People v. McGinnis
This text of 256 N.W.2d 587 (People v. McGinnis) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Michigan Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinions
R. M. Maher, J.
(dissenting). I must dissent. Defendant testified on his own behalf. He denied committing the offense claiming that he had spent the day in question at a Clock Restaurant and Coney Island. He further stated that while at the restaurant he spoke with a waitress named Ms. Maranucci and offered to fix her car windshield.
Prior to trial, defendant filed notice of alibi listing Ms. Maranucci as an alibi witness; she was never called as a witness.
During cross-examination the prosecutor questioned defendant concerning the failure to produce Ms. Maranucci and again commented during closing argument upon the nonproduction of defendant’s alibi witness.
Although defense counsel admitted confusion about the legitimacy of an alibi defense, he submitted a request for an alibi instruction and argued alibi to the jury. The prosecutor stated that he had no objection to the requested instruction. The trial judge refused to give an alibi instruction being of the opinion that the defense had been withdrawn. Following the trial court’s charge to the jury, defense counsel again objected to the failure to give the requested instruction.
Our Supreme Court has unequivocally stated that "if requested, an alibi instruction must be given”. People v Burden, 395 Mich 462, 466; 236 NW2d 505 (1975), People v Miller, 250 Mich 72; 229 NW 475 (1930). There is no dispute that in this case a request was made. The question is whether a defendant’s testimony alone may be sufficient to raise an alibi defense. If so, then the failure to give a requested alibi instruction was reversible error.
[275]*275Alibi testimony has been defined as "testimony offered for the sole purpose of placing the defendant elsewhere than at the scene of the crime”. People v Watkins, 54 Mich App 576, 580; 221 NW2d 437 (1974). See also, People v Gillman, 66 Mich App 419, 424; 239 NW2d 396 (1976). While a defendant’s general denial of the charges against him does not constitute an alibi defense, People v Watkins, supra, if a defendant gives specific testimony regarding his whereabouts at the time in question, it is alibi testimony the same as if another witness had given the testimony, People v Merritt, 396 Mich 67; 238 NW2d 31 (1976).1
The rationale for requiring an alibi instruction is to make sure that the jury understands that the defendant does not have to prove an alibi. People v Burden, supra, at 467. Alibi has been characterized as a defense and also a rebuttal of the people’s case.
"Thus, the 'defense’ of alibi offers the defendant two separate avenues of relief. First, if the alibi is established, a perfect defense has been shown. Perhaps more importantly, if any reasonable doubt exists as to the presence of the defendant at the scene of the crime at the time the offense was committed (if such presence is necessary to commit the crime), the defendant must also be acquitted.” People v Burden, supra, at 467.
The reasons for requiring an alibi instruction, especially when requested, do not change with the identity of the witness offering the testimony. [276]*276Regardless whether a defendant says he was home sleeping, or his sister says that she was with him at the time of the crime, or he presents a charge slip signed by him in another state on the day in question, the purpose of the proffered evidence is the same — to place defendant elsewhere than at the scene thereby making it impossible for him to have committed the crime if presence is indeed necessary.
I recognize that at the time of trial in the present case the learned trial judge did not have the benefit of People v Merritt, supra. However, I do not feel that Merritt is new law. Defendant was entitled to an instruction on his theory of the case, which, as his testimony and argument to the jury clearly showed, was that he was elsewhere when the crime occurred.
I reject the argument that the instruction was unnecessary because counsel mentioned that the "defense” was withdrawn. Notice of an alibi is statutorily required for the protection of the public. People v Merritt, supra. Although failure to give notice may preclude others from giving alibi testimony, it does not preclude the defendant from testifying regarding his whereabouts at the time in question. The withdrawal of the "defense” here was the withdrawal of the notice thereby precluding third-party alibi testimony, not the defendant’s.
Additionally, although defendant, technically, did withdraw his notice of alibi, the prosecutor questioned defendant and commented extensively on the failure to produce Ms. Maranucci. These questions and comments could have easily confused the jury as to the proper burden of proof thereby compounding the prejudice resulting from the failure to give the requested instruction. Al[277]*277though on appeal the prosecutor argues that defendant’s defense was misidentification, at trial alibi was the defense raised and attacked and was very much at issue in this case.2 Accordingly, it was error to deny the requested instruction.
The conviction should be reversed and defendant given a new trial.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Related
Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
256 N.W.2d 587, 76 Mich. App. 268, 1977 Mich. App. LEXIS 913, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/people-v-mcginnis-michctapp-1977.