People v. McCorkle

2025 IL App (5th) 230238

Opinion

NOTICE 2025 IL App (5th) 230238 Decision filed 12/18/25. The text of this decision may be NO. 5-23-0238 changed or corrected prior to the filing of a Petition for IN THE Rehearing or the disposition of the same. APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIFTH DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) St. Clair County. ) v. ) No. 17-CF-482 ) ARNEZ McCORKLE, ) Honorable ) Julie K. Katz, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE McHANEY delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Justice Moore concurred in the judgment and opinion. Justice Sholar specially concurred, with opinion.

OPINION

¶1 Following a negotiated plea, the defendant, Arnez McCorkle, was convicted of aggravated

unlawful use of a weapon (AUUW) (720 ILCS 5/24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(D) (West 2016)), having

previously been adjudicated a delinquent minor under the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS

405/1-1 et seq. (West 2016)), and unlawful possession of firearm ammunition (720 ILCS 5/24-

3.1(a)(2) (West 2016)). The defendant subsequently filed a petition for relief from judgment

pursuant to section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2022)). He

appeals from the trial court’s judgment dismissing his petition. For the reasons that follow, we

affirm.

1 ¶2 I. BACKGROUND

¶3 In April 2017, about six weeks after he turned 18, the defendant was charged with AUUW,

unlawful possession of a firearm, and unlawful possession of firearm ammunition. The AUUW

count was predicated on the defendant’s 2014 juvenile delinquent adjudication for criminal

damage to property greater than $300, an act that would have been a felony if committed by an

adult.

¶4 On May 16, 2017, the defendant entered a negotiated plea of guilty to one count of AUUW

and one count of unlawful possession of firearm ammunition. In exchange for his guilty plea, the

State agreed to a sentence of 30 months of probation and the dismissal of count II, unlawful

possession of a firearm (720 ILCS 5/24-3.1(a)(2) (West 2016)). Additionally, as part of the plea

agreement, the defendant would serve 50 hours of community service, pay court costs and

probation fees, and the firearm recovered by police would be destroyed.

¶5 According to the factual basis presented by the State, on or about April 12, 2017, at about

1:31 a.m., law enforcement conducted a traffic stop of a vehicle based on failure to signal a turn

and found that the defendant was the driver and registered owner of the vehicle. There were also

two passengers under the age of 21 in the defendant’s vehicle. The officers saw in plain view a

loaded revolver and box of ammunition in an empty space in the dashboard of the defendant’s car,

where the radio commonly would be located. The defendant disclaimed any knowledge of these

items in plain view in his car. The officers had the defendant and his passengers exit the vehicle.

The items were seized, and the defendant was arrested.

¶6 After finding a factual basis and ascertaining that the guilty plea was knowing and

voluntary, the trial court accepted the defendant’s plea, dismissed the charge of unlawful

possession of a firearm pursuant to the plea, and imposed the agreed sentences on each count of

2 30 months’ probation plus additional negotiated terms. The defendant was released from custody

on June 1, 2017. Three weeks later, he was charged with armed robbery and unlawful possession

of a weapon by a felon in Madison County, Illinois, case No. 2017-CF-1763, based on allegations

that he committed armed robbery with a firearm on June 19, 2017. The State filed a petition to

revoke his probation in the present case.

¶7 In December 2017, the State amended its petition to revoke probation, alleging that the

defendant had been charged with mob action in Madison County, Illinois, based on allegations that

he committed this offense in November 2017. In August 2019, the court terminated the defendant

from probation, as he had been sentenced to 12 years in prison in Madison County case No. 2017-

CF-1763.

¶8 On February 13, 2023, the defendant filed a pro se section 2-1401 petition for relief from

judgment, almost six years after his sentence was imposed. Citing People v. Aguilar, 2013 IL

112116, the defendant argued that his AUUW conviction violated his second amendment right to

bear arms because the legislature could not prohibit someone from possessing an uncased, loaded,

and immediately accessible weapon. It does not appear from the record that a hearing was held on

the defendant’s section 2-1401 petition.

¶9 In its written order, the trial court noted that section 2-1401 petitions must be filed within

two years of the order of judgment, although the trial court recognized there is an exception to this

time limitation for void judgments. See 735 ILCS 5/2-1401(c) (West 2022). The trial court denied

the defendant’s petition, reasoning that Aguilar held that section 24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(A) of the

AUUW was unconstitutional (720 ILCS 5/24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(A) (West 2016)), not the section

under which the defendant was convicted. Thus, because Illinois courts had not held that section

24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(D) was unconstitutional, the trial court found that the defendant’s conviction

3 was not void pursuant to Aguilar. The trial court concluded that the defendant failed to show the

voidness exception to the two-year limitation period applied to his petition and determined there

was no valid basis to excuse the delay in filing. This appeal followed.

¶ 10 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 11 On appeal, the defendant abandons the arguments raised in his section 2-1401 petition.

Instead, he argues that, following the United States Supreme Court’s decision in New York State

Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022), section 24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(D) of the AUUW

statute under which he was convicted violates the second amendment to the United States

Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. II). Specifically, the defendant argues that because there is no

historical analogue for a categorical ban on the right to bear arms based solely on a prior juvenile

adjudication, section 24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(D) is both facially unconstitutional and unconstitutional

as applied to him.

¶ 12 While the defendant did not raise this argument at the court below, as a general rule, a

constitutional challenge to a criminal statute may be raised at any time. People v. Thompson, 2015

IL 118151, ¶ 32. A statute that is later declared facially unconstitutional and void ab initio was

constitutionally infirm from the moment of its enactment and, thus, unenforceable. Id. “[A]n as-

applied constitutional challenge is dependent on the particular circumstances and facts of the

individual defendant or petitioner. Therefore, it is paramount that the record be sufficiently

developed in terms of those facts and circumstances for purposes of appellate review.” Id. ¶ 37.

The State concedes that the record contains the facts and circumstances relevant to this claim where

the defendant’s as-applied challenge is based on the nature of the prior adjudication of delinquency

upon which his AUUW conviction was predicated. See People v. Brooks, 2023 IL App (1st)

200435, ¶ 57 (as-applied challenge not raised in trial court could be considered on appeal where it

4 was based on facts in the record and no relevant facts were missing). Accordingly, we will address

the defendant’s facial and as-applied challenges to the statute.

¶ 13 The defendant maintains that since his conviction, the United States Supreme Court has

determined that a new test applies when evaluating the constitutionality of firearms restrictions

under the second amendment. See Bruen, 597 U.S. at 17. In Bruen, the United States Supreme

Court held that if the conduct at issue falls within the scope of the second amendment, namely the

defendant’s right to keep and bear arms, the defendant’s conduct is presumptively protected by the

constitution. Id. In order to justify a law regulating firearm possession, the State must show that it

is “consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.” Id. If the State meets its

burden, then the defendant’s conduct is outside the scope of the second amendment. See id. at 17-

25. The defendant argues that under the new test articulated in Bruen, the State cannot show that

the prohibition found in section 24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(D) on the possession of a weapon by any

person adjudicated a delinquent minor has a historical analogue that would support its

constitutionality under the second amendment. The defendant asks this court to find section 24-

1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(D) facially unconstitutional and unconstitutional as-applied to him and vacate his

AUUW conviction.

¶ 14 The State counters that it is constitutional, both facially and as applied to the defendant, to

prohibit the possession of firearms by a person who previously was adjudicated delinquent for an

act that would have been a felony if committed by an adult. The State notes that at the time of his

AUUW conviction, the defendant was not a felon. However, implicit in the parties’ arguments and

cases they cite on appeal, the defendant may be compared to a person convicted of a felony for

purpose of the Bruen analysis.

5 ¶ 15 Whether a statute is unconstitutional is a question of law, reviewable de novo. People v.

Davis, 2014 IL 115595, ¶ 26. To overcome the strong presumption of constitutionality, “the party

challenging [a] statute must clearly establish that it violates the constitution.” (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Brooks, 2023 IL App (1st) 200435, ¶ 64. “A reviewing court has ‘a duty to

construe a statute in a manner that upholds its validity and constitutionality if it reasonably can.’ ”

Id. (quoting People v. Graves, 207 Ill. 2d 478, 482 (2003)).

¶ 16 After the appeal was fully briefed, our supreme court issued its opinion in People v.

Thompson, 2025 IL 129965. In Thompson, the supreme court determined that the issue properly

before it was “the constitutionality of the AUUW statute’s enforcement of the [Firearm Concealed

Carry Act] licensing regime, which incorporates [Firearm Owners Identification Card Act]

licensure.” Id. ¶ 17. The Thompson court affirmed the defendant’s conviction under the section of

the AUUW which prohibits the possession of an “uncased, loaded, and immediately accessible”

firearm in a vehicle without a valid concealed carry license. 720 ILCS 5/24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(A-5)

(West 2020). The State filed a motion to cite Thompson, 2025 IL 129965, ¶ 3, as additional

authority, which we granted. In its motion, the State argues that Thompson is relevant to the instant

case because it held that the statute’s ban on unlicensed public carriage, coupled with the

requirements to obtain concealed-carry licenses and FOID cards, is not facially unconstitutional

under the second amendment analysis set forth in Bruen, 597 U.S. 1. See Thompson, 2025 IL

129965, ¶ 3; see also 430 ILCS 66/1 et seq. (West 2020); 430 ILCS 65/0.01 et seq. (West 2020).

However, Thompson is not dispositive as it does not implicate the section of the AUUW statute

under which the defendant was convicted.

6 ¶ 17 A. Facial Challenge

¶ 18 “A facial challenge to the constitutionality of a statute is the most difficult challenge to

mount.” Davis, 2014 IL 115595, ¶ 25. “A statute is facially unconstitutional only if there are no

circumstances in which the statute could be validly applied.” Id. In a facial challenge, “[t]he

particular facts related to the challenging party are irrelevant.” People v. Bochenek, 2021 IL

125889, ¶ 10.

¶ 19 The second amendment to the United States Constitution provides, “A well regulated

Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear

Arms, shall not be infringed.” U.S. Const., amend. II. In District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S.

570, 592, 635 (2008), the United States Supreme Court interpreted the second amendment as

codifying a preexisting individual right, unconnected with service in the militia, to keep and bear

arms for “law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home.” Two years

later, in McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010), the Supreme Court extended the

second amendment’s individual right to keep and bear arms to the states under the fourteenth

amendment (U.S. Const., amend. XIV).

¶ 20 Following Heller and McDonald, courts developed a “two-step” framework for analyzing

second amendment challenges to firearms regulations that combined history with means-end

scrutiny. Bruen, 597 U.S. at 17. The Bruen Court explained that when evaluating the

constitutionality of a statute, a court first must determine whether the plain text of the second

amendment covers an individual’s conduct. Id. at 24. If it does, then the constitution presumptively

protects that conduct, and the government must then justify its regulation by demonstrating that it

is consistent with the nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. Id. Only then may a court

conclude that the individual’s conduct falls outside the second amendment. Id.

7 ¶ 21 The State contends that under the Bruen analysis, the defendant was not protected by the

second amendment, arguing that, like a convicted felon, a person who was adjudicated delinquent

for an act that would be a felony if committed by an adult is not a “law-abiding citizen” protected

by the second amendment. In support of its argument, the State points out that the Bruen Court

noted that the petitioners in that case were, as “ordinary, law-abiding, adult citizens,” “part of ‘the

people’ whom the Second Amendment protects.” Id. at 15, 31-32. However, the State recognizes

that reviewing courts have disagreed about whether a person’s status as a non-law-abiding citizen

is relevant at the plain-text stage of the Bruen analysis.

¶ 22 Since the Supreme Court’s Bruen decision, two lines of cases have emerged as Illinois

courts have endeavored to faithfully apply the Bruen analysis. At least two panels of the First

District have determined that Bruen does not apply since felons are not “law-abiding citizens”

covered by the second amendment. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Baker, 2023 IL

App (1st) 220328, ¶ 37; People v. Mobley, 2023 IL App (1st) 221264, ¶ 30. In contrast, other

panels of the First District have followed the approach taken in Brooks, 2023 IL App (1st) 200435,

¶ 89, which determined that Bruen’s newly announced analytical framework requires reviewing

courts to first examine a defendant’s conduct, not the status of the person performing the conduct.

Although we find Brooks persuasive, we are mindful that two panels of this district disagree with

this approach, finding that felons do not fall “into the category of ‘the people’ protected by the

second amendment.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) See People v. Smith, 2025 IL App (5th)

230656, ¶ 25; People v. Gordon, 2025 IL App (5th) 240359-U, ¶ 21. We respectfully disagree.

That is not to say that the defendant’s status is irrelevant; rather, it is more properly evaluated

under the second prong of the Bruen analysis in which we must assess whether the challenged

8 statute is consistent with the nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. See Brooks, 2023

IL App (1st) 200435, ¶ 89.

¶ 23 The defendant maintains the State cannot show that the prohibition found on the possession

of a weapon by any person adjudicated a delinquent minor has a historical analogue that would

support its constitutionality under the second amendment. The State counters that the challenged

subsection of the AUUW statute is relevantly similar to historical regulations disarming felons.

The State points out that Illinois courts have ruled that statutes disarming felons satisfy the

historical analysis required by Bruen. See, e.g., People v. Stephens, 2024 IL App (5th) 220828,

¶¶ 37-39 (rejecting facial challenge to unlawful use of a weapon by a felon (UUWF) statute under

the second prong of Bruen); Brooks, 2023 IL App (1st) 200435, ¶¶ 90-105 (rejecting as-applied

challenge to the armed habitual criminal (AHC) statute). Thus, the State argues, the challenged

subsection of the AUUW statute is consistent with a long-standing historical tradition of similar

regulation.

¶ 24 As the State notes, in Brooks, 2023 IL App (1st) 200435, ¶¶ 90-105, the First District

rejected an as-applied challenge to the AHC statute, finding that founding-era historical records

and United States Supreme Court precedent provided historical underpinnings for it. The First

District surveyed the history of restrictions on the possession of firearms starting in England in the

1600s through colonial America and the founding era, concluding that restrictions on previously

convicted felons’ possession of firearms are consistent with this historical tradition. See id. ¶¶ 91-

98 (collecting authority). The Brooks court found historical support for the founders’

understanding that “crimes committed, whether dangerous or not, justified disarmament.” (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Id. ¶ 95. The court noted evidence that “[f]ounding-era criminal

punishments also demonstrate[d] the widespread acceptance of the legislatures’ authority to disarm

9 felons.” Id. ¶ 96 (collecting authority). The Brooks court found that the AHC statute was analogous

to those regulations, as it had been enacted to address “ ‘the threat of violence that arises when

repeat offenders possess firearms.’ ” Id. ¶ 103 (quoting People v. Johnson, 2015 IL App (1st)

133663, ¶ 27). The State also points out that in Stephens, 2024 IL App (5th) 220828, ¶¶ 37-39, this

court rejected a facial challenge to the UUWF statute, finding it was consistent with the nation’s

historical tradition of firearm regulation.

¶ 25 We find the State’s arguments persuasive. Accordingly, we conclude that the challenged

section of the AUUW is facially constitutional under the second amendment of the United States

Constitution.

¶ 26 B. As-Applied Challenge

¶ 27 “An as-applied challenge requires a showing that the statute violates the constitution as it

applies to the facts and circumstances of the challenging party.” Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, ¶ 36.

The defendant argues that his conviction for AUUW was predicated on a prior criminal damage to

property adjudication, which is not a crime that indicates extreme dangerousness such as to justify

permanent disarmament. The defendant argues that because his prior conviction does not fall

within a category of offenses for which there is a historical analogue, section 24-1.6(a)(1),

(a)(3)(D) cannot be constitutionally applied to him.

¶ 28 The State responds that the challenged section of the AUUW statute bars possession of a

firearm by a person who was adjudicated delinquent for an act that would be a felony if committed

by an adult. The State maintains that, based on case law discussing the history of disarming felons,

the challenged subsection of the AUUW statute is constitutional as applied to the defendant. We

find the State’s argument well-reasoned. In McDonald, the United States Supreme Court reiterated

that the holding in Heller “did not cast doubt on such longstanding regulatory measures as

10 prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

McDonald, 561 U.S. at 786; see United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680, 699 (2024) (noting that

Heller recognized that “many such prohibitions, like those on the possession of firearms by ‘felons

and the mentally ill,’ are ‘presumptively lawful’ ” (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 626, 627 n.26)).

Thus, the defendant’s argument fails. We conclude that the challenged section of the AUUW is

constitutional as applied to the defendant.

¶ 29 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 30 For the foregoing reasons, we find that the challenged section of the AUUW is

constitutional on its face and as applied to the defendant. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s

dismissal of the defendant’s section 2-1401 petition for relief from judgment.

¶ 31 Affirmed.

¶ 32 JUSTICE SHOLAR, specially concurring:

¶ 33 While I concur in the ultimate judgment, I would apply the Bruen analysis in accordance

with this court’s decisions in People v. Smith, 2025 IL App (5th) 230656, ¶ 25 (finding the

defendant was not a protected person under the second amendment), and People v. Gordon, 2025

IL App (5th) 240359-U, ¶ 22 (same).

11 People v. McCorkle, 2025 IL App (5th) 230238

Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of St. Clair County, No. 17-CF- 482; the Hon. Julie K. Katz, Judge, presiding.

Attorneys James E. Chadd, Ellen J. Curry, and Jennifer M. Lassy, of State for Appellate Defender’s Office, of Mt. Vernon, for appellant. Appellant:

Attorneys James A. Gomric, State’s Attorney, of Belleville (Patrick for Delfino, Patrick D. Daly, and Jennifer Camden, of State’s Appellee: Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor’s Office, of counsel), for the People.