would
not be sufficient, by itself, to confirm that the photo was taken by that specific cellphone.
¶ 23 Anthony Hull next testified. Hull, a detective in the investigative division of the
Montgomery Police Department, testified he had trained as an evidence technician. In the
immediate matter, Hull received the two cellphones from defendant’s vehicle and passed them on
to Bruening at the Kane County Sheriff’s Office for the extraction of the contents of the cellphones.
¶ 24 Hull testified he reviewed the extraction report from Bruening. The report contained a
photo of a handgun with an American flag print and a photo of a blue Jeep Cherokee with a missing
rear reflector, among other things. Hull also testified to several text message conversations
between defendant and other individuals, as well as a variety of searches defendant performed
after the incident. The messages include references to defendant being aware the police were
looking for him, his desire to have a vehicle detailed to remove gun powder residue, his switching
vehicles, and defendant discussing possibly leaving Illinois. On cross-examination, Hull agreed
he found no messages in which defendant stated he fired a gun at Dazhia and was not aware of
defendant actually leaving the state. The State rested.
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¶ 25 Defendant testified on his own behalf. He stated that Dazhia had reached out to him on
May 31, 2022, to pay him back money she owed to him. They met at the gas station and defendant
agreed to follow her to the Fifth Third Bank on Route 30. Defendant explained that he borrowed
the Jeep from a friend and was aware that there was a gun in the glove compartment, but it did not
belong to him. He claimed he did not take the gun out of the glove compartment during his
conversation with Dazhia at the gas station.
¶ 26 Defendant testified he followed Dazhia on Route 30 until she made a U-turn near Douglas
Road. As their vehicles were parallel, defendant asked why Dazhia had turned around and she
allegedly told him that they should go to the Chase Bank on Orchard and Mayfield. He testified
that he did not take the gun out of the glove compartment. As they approached the bank, defendant
stated that Denarviz’ pickup truck cut him off and that he “almost had to really go on the sidewalk
to stop me being hit.” Defendant testified that Dazhia drove past the Chase Bank branch, realized
“something was going on,” and made a right turn onto a road behind Walgreens.
¶ 27 Defendant testified that Denarviz began to repeatedly ram his truck into the back of the
SUV defendant was driving. He rammed defendant’s vehicle as he turned onto the access road.
Defendant had to stop before turning back onto Orchard, but Denarviz pushed defendant’s vehicle
into the intersection.
¶ 28 Defendant testified that, when Denarviz pulled alongside defendant’s vehicle, Denarviz
pulled an assault rifle from a black bag on his lap. Denarviz aimed the assault rifle at defendant
and it was only then that defendant realized the other driver was Dazhia’s father. Defendant
testified he was afraid for his safety; he pulled the gun from the glove compartment and fired three
times. Defendant explained that he was aiming for the lower portion of the truck. He fired the
gun to scare Denarviz and did not intend to kill him.
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¶ 29 When asked about the first time he met Denarviz, defendant testified that he had gone to
pick up his cell phone from Dazhia’s house. After a brief conversation, Denarviz allegedly brought
out an assault rifle and told defendant “If I see you again, I’m going to kill you.”
¶ 30 On cross-examination, defendant stated that the gun in the Jeep was a black Glock 19 and
did not have an American flag print. He denied shooting at or threatening to kill Dazhia. He stated
that he did not call the police when Denarviz rammed his vehicle because he doesn’t “cooperate
with police.” He agreed Denarviz never fired a gun at him, but said “you aim a gun at me, and I
have the opportunity to defend myself, I feel like my life is in danger, that’s what I will do.”
Defendant admitted that one of his gunshots hit the Walgreens window but suggested that the
kickback from the first two shots must have caused the bullet to go higher than Denarviz’s truck.
Defendant also admitted wanting to remove gunshot residue from a vehicle but claimed he “wasn’t
hiding anything.” He further admitted to searching for when it was legal to shoot someone and
how to “beat” an attempted murder charge, and that he did not mention Denarviz’s alleged assault
rifle in the many text conversations or chat he had with friends about the incident.
¶ 31 The State recalled Denarviz in rebuttal. He testified that he did not own an assault rifle
and did not have any firearm with him during the incident. He had a valid FOID card and owned
a 9mm handgun. Denarviz testified that the handgun was stored in a secured lockbox at home and
he did not have it with him during the incident. The black bag in his truck was a large, rolling
backpack that he used to carry materials for work and would not be small enough to hold in his
lap while he was driving.
¶ 32 The State next presented certified copies of defendant’s previous criminal convictions to
be published to the jury. These included criminal damage to property (Class 4 felony) in case
no. 16 CF 1127, unlawful delivery of cannabis (Class 4 felony) in case no. 18 CF 55, and unlawful
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possession of a weapon by a felon (Class 3 felony) and unlawful possession of controlled substance
(Class 4 felony) in case no. 20 CF 352.
¶ 33 B. Jury Instruction Conference
¶ 34 Defendant’s trial counsel submitted jury instruction on self-defense as an affirmative
defense. During the jury instruction conference, the trial court held there was insufficient evidence
to warrant the instruction for self-defense. The court took no position on whether defendant was
the initial aggressor but noted that the State was only required to negate one of the six elements.
The trial court denied the jury instruction on self-defense.
¶ 35 C. Deliberation and Verdict
¶ 36 The jury began deliberating in the evening of October 19, 2023. During the early part of
deliberations, the trial court received a question from the jury on “what the transcripts say when
Dazhia heard the gunshot.” After reaching a consensus with counsel, the trial court returned an
answer that the jury had heard all of the evidence that is proper and pertinent in the case and had
received instructions which cover the applicable law, and that the law requires them to render its
verdict on the evidence and instructions already given.
¶ 37 At 9:20 pm, the jury asked if it was common procedure for an evidence technician to take
photos of the entire inside of a vehicle that was driven by the victim of a gun-related crime. After
discussing the question with counsel, both parties agreed to send the same answer to the second
question.
¶ 38 The jury sent a third note to the trial court at 10:04 pm. In it, the jury stated it was “currently
undecided on three of the seven charges against defendant. What are our options? Please advise.”
After discussing options with counsel, the trial court replied that the jury should continue
deliberating in an effort to reach a verdict based on the evidence and testimony presented during
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the trial, but there would be an option to break for the evening if they were unable to complete
deliberation.
¶ 39 At 11:08 pm, the jury asked for a legal definition of intent to kill. Counsel for the State
and defendant agreed to a reply from the trial court that the instructions already given cover the
law applicable to the case. At 11:57 pm, the trial court asked counsel to return. There was not a
question from the jury, but the trial court suggested that the jury be given the option to recess for
the evening. The parties agreed and the jury was sent home until 8:30 am on October 20, 2023.
¶ 40 The jury deliberated most of October 20. At 2:54 pm, the trial court addressed the jury to
ask the foreperson if they believed further deliberation would be fruitful with respect to the
remaining charges. The foreperson stated that it might be useful for one charge, but that there was
another charge which seemed unlikely to be resolved by further deliberation. The jury returned to
deliberation and sent a question to the trial court at 3:43 pm. The question was “when can a person
use force to defend themselves?” The trial court, with the agreement of the parties, sent an answer
similar to the ones provided to the earlier questions.
¶ 41 The trial court called the jury back into the courtroom at 4:44 pm. The trial court noted the
jury had sent a note a indicating they had made a decision on six of the charges but were in “solid
disagreement” on one remaining charge. The trial court asked each juror individually if he or she
believed they could reach a verdict on the remaining charge and all answered “no.” The trial court
asked the jury to provide the completed verdict forms and informed the parties that it would declare
a mistrial on the unresolved charge.
¶ 42 The jury found defendant guilty of attempt first degree murder of Denarviz Mapp,
aggravated discharge of a firearm at a vehicle driven by Denarviz Mapp, aggravated discharge of
a firearm at a vehicle driven by Dazhia Mapp, unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon, and
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aggravated unlawful use of a weapon for both possessing a weapon in a vehicle and on his person.
The jury did not agree, and the court found a manifest necessity for a mistrial, on the charge of
attempt first degree murder of Dazhia Mapp.
¶ 43 D. Post-Trial Proceedings
¶ 44 The trial court conducted the sentencing hearing on March 22, 2024. Defendant, through
his trial counsel, filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, in the alternative, for
a new trial. The trial court held a hearing on the motion and denied it. The State presented
Raymond Ritter, an officer with the Montgomery Police Department, to testify to evidence in
aggravation. Ritter responded to the alleged violation of an order of protection by defendant
against Dazhia. He testified that records from the Kendall County Jail showed that defendant had
called Dazhia on 68 occasions, including at least twice when he successfully made contact with
her, since his arrest. Denarviz read his victim impact statement. Defendant presented no evidence
in mitigation.
¶ 45 The State and defense counsel presented arguments in aggravation and mitigation,
respectively. The State requested the trial court sentence defendant to 36 years in prison out of a
potential sentencing range of 26 to 50 years for attempt first degree murder. Defense counsel
asked for the minimum sentence for each charge, including 26 years for attempt first degree
murder. Defendant chose not to make a statement in allocution but stated his belief that he received
ineffective assistance of counsel.
¶ 46 The trial court sentenced defendant to 30 years for attempt first degree murder of Denarviz
and merged the conviction of discharge of a firearm at Denarviz into this sentence. The court
sentenced defendant to 10 years in prison for aggravated discharge of a firearm at Dazhia, 8 years
for unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon, and 5 years for the aggravated unlawful use of a
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weapon. All convictions were to be served concurrently with the sentence imposed in case no. 20
CF 352 and with each other. 1
¶ 47 Defendant filed a pro se pleading alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court
held a preliminary Krankel inquiry and found that defendant’s claims failed to show possible
neglect by his trial counsel. Defendant’s trial counsel then filed a motion to reduce or reconsider
his sentence, arguing he should be sentenced for a Class 1 felony and not a Class X felony for
attempt (first degree murder). The trial court denied the motion. This timely appeal followed.
¶ 48 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 49 At issue in this appeal is: (1) whether the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to
instruct the jury on self-defense, (2) whether defendant’s trial counsel was ineffective, (3) whether
the evidence was sufficient to prove defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and (4) whether
the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing defendant. For reasons that follow, we affirm the
trial court.
¶ 50 A. Self Defense
¶ 51 Defendant asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the requested jury
instruction on self-defense. Defendant had requested modified Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions,
Criminal (hereinafter IPI Criminal) No. 6.07X and No. 18.12, as well as No. 24-25.06. IPI
Criminal No. 24-25.06 states that a person “is justified in the use of force when and to the extent
he reasonably believes such conduct is necessary to defend himself against the imminent use of
unlawful force.” And while the State inexplicably failed to address whether the denial of the
1 In its brief, appellate defense counsel mistakenly describes the sentences to be served consecutively.
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instruction was error, the State did assert that the trial court’s refusal to instruct the jury on self-
defense was harmless error.
¶ 52 Jury instructions should guide jury deliberations and help the jury reach the proper verdict
through the application of legal principles to the evidence. People v. Parker, 223 Ill. 2d 494, 500
(2006). Jury instructions should be construed as a whole and not read in isolation. People v. Ward,
187 Ill. 2d 249, 265 (1999). “[W]hen the trial court, after reviewing all the evidence, determines
that there is insufficient evidence to justify the giving of a jury instruction, the proper standard of
review of that decision is abuse of discretion.” People v. McDonald, 2016 IL 118882, ¶ 42.
¶ 53 Self-defense is an affirmative defense, and once a defendant raises it, the State has the
burden of proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, not only all the elements of the charged offense but
also that the defendant did not act in self-defense. People v. Lee, 213 Ill. 2d 218, 224-25 (2004).
The elements of self-defense are: (1) unlawful force was threatened against the defendant, (2) the
defendant was not the aggressor, (3) the danger of harm was imminent, (4) the use of force was
necessary, (5) the defendant subjectively believed a danger existed that required the use of the
force applied, and (6) the defendant’s belief was objectively reasonable. Id. at 225; see also 720
ILCS 5/7-1 (West 2022). If the State negates any element of self-defense, the defense fails. Lee,
at 225; People v. Martinez, 2019 IL App (2d) 170793, ¶ 70. It is “well settled” that a defendant is
entitled to a jury instruction on self-defense “if there is some evidence, however slight, in the
record to support that defense.” People v. Washington, 2012 IL 110283, ¶ 43. And as recently
explained by our supreme court, a defendant “who subjectively believes in the need for self-
defense cannot be convicted of attempted first degree murder because the defendant would not
have the specific intent to commit first degree murder.” People v. Guy, 2025 IL 129967, ¶ 47.
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¶ 54 During the jury instruction conference, the trial court provided a detailed analysis of the
six elements of self-defense as applied to defendant. The trial court found that four of the six
elements had not been established. Specifically, the court found that the danger of harm was not
imminent, that the use of force was not necessary, that the defendant did not actually and
subjectively believe a danger existed that required the use of force, and that such a belief, if held,
was unreasonable. Based on this analysis, the trial court rejected the proposed jury instruction on
self-defense.
¶ 55 In the instant case, there was no evidence to support the request for an instruction on self-
defense. Based upon the total transaction, defendant was clearly the aggressor. He threatened
Dazhia at the gas station and delivered on his threats when he fired at her as she attempted to flee.
He was still in pursuit of Dazhia when Denarviz intervened. Even if defendant briefly believed he
was in danger of being harmed, that moment had passed and he fired three times at Denarviz as
the latter was retreating. Further, defendant has failed to convince us that he reasonably believed
he was in danger of being harmed. His car, perhaps, but not himself. Based on the record, we find
the trial court’s refusal of the jury instruction on self-defense to not be error.
¶ 56 Assuming arguendo that it was error, we determine that the trial court’s refusal was
harmless error. Jury instructions are, as the name suggests, instructional and not structural, and
therefore not subject to automatic reversal. Washington, 2012 IL 110283, ¶ 59. An instructional
error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt if the result of the trial would not have been different
had the jury been properly instructed. Id. ¶ 60; People v. Russell, 2022 IL App (2d) 190733, ¶ 39.
In other words, “[w]here the evidence of guilt is clear and convincing, an instructional error may
be deemed harmless.” People v. Dennis, 181 Ill. 2d 87, 95 (1998).
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¶ 57 The evidence of defendant’s guilt was considerable, and almost all evidence of self-defense
came from defendant’s self-serving testimony. Defendant claimed that Denarviz rammed his
vehicle repeatedly, but the only physical evidence of contact was a slightly bent license plate and
a broken reflector. Defendant claimed he saw Denarviz withdraw an assault rifle from a black
bag. However, there is also evidence that the bag was a large, rolling bag, and defendant’s vehicle
was considerably lower than Denarviz’ pickup truck. It seems highly unlikely that defendant could
have seen across the passenger side of his vehicle to see the lap of the driver in a large pickup truck
beside him. From that angle, it would have been difficult for defendant to observe either the bag
or the alleged assault rifle on Denarviz’s lap. And defendant’s claim that Denarviz was driving
with a large bag on his lap while simultaneously holding an assault rifle defies common sense.
While there was evidence that defendant used his cellphone to search for ways to “beat” attempted
murder charges and clean gunshot residue from his vehicle and person, there was no evidence that
he communicated to any of his friends regarding Denarviz having an assault rifle during the
incident. He told a friend of his incredulity over being charged with attempted murder when he
“ain’t even pop nobody” and his plans to leave the state. Defendant hid from the police and paid
to have his vehicle detailed to remove gunpowder residue. Based on the record, we find the trial
court’s refusal of a jury instruction on self-defense to be harmless error at best.
¶ 58 B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
¶ 59 In the alternative, defendant argues that he was denied effective assistance of counsel when
trial counsel failed to offer a jury instruction on the initial aggressor’s use of force and intent.
Specifically, defendant asserts that his trial counsel should have offered IPI Criminal No. 24-25.09
and No. 5.01 A. The State counters that defendant was not prejudiced by his trial counsel’s
performance and that the decision to not offer the jury instructions was sound trial strategy.
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¶ 60 The right to counsel is, in effect, the right to the effective assistance of counsel. McMann
v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970); People v. Rogers, 2021 IL 126163, ¶ 23. “The
benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel’s conduct so
undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as
having produced a just result.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). To succeed
in his claim, defendant must show two things: that the performance of his counsel was deficient
and that he was prejudiced by such deficiency. Id. at 694. In People v. Albanese, our supreme
court adopted Strickland and noted specifically that a court can dispose of a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel for a lack of sufficient prejudice without determining if such counsel was
deficient. People v. Albanese, 104 Ill. 2d 504, 527 (1984). Even if a trial strategy did not result
in an outcome favorable to the defendant, we “must make every effort to eliminate ‘the distorting
effects of hindsight.’ ” People v. Peterson, 2017 IL 120331, ¶ 88 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at
689). “There is a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of
reasonable professional assistance[.]” People v. Miller, 346 Ill. App. 3d 972, 982 (2004) (citing
People v. Smith, 195 Ill. 2d 179, 188 (2000)).
¶ 61 1. Initial Aggressor’s Use of Force
¶ 62 Defendant’s trial counsel requested a jury instruction for self-defense, specifically IPI
Criminal No. 24-25.06. Defendant claims that his trial counsel was ineffective for not also offering
IPI Criminal No. 24-25.09 for the initial aggressor’s use of force:
“A person who initially provokes the use of force against himself is justified in the
use of force only if
[1] the force used against him is so great that he reasonably believes he is in
imminent danger of death or great bodily harm, and he has exhausted every reasonable
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means to escape the danger other than the use of force which is likely to cause death or
great bodily harm to the other person.
[or]
[2] in good faith, he withdraws from physical contact with the other person and
indicates clearly to the other person that he desires to withdraw and terminate the use of
force, but the other person continues or resumes the use of force.”
¶ 63 As noted above, defendant testified that he had been merely following Dazhia and had not
fired a shot at her. Defendant was calmly driving behind Dazhia when Denarviz cut him off and
began to aggressively ram his vehicle. Denarviz pushed defendant’s vehicle into traffic and then
aimed an assault rifle at him. It was only then that defendant reacted and fired three shots at
Denarviz to scare him away.
¶ 64 In other words, defendant testified he was not the initial aggressor against either Dazhia or
Denarviz. He had not threatened Dazhia. He had not chased her or shot at her. For defendant to
have been the initial aggressor, he would have had to concede that he had initially provoked the
use of force against himself. He could have accomplished this by admitting that he was the
aggressor against Dazhia, but that would have been directly counter to his testimony. As noted by
the State, the instruction could have also highlighted the fact that there was no evidence presented
that defendant tried to withdraw from the conflict.
¶ 65 Defendant’s trial counsel could have declined to offer the jury instruction on the initial
aggressor’s use of force as a trial strategy. Defendant may have wished that this instruction could
have undercut Denarviz’s testimony, but it could have easily backfired. This instruction could
have strengthened the State’s position. And when viewed with the evidence against defendant, we
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find that defendant has failed to satisfy either prong of Strickland as it relates to the instruction for
the initial aggressor’s use of force. See Albanese, 104 Ill. 2d 504, 527.
¶ 66 2. Intent
¶ 67 Defendant also alleges that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to offer a jury
instruction on the definition of intent when the jury had asked the trial court for a “legal definition
of ‘intent to kill’ ” during jury deliberations. Defendant claims that his trial counsel should have
offered IPI Criminal No. 5.01 A. However, the State correctly notes that the committee comment
took no position on how often the instruction should be given since “intentionally” was given a
plain meaning that should already be understood by the jury.
¶ 68 Defendant has failed to meet the second prong of Strickland. The jury was unable to reach
a verdict on the attempted murder charge against Dazhia. Defendant speculates that the jury
instruction on “intent” could have resulted in him being found not guilty of attempted murder
against Denarviz, but it is just as possible that he could have been found guilty of attempted murder
against both Dazhia and Denarviz. Defendant asserts that the jury instruction providing the
common definition of intent is somehow significantly different than the common-sense definition
the jury applied, but this argument is specious, at best. The defendant has failed to show prejudice.
¶ 69 3. Cumulative Error
¶ 70 Moreover, we are not persuaded by defendant’s argument that the errors cumulatively
denied him a fair trial. The cumulative error doctrine states that “individual trial errors that do not
entitle a defendant to appellate relief may do so if the errors, when considered in the aggregate,
‘have the cumulative effect of denying [the] defendant a fair trial.’ ” People v. Quezada, 2024 IL
128805, ¶ 46 (quoting People v. Speight, 153 Ill. 2d 365, 376 (1992)). Cumulative errors can only
arise from actual trial errors. People v. Franklin, 135 Ill. 2d 78, 105 (1990).
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¶ 71 As discussed above, the trial court declining to instruct the jury on self-defense was, at
best, harmless error. Even if we were to accept that defendant’s trial counsel committed an error
in not tendering an instruction on the definition of intent, we have held that the error did not
prejudice defendant. These two alleged errors would not have combined to create a cumulative
error that denied defendant a fair trial. We therefore hold that there was no cumulative error.
¶ 72 C. Sufficiency of Evidence
¶ 73 Defendant asserts that the evidence was insufficient to prove him guilty of aggravated
discharge of a firearm at Dazhia Mapp beyond a reasonable doubt. In making this claim, defendant
notes that Dazhia testified she did not see defendant with a gun after she left the gas station and
only heard a “pop” sound when something hit her vehicle. The State counters that there was
evidence that defendant threatened Dazhia, chased her at high speeds, and tried to make good on
his threat to turn her car into “Swiss cheese” by firing at her vehicle during the chase.
¶ 74 The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution
requires that a person can only be convicted in a state court upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt
of every essential element of the crime with which they were charged. People v. Wheeler, 226 Ill.
2d 92, 114 (2007). “When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, it is not the
function of this court to retry the defendant.” People v. Evans, 209 Ill. 2d 194, 209 (2004). Rather,
the appropriate question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
State, any trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt. People v. Gray, 2017 IL 120958, ¶ 35; People v. Ostrowski, 394 Ill. App. 3d 82, 91 (2009).
This standard of review applies whether the evidence is direct or circumstantial, and
“circumstantial evidence that meets this standard is sufficient to sustain a criminal conviction.”
People v. Jackson, 2020 IL 124114, ¶ 64.
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¶ 75 The United States Supreme Court has stated that “the critical inquiry on review of the
sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction must be not simply to determine
whether the jury was properly instructed, but to determine whether the record evidence could
reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.
307, 318 (1979). “A criminal conviction will not be set aside unless the evidence is so improbable
or unsatisfactory that it creates a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt.” People v. Collins,
106 Ill. 2d 237, 261 (1985). The trier of fact is in the best position to judge the credibility of
witnesses. People v. Smith, 185 Ill. 2d 532, 541-42 (1999). Due deference must be given to the
fact that the trial court and jury saw and heard the witnesses. Wheeler, 226 Ill. 2d at 114.
“Accordingly, a jury’s findings concerning credibility are entitled to great weight.” Id. Deference
is not conclusory, however, and a conviction “will be reversed where the evidence is so
unreasonable, improbable, or unsatisfactory that it justifies a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s
guilt.” People v. Lamonica, 2021 IL App (2d) 200136, ¶ 36.
¶ 76 The evidence presented at trial was sufficient for a jury to find defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. The jury heard testimony that defendant pointed a gun at Dazhia at the gas
station and threatened to turn her vehicle into “Swiss cheese.” A recent photo of a handgun with
an American flag design, similar to the one described by Dazhia, was found on defendant’s
cellphone. The jury heard testimony that defendant chased Dazhia at a high rate of speed and had
pulled next to her when she heard the sound of gun fire and something striking her vehicle. Both
Dazhia and Detective Mayyou described the new dent in the vehicle as a ricochet, and the jury was
shown photographs of the damage. Dazhia called her father to let him know that defendant had
shot at her. Moments later, defendant fired three times at Denarviz’ vehicle.
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¶ 77 Defendant notes that officers did not attempt to recover physical evidence near Route 30
and Douglas, the location of the first shooting. While it might have been helpful for officers to
recover physical evidence from both shooting locations, physical evidence is not necessary to
corroborate eyewitness accounts of a shooting. See People v. Corral, 2019 IL App (1st) 171501,
¶ 91. Considering the record in the light most favorable to the State, we are unable to conclude
that the jury’s finding is so improbable that it creates reasonable doubt as to defendant’s guilt.
¶ 78 D. Sentencing
¶ 79 Finally, defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing by applying
Class X sentencing to his conviction for attempt (first degree murder) instead of Class 1 sentencing.
The State counters that defendant forfeited this claim, invited the error, and failed to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that he acted with sudden and intense passion resulting in strong
provocation.
¶ 80 The Illinois Constitution requires that “[a]ll penalties shall be determined both according
to the seriousness of the offense and with the objective of restoring the offender to useful
citizenship.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11. A trial court has broad discretion in imposing a sentence.
People v. Jones, 168 Ill. 2d 367, 373-74 (1995). A sentence that falls within the statutory range
should only be reversed when the court has abused that discretion. People v. Patterson, 217 Ill.
2d 407, 448 (2005). “The trial court must base its sentencing determination on the particular
circumstances of each case, considering such factors as the defendant’s credibility, demeanor,
general moral character, mentality, social environment, habits, and age.” People v. Fern, 189 Ill.
2d 48, 53 (1999). A trial court abuses its discretion when the penalty imposed is “greatly at
variance with the spirit and purpose of the law, or is manifestly disproportionate to the crime.”
People v. Watt, 2013 IL App (2d) 120183, ¶ 49. A trial court is given wide latitude in sentencing
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as long as it neither ignores relevant mitigating factors nor considers improper aggravating factors.
People v. McGee, 2020 IL App (2d) 180998, ¶ 8. It is the responsibility of the trial court to balance
the relevant factors to make a reasonable decision, and it is not for a reviewing court to reweigh
such factors. People v. Flores, 404 Ill. App. 3d 155, 158 (2010). Generally, a sentence falling
within the statutory range will be presumed to be proper. People v. Campos, 2024 IL App (2d)
230056, ¶ 53.
¶ 81 Here, defendant was convicted of a Class X felony offense. As a result, he was subject to
a sentencing range of 6 to 30 years in prison for the attempt first degree murder of Denarviz Mapp.
See 720 ILCS 5/8-4(c)(1) (West 2022); 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-25(a) (West 2022). Defendant was also
subject to a 20-year mandatory sentencing enhancement, as he personally discharged a firearm
during the offense. See 720 ILCS 5/8-4(a) (West 2022). As a result, defendant was eligible for a
sentencing ranging from 26 to 50 years for the offense.
¶ 82 On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by not applying a
section of the attempt murder statute that would reduce the sentencing to a Class 1 felony:
“[I]f the defendant proves by a preponderance of the evidence at sentencing that, at
the time of the attempted murder, he or she was acting under a sudden and intense passion
resulting from serious provocation by the individual whom the defendant endeavored to
kill, or another, and, had the individual the defendant endeavored to kill died, the defendant
would have negligently or accidentally caused that death, then the sentence for the
attempted murder is the sentence for a Class 1 felony.” 720 ILST 5/8-4(c)(1)(E) (West
2022).
¶ 83 The State counters that defendant forfeited the alleged sentencing error by failing to ask
the trial court to apply this sentencing statute. To preserve this issue for appeal, defendant was
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required to both make a contemporaneous objection at the sentencing hearing and to raise the issue
in a post-sentencing motion. People v. Bannister, 232 Ill. 2d 52, 76 (2008). While defendant did
raise this issue in his post-sentencing motion, he failed to make an objection during the sentencing
hearing. Defendant mentioned the statute in passing, but did not present any argument as to how
it might apply to the sentence. Accordingly, this contention was procedurally forfeited. However,
“forfeiture is ‘an admonition to the parties, not a limitation upon the jurisdiction of the reviewing
court’ ” (People v. Quezada, 2024 IL 128805, ¶ 48 (quoting Hux v. Raben, 38 Ill. 2d 223, 224
(1967))), we may review the issue.
¶ 84 The State further asserts that defendant invited the alleged error by requesting the minimum
Class X sentence of 26 years of imprisonment and not a sentence within Class 1 sentencing range.
The doctrine of invited error or acquiescence is a form of procedural default or estoppel. People
v. Liekis, 2012 IL App (2d) 100774, ¶ 24. It is “well established that ‘an accused may not ask the
trial court to proceed in a certain manner and then contend in a court of review that the order which
he obtained was in error.’ ” People v. Segoviano, 189 Ill.2d 228, 241 (2000) (quoting People v.
McDonald, 153 Ill. 2d 195, 199 (1992)); see also People v. Abston, 263 Ill. App. 3d 665, 671
(1994) (“where the trial court’s course of action is taken at defendant’s suggestion and the
defendant thereafter acquiesces in the court’s expressed course of conduct, the defendant should
be precluded from raising such course of conduct as error on appeal”). The rationale for the
doctrine is that it would be unfair to grant a party relief based on errors that they introduced into
the proceedings. Gaffney v. Board of Trustees of the Orland Fire Protection District, 2012 IL
110013, ¶ 33. And where a defendant has invited or acquiesced to the error, we decline to review
any related plain-error claim. People v. Hernandez-Chirinos, 2024 IL App (2d) 230125, ¶ 76.
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¶ 85 Defendant’s trial counsel made the strategic decision to argue for the minimum sentence
of 26 years under Class X rather than try to prove that defendant was acting under a sudden and
intense passion. Defendant cannot now claim that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing
him under the very sentencing range suggested by his trial counsel. Defendant has not claimed
that his counsel was ineffective for requesting the minimum Class X sentence rather than arguing
for a Class 1 sentence. Even if we had not already determined this issue forfeited, the alleged error
was invited.
¶ 86 Furthermore, we would find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing
defendant if we were to address the issue on its merits. Defendant did not prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that he acted under a sudden and intense passion. Our supreme
court has held that there are four categories of serious provocation: “(1) substantial physical injury
or assault, (2) mutual quarrel or combat, (3) illegal arrest, and (4) adultery with the offender's
spouse.” People v. Haynes, 2024 IL 129795, ¶ 36. Only mutual quarrel or combat could apply to
the facts in the immediate matter. However, a slight provocation is not sufficient because the
retaliation must be proportionate to the provocation. Id. at ¶ 46. Here, defendant’s vehicle was
pushed with so little force that a broken reflector was the only resulting damage. His firing a
handgun three times at Denarviz was grossly disproportionate. The trial court did not err in
sentencing defendant under Class X guidelines.
¶ 87 We note that the State requested a 36-year term of imprisonment, and the defense requested
a 26-year term. The trial court fully reviewed all evidence before it, and, on the motion to
reconsider, the trial court explicitly stated that it reviewed all factors, including defendant’s
rehabilitative potential. As noted, it is not our province to reweigh those factors. The trial court
sentenced defendant to a 30-year term, which was about at the mid-point of the recommendations
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and substantially less than the maximum allowable sentence. Furthermore, the trial court had the
discretion to sentence defendant to consecutive terms and chose to sentence him to concurrent
terms. We find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing defendant.
¶ 88 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 89 For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Kendall County.
¶ 90 Affirmed.
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