People v. McDermott

2025 IL App (3d) 240707-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: March 27, 2025
• Docket: 3-24-0707
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

2025 IL App (3d) 240707-U

Order filed March 27, 2025 ____________________________________________________________________________

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

THIRD DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ILLINOIS, ) of the 21st Judicial Circuit, ) Kankakee County, Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) Appeal No. 3-24-0707 v. ) Circuit No. 24-CF-692 ) THOMAS B. McDERMOTT, ) Honorable ) William S. Dickenson, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding. ____________________________________________________________________________

PRESIDING JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the judgment of the court. Justice Anderson concurred in the judgment. Justice Holdridge dissented. ____________________________________________________________________________

ORDER

¶1 Held: The trial court did not err in granting the State’s verified petition to deny pretrial release.

¶2 Defendant, Thomas B. McDermott, appeals from the trial court’s granting of the State’s

verified petition to deny pretrial release. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND ¶4 On October 18, 2024, a grand jury returned an indictment against defendant, Thomas B.

McDermott, for two counts of criminal sexual assault (720 ILCS 5/11-1.20(a)(3) (West 2020)) and

aggravated criminal sexual abuse (id. § 11-1.60(b)). The State filed a verified petition to deny

pretrial release, alleging defendant was charged with a detainable offense and he posed a real and

present threat to the safety of any person, persons, or the community pursuant to section 110-

6.1(a)(1.5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a)(1.5) (West 2022)).

¶5 The initial hearing on the State’s detention petition was held on November 6, 2024, wherein

the State provided a factual basis as follows. In July 2024, D.G. contacted the police regarding

sexual incidents that occurred with defendant, who was her stepfather at the time. D.G. reported

that defendant started sexually abusing her in 2020 when she was a sophomore in high school, and

it continued into 2023. The first incident occurred when D.G.’s mother had taken one of her

brothers to wrestling practice and defendant entered D.G.’s bedroom, began to hug her in bed, and

told her to go into the bathroom. D.G. refused and defendant yelled at her and told her she had to

listen to him. Defendant entered the bathroom, turned on the shower, and began to undress. D.G.

followed defendant into the bathroom, and he made her perform oral sex on him. Afterwards,

defendant rubbed body wash all over D.G. On another occasion, defendant took D.G. to visit a

college. During the drive, defendant touched D.G.’s thigh. Defendant made D.G. shower with him

in the hotel room, he made her consume alcohol, and he performed oral sex on her. D.G. recalled

other incidents when her mother was not present and defendant would call her into his bedroom

or enter her bedroom. Defendant would have D.G. perform oral sex on him, digitally penetrate her,

make her kiss him, and masturbate and ejaculate on her face and chest while she was topless. D.G.

approximated these incidents occurred 80 times. D.G. had been involved in therapy and felt ready

to speak about what occurred with defendant.

2 ¶6 As it relates to threats of violence and physical violence, defendant told D.G. on multiple

occasions that if she told her mother, he would kill D.G. When D.G. would confront defendant, he

would push and choke her. On other occasions, when defendant was mad at D.G. and her siblings,

he would threaten to push them off a balcony.

¶7 Defense counsel proffered that defendant was employed as a facilities manager for the

tollway. Defendant and D.G.’s mother began living together in 2015, married in 2016, and

divorced in 2022. Defendant and D.G.’s mother had one child together, L.M., and there was an

ongoing case for parenting time that was mutually filed. Counsel argued D.G. was not credible

and noted that defendant did not have a criminal history. Counsel stated, in late 2023, D.G. told

her mother about the alleged incidents and her mother confronted defendant. Defendant denied the

allegations and threatened to take legal action for defamation if the claims continued. The

confrontations stopped. Counsel argued there were no safety issues as to defendant’s release

because D.G.’s mother knew about the allegations for a year and D.G. continued to attend events

where defendant was present. Moreover, the record demonstrated that defendant lived in a different

county than where D.G. resided and attended college.

¶8 In their respective arguments, both parties referenced D.G.’s videotaped sheriff’s interview

regarding the alleged abuse as part of their respective proffers. The State urged that D.G.’s account

was detailed and credible, while the defense characterized D.G. as vague and unreliable, further

informing the court, “upon information and belief,” that D.G. had made a previous allegation of a

sexual nature against her biological father which she subsequently recanted. Ultimately, both sides

asked, and the court agreed, to review D.G.’s videotaped interview to assist in determining if

detention was appropriate.

3 ¶9 The matter reconvened the next day, where the court made oral and written findings.

Commenting on the videotaped interview, the court noted that “[D.G.] continued to be consistent,

continued to be specific in detail. Her demeanor appeared to be appropriate. There was nothing

about her demeanor that caused me concern.” The court then recounted the charges and the

statement of D.G. to determine that the charges were detention-eligible offenses supported by clear

and convincing evidence. In finding that defendant was a danger to D.G. and that no conditions

could mitigate the danger, the court’s written order found that defendant “has threatened to kill the

victim if she told her mom. He has also pushed her down and choked her. He has been mentally

and physically abusive to her ***. Although he kept tell [sic] her he would stop he didn’t.”

¶ 10 The court granted the State’s petition, finding by clear and convincing evidence that the

presumption was great that defendant committed a detainable offense. The court found defendant

was a danger to D.G. and L.M. and no conditions could mitigate the risk of dangerousness because

defendant knew what he was doing was wrong, said he was going to stop, but nonetheless

persisted. The court also issued a civil no contact order as to D.G., providing that defendant shall

stay at least 500 feet away from D.G., prohibited defendant from entering or remaining at D.G.’s

residence and college, and ordering that defendant have no contact with D.G.

¶ 11 Defendant moved for release on two more occasions and presented the testimony of Diana

Wybourn, operator of Presa LLC, who had provided supervised parenting time in response to court

orders prior to defendant’s detention in this case. Wybourn testified that a court order limited

defendant’s visitation with L.M. to three times per week for two hours each time. The order was

caused by an allegation that defendant grabbed L.M.’s leg improperly after L.M. fed a dog human

food. The State proffered that L.M. was returned to his mother’s care with a large bruise on his

thigh, and L.M. told his mother that defendant struck him when L.M. dropped a cheeseburger and

4 a dog ate it. Wybourn testified that defendant and L.M. seemed to enjoy their visits. Wybourn

stated that D.G. brought L.M. to visitation in September 2024 and did not appear distressed at

being in the same building as defendant. The court found defendant’s detention remained

necessary.

¶ 12 Thereafter, defendant filed a motion for relief, arguing, among other things, that the court

erred in finding he posed a danger and that the danger could not be mitigated with conditions.

Defendant noted that no criminal violence was alleged to have occurred against D.G. in 2024, none

of the family lived with defendant anymore, and neither D.G. nor the rest of the family appeared

to have concern for their safety when seeing defendant in public. Following a hearing, the court

denied the motion. Defendant appeals.

¶ 13 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 14 On appeal, defendant argues the court erred in granting the State’s petition. Specifically,

defendant contends the court erred in finding he posed a threat that could not be mitigated by

conditions. Everyone charged with an offense is eligible for pretrial release, which may only be

denied in certain situations. 725 ILCS 5/110-2(a), 110-6.1 (West 2022). The State must file a

verified petition requesting the denial of pretrial release. Id. § 110-6.1. The State then has the

burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence (1) the proof is evident or presumption great

that the defendant committed a detainable offense, (2) the defendant poses a real and present threat

to any person, persons, or the community or is a flight risk, and (3) no conditions could mitigate

this threat or risk of flight. Id. § 110-6.1(a), (e). When determining a defendant’s dangerousness

and the conditions of release, the statute includes a nonexhaustive list of factors the court can

consider. Id. §§ 110-6.1(g), 110-5; People v. Mikolaitis, 2024 IL 130693, ¶ 21. Where the hearing

on the State’s petition to detain contains no live witness testimony our review is de novo. People

5 v. Morgan, 2025 IL 130626, ¶ 54. When live witness testimony is presented, the court’s decision

will not be disturbed unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. 1 Id.

¶ 15 We agree with the court’s decision that no conditions could be imposed on defendant to

mitigate the risk he poses to D.G. Though the evidence demonstrated defendant had no criminal

history and that D.G. resided and attended school in different counties than where defendant

resided, the fact remains that defendant had regularly threatened to kill D.G. if she disclosed the

abuse. He also choked her on more than one occasion when she tried to stop the abuse. The no

contact order entered by the court would do little to prevent defendant from following through on

his threat to kill D.G. if indeed this is his intent. For the same reason, defendant’s offer to the court

to wear a GPS device would not prevent, in real time, defendant’s violation of a no contact order.

Therefore, neither the court’s decision to detain defendant, nor the underlying factual findings

supporting its decision, were against the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶ 16 We affirm.

¶ 17 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 18 The judgment of the circuit court of Kankakee County is affirmed.

¶ 19 Affirmed.

¶ 20 JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE, dissenting:

1 D.G.’s videotaped interview, which the court reviewed to assess the credibility of the State’s proffer, does not fall neatly into either of the Morgan court’s standard of review boxes. While, in the literal sense, D.G.’s videotaped interview was not live testimony, what are we to make of the credibility arguments urged by both sides and the parties’ request that the court review D.G.’s videotaped interview and assess her credibility? Given this unusual procedural posture and the court’s specific credibility findings regarding D.G.’s statement, one might apply the manifest weight of the evidence standard to both the court’s factual findings as well as its ultimate decision to detain. Ultimately, however, the standard of review question is academic in that we would affirm the trial court’s decision to detain under either the manifest weight or the de novo standard.

6 ¶ 21 The majority upholds the decision of the trial court to detain defendant because it found

there are no conditions that could be imposed that would mitigate the danger defendant poses to

D.G. I disagree and would reverse and remand for the court to determine which conditions to

impose and to release the defendant.

¶ 22 As the majority has stated, the evidence demonstrated the defendant had no criminal

history, D.G. resided and attended school in different counties than where the defendant resided,

and the defendant had a history of compliance with court orders that were in place regarding

supervised visitation with L.M. Additionally, when the defendant learned of the charges brought

against him and that an arrest warrant had been issued for him in the present matter, he turned

himself in to the Kankakee County Sheriff’s Office, indicating further his willingness to comply

with court orders.

¶ 23 D.G. has stated that defendant had on more than one occasion threatened to kill her if she

disclosed the abuse to her mother, and that defendant choked her on more than one occasion when

she tried to stop the abuse. Even if this is true, in late 2023, D.G. did tell her mother about the

actions of the defendant detailed above, and when the D.G.’s mother confronted defendant about

it, defendant did nothing to D.G. in response. In the approximately ten months between defendant

learning that D.G. spoke to her mother and being taken into custody on November 4, 2024,

defendant attempted no contact with D.G. or gave any indication that he would act out on his prior

threats. The passage of time not only showed a reduction of the real and present threat the

defendant may have posed, but proved defendant’s willingness to abide by court orders and

conditions. Had charges been pursued and defendant been taken into custody shortly after learning

that D.G. had spoken to her mother, defendant may have then posed a threat that no conditions of

release could have mitigated. However, that is not the case here.

7 ¶ 24 In People v. Crawford, 2024 IL App (3d) 230668, ¶ 10, a pretrial detention case recently

before our court, we held that the passage of seven months from the date of the defendant’s offense

of stalking until charges were brought was sufficient to reduce the threat posed by the defendant.

Such a reduction in the threat led us to find that conditions were available to prevent the fulfillment

of the threat. Id. However, “[h]ad the state pursued charges earlier, the result may have been

different.” Id. I believe this case is analogous to our decision in Crawford.

¶ 25 Lastly, there was no allegation or evidence presented that the defendant posed a threat to

the community as a whole. Given the evidence before us, under either the de novo or manifest

weight of the evidence standard, I believe the trial court erred in finding that no conditions could

mitigate any threat the defendant posed to D.G., and I would remand for the court to determine

which conditions to impose and to release the defendant.

¶ 26 As a final matter, I would point out that whether the defendant is guilty of these offenses

is a question that has not yet been resolved. The issue before this court is not the defendant’s guilt

or innocence but whether he should be detained prior to trial.